Lake, Sea, Ocean, River

Ethiopian Airlines flight ET961 had taken off from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at 08:09 hours UTC for a scheduled flight to Abidjan, Ivory Coast via Nairobi, Kenya; Brazzaville, Congo; and Lagos, Nigeria. Twenty minutes after takeoff, at about 08:29 UTC, one passenger stood up from his seat and ran up the aisle to the cockpit, and two other passengers followed him heading for the cockpit. While rushing to the cockpit one of the men said "Everybody should be seated, I have a bomb!". Then they opened the cockpit door and stormed in. They declared to the pilots that there were eleven hijackers on board and beat the First Officer and forced him out of the cockpit. They then grabbed the fire axe and fire extinguisher bottle from their respective stowages and ordered the pilot-in-command to change direction and fly to Australia. The pilot-in-command explained to the hijackers that he had not enough fuel to reach Australia and demanded to make a refueling stop at Mombasa. The hijackers refused the refueling stop and continued arguing with the pilot-in-command. They insisted that they had learned from the inflight magazine that the B767 could fly 11 hours without refueling. After passing Dar es Salaam one of the hijackers ordered him to fly away from the coast, head to Australia and indicating to the altimeter not to descend below FL390. The pilot-in-command turned left towards the Comoros Island. The lead hijacker was sitting in the first officer's seat and was fiddling with the aircraft's controls, kicking the rudder, whilst also drinking whisky. The pilot-in-command kept on telling them that he was running short of fuel pointing to the fuel quantity indicators, but the hijackers did not listen. The leader continued fiddling with the controls, trying to turn the aileron and pulling the reverse thrust lever at random. As the flight came over the Comoros Islands the pilot-in-command saw the Moroni International Airport runway and circled 15-20 nm south of the field. Then the LOW FUEL CAUTION came on. The pilot-in-command pleaded to land because of low fuel. The hijackers were unconcerned and only insisted that the pilot not descend below FL390. At about 11:41 UTC the right engine ran down to wind milling speed. The pilot-in-command showed the red warning message for the right engine on the EICAS to the hijacker. At this moment, the hijacker left the right seat and went to the cabin door to discuss with the other two hijackers. This gave the captain the opportunity to pick up his microphone and address the passengers: "....ladies and gentlemen this is your pilot, we have run out of fuel and we are losing one engine this time, and we are expecting crash landing and that is all I have to say. we have lost already one engine, and I ask all passengers to react ..... to the hijackers ....". The hijacker then came back to the cockpit and hit the microphone out of the pilot's hand. After the right engine failed, the pilot started to descend the aircraft in order to increase speed, but the hijacker again interfered and violently played with the controls which resulted in improper control inputs. As a result the autopilot was disconnected and the flight became erratic with the airspeed varying between 216 and 336 kts. As the pilot regained control of the aircraft, the left engine went dead. The hijacker kept on instructing the pilot not to descend and again went to the cabin. Upon returning to the cockpit he saw that the altitude was decreasing, and angrily shouted at the pilot not to go any lower. The pilot said that the fuel was already finished and that the engines were without power. This time the hijacker instructed the captain not to touch the controls, and threatened to kill him. The captain said, "I am already dead because I am flying an airplane without engine power." The first officer, who had earlier been forced out to the First Class cabin, got up and, via the right aisle, went to the rear of the aircraft where he saw that a lot of economy class passengers had their life jackets on and that some had already inflated them. The first officer, along with the cabin crew members, helped the passengers to deflate the life jackets and showed them how the jackets should be re-inflated and how to assume the brace position during impact. While returning to the front of the aircraft, they repeated the same instructions as many times as they could. About less than 2 minutes before the ditching, the co-pilot forced his way to the cockpit shouting "let me help the pilot ...". After adjusting his seat and seat belts the pilot asked him for help since the controls were heavy. The hijackers still kept on struggling with the controls. By now, the aircraft was descending into the Indian Ocean over the Comoros Islands. The aircraft now had only standby instruments and RAT (Ram Air Turbine). The altimeter was indicating 150 feet and the airspeed was 200 kts. By this time the flight crew had been left alone to assume control. They turned the aircraft to the left in order to parallel the waves. However, the aircraft brushed the water in a left-wing-low attitude. It was then held straight and level after which it broke into four sections and came to rest in the sheltered waters 500 metres off Le Galawa Beach. Of the 175 occupants, 6 crew members and 119 passengers were fatally injured in the accident. Six crew members and 38 passengers sustained serious injuries, 2 passengers sustained minor injuries and 4 passengers received no injury.

Based upon digital flight data recorded (DFDR) information, the mishap aircraft departed Portland IAP at 1720 PST on 22 Nov 96 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight en route to North Island Naval Air Station. The purpose of the sortie was to conduct an overwater navigation evaluation. King 56 began the sortie with a normal takeoff, departure and climbout. One hour and 24 minutes after takeoff in level flight at FL 220 the mishap sequence began with the engineer commenting on a torque flux on the number 1 engine. Nothing on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), the DFDR, or the survivor’s testimony suggested any unusual events prior to the engineer’s comment. Over the next three minutes, the operations of all four engines became unstable and eventually failed. Crew actions during these critical three minutes are known only by verbal comments on the CVR and the survivor’s testimony. The following discusses what we know of those actions. The engineer called for n°1 propeller to be placed in mechanical governing. This would normally remove electrical inputs to the propeller through the synchrophaser. The pilot then called for all four propellers to be placed in mechanical governing. This action was consistent with treating this emergency as a four-engine rollback. There is no indication on the DFDR or the CVR as to whether or not the crew selected mechanical governing on any of the remaining three propellers. At the same time the crew was analyzing the emergency, they also declared an in-flight emergency with Oakland ARTCC and turned the mission aircraft east to proceed toward Kingsley Field, Klamath Falls, OR, approximately 230 miles away and approximately 80 miles from the coast. The Radio Operator radioed the USCG Humboldt Bay Station and notified them of the in-flight emergency. During the turn toward the shore the number 3 and number 4 engines once briefly recovered most of their torque. These increases are recorded by the flight data recorder. When the RPM on number 3 (the aircraft’s last functioning engine) finally decreased below 94% RPM the last generator producing electrical power dropped off line due to low frequencies. As a result, at 1846 Pacific Standard Time all electrical power was lost. After a brief period, power was restored to the equipment powered by the battery bus. From this point on, the aircraft glided to the attempted ditching. There is no record of that portion of the flight, except the survivor’s testimony.The outboard wing sections and all four engines separated from the center wing section that in turn separated from the fuselage. Subsequently, the engines and fuselage went straight to the ocean floor at a depth of approximately 5500 feet. The outer wing and the center wing sections floated on the surface for several days and sank more than 50 nm from the impact location. The radio navigator was rescued while 10 other crew members were killed.

After takeoff from Port Harcourt Airport, the crew was cleared to climb to FL240. At 15:47 the flight established initial contact with Lagos Approach Control, and was assigned a transponder code. At 15:54 the flight reported crossing SEPER point. After this position report, the flight appeared not to be maintaining a listening watch, as it gave no reply to two consecutive calls from Approach Control, and then after some time replied to a transmission not meant for it. At the same time a Triax Airlines Boeing 727 (Flight TIX185) had departed Lagos and was flying at FL160 towards Enugu. The Lagos controller had terminated contact with the Triax aircraft when the ADC crew requested to descend. The permission to descend was delayed to allow a corporate jet (5N-APN) to pass beneath the 727 at FL210. At 15:59 Lagos Approach Control then cleared the flight to FL160 and subsequently requested the flight to contact Lagos Radar. The flight was identified by Lagos Radar 41 miles south-east of the airport, and instructed it to fly the heading of 320° to avoid Triax flight 185, and to descend to FL50. At 16:02.50 Lagos Radar instructed the aircraft two times in succession to maintain heading 300. The captain then took over control from the copilot by stating: "I have it." At 16:03.08 the flight reported: "I have the traffic... and I continue my heading to 330 to avoid him". This was the last transmission. The records of the FDR show that flight 086 was maintaining a steady coordinated turn towards heading 330 for the first 10 seconds of the last 50 seconds of the flight. After 15 seconds, the airplane was put in bank angle of 43.2°. It maintained this configuration for 10 seconds before the bank angle increased to 68.8 degrees. This attitude was observed for 5.5 seconds before it was further increased to 83 degrees. The airplane must have suffered from high speed stall and gone into a roll with a nose down attitude. The aircraft appeared to be recovering just before it impacted the lagoon water because it succeeded in reducing the vertical acceleration from 8.44 to 2.1 G and the bank angle to 61.6°. But it did not have sufficient height to make a full recovery and crashed in the lagoon about 7,5 km west of Ejirin. The wreckage was found in the afternoon of the following day. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 144 occupants were killed.

The aircraft departed Lima-Jorge Chávez Airport at 0042LT on an international regular service to Santiago de Chile, carrying 61 passengers and a crew of nine. When they took off and reached speed V2 + 10, the crew noticed that the altimeters were not responding and that something irregular was occurring. They therefore decided to notify the control tower in Lima to declare an emergency, consulted Lima for confirmation of their altitude by radar, and requested assistance to return via radar vectors. After 29 minutes of flight, while returning to Lima airport and with the crew attempting to control the aircraft, it impacted with the sea 48 nautical miles from the airport, with the total loss of the aircraft and all of its occupants.

The pilot of C-FFHF, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver, departed the company camp at Ugly Lake, Labrador, en route to Goose Bay. Prior to arriving at Goose Bay, the pilot contacted an overflying Air Labrador flight and advised them that he had landed on a pond and that he needed the SAR (search and rescue) time extended on his flight plan. The pilot also said that he would be departing the pond shortly, en route to Goose Bay. When C-FFHF did not arrive at the destination by the SAR time of 2030 Atlantic daylight saving time (ADT), a search was commenced. Seven days later, an oil slick and a paddle with the company name on it were identified on a pond about 66 nautical miles (nm) north of Goose Bay. Divers located the aircraft wreckage in 120 feet of water. The aircraft was destroyed and the bodies of the pilot and passenger were located inside the wreckage.

The aircraft took off at 14.28 from Texel International Airport for the return flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport. Before take-off the airport manager of Texel International Airport requested the crew of PH-DDA to squawk transponder-code 0060. The take-off was considered normal by several witnesses, including the Airport Manager, without deviations from what they had seen during previous take-offs from Texel. Several witnesses observed the aircraft passing outbound over the east coast of the island of Texel. One witness reported a short-lived orange colored fire streak emanating from the underside of the left engine, another mentioned a shrieking noise on one engine. The weather situation over the Waddenzee was : a visibility of about 1 .5 km in haze without a distinct horizon. The sun was obscured. There was a glassy smooth water surface without any references. At approximately 14.33, the crew reported to Texel Radio that they had problems with an engine. They were advised to switch over to De Kooy Approach. There is no radio telephony (RT) recording available of this phase of the flight. Naval Air Station (NAS) De Kooy is not equipped with primary radar. No primary radar recordings from other sources were available. The aircraft became visible on the secondary radar of NAS De Kooy at 14.34:33, squawking 0060 and flying at an altitude of 800 feet on a heading of 155°, which changed gradually to 175°. Most likely the transponder had been switched on at that time. Refer to the radar plot in Appendix 1. At 14.35:32 the flight crew reported to De Kooy Approach : "Uh, PDA is uh..., at 600 feet and approaching uh..., De Kooy, we want to make an emergency landing on De Kooy". The position of the aircraft at that moment was approximately 11 mn northeast of NAS De Kooy. Shortly thereafter the aircraft made a sudden left turn to a heading of 110°. The aircraft was then at an altitude of 700 feet. The flight crew reported that they had feathered the left engine. De Kooy Approach instructed to set Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) code 4321 instead of the then used VFR code 0060, gave QNH and reported that runway 22 was in use ; the pilot did not respond to this message. De Kooy Approach twice repeated the advise to squawk and advised to proceed inbound runway 22. During the transmission of this message the aircraft was turning to approximately the required heading of 225°, at an altitude of 500 feet. The aircraft maintained heading 225° at 500 feet and the airspeed decreased. After several inquiring calls concerning the correct squawk, at 14.36:52 the pilot confirmed squawking 4321 and asked for a heading. Some parts of the radio communication were hindered by a whistle tone. In response to the question, De Kooy Approach requested the position ; the pilot reported 11 nm out to the northeast. Seven seconds later De Kooy Approach confirmed radar contact and advised a heading of 240° . During this conversation the aircraft turned left to a heading of 180°. At that time the altitude was still 500 feet and the airspeed had further decreased. The crew confirmed the advised heading of 240°, but the aircraft did not turn to this direction. This was the last message from the aircraft. The radar recording showed that at 14.37:28 the aircraft started to turn to the left at an increasing rate. At 14.37:47 the last radar echo showed an altitude of 200 feet. The approach controller stated that the aircraft disappeared from the radar screen. There was no reply on repeated calls from De Kooy Approach, upon which the controller initiated an emergency status. The aircraft crashed onto a flooded sand bank in the Waddenzee, where at that time the water had a depth of about 1.2 meter. Forty seconds after the aircraft had disappeared from the radar, the controller contacted a KLM ERA helicopter, approaching NAS De Kooy, informed the pilot of the situation with the PHDDA and requested the pilot to have a look at the approximate position ; about seven minutes later the helicopter reported the wreckage in sight. That started an extensive rescue action; one severely injured passenger was taken to a hospital by a Naval helicopter, but died the same evening. The other 31 occupants to all probability died instantaneously in the crash. There was no fire.

The pilot and three passengers were departing a remote lake in a float equipped airplane. The pilot positioned the hydraulic actuated flaps to 20 degrees. After takeoff, about 150 ft above the water, the pilot positioned the flap lever to the 'UP' position in preparation of pumping the flaps up, but said he did not move the pump handle. Turbulence was present during the takeoff, and during a left turn, the pilot encountered a severe gust at the time he positioned the flap lever. The airplane stalled in a left turn that steepened to almost a 90 degree bank. The airplane descended and the left wing contacted the surface of the lake. The left wing was torn off the fuselage, and the floats were crushed upward. Both flaps are activated by a common torque tube connected to a double-acting flap actuating cylinder. At the accident scene, the right wing flap and right aileron were observed to be extended to an intermediate position. The weather conditions included 20 kts of wind, turbulence, and rain. The pilot expressed a concern that the flaps may have retracted without being pumped to the up position. An examination of the flap system and the ratchet valve assembly was conducted after the airplane was recovered and the wings were removed. Leakage of hydraulic fluid and air was observed through the ratchet valve. Additional testing of the ratchet valve at an overhaul facility did not reveal any leakage.

The DC-4 aircraft (serial number 10389) was on a visual flight rules flight from Bronson Creek, British Columbia, to Wrangell, Alaska, with a crew of three and about 16,600 pounds of cargo on board. The departure from the remote mining strip was uneventful until the aircraft approached 1,500 feet above sea level, when the crew heard a whining noise in their headsets. Believing that the whining was caused by an inverter problem, they switched inverters, but the problem persisted. Electrical instrument indications in the cockpit then became erratic, and the number 2 engine, on the left wing, began to misfire; its fire warning light in the cockpit illuminated briefly, but without the accompanying bell. The captain confirmed visually that the number 2 engine was on fire and the crew carried out the engine fire drill; however, the fire did not extinguish. The captain commenced a right-hand turn to return to the Bronson Creek airstrip, and announced to the crew that the number 2 engine had separated from the wing. The captain applied maximum power to the three remaining engines; however, the aircraft began to lose altitude. Both pilots held the rudder and aileron controls at full right deflection in an attempt to prevent the aircraft from yawing or rolling to the left. The aircraft was shaking violently at that time, and the crew members were unable to read any of the engine or flight instruments. At about 50 feet above ground level, just short of the Iskut River, the pilots closed the throttles. The aircraft descended rapidly, and the burning left wing struck a tree just as the fuselage contacted the surface of the river. The three occupants escaped the burning aircraft, and the first officer and load master swam to safety. The captain is missing and is presumed to have drowned. The aircraft was destroyed.

First Air 064, a DHC-6 Twin Otter (Serial No. 427), took off from Iqaluit, Northwest Territories (NWT), at 1258 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) on a charter flight to Markham Bay, Lake Harbour, and back to Iqaluit. The aircraft was carrying six barrels of Jet B fuel to be delivered to Markham Bay, an off-strip landing site. At 1300, just after he took off, the captain told the Iqaluit Flight Service Station (FSS) specialist that the estimated time of arrival (ETA) for Markham Bay would be 1335. At approximately 1345, the crew informed First Air dispatch that they were landing at Markham Bay. After touching down, the pilot attempted an overshoot. During the attempt, the aircraft struck the ground about 200 metres past the end of the landing area, got airborne again, cleared a ridge, then crashed onto a rocky beach. A helicopter located the airplane 629 metres from the beginning of the landing area, partially submerged in water. The two pilots, the only occupants, received fatal injuries in the crash.

On August 11, 1996, about 1615 Alaska daylight time, an amphibious Grumman G21-G, N660PA, is presumed to have been involved in a fatal accident about 20 miles south of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country on demand passenger flight under Title 14 CFR Part 135 when the accident occurred. The airplane, registered to and operated by Peninsula Airways Inc., Anchorage, Alaska, is presumed to have been destroyed. The certificated airline transport pilot, and the sole passenger are presumed to have received fatal injuries. Low ceilings were reported in the area of departure by the operator. VFR company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight originated from Anderson Bay, on the Island of Unalaska, about 1610.