Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The captain and first officer were assigned a two-leg overnight on-demand cargo flight. The flight crew were accustomed to flying night cargo flights, had regularly flown together, and were experienced pilots. The first leg of the trip was uneventful and was flown by the captain; however, their trip was delayed 2 hours and 20 minutes at the intermediate stop due to a delay in the freight arriving. The flight subsequently departed with the first officer as the pilot flying. While enroute, about forty minutes from the destination, the flight crew asked the air traffic controller about the NOTAMs for the instrument landing system (ILS) instrument approach procedure at the destination. The controller informed the flight crew of two NOTAMs: the first pertained to the ILS glidepath being unserviceable and the second applied to the localizer being unserviceable. When the controller read the first NOTAM, he stated he did not know what “GP” meant, which was the abbreviation for the glideslope/glidepath on the approach. The controller also informed the flight crew that the localizer NOTAM was not in effect until later in the morning after their expected arrival, which was consistent with the published NOTAM. The flight crew subsequently requested the ILS approach and when the flight was about 15 miles from the final approach fix, the controller cleared the flight for the ILS or localizer approach, to which the captain read back that they were cleared for the ILS approach. As the flight neared the final approach fix, the captain reported that they had the airport in sight; he cancelled the instrument flight rules flight plan, and the flight continued flying towards the runway. The airplane crossed the final approach fix off course, high, and fast. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript revealed that the captain repeatedly instructed the first officer to correct for the approach path deviations. Furthermore, the majority of the approach was conducted with a flight-idle power setting and no standard altitude callouts were made during the final approach. Instead of performing a go-around and acknowledging the unstable approach conditions, the captain instructed the first officer to use the air brakes on final approach to reduce the altitude and airspeed. Shortly after this comment was made, the captain announced that they were low on the approach and a few seconds later the captain announced that trees were observed in their flight path. The CVR captured sounds consistent with power increasing; however, the audible stall warning tone was also heard. Subsequently, the airplane continued its descent and impacted terrain about .70 nautical mile from the runway. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and both occupants were killed.

After an uneventful return flight to Barbuda, the aircraft departed Antigua at 2114 hrs (1714 hrs local) for John A Osborne Airport, Montserrat, with the pilot and six passengers on board. The aircraft cruised at 2,000 ft enroute and the pilot recalled there were good visual meteorological conditions throughout the 19 minute flight. On arriving at Montserrat there were no other aircraft operating in the vicinity of the airport and the pilot positioned the aircraft visually on a downwind leg for Runway 10. The pilot reported he commenced the approach, flying an approach speed of 65 kt, reducing to 60 kt as the aircraft touched down. The runway surface was dry and the pilot described the landing as “smooth”. After the main landing gear touched down, but prior to the nosewheel contacting the runway, the pilot applied the brakes. He reported that the left brake felt “spongy” and did not seem to act, but that the right brake felt normal. The pilot was unable to maintain directional control of the aircraft which veered to the right two seconds after touchdown, departing the runway a further three seconds later. The aircraft continued across the adjacent grassed area before impacting an embankment close to the runway. After the aircraft had come to a stop, the pilot shut down the engines using the normal shut down procedure. The left main gear had collapsed and rendered the left cabin exit unusable. The pilot evacuated through the flight deck door which was on the left of the aircraft. The six passengers were able to evacuate through the right cabin exit. The airport fire service then arrived at the aircraft, less than one minute after the accident.

On August 19, 2021, the airplane was acquired by a British citizen in Saudi Arabia and repatriated to UK via Egypt, Crete, Greece, Croatia and France. On August 25, en route from Croatia to France, the right engine suffered a loss of hydraulic pressure after the cylinder n°5 failed. The crew diverted to Bastia-Poretta Airport where he landed safely. On September 13, the cylinder n°5 was replaced by a qualified technician and a post maintenance control flight was scheduled for September 14, despite the pilot was slightly ill. The airplane departed Bastia-Poretta Airport at 1010LT and six minutes later, the pilot informed ATC that the control was completed and that he wanted to return to the airport. Due to departure traffic, the pilot was asked to fly along the mountain for a left hand circuit to land on runway 34. Seven minutes later, the right engine failed, followed 20 seconds later by a loss of power on the left engine. With a rate of descent between 900 and 1,500 feet per minute, the pilot was unable to reach the airport and attempted an emergency landing when the airplane impacted trees and crashed in an orchard, bursting into flames. All three occupants escaped the airplane by their own and were injured. The airplane was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

Shortly after takeoff from Piracicaba Airport Runway 35, while climbing, the twin engine aircraft entered a right turn, descended to the ground and crashed in a eucalyptus forest located about 1,5 km north of the airport. The aircraft exploded on impact and was totally destroyed. All seven occupants were killed among them the Brazilian businessman Celso Silveira Mello Filho aged 73 who was travelling with his wife and three kids.
Crew:
Celso Elias Carloni, pilot,
Giovani Dedini Gulo, copilot.
Passengers:
Celso Silveira Mello Filho,
Maria Luiza Meneghel,
Celso Meneghel Silveira Mello,
Camila Meneghel Silveira Mello Zanforlin,
Fernando Meneghel Silveira Mello.

On approach to Kazashinskoye Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to the night and fog and initiated a go-around procedure. During the second attempt to land, the twin engine aircraft descended too low, impacted trees and crashed in a wooded area located 4 km short of runway. Three passengers and a pilot were killed while 12 others occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces.

The pilot was transporting six passengers on a scheduled revenue flight in instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot familiarized himself with the weather conditions before departure and surmised that he would be executing the instrument landing system (ILS) instrument approach for the landing runway at the destination airport. The operator prohibited approaches to runways less than 4,000 ft long if the tailwind component was 5 knots or more. The landing runway was 498 ft shorter than the operator-specified length. The pilot said he obtained the automated weather observing system (AWOS) data at least twice during the flight since he was required to obtain it before starting the instrument approach and then once again before he crossed the approach’s final-approach-fix (FAF). Though the pilot could not recall when he checked the AWOS, he said the conditions were within the airplane and company performance limits and he continued with the approach. A review of the wind data at the time he accepted the approach revealed the tailwind component was within limitations. As the airplane approached the FAF, wind speed increased, and the tailwind component ranged between 1 and 7 knots. Since the exact time the pilot checked the AWOS is unknown, it is possible that he obtained an observation when the tailwind component was within operator limits; however, between the time that the airplane crossed over the FAF and the time it landed, the tailwind component increased above 5 knots. The pilot said the approach was normal until he encountered a strong downdraft when the airplane was about 50 to 100 ft above the ground. He said that the approach became unstabilized and that he immediately executed a go-around; the airplane touched down briefly before becoming airborne again. The pilot said he was unable to establish a positive rate of climb and the airplane impacted trees off the end of the runway. The accident was captured on three airport surveillance cameras. A study of the video data revealed the airplane made a normal landing and touched down about 500 ft from the beginning of the runway. It was raining heavily at the time. The airplane rolled down the runway for about 21 seconds, and then took off again. The airplane entered a shallow climb, collided with trees, and caught on fire. All seven occupants were seriously injured and the airplane was destroyed.

The airport tower controller initially assigned the pilot to take off from runway 28L, which presented a 7-knot headwind. Shortly afterward, the controller informed the pilot of “a storm rolling in . . . from west to east,” and offered runway 10R. The pilot accepted the opposite direction runway for departure and added, “we’re ready to go when we get to the end . . . before the storm comes.” About 4 seconds after the airplane began accelerating during takeoff, the controller advised the pilot of a wind shear alert of plus 20 knots (kts) at a 1-mile final for runway 28L, and the pilot acknowledged the alert. In a postaccident statement, the pilot stated that departing with a 7-kt tailwind was within the operating and performance limitations of the airplane. The pilot reported that after a takeoff ground roll of about 4,000 ft “the left rudder didn’t seem to be functioning properly” and he decided to reject the takeoff. However, when he applied full braking, the airplane tended to turn to the right. He used minimal braking consistent with maintaining directional control of the airplane. The airplane ultimately overran the runway, impacted the airport perimeter fence, and encountered a ditch before it came to a rest. A postimpact fire ensued and consumed a majority of the fuselage. All four occupants evacuated safely.

The flight crew, which consisted of the pilot- and second-in-command (PIC and SIC), and a non-type-rated observer pilot, reported that during takeoff near 100 knots a violent shimmy developed at the nose landing gear (NLG). The PIC aborted the takeoff and during the abort procedure, the NLG separated. The airplane veered off the runway, and the right wing and right main landing gear struck approach lights, which resulted in substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing. The passengers and flight crew evacuated the airplane without incident through the main cabin door. Postaccident interviews revealed that following towing operations prior to the flight crew’s arrival, ground personnel were unable to get the plunger button and locking balls of the NLG’s removable pip pin to release normally. Following a brief troubleshooting effort by the ground crew, the pip pin’s plunger button remained stuck fully inward, and the locking balls remained retracted. The ground crew re-installed the pip pin through the steering collar with the upper torque link arm connected. However, with the locking balls in the retracted position, the pin was not secured in position as it should have been. Further, the ground personnel could not install the safety pin through the pip pin because the pin’s design prevented the safety pin from being inserted if the locking balls and plunger were not released. The ground personnel left the safety pin hanging from its lanyard on the right side of the NLG. The ground personnel subsequently informed their ramp supervisor of the anomaly. The supervisor reported that he informed the first arriving crewmember at the airplane (the observer pilot) that the nose pin needed to be checked. However, all three pilots reported that no ground crewmember told them about any issues with the NLG or pins. Examination of the runway environment revealed that the first item of debris located on the runway was the pip pin. Shortly after this location, tire swivel marks were located near the runway centerline, which were followed by large scrape and tire marks, leading to the separated NLG. The safety pin remained attached to the NLG via its lanyard and was undamaged. Postaccident examination and testing of the NLG and its pins revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures. The sticking of the pip pin plunger button that the ground crew reported experiencing could not be duplicated during postaccident testing. When installed on the NLG, the locking ball mechanism worked as intended, and the pip pin could not be removed by hand. Although the airplane’s preflight checklist called for a visual check of the NLG’s torque link to ensure that it was connected to the steering collar by the pip pin and that the safety pin was installed, it is likely that none of the pilots noticed that the pip pin did not have its safety pin installed during preflight. Subsequently, during the takeoff roll, without the locking balls extended, the pip pin likely moved outward and fell from its position holding the upper torque link arm. This allowed the upper torque link arm to move freely, which resulted in the violent shimmy and NLG separation. The location of the debris on the runway, tire marks, and postaccident examination and testing support this likely chain of events. Contributing to the PIC and SIC’s omission during preflight was the ground crew’s failure to directly inform the PIC or SIC that there was a problem with the NLG pip pin. The ground crew also failed to discard the malfunctioning pip pin per the airplane’s ground handling procedures and instead re-installed the pip pin. Although the observer pilot was reportedly informed of an issue with a nose gear pin, he was not qualified to act as a required flight crewmember for the airplane and was on his cell phone when he was reportedly informed of the issue by the ramp supervisor. These factors likely contributed to the miscommunication and the PIC’s and SIC’s subsequent lack of awareness of the NLG issue.

On August 13, the aircraft (first prototype of this new model) departed the aviation plant at Voronezh Airport on a flight to Moscow-Zhukovsky, preparing for a demonstration flight at the 7th Military Technical Forum. On August 17, the crew departed Zhukovsky for a test flight to Kubinka Airport where the aircraft landed at 1109LT. Four minutes after takeoff at 1114LT, while flying at low altitude in a flat attitude, the right engine caught fire. 35 seconds later, while the crew elected to reach the airport, the aircraft rolled to the right, got inverted and crashed in a wooded area located 2,5 km short of runway 22. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed. This first exemple was dedicated to the Russian Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily) and was also registered 01 yellow.
Crew:
Nikolay Dmitrievich Kuimov, test pilot,
Dmitry Komarov, test pilot,
Nikolai Khludeyev, flight engineer.

The airplane, operated by MAG Aerospace Canada Corp. as flight BD160, was conducting a visual flight rules flight from Thunder Bay Airport, Ontario, to Dryden Regional Airport, Ontario, with only the pilot on board. At 2109 Eastern Daylight Time, the aircraft began a takeoff on Runway 12. Shortly after rotation, the aircraft entered a left bank, continued to roll, and then struck the surface of Runway 07 in an inverted attitude. The pilot was fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and postimpact fire. The emergency locator transmitter activated on impact.