Airport (less than 10 km from airport)

The pilot stated that on the morning of the accident he filled both wing fuel tanks to full. After takeoff, he climbed to his planned cruise altitude of 24,000 ft mean sea level (msl). While en route to his destination, the pilot reported that the left engine experienced a flame-out. The pilot opted to divert from the originally planned destination and descended. When the airplane was about 7,900 ft msl, the pilot reported that the right engine experienced a loss of power and that he was not going to be able to make it to the airport. Shortly thereafter, the airplane collided with trees and the airplane came to rest with the right wing and empennage severed from the fuselage.

The single engine airplane departed Cannes-Mandelieu Airport on a private flight to Courchevel with two passengers and one pilot on board. The goal of the flight was to maintain the validity of the pilot to access to the Courchevel Altiport. Following a right hand base leg, the pilot configured the airplane to land on runway 22. On final, the altimeter showed an altitude close to the runway threshold, and the aircraft was levelled off to the runway threshold. A few seconds before landing, the stall warning sounded, the engine power was increased and then reduced completely. The undercarriage impacted an embankment above the runway threshold and were torn off. The airplane lifted a bit then fell back onto the runway. It slid for about 100 metres before coming to rest. A fire erupted on the right side of the fuselage. The pilot and the front passenger exited the aircraft through the rear door and managed to extract the rear passenger, who was unconscious and died a few minutes later.

The captain and first officer (FO) departed on a non-revenue flight operating under instrument flight rules with four passengers bound for Truckee, California. Most of the flight was uneventful. During the descent, air traffic control (ATC) told the flight crew to expect the area navigation (RNAV [GPS]) approach for runway 20. The captain (pilot flying [PF]) stated and the FO (pilot monitoring [PM]) calculated and confirmed that runway 20 was too short for the landing distance required by the airplane at its expected landing weight. Instead of making a request to ATC for the straight-in approach to runway 11 (the longer runway), the captain told the FO they could take the runway 20 approach and circle to land on runway 11, and the FO relayed this information to ATC. ATC approved, and the flight crew accepted the circle-to-land approach. Although the descent checklist required that the flight crew brief the new circle-to-land approach, and the flight crew’s acceptance of the new approach invalidated the previous straight-in approach brief, they failed to brief the new approach. ATC instructed the flight crew to hold, but the captain was slow in complying with this instruction, so the FO started the turn to enter the holding pattern and then informed ATC once they were established in the hold. About 20 seconds later, ATC cleared them for the approach. Before the FO confirmed the clearance, he asked the captain if he was ready for the approach, and the captain stated that he was. The FO subsequently commented that they had too much airspeed at the beginning of the approach and then suggested a 360° turn to the captain, but the captain never acknowledged the excessive airspeed and refused the 360° turn. After the FO visually identified the airport, he told the captain to make a 90° right turn to put the airplane on an approximate heading of 290°, which was parallel to runway 11 and consistent with the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg of the circling approach. However, the FO instructed the captain to roll out of the turn prematurely, and the captain stopped the turn on a heading of about 233° magnetic, which placed the airplane at an angle 57° left of the downwind course parallel with runway 11. As a result of the early roll-out, the flight crew established a course that required an unnecessarily tight turning radius. When they started the turn to final, the airplane was still about 1.3 nautical miles (nm) from the maximum circling radius that was established for the airplane’s approach category. The FO also deployed flaps 45° after confirming with the captain (the manufacturer’s operating manual procedures for the downwind leg called for a flaps setting of 30°, but the manufacturer stated that a flight crew is not prohibited from a flaps 45° configuration if the approach remains within the limitations of the airplane’s flight manual). The airplane’s airspeed was 44 kts above the landing reference speed (Vref) of 118 kts that the flight crew had calculated earlier in the flight; the FO told the captain, “I’m gonna get your speed under control for you.” The FO likely reduced the throttles after he made this statement, as the engine fan speeds (N1) began to decrease from about 88% to about 28%, and the airplane began to slow from 162 kts. After the FO repeatedly attempted to point out the airport to the captain, the captain identified the runway; the captain's difficulty in finding the runway might have been the result of reduced visibility in the area due to smoke. The FO continuously reassured and instructed the captain throughout the circle-to-land portion of the approach. On the base leg to the runway and about 25 seconds before impact with the ground, the FO started to repeatedly ask for control of the airplane, but neither flight crewmember verbalized a positive transfer of control as required by the operator’s general operating manual (GOM); we could not determine who had control of the airplane following these requests. As the airplane crossed the runway extended centerline while maneuvering toward the runway, the FO noted that the airplane was too high. One of the pilots (recorded flight data did not indicate which) fully deployed the flight spoilers, likely to increase the airplane's sink rate. (The flight spoilers are deployed using a single control lever accessible to both pilots.) The airspeed at the time was 135 kts, 17 kts above the Vref based on the erroneous basic operating weight (BOW) programmed into the airplane’s flight management system (FMS). About 7 seconds later, the left bank became steeper, and the stall protection system (SPS) stick shaker and stick pusher engaged. The captain asked the FO, “What are you doing,” and the FO again asked the captain multiple times to “let [him] have the airplane.” The stick shaker and stick pusher then briefly disengaged before engaging again. The airplane then entered a rapid left roll, consistent with a left-wing stall, and impacted terrain. A postcrash fire consumed most of the wreckage. All six occupants, four passengers and two pilots, were killed.

The airplane departed Nairobi-Wilson Airport on a charter flight to El Wak, carrying 37 passengers and 4 crew members. While descending to El Wak Airport, the pilot continued to the east and elected to land on an airfield located 18 km east of El Wak, near Bur Ache, in Somalia. After landing, the airplane veered to the left and impacted a pile of earth and rocks, causing the left main gear to collapse. All 41 occupants evaacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing at Durango-Guadalupe Victoria Airport following an uneventful flight from San Luis Potosí, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in a grassy area, coming to rest upside down and bursting into flames. A pilot and two passengers were killed while four other occupants were injured.

The pilot reported that he performed the “before starting engine” and “starting engine” checklists and everything was normal before taking off in the twin-engine airplane. He performed an engine runup and then started his takeoff roll. The pilot reported that about halfway down the runway the airplane was not accelerating as fast as it should. He attempted to rotate the airplane; however, “the airplane mushed off the runway.” The airplane settled back onto the runway, then exited the departure end of the runway, where it sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The airplane engine monitor data indicated the airplane’s engines were operating consistent with each other at takeoff power at the time of the accident. Density altitude at the time of the accident was 7,170 ft and according to performance charts, there was adequate runway for takeoff. The reason for the loss of performance could not be determined.

The intention of the flight was to drop eight parachutists from an altitude of 1,500 metres. It was the twelfth and planned to be the last flight of the day. The weather conditions were good. The parachutist bench to the right of the pilot had been replaced with a pilot's seat to distance the parachutists from the pilot as a Covid-19 precautionary measure. The pilot had no ability to perform a mass and balance calculation with the available information. After take-off, the aircraft climbed to an altitude of 400 to 500 feet above ground before changing course 180 degrees to the left. The aircraft turned around quickly in a descending turn with a high bank angle. During the final phase, the aircraft dived steeply and then slightly levelled off before impact. Upon impact, the landing gear was teared off, after which the aircraft skidded on its belly 48 metres straight ahead and caught fire. All nine persons on board sustained fatal injuries.

The aircraft departed Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky Airport at 1257LT on a schedule service (flight PTK251) to Palana, carrying 22 passengers and a crew of six, among them Olga Mokhiriova, chief of the municipality of Palana. At 1439LT, the crew contacted Palana ATC and was cleared to start the descent at 1450LT. While completing an NDB approach to runway 29, the crew encountered marginal weather conditions with fog and ceiling at 300 metres. Too low, the aircraft impacted terrain about 4 km northwest of the airport. The wreckage was found in the evening on the top of a rocky wall. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and debris fall down on the sea bank. All 28 occupants were killed.

On the 5th July, 2021 at approximately 3:45PM, EDT (1945UTC), an Israeli Aircraft Industries, (IAI) Westwind 1124A aircraft, United States registration N790JR, crashed a short distance from the end of runway 32 at the Treasure Cay International Airport (MYAT), Treasure Cay, Abaco, Bahamas. The aircraft plowed through airport lighting equipment at the end of the runway, hitting and breaking several trees along its path. A trail of aviation fuel and pieces of the aircraft and avionics equipment from the flight deck, were left behind before the aircraft finally hit a small mound (hill), spinning, hitting several additional trees, breaking apart and bursting into flames. The aircraft came to rest at coordinates 26°45’21.50”N, 77°24’7.26”W, approximately 2,000 feet (.33 miles) from the end of runway 32. As this airport did not have a fire truck or crash and rescue personnel stationed on site, assistance with fire services were requested from the town. Two firetrucks from the township responded, however, due to the location of the crash, and no access road available, the trucks were unable to reach the crash site and assist in extinguishing the blaze. The fire continued unimpeded, dampened only by the intermittent downpour of rain, which did not aid in extinguishing the blaze, but rather, only limited the spread of the fire to surrounding bushes. The raging fire totally destroyed the aircraft and much of the control surfaces and components in the direct area of the blaze. On July 6, a team of investigators from the AAIA and CAA-B were dispatched to the scene. Upon arrival of the investigation team, surrounding brush and trees, as well as some parts and components of the aircraft were still burning. Initial assessments pointed to a possible failure of the aircraft to climb and perform as required. Runway 14/32 is 7,001 x 150 feet with an asphalt surface and based on the distance the aircraft traveled from the end of the runway to its final resting place, the signature marking on trees and airport lighting fixtures struck by the aircraft, in addition to the ground scars, along with pieces of the aircraft beyond the runway, up to the final resting place of the aircraft, it appears the aircraft was approximately 2 to 5 feet about the surface and not developing any lift or climb performance, while developing full power over the ground, striking trees and brush along its path. Investigations uncovered the private flight with a crew of two (2), proposed a flight time departure of 2:10PM EDT from the Treasure Cay International Airport (MYAT), with a planned destination of Nassau, Bahamas (MYNN) and an arrival time of 2:33PM EDT, according to flight plan retrieved from Flightaware.com. The flight plan did not specify whether the flight would be operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). According to witness statements taken at Treasure Cay, witnesses recalled two pilots entering the ramp after 3 pm. Witnesses also stated that one of the persons onboard advised customs that they will be departing for Marsh Harbor for fuel in the aircraft (N790JR).

The four engine aircraft departed Cagayan de Oro Airport to transfer troops to Jolo. On board were 88 passengers and a crew of 8, including three pilots. After landing on runway 09 at Jolo Airport, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with several house and came to rest in a wooded area, bursting into flames. At least 49 occupants were killed as well as three people on the ground. All others were injured.