Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The aircraft was transferred from Gomel to Kunovice for maintenance purposes. On approach to Kunovice, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and decided to divert to Brno-Tuřany Airport where the conditions were poor as well. Two approaches were abandoned. During the third attempt to land, in a gear up/flaps up configuration, the aircraft crashed 3,5 km from the runway threshold and was destroyed upon impact. Both pilots were killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to 50 metres due to thick fog.

The flight crew was positioning the airplane in preparation for a revenue flight when it crashed 2 nautical miles (nm) short of the runway during a second instrument landing system approach in instrument meteorological conditions. Except for the final 48 seconds of the 25- minute flight, the captain was the flying pilot, and the first officer was the nonflying pilot. When the airplane was about 0.5 nm inside the outer marker on the first approach, the compass warning flag on the captain's course deviation indicator appeared, indicating that the heading display was unreliable. The airplane deviated from the localizer centerline to the left but continued to descend. After about 1 minute, during which time the airplane's track continued to diverge from the localizer centerline, the flight crew executed a missed approach. The flight crew then unsuccessfully attempted to clear the compass flag by resetting circuit breakers. The captain directed the first officer to request a second approach. Contrary to company crew coordination procedures, the flight crew did not conduct an approach briefing or make altitude callouts for either approach. Although accurate heading information was available to the captain on his radio magnetic indicator, he experienced difficulty tracking the localizer course as the airplane proceeded past the outer marker on the second approach. The captain transferred control to the first officer when the airplane was 1.9 nm inside the outer marker. The airplane then began to deviate below the glideslope. The descent continued through the published decision height of 200 feet above ground level, and the airplane struck 80-foot-tall trees. Post accident testing revealed that the first officer's instruments were displaying a false full fly-down glideslope indication because of a failed amplifier in the navigation receiver. The glideslope deficiency was discovered 2 months before the accident by another flight crew. An FAA repair station attempted to resolve the problem and misdiagnosed it as "sticking" needles in the cockpit instruments. The operator was immediately advised of the problem. The operator's minimum equipment list for the airplane required that the problem be repaired within 10 days, but the operator improperly deferred maintenance on it for 60 days and allowed the unairworthy airplane to be flown by the accident flight crew. The airplane was not equipped with, nor was it required to be equipped with, a ground proximity warning system, which would have sounded 40 seconds before impact.

On approach to runway 21, the crew encountered poor weather conditions and limited visibility. unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, the captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure. While on a second approach to runway 03 which is 1,620 metres long, the aircraft was too high on the glide and landed about half way down the runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, it overran, lost its undercarriage and collided with an earth mound located 67 metres past the runway end. All 74 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After departing on an IFR flight in VFR conditions, the flight had been cleared to climb from 3,000 to 4,000 feet, when the right engine lost power. The pilots diverted toward an uncontrolled airport, secured the right engine, & cancelled their IFR clearance. They made an approach to land on runway 15, then attempted a single engine go-around. During the go-around, the airplane yawed/rolled to the right in what the passenger believed was a VMC roll. It then struck power lines & crashed in a right wing low attitude. Investigation revealed that both pilots held multi-engine ratings. The owner said the pilot (PIC) had flown the airplane for a short time on 12/21/98; however, no other record was found to verify that either the pilot or copilot had flight experience in this make/model of airplane. Examination of the wreckage revealed evidence that the flaps were retracted, the landing gear was in transit, the left propeller was operating with power, & the right propeller was feathered. The airplane had a history of fuel flow fluctuations in the right engine. The diaphragm (P/N 364446) in the right engine distributor valve assembly was found ruptured. It was an old style diaphragm, which was colored black. Bendix Service Bulletin RS-76, issued 11/15/80, called for replacement of the black diaphragm with a red fluorosilicone diaphragm (P/N 245088) at overhaul. The engine was overhauled in June 1992. During maintenance in December 1997, both fuel system injectors & nozzles were tested; however, the distributor valve assembles were not tested. Calculations showed the airplane was loaded 116.3 lbs over the maximum allowable gross weight & 1.3 inches forward of the allowable CG range.

On January 9, 1998, at 1935 hours Philippines local time, a Piper PA-31, N4111M, reportedly experienced a loss of engine power and crashed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila, Philippines. The aircraft was substantially damage the airline transport rated pilot and copilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions existed for the night ferry flight to Saipan in the Marianas, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. The pilot stated that after completing a preflight they had been cleared to taxi to the active runway. The pilot requested a full length takeoff from runway 06. Approximately 75 feet after lifting off from the ground, the pilot requested that the copilot retract the landing gear. The pilot reported that shortly after the landing gear was raised the aircraft yawed sharply to the right. He lowered the nose to regain some of the airspeed that was lost due to the right yaw. He stated that they were losing airspeed and altitude quickly, and asked the copilot to extend the landing gear. The pilot reported that on landing he had the power on until they contacted the runway. The aircraft slid to the left and came to rest after striking a concrete ditch. A test flight of the accident aircraft had been conducted 2 days and on the day before the accident. The purpose of the test flights were to check the propellers that had been overhauled, and to obtain a ferry permit from the Federal Aviation Administration's Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR). The DAR found the aircraft to be within required specifications. He made the appropriate entry into the aircraft's logbook and issued the ferry authorization.

The pilot was reported to be in a hurry as he positioned two aircraft and picked up the accident aircraft for his final positioning leg. He told company personnel he had a birthday party to go to and his family confirmed this. The pilot reported to company personnel that he was departing on runway 3 and that he would report in on his arrival at the destination. No further contacts with the flight were made and the wreckage of the aircraft was discovered off the end of the departure runway about 40 minutes after his reported takeoff. Examination showed the aircraft had run off the left side of the runway about 800 feet from the end and then crossed over the runway and entered into the woods at the departure end of the runway. Post crash examination showed no evidence of pre crash failure or malfunction of the aircraft structure, flight controls, or engine. The onboard engine computer showed the engine was producing normal engine power and the aircraft was traveling at 98 knots when electrical power was lost as it collided with trees. The aircraft's control lock was found tangled in the instrument panel near the left control yoke where it is normally installed and the lock had multiple abnormal bends, including a 90 degree bend in the last 1/2 inch of the lock where it engages the control column. Removal of the control lock and checking the flight controls for freedom is on the normal pilots checklist. The pilot was also found to not be wearing his shoulder harness.

The aircraft landed a little too far down the runway and bounced twice. Out of control, it skidded and overran the runway before coming to rest in a ditch. All eight occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot initiated an ILS approach with rain and fog. Approach flaps were maintained until the runway was sighted, and then landing flaps were set. The airplane landed long, overran the runway, struck the ILS localizer antenna on the departure end of the runway, and came to rest at the edge of a mobile home park. The airplane and two mobile homes were destroyed by fire. Vref had been computed at 110 Kts. The PIC reported a speed on final of 130 Kts, while the SIC said it was 140 Kts. Radar data revealed a 160 knots ground speed from the outer marker until 1.8 miles from touchdown. The airplane passed the control tower, airborne, with 2,500 feet of runway remaining on the 6,500 foot long runway. Performance data revealed that the airplane would require about 2,509 feet on a dry runway, and 5,520 feet on a wet runway. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers or anti-skid brakes. The PIC was the company president, and the SIC was a recent hire who had flown with the PIC three previous times. The PIC was qualified for single-pilot operations in the airplane, and had been trained to fly stabilized approaches.

While descending to Tehran-Mehrabad Airport, the crew was informed about the poor weather conditions at destination with snow falls, low visibility and a 20 knots tailwind. The crew decided to divert to Isfahan-Shahid Beheshti Airport. On approach, the crew encountered limited visibility due to foggy conditions. The aircraft struck the ground, lost its undercarriage and slid for almost one km before coming to rest in a desert area located 8 km short of runway 26. All 113 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During the takeoff roll, while passing 45 knots indicated airspeed, ice formed between the inner and outer panes of the airplane's windshield, obscuring the crew's vision. The flight crew aborted the takeoff, the airplane drifted off the left side of the snow covered runway, and caught fire. The crew reported the airplane and windshield were cold soaked and the temperature was -10 degrees Fahrenheit. The windshield anti-ice system blows air from a combustion heater between the windshield glass panes. The air source for the heater, once the airplane has forward airspeed, is two leading edge wing scoops. The crew told the NTSB investigator that the taxi time was too short for the windshield to warm up, and that during the taxi, snow was circulated around the airplane and into the wing scoops.