Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The pilot reported that prior to takeoff, he completed a preflight inspection of the airplane that included checking the engine oil quantity. The line personnel topped off the oil reservoirs, and reportedly secured the engine oil reservoir filler caps. Approximately two minutes into the flight, the right engine oil pressure warning light illuminated. The pilot informed Palm Beach Approach Control of the engine oil pressure problem, shut down the right engine, and returned to Lantana. As the flight approached runway 03, the pilot heard a radio transmission from another airplane taxiing for takeoff. As the pilot continued the approach, with full flaps extended, he elected to go-around 1500 feet from the approach end of the 3000-foot runway. The airplane collided with the ground during the go-around maneuver to runway 15. The wreckage examination also disclosed that the right cowling showed oil streaming back from behind the engine and onto the wing strut. Inspection of the oil filler cap revealed that it had not been properly installed.

The pilot was receiving a competency flight in the seaplane from an FAA inspector. The pilot was returning to their initial departure airport, descended to 1,000 feet, contacted the control tower for landing instructions, and was instructed to enter on a right base. Before he could acknowledge the landing instructions the engines started to make loud, rough, and unusual noises. The pilot informed the control tower that he was 2 miles south , declared an emergency, and stated he had a bad engine on the left side. The FAA inspector stated the pilot started the emergency procedure, the manifold pressure and rpm was fluctuating. The inspector could not determine the dead engine by the dead foot, dead engine method, because her rudder pedals were stowed. She pointed out a pasture and the pilot stated they were going to the water. She did not recall the pilot shutting down the engine or feathering the propeller. She could not recall the final seconds of the flight. The airplane collided with a tree, canal bank, and came to rest inverted in the canal. Examination of the airframe and flight control systems revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the left propeller revealed it was not feathered. The No. 6 front forward spark plug ignition lead was disconnected from the spark plug. The ignition lead shroud threaded coupling on the No. 4 front forward spark plug was unscrewed and the carbon wire was exposed. The left and right engines were removed from the airplane and transported to an authorized FAA approved repair station. The left engine was placed in an engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. The spark plug lead was removed from the No.6 forward cylinder. The left magneto had a 125 rpm drop during the magneto check. The right magneto had a 75 rpm drop. The magneto drop exceeded the allowable drop indicated by the engine overhaul manual. The right engine was placed in a engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. Review of the FAA inspectors FAA Form 4040.6 revealed she was not Event Based Current (EBC) for the 4th quarter of the Flight Standards EBC program, and she did not meet the EBC quarterly events required by the end of the 14-day grace period. FAA Order 4040.9 states for an FAA inspector to be eligible / assigned to perform flight certification job function they must be EBC current., and inspectors should not accept assignments without being in compliance with the FAA Order. Managers and supervisors should not assign inspectors who are not current. The FAA inspector's supervisor was aware that the inspector was not current. He contacted the FAA Safety Regulation Branch, FAA Southern Region Headquarters, and stated that FAA Southern Region indicated that the inspector could administer the checkride. FAA Southern Region stated at no time did they approve or agree to an operation outside the parameters of the FAR's, Inspector Handbook or FAA Order.

Following an uneventful flight from Dubai, the crew completed the approach to Rhodes-Diagoras Airport in rain falls and strong winds. The aircraft landed at a speed of 166 knots, about 22 knots above Vref. After touchdown, the ground spoilers did not deploy automatically because they had not been armed. Consequently the auto brake system, which operates by the deployment of spoilers, did not activate. The crew attempted manual braking but this operation was too late and the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen metres further. All 271 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Less than a minute after takeoff from Franca Airport, while climbing in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft nosed down and crashed in a huge explosion about 1,500 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed. They were completing a cargo flight to Ribeirão Preto, carrying documents on behalf of Banco do Brasil.

The flight was a pilot self-dispatched, non-scheduled cargo flight from Goose Bay to Davis Inlet, Newfoundland, and was operating as Speed Air 960 under a defence visual flight rules flight plan. Before the flight, the captain received weather information from the St. John's, Newfoundland, flight service station (FSS) via telephone and fax. The aircraft departed for Davis Inlet at 0815 Atlantic standard time (AST). The captain was the pilot flying (PF). During the first approach, the first officer (FO) had occasional visual glimpses of the snow on the surface. The captain descended the aircraft to the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 1340 feet above sea level (asl). When the crew did not acquire the required visual references at the missed approach point, they executed a missed approach. On the second approach, the captain flew outbound from the beacon at 3000 feet asl until turning on the inbound track. It was decided that if visual contact of the surface was made at any time during the approach procedure, they would continue below the MDA in anticipation of the required visual references. The captain initiated a constant descent at approximately 1500 feet per minute with 10 degrees flap selected. The FO occasionally caught glimpses of the surface. At MDA, in whiteout conditions, the captain continued the descent. In the final stages of the descent, the FO acquired visual ground contact; 16 seconds before impact, the captain also acquired visual ground contact. At 8 seconds before impact, the crew selected maximum propeller revolutions per minute. The aircraft struck the ice in controlled flight two nautical miles (nm) from the airport (see Appendix B). During both approaches, the aircraft encountered airframe icing. The crew selected wing de-ice, which functioned normally by removing the ice.

On approach to Mucuri-Itabatã Airport runway 05, the right engine caught fire. The crew followed the checklist, continued the approach and completed a safe landing. After touchdown, the aircraft slightly deviated to the right and came to rest, bursting into flames. All 14 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After takeoff, the airplane returned to the departure airport for an emergency landing. The aircraft was observed in the vicinity of the runway threshold, about 500 feet above the ground, with it's left propeller feathered, when it entered a left bank which increased to about 90 degrees. The airplane then entered a spin, descended, and impacted the ground. Examination of wreckage revealed the camshaft of the left engine had failed as a result of a fatigue crack. No other abnormalities were observed of airframe or engine. The left engine had accumulated about 1,200 hours since overhaul. The pilot purchased the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident. At that time, he reported 700 hours of flight experience in multi-engine airplanes, of which, 10 hours were in the make and model of the accident airplane.

On approach to Pohang Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with rain falls and strong winds. The captain decided to initiate a go-around procedure and started a second approach few minutes later. On approach to runway 10, the wind component changed and the crew continued the descent with a 20 knots tailwind. At an excessive speed of 158 knots, the aircraft landed 1,500 feet past the runway threshold. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 10 is 7,000 feet long), overran, struck a 3 metres high embankment and came to rest in a ravine, broken in two. All 156 occupants were rescued, among them 60 passengers were injured, two seriously.

The aircraft declared an emergency following departure from runway 03R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan. The aircraft was resting on a magnetic heading of 055 degrees located approximately 3,400 feet from and 1,900 feet to the left of the departure end and centerline of runway 03R at DTW. Inspection of the forward section of the fuselage door and surrounding fuselage, a circular impression with no exposure of the underlying metal was noted approximately 2 feet 6-1/2 inches from the door hinge line. The door was opened to a point nearly flush with the aircraft's fuselage. The door handle was found to match the circular impression in position and shape. There was no tearing or fracturing of the forward fuselage door pin tips or its door pin holes. Inspection of the door's latching mechanism revealed a brown colored nail connecting the handle and vertical latches. Both engine supercharger turbine wheels displayed scoring and deformation of the impeller blades in the plane of rotation. Aileron, elevator and rudder flight control continuity was established. The elevator trim was in the neutral position. The trailing edge flaps were in the retracted positions. Both engine oil screens showed no evidence of metal contamination.

Witnesses reported hearing the engines start and shortly thereafter, the airplane taxied to the runway. The pilot then contacted ATC for an IFR clearance. The clearance was given with a short void time. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and began the takeoff ground roll. Witnesses reported that the night-time takeoff roll and engine sound appeared normal. Witnesses near the end of the runway reported that the airplane was observed at about 50 feet above the runway with about 1,000 feet of runway remaining when engine power was reduced on both engines. The airplane was heard to touch down, then engine power was reapplied. Shortly thereafter, the sound of the impact was heard. The airplane collided with the terrain about 600 feet from the end of the runway. During the post-accident inspection of the airplane and engines, no evidence was found to indicate a mechanical failure or malfunction. Documentation of the events indicated that from the time the aircraft began its taxi to the runway, to the time the takeoff roll began, was approximately six minutes in duration. Before the takeoff roll began, the pilot had accepted a clearance with a void time of four minutes. By the time the pilot correctly read back the clearance, less than two minutes remained before the void time. Post accident documentation of the accident site revealed that neither the pilot nor the passenger were wearing their lap belts or shoulder harnesses. It was also noted that the pilot had not yet selected the discrete transponder code as indicated by the clearance.