Crash of a Learjet 55 Longhorn in Fort Lauderdale

Date & Time: Jul 19, 2004 at 1137 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N55LF
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Fort Lauderdale - Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
55-112
YOM:
1984
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7595
Captain / Total hours on type:
1994.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
412
Copilot / Total hours on type:
10
Aircraft flight hours:
6318
Circumstances:
The flight was a VFR positioning flight from FLL to FXE. Transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) showed that while waiting for takeoff from FLL the flightcrew heard the local controller reported to a Delta Airlines flight that was on a seven mile final approach to land on runway 27R that the winds were 250 degrees at 19 knots, gusting to 50 knots. The Delta Airlines flight crew then informed the controller they were making a missed approach. At 1130:05 the captain asks the first officer if "can you see the end of the weather? If we make a hard right turn, can we stay clear of it?" The first officer responded "I believe so." At 1130:06 the local controller reported "wind shear alert. The centerfield wind 230 at 22. Runway 27R departure 25 knot loss one mile departure." The captain stated to the first officer "sweet." At 1132:11 the captain transmitted to the local controller "tower, any chance of Hop-a-Jet 55 getting out of here?" The local controller responded wind 230 at 17, right turn direct FXE approved, runway 27R cleared for takeoff. The captain responded "cleared to go, right turn out." At 1133:10 the captain asks for gear up. At 1133:15 the local controller responded to a Southwest Airlines Flight waiting for takeoff "no, don't look like anyone's gonna go." "The uh, weather is due west moving rapidly to the north. It looks like a few minutes, and you all be in the clear straight out." At 1133:17, the captain stated to the first officer "oh #. Think this was a bad idea." The first officer responded "no airport in sight." At 1133:43 the sound similar to precipitation hitting the windshield is recorded. At 1133:46 the FLL local controller instructs the flight crew to contact FXE Tower. At 1133:54 the CVR records the FXE local controller transmitting "wind 200, variable 250 at 15, altimeter 29.99. Heavy cell of weather to the west moving eastbound. Low level wind shear possible. At 1134:16, the FXE local controller transmits "attention all aircraft, low level wind shear advisories are in effect. Use caution. Wind 240 at 10." At 1134:51, the first officer transmitted to the FXE local controller that the flight was over the shoreline inbound full stop. At 1135:02, the FXE local controller transmitted "Hop-a-Jet 55, Executive tower, wind 210 variable 250 at 35, 35 knots and gusting. Winds are uh, heavy on the field. Low level wind shear advisories are in effect. Heavy rains from the west, eastbound and would you like to proceed inbound and land Executive? Say intentions." The first officer responded "that's affirmative." The local controller responded, "Hop-a-Jet 55 straight in runway three one if able. The winds 230 gusts, correction, winds 230 variable 210 at 25." At 1135:48, the local controller transmitted, "Hop-a-Jet 55, wind 230 variable 300 at 25 gusts 35. Altimeter 30.00. Runways are wet. Traffic is exiting the runway prior to your arrival, a Dutchess. Caution standing water on runways. Low level wind shear advisories in effect, Runway 31. Cleared to land." The first officer responded "cleared to land, Hop-a-Jet 55." At 1136:35, the local controller transmitted "wind 230 at 25, gusts 35." At 1136:58, the CVR records the sound similar to precipitation on the windshield. At 1137:17, the CVR records a sound similar to the aircraft touching down on the runway. At 1137:19, the sound of a repetitive tone similar to the thrust reverser warning starts and continues to the end of the recording. At 1137:23 a loud unidentified roaring sound starts and lasts 8 seconds. At 1137:30, loud rumbling noises similar to the aircraft departing the runway start. At 1137:36, a continuous tone similar to landing gear warning signal sounds and continues to the end of the recording. The rumbling noises stop. At 1137:39 the captain states the thrust reversers didn't stow and at 1138:36, the captain states "I went around and the # TRs stayed. The CVR recording ended. The 1132, Goes-12 infrared image depicts a rapidly developing cumulonimbus cloud between and over the FLL and FXE airports. The top of the cloud over FXE was in the range of 22,000 feet. The top of the cloud southwest of FXE was in the 39,000 feet range. The 1145, Goes-12 infrared image depicts a developing cumulonimbus cloud over FXE with the cloud top in the 42,000 feet range. Data was obtained from the Melbourne, Florida Doppler Weather Radar System, located 118 miles north-northwest of the accident site. The data showed that at FXE, between 1130 and 1145, a VIP Level 1 to 2 echo evolved into a VIP Level 5 "intense" echo at 1135 and a VIP Level 6 "extreme" echo by 1145.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's decision to continue the approach into known area of potentially severe weather (Thunderstorm), which resulted in the flight encountering a 30 knot crosswind, heavy rain, low-level wind shear, and hydroplaning on a ungrooved contaminated runway.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-28 in Østre Æra

Date & Time: Jul 16, 2004 at 1324 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
YL-KAB
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Østre Æra - Østre Æra
MSN:
1AJ009-15
YOM:
1991
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14000
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
18000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1000
Circumstances:
Two aircraft of type AN-28, operated by Rigas Aeroklubs Latvia, were dropping parachutists at the National Parachute Sport Centre, Østre Æra airstrip in Østerdalen. The company had had a great deal of experience with this type of operations, and had been carrying out parachute drops in Norway each summer for the last 9 years. They had brought their own licensed aircraft technicians with them to Østre Æra. On Friday morning, 16 July 2004, the weather conditions were good when the flights started. The crew of YL-KAB, which comprised two experienced pilots, were rested after a normal night's sleep. They first performed six routine drop flights. After stopping to fill up with fuel, normal preparations were made for the next flight with 20 parachutists who were to jump in two groups of 10. The seventh departure was carried out at time 1305. The Commander asked for and was given clearance by the air traffic control service to climb to flight level FL150 (15,000 ft equivalent to approx. 4,500 metres). The parachutists were then dropped from that altitude. The first drop of 10 parachutists was made on a southerly course above the airstrip, and the aircraft continued on that course for a short time before turning through 180° and getting ready for the next drop at the same location on a northerly course. A large cumulonimbus cloud (CB), with precipitation, had approached the airfield from the north at this time. To reach the drop zone above the runway, the aircraft had to fly close to this cloud. The aircraft was not equipped with weather radar. The last parachutists to leave the aircraft were in a tandem jump that was being filmed on video. The film showed that the parachutists became covered in a layer of white ice within 2-3 seconds of leaving the aircraft. The ice on the parachutists only thawed once they had descended to lower altitudes where the air temperature was above zero. Once the parachutists had jumped, the aircraft was positioned close to the CB cloud at a low cruising speed. They were exposed to moderate turbulence from the cloud. The Commander, who was the PF (pilot flying), started a sudden 90° turn to the left while also reducing engine power to flight idle in order to avoid the CB cloud and return to Østre Æra to land. At this point, the First Officer who was PNF (pilot not flying) observed that ice had formed on the front windshield, and he chose to switch on the anti-icing system. He did this without informing the PF. A few seconds later both engines stopped, and both propellers automatically adopted the feathered position. The pilots had not noticed any technical problems with the aircraft engines before they failed. During the descent, the PNF, on the PF's orders, carried out a series of start-up attempts with reference to the checklist/procedure they had available in the cockpit. The engines would not start and the PF made a decision and prepared to carry out an emergency landing at Østre Æra without engines. The runway at Østre Æra is 600 m long and 10 m wide. The surrounding area is covered by dense coniferous forest and they had no alternative landing areas within reach. Because they were without engine power, there was no hydraulic power to operate the aircraft's flaps. This meant that the speed of the aircraft had to be kept relatively high, approx. 160-180 km/h. The final approach was further complicated because the PF had to avoid the last 10 parachutists who were still in the air and who were steering towards a landing area just beside the airstrip. The PF first positioned the aircraft on downwind on a southerly course west of the airfield, in order then to make a left turn to final on runway 01. The landing took place around halfway down the runway, at a faster speed than normal - according to the Commander's explanation approximately 160-170 km/h. The PF braked using the wheel brakes, but when he realized that he would not be able to stop on the length of runway remaining, he ceased braking. He knew that the terrain directly on the extension to the runway was rough, and chose to use the aircraft's remaining speed to lift it off the ground and to alter course a little to the right. The aircraft passed over the approx. 2.5 m high embankment in the transition between the runway level and the higher marshy plateau surrounding the northern runway area, see Figure 1. The aircraft ran approx. 230 m in ground effect before landing on its heels in the flat marshy area north of the airfield. After around 60 m of roll-out, the nose wheel and the aircraft's nose struck a ditch and the aircraft turned over lengthways. It came to rest upside down with its nose section pointing towards the landing strip.
Probable cause:
The experienced Commander assessed the distance to the cumulonimbus cloud as sufficient to allow the drop to be carried out, and expected that they would then rapidly make their way out of the exposed area. It appeared, however, that problems arose when the aircraft was exposed to turbulence and icing from the cloud. The AIBN believes the limits of the engines' operational range were exceeded since the anti-icing system was switched on while the power output from the engines was low, in combination with low airspeed, turbulence and sudden manoeuvring. At that, both engines stopped, and the propellers were automatically feathered. The AIBN believes the engines would not restart because the Feathering Levers were not moved from the forward to the rear position and forward again, as is required after automatic feathering. The manufacturer has pointed out that, according to the procedures, the crew should have refrained from restart attempts and prioritized preparing for the emergency landing. AIBN acknowledges this view, taken into consideration that the crew had not received necessary training and that no suitable checklists existed. On the other hand, it is the AIBN’s opinion that this strategy may appear too passive in a real emergency. If the flight is over rugged mountain terrain or over water, an emergency landing may have fatal outcome. Provided there is sufficient time, and that crew cooperation is organised in such a way that it does not jeopardise the conduct of safe flight, a successful restart may prevent an accident. The AIBN cannot rule out the possibility that the crew's ability to make a correct assessment of the situation was reduced due to oxygen deficiency. Low oxygen-saturation in the brain would first lead to generally reduced mental capacity. In particular, this applies to the capacity to do several things simultaneously and the ability to remember. These are factors that are crucial when a pilot in a stressful situation has to choose the best solution to a problem, and the negative effects will appear more rapidly the older a person is. The fact that the First Officer switched on the anti-icing system without asking the Commander first, indicates that crew collaboration was not functioning at its best. The AIBN believes that the crew, after having entered this difficult situation, carried out a satisfactory emergency landing under very demanding conditions. The fact of the parachutists being within the approach sector made the scenario more complex, and a landing ahead of the threshold had to be avoided. With the flaps non-functional, it is understandable that the speed was high and the touchdown point not optimal. The fact that the Commander got the aircraft into the air again and landed on the higher marshy plateau, was probably crucial to the outcome. Continued braking would have resulted in the aircraft running into the earth embankment at relatively high residual speed, and it is doubtful whether the crew would have survived. A safety recommendation is being put forward in connection with this. Even if allowances are made for parachuting being a special type of operation that often takes place under the direction of a club, the AIBN believes that this investigation has uncovered several issues that cannot be considered to be satisfactory when compared to the safety standard on which they ought to be based. A user-friendly checklist system in the cockpit which is used during normal operations, in emergency situations and during flight training would increase the probability of the aircraft being operated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations. It is of great importance that pilots are sufficiently trained and experienced to carry out appropriate emergency procedures. It is assumed, however, that the new regulation concerning civil parachute jumping will contribute to increased levels of safety, and the AIBN sees no need to recommend any further measures.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet 35A in Nevis

Date & Time: Jul 13, 2004 at 1920 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N829CA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sint Maarten - Nevis
MSN:
35-459
YOM:
1981
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
539.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
10000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
539
Aircraft flight hours:
9899
Circumstances:
The flightcrew stated that approximately 8 miles out on a visual approach for runway 10 they requested winds and altimeter setting from the control tower. They received altimeter setting 29.95 inches Hg., and winds from 090 degrees at 20 knots. About 5 miles out, in full landing configuration, they checked wind conditions again, and were told 090 at 16 knots. They were holding Vref of 125 knots plus 10 knots on final. The approach was normal until they got a downdraft on short final. The airplane sank and they reacted by immediately adding engine power and increasing pitch, but the airplane continued to sink. The airplane's main landing gear came in contact with the top of the barbwire fencing at the approach end of the runway. The airplane landed short of the threshold. The airplane was under control during the roll out and they taxied to the ramp. A special weather observation was taken at the Vance W. Amory International Airport at 1930, 10 minutes after the accident. The special weather observation was winds 090 at 15 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, scattered clouds at 2,000, temperature 27 degrees centigrade, dewpoint temperature 23 degrees centigrade, altimeter setting 29.95 inches hg.
Probable cause:
The pilot's encounter with a downdraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft A100 King Air in Fort Vermilion

Date & Time: Jul 13, 2004 at 0001 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-FQOV
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Grande Prairie – Fort Vermilion
MSN:
B-38
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
LRA913M
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crew twin engine aircraft was performing an ambulance flight from Grande Prairie to his base in Fort Vermilion with one patient, one doctor, one accompanist and two pilots on board. On final approach, the aircraft was too high and eventually landed hard. Upon touchdown, the right main gear collapsed and the aircraft veered off runway to the right and and came to rest. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2Sx in Yaroslavy

Date & Time: Jul 9, 2004
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
RA-02230
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Yaroslavy - Yaroslavy
MSN:
1G235-01
YOM:
1989
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew already completed 15 spraying sorties successfully that day. After being refilled with a load of 1,200 kg of chemicals for the next mission, the crew started the takeoff procedure with flaps down to 20° from the middle of the runway which is 850 metres long. At a speed of about 90-100 km/h, the crew started the rotation but the aircraft failed to respond. It overran, struck an embankment located 572 metres past the runway end and crashed, bursting into flames. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the engine lost power during the takeoff procedure because the fuel filter was blocked by fertilizers that probably fell in the fuel during servicing prior to departure. The decision of the crew to start the takeoff procedure from the middle of the runway was considered as a contributing factor as the distance available was insufficient for a rejected takeoff.

Crash of a Piper PA-31P Pressurized Navajo in Albacete

Date & Time: Jul 4, 2004 at 1855 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
EC-CTG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Biscarosse – Alicante
MSN:
31P-7530017
YOM:
1975
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2700
Captain / Total hours on type:
300.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2490
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Biscarosse Airport, Landes, at 1629LT, on a private flight to Alicante, carrying five passengers and one pilot. At 1840LT, while descending to Alicante, the pilot contacted ATC and reported a low fuel situation. After being vectored to Albacete-Los Llanos AFB, he modified his route and started the descent for an approach to runway 09. Four minutes later, at an altitude of 3,000 feet and a distance of 8 NM, he declared an emergency following an engine failure. Two minutes later, the aircraft crashed near Chinchilla, about 10 km southeast of the airport. All six occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Failure of both engines in flight due to fuel exhaustion. This situation was probably the consequence of an incorrect fuel consumption calculation prior to departure, combined with a possible over-consumption in flight.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Mile 222 (Canol Road)

Date & Time: Jul 4, 2004 at 1730 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FMOL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Mile 222 - Mile 170
MSN:
303
YOM:
1971
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The North-Wright Airways Ltd. DHC-6 Twin Otter, registration C-FMOL, was departing from an approximately 1,500 foot long gravel strip at Mile 222 of the Canol Road (near the Tsichu River), Canada. The takeoff was initiated to the north and into wind. Immediately after becoming airborne, the aircraft encountered a strong right cross-wind and settled back onto the strip. The left wheel contacted willows that had overgrown the edge of the strip. The aircraft veered left into the willows at about 60 knots, and began to decelerate. Prior to flying speed being regained, the aircraft rolled off the end of the strip and come to rest in a shallow creek. The right wing partially separated from the fuselage at impact and the forward fuselage, nose gear and right main gear sustained substantial damage. The pilot and first officer were uninjured. The purpose of the trip was to move hunting gear and outfitter supplies back to an airstrip at Mile 170 of the Canol Road (Godlin Lake). The aircraft was at or near gross weight at the time of the occurrence.

Crash of an IAI-1124 Westwind in Panama City: 7 killed

Date & Time: Jul 2, 2004 at 1338 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N280AT
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Quito – Panama City – Washington DC – Milan
MSN:
247
YOM:
1979
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
7
Circumstances:
On July 2, 2004, at 1338 eastern standard time, a U.S. registered Westwind model 1124 corporate jet, N280AT, operated by Air Trek, Inc., as a Part 135 commercial air ambulance flight, impacted terrain and crashed into a building after departing from the Tocumen International Airport (MPTY), Tocumen, Panama. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post-crash fire. All six occupants on the airplane were fatally injured. A seventh person was also fatally injured on the ground. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Quito, Ecuador, and stopped in Tocumen for fuel. The flight was destined for Milan, Italy, via another fuel and crew-change stop at the Dulles International Airport, near Washington, DC. According to the operator, the airplane was flown with the two pilots and two flight nurses from Punta Gorda, Florida, to Guayaquil, Ecuador, on July 1, 2004. The airplane was refueled with 450 gallons of Jet A upon arrival, and remained overnight. On July 2, 2004, the airplane was fueled with an additional 150 gallons of Jet A, and subsequently departed for Quito, Ecuador. Upon arriving in Quito, two passengers were boarded, and the flight departed for Panama, where it would be refueled. The airplane was not fueled during the stop in Quito. According to the Panama Autoridad Aeronautica Civil, the flight landed in Panama uneventfully, and proceeded to the north ramp at the main terminal. The flightcrew requested from ground service personnel that the airplane be refueled with 600 gallons of Jet A. The flightcrew specifically requested that 500 gallons of fuel be added utilizing the pressure point fueling station, and 100 gallons be added to the auxiliary tank, utilizing a gravity filler port. After refueling, the airplane was started and taxied to runway 03L. An air traffic controller observed the airplane as it began to takeoff. He recalled that, "It pitched up vertically, the nose then lowered, and the wings rocked side to side. The airplane then veered to the right and descended out of view." A witness, who was located north of the accident site, observed the airplane veering to the right, before descending from his view. The airplane impacted the ground on taxiway Hotel, north of taxiway Bravo, and a fire ensued. The right wing and right engine separated from the fuselage and fragmented into multiple pieces. The vertical stabilizer impacted the ground, and separated from the fuselage. The main fuselage, left wing, and left engine continued across a grass field, where it struck an airport worker, and impacted a concrete wall. The airplane continued through the wall, and came to rest inverted inside a building. Airport crash fire and rescue responded to the accident, and contained the post crash fire within 3 minutes. The wreckage path was oriented on a heading of about 80 degrees. Ground scars on the taxiway were consistent with the right wing tip tank impacting the taxiway surface with the airplane in a nose high attitude, banked 90 degrees to the horizon. The scars continued forward, with the airplane rolling onto its back, collapsing the vertical stabilizer. About 35 feet beyond the vertical stabilizer impact point, scars were observed from the left tip tank. Debris from the cockpit and forward cabin area was observed in the grass area along the wreckage path. Airport personnel tested the fuel truck used to refuel the airplane for contamination after the accident. No abnormalities were noted. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C. for further review. The left and right engines, the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator, and the airplane's annunciator warning panel, were also retained for further examination.

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Green Bay

Date & Time: Jun 30, 2004 at 0610 LT
Registration:
N432FA
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Green Bay - Grand Rapids
MSN:
BB-592
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
7
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4800
Captain / Total hours on type:
750.00
Aircraft flight hours:
6812
Circumstances:
The twin-engine airplane was damaged during a precautionary landing following a reported loss of power to the right engine on takeoff. The pilot reported that the right engine lost power as the landing gear was retracting after takeoff. He stated that he elected to land the airplane on the remaining runway and selected gear down. The pilot stated, "I then flew the aircraft maintaining directional control and landed on runway 24 however due to the short time between selecting gear down and landing the landing gear had not extended and the aircraft landed gear up." No anomalies were found with respect to the right engine or fuel controls during the on-scene or follow-up examination. Examination of the right propeller indicated that it was not in the feather position. The pilot reported that the autofeather system did not engage. The airplane came to rest on the runway with approximately 2000 feet of the runway surface remaining.
Probable cause:
The loss of engine power after takeoff for an undetermined reason.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in São Sebastião: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jun 28, 2004 at 1710 LT
Registration:
ZS-NRW
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
São Sebastião - Vilanculos
MSN:
BB-201
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5800
Captain / Total hours on type:
2080.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1203
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1
Circumstances:
The aircraft was refuelled to capacity at Polokwane Airport, South Africa on 28 June 2004 with 1750 litres of Jet A1 fuel where after it flew to São Sebastião, near Vilanculos, Mozambique. Later the day on 28 June 2004 the crew attempted to take off on a non-scheduled flight from Sao Sebastiao (near Vilanculos) to Vilanculos Airport (VNX). The purpose of the fight was to airlift an injured man to a hospital at an unknown destination. The crew did not use the full runway length available but attempted the takeoff run with only 870ft (265 m) of runway available. The aircraft failed to become airborne and overran the runway, colliding with a sandbank, the perimeter fence and trees and erupted in fire. Calculations, using the takeoff performance graphs in the POH (Pilot Operating Handbook), showed that the aircraft would have required a ground roll distance of 2000 ft (610 m) with 40° flap and 2100 ft (640 m) with no flap selected.
Final Report: