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Shortly after takeoff from Acandí-Alcides Fernandez Airport, while in initial climb, the twin engine aircraft stalled and crashed in a house located in the district of Miramar, near the airport. The pilot and a passenger were killed and eight other occupants were injured. There were no victims on the ground and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft departed controlled flight while on a non precision localizer approach to runway 25 at Akron Fulton International Airport (AKR) and impacted a four-unit apartment building in Akron, Ohio. The captain, first officer, and seven passengers died; no one on the ground was injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The airplane was registered to Rais Group International NC LLC and operated by Execuflight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand charter flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight departed from Dayton-Wright Brothers Airport, Dayton, Ohio, about 1413 and was destined for AKR. Contrary to Execuflight’s informal practice of the captain acting as pilot flying on flights carrying revenue passengers, the first officer was the pilot flying, and the captain was the pilot monitoring. While en route, the flight crew began preparing for the approach into AKR. Although company standard operating procedures (SOPs) specified that the pilot flying was to brief the approach, the captain agreed to the first officer’s request that the captain brief the approach. The ensuing approach briefing was unstructured, inconsistent, and incomplete, and the approach checklist was not completed. As a result, the captain and first officer did not have a shared understanding of how the approach was to be conducted. As the airplane neared AKR, the approach controller instructed the flight to reduce speed because it was following a slower airplane on the approach. To reduce speed, the first officer began configuring the airplane for landing, lowering the landing gear and likely extending the flaps to 25° (the airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder, nor was it required to be). When the flight was about 4 nautical miles from the final approach fix (FAF), the approach controller cleared the flight for the localizer 25 approach and instructed the flight to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until established on the localizer. The airplane was already established on the localizer when the approach clearance was issued and could have descended to the FAF minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. However, the first officer did not initiate a descent, the captain failed to notice, and the airplane remained level at 3,000 ft msl. As the first officer continued to slow the airplane from about 150 to 125 knots, the captain made several comments about the decaying speed, which was well below the proper approach speed with 25° flaps of 144 knots. The first officer’s speed reduction placed the airplane in danger of an aerodynamic stall if the speed continued to decay, but the first officer apparently did not realize it. The first officer’s lack of awareness and his difficulty flying the airplane to standards should have prompted the captain to take control of the airplane or call for a missed approach, but he did not do so. Before the airplane reached the FAF, the first officer requested 45° flaps and reduced power, and the airplane began to descend. The first officer’s use of flaps 45° was contrary to Execuflight’s Hawker 700A non precision approach profile, which required the airplane to be flown at flaps 25° until after descending to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) and landing was assured; however, the captain did not question the first officer’s decision to conduct the approach with flaps 45°. The airplane crossed the FAF at an altitude of about 2,700 ft msl, which was 400 ft higher than the published minimum crossing altitude of 2,300 ft msl. Because the airplane was high on the approach, it was out of position to use a normal descent rate of 1,000 feet per minute (fpm) to the MDA. The airplane’s rate of descent quickly increased to 2,000 fpm, likely due to the first officer attempting to salvage the approach by increasing the rate of descent, exacerbated by the increased drag resulting from the improper flaps 45° configuration. The captain instructed the first officer not to descend so rapidly but did not attempt to take control of the airplane even though he was responsible for safety of the flight. As the airplane continued to descend on the approach, the captain did not make the required callouts regarding approaching and reaching the MDA, and the first officer did not arrest the descent at the MDA. When the airplane reached the MDA, which was about 500 ft above the touchdown zone elevation, the point at which Execuflight’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the airspeed was 11 knots below the minimum required airspeed of 124 knots, and the airplane was improperly configured with 45° flaps. The captain should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a missed approach, but he did not do so. About 14 seconds after the airplane descended below the MDA, the captain instructed the first officer to level off. As a result of the increased drag due to the improper flaps 45° configuration and the low airspeed, the airplane entered a stalled condition when the first officer attempted to arrest the descent. About 7 seconds after the captain’s instruction to level off, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the first sounds of impact.

The twin engine aircraft departed Bogotá-El Dorado on a short flight to Bogotá-Guaymaral Airport, carrying three passengers and one pilot. Three minutes after takeoff from runway 13L, while climbing to a height of 200 feet in VFR conditions, the airplane entered a left turn then descended into the ground and crashed into several houses located in the district of Engativá, near the airport, bursting into flames. The aircraft as well as several houses and vehicles were destroyed. All four occupants as well as five people on the ground were killed. Thirteen others were injured, seven seriously.

Shortly after takeoff from the Kaduna Military Airfield, while climbing, the aircraft went out of control and crashed into a house located in the Ribadu Cantonment, bursting into flames. All seven occupants (two pilots, two engineers and three passengers) were killed.

On Sunday, July 26, 2015 at around 10:58 Japan Standard Time (JST: UTC + 9 hrs: unless otherwise stated, all times are indicated in JST using the 24-hour clock), a privately owned Piper PA-64-350P, registered JA4060, crashed into a private house at Fujimi Town in Chōfu City, right after its takeoff from Runway 17 of Chōfu Airport There were five people on board, consisting of the captain and four passengers. The captain and one passenger died and three passengers were seriously injured. In addition, one resident died and two residents had minor injuries. The aircraft was destroyed and a fire broke out. Furthermore, the house where the Aircraft crashed into were consumed in a fire, and neighboring houses sustained damage due to the fire and other factors.

Two minutes after takeoff from Medan-Soewondo AFB Airport Runway 23, while climbing in good weather conditions, the crew reported technical problem. The aircraft encountered difficulties to gain height, banked to the right, hit a utility pole and the roof of a building then crashed inverted in a huge explosion in a suburb located less than 5 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and several buildings were destroyed as well. All 122 occupants as well as 17 people on the ground were killed. 20 others were injured. It is believed that an engine failed during initial climb.
Crew:
1st Lt Sandi Permana, pilot,
1st Lt Pandu Setiawan, copilot,
Lt Dian Sukman P, copilot,
Cpt Riri Setiawan, navigator,
Serma Bambang H, radio operator,
Peltu Ibnu Kohar, flight engineer,
Pelda Andik S, flight engineer,
Peltu Ngateman, load master,
Peltu Yahya Komari,
Pelda Agus P,
Dan Prada Alvian.

The twin engine airplane departed Belo Horizonte-Pampulha-Carlos Drummond de Andrade Airport on a flight to Setubinha-Fazenda Sequóia Airfield, carrying one employee of the company and two pilots. Prior to takeoff, the captain informed the copilot he wanted to perform an 'American' takeoff with full engine power followed by a steep climb. After liftoff, the crew raised the landing gear then continued over the runway at low height until the end of the terrain to reach a maximum speed, then initiated a steep climb at 90°. The aircraft reached the altitude of 1,700 feet in 15 seconds then stalled and entered an uncontrolled descent. It dove into the ground and crashed in a vertical attitude into a houses located in a residential area some 800 metres from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed. One people on the ground was slightly injured.

The single engine aircraft was completing a flight from Kevsala (Ipatovo district of the Stavropol region) to Gribnoye, in the Novopavlovsk district, carrying one pilot and four oil drums. En route, while approaching Sanamer at low altitude, the pilot encountered engine problems and attempted an emergency landing. After touchdown, the aircraft hit a fence, crushed some trees and came to rest against the wall of a church. The pilot was seriously injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane crashed while on approach to runway 14 at Montgomery County Airpark (GAI), Gaithersburg, Maryland. The airplane impacted three houses and the ground about 3/4 mile from the approach end of the runway. A postcrash fire involving the airplane and one of the three houses, which contained three occupants, ensued. The pilot, the two passengers, and the three people in the house died as a result of the accident. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The flight was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. Data from the airplane’s cockpit voice and data recorder (CVDR) indicated that the takeoff about 0945 from Horace Williams Airport, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and the cruise portion of the flight were uneventful. CVDR data showed that about 15 minutes after takeoff, the passenger in the right cockpit seat made a statement that the airplane was “in the clouds.” A few seconds later, the airplane’s engine anti-ice system and the wing and horizontal stabilizer deice system were manually activated for about 2 minutes before they were manually turned off. About 6 minutes later, a recording from the automated weather observing system (AWOS) at GAI began transmitting over the pilot’s audio channel, containing sufficient information to indicate that conditions were conducive to icing during the approach to GAI. The CVDR recorded no activity or faults during the rest of the flight for either ice protection system, indicating that the pilot did not turn the systems back on. Before the airplane descended through 10,000 ft, in keeping with procedures in the EMB-500 Pilot Operating Handbook, the pilot was expected to perform the Descent checklist items in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), which the pilot should have had available in the airplane during the flight. Based on the AWOS-reported weather conditions, the pilot should have performed the Descent checklist items that appeared in the Normal Icing Conditions checklist, which included turning on the engine anti-ice and wing and horizontal stabilizer deice systems. That action, in turn, would require the pilot to use landing distance performance data that take into account the deice system’s activation. CVDR data show that, before beginning the descent, the pilot set the landing reference (Vref) speed at 92 knots, indicating that he used performance data for operation with the wing and horizontal stabilizer deice system turned off and an airplane landing weight less than the airplane’s actual weight. Using the appropriate Normal Icing Conditions checklist and accurate airplane weight, the pilot should have flown the approach at 126 knots (a Vref of 121 knots +5 knots) to account for the icing conditions.

The commercial pilot was conducting an on-demand cargo charter flight. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot informed the tower controller that he wanted to "come back and land" because he was "having trouble with the left engine." The pilot chose to fly a left traffic pattern and return for landing. No further transmissions were received from the pilot. The accident site was located about 0.50 mile southeast of the runway's displaced threshold. GPS data revealed that, after takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn to a southeasterly course and reached a maximum GPS altitude of 959 ft (about 342 ft above ground level [agl]). The airplane then entered another left turn that appeared to continue until the final data point. The altitude associated with the final data point was 890 ft (about 273 ft agl). The final GPS data point was located about 135 ft northeast of the accident site. Based on GPS data and the prevailing surface winds, the airspeed was about 45 knots during the turn. According to the airplane flight manual, the stall speed in level flight with the wing flaps extended was 59 knots. Postaccident examination and testing of the airframe, engines, and related components did not reveal any preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation; therefore, the nature of any issue related to the left engine could not be determined. Based on the evidence, the pilot failed to maintain adequate airspeed while turning the airplane back toward the airport, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall/spin.