Oceania

After lift-off at 85 knots, the pilot noted a positive rate of climb before retracting the landing gear and flaps. He then felt the aircraft sink and noted a high indicated rate of descent. Although full power was applied the descent continued until the aircraft struck the runway in a slightly nose-up attitude. The aircraft slid across the overrun area and through a fence before coming to rest. Fire broke out and engulfed the wreckage. At the time of the accident the aircraft weight was more than 200 kg above the maximum allowable and the centre of gravity was 142 mm forward of the forward limit. The pilot had been unable to retain control of the aircraft during the initial climb phase when the flaps were retracted at a relatively low airspeed.

Crashed in unknown circumstances near Kakatahi. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

En route from Rennell Island to Bellona, while cruising in stormy weather, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed into the sea off Bellona Island. All 11 occupants were killed. The crew was unable to send any distress call.

The twin engine airplane was engaged in a local training flight at MelBourne-Essendon Airport, carrying one instructor, a pilot under supervision and a pilot's friend as passenger. Shortly after takeoff from runway 26, while climbing to a height of 200-250 feet, the pilot-under-supervision selected the wing flaps up and, at about this time, the pilot-in-command simulated an engine failure of one engine by closing a mixture control-believed to have been the starboard engine. The pilot-under-supervision identified the 'failed' engine, exercised the appropriate engine throttle to signify this identification and indicated the essential actions which would be taken in the event of an actual engine failure. The relevant controls were not operated. Following the completion of these actions full engine power was restored by the pilot-in-command. During the course of the simulated engine failure the aircraft assumed a nose down attitude. It then descended straight ahead with full engine power, passed through electric power cables outside the airport boundary at a height of 4.15 metres above terrain, and crashed into houses 286 metres beyond the western end of the runway. All three occupants were seriously injured while six people on the ground were killed, a seventh was injured as well.

On the morning of 2.7.78 the pilot obtained the relevant meteorological forecasts and submitted a flight plan to the Moorabbin Briefing Office for a flight from Moorabbin to Flinders Island and return. He did not hold an instrument rating and was therefore restricted to flight in accordance with the Visual Flight Rules (VFR). The forecasts indicated patches of fog over the route initially, with areas of rain developing later in the day. Broken layers of stratus and strato-cumulus cloud were forecast but there was nothing to suggest that VFR flight would not be possible. The VFR flight plan submitted indicated an estimated flight time of 89 minutes to Flinders Island and 72 minutes for the return flight. The fuel endurance was stated as 300 minutes. After being refuelled to capacity, the aircraft departed from Moorabbin at 1007 hours and the pilot subsequently reported in the Flinders Island circuit area at 1143 hours. The aircraft landed at Flinders Island Aerodrome and the pilot and passenger proceeded by motor vehicle to a farming property some 40 kilometres distant. On returning to the aerodrome later in the day the pilot attempted to obtain up-to-date weather information for the return flight but the telephone was found to be unserviceable. By this time, the earlier forecasts covering the route had been amended and generally indicated some deterioration in conditions, particularly in relation to increased cloud at the lower levels. Nevertheless, the forecast conditions suggested that VFR flight could be possible over the route. The amended terminal forecast for Moorabbin also indicated increasing low cloud. The pilot and the passenger were seen to board the aircraft which then took off and circled the aerodrome before being obscured by cloud. At this time the weather to the south of Flinders Island Aerodrome was squally and the nearby mountain was partly covered by cloud. At 1543 hours the pilot established radio communication with Launceston Flight Service Unit (FSU) and reported his departure from Flinders Island at 1541 hours, his intention to cruise below 5000 feet and his estimated time over South East Point (southern end of Wilson's Promontory) as 1617 hours. He also asked for confirmation that Moorabbin Airport was open to VFR traffic. He was advised that Moorabbin was "not closed to VFR at the moment however they expect it to be". He was also given the current terminal forecast for Moorabbin and the sections of the relevant area forecasts relating to cloud. He was requested to call Melbourne FSU at 1550 hours. At 1551 hours the pilot established communication with Melbourne FSU and, at 1600 hours, he again asked for confirmation that Moorabbin Airport was open to VFR operations and was advised in the affirmative. He then reported that he was climbing to his planned altitude of 6500 feet and, at 1607 hours, reported that he was climbing to 8500 feet. At 1620 hours he reported an amended estimated time over South East Point as 1625 hours and again requested confirmation that Moorabbin was still open to VFR operations. He was again advised in the affirmative. At 1622 hours the pilot broadcast the call sign of the aircraft once very rapidly and the pitch of his voice was raised above normal. The flight service officer heard but did not understand the call and twice requested the calling aircraft to repeat its call. There was no reply and no further communications were received from the aircraft. Following failure of the aircraft to report position at South East Point, the Uncertainty Phase of search and rescue procedures was declared at 1640 hours. When widespread checks failed to establish the location of the aircraft, the Alert Phase was declared at 1713 hours and this was upgraded to the Distress Phase at 1745 hours. A search of the probability area was carried out by air, land and sea during the next three days and, on the morning of 3. 7. 78, two seats and a left main wheel assembly from a Partenavia P68B aircraft were found on the eastern shoreline of Wilson's Promontory. Additionally, three life jackets with the name "TIPPETT" stencilled on them were found in the same area. No trace of the main wreckage of the aircraft, or of the occupants, has been found. Damage to the recovered aircraft seats and wheel assembly was consistent with them having been attached to an aircraft which had struck the water at high speed in a nose down, left wing down attitude. Post analysis of the meteorological situation at the time of the accident indicated that a complex low pressure system was moving across Victoria. There was extensive cloud cover in the Wilson's Promontory area and the base of the lowest cloud was 1000/2000 feet. Visibility was reduced in areas of heavy rain showers. The interaction of differing air masses could have produced conditions conducive to severe airframe icing In respect of aircraft operating at altitudes between 5000 and 7000 feet.

While completing a crop spraying flight, the pilot was forced to attempt an emergency landing for unknown reasons. The single engine airplane landed hard, went out of control and came to rest. The pilot, sole on board, escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to Apia-Fagali'l Airport, the twin engine airplane went out of control and crashed into the sea few km offshore. All 10 occupants were killed.

The aircraft was based at Moorabbin Airport and, late in foe afternoon of 29.3.78, it was refuelled and a pre-flight inspection was carried out. The pilot ferried it to Melbourne Airport just after midnight. While he was preparing and submitting a flight plan for the flight to Canberra and return, the aircraft was loaded with newspapers and a small quantity of other freight. On returning to the aircraft, the pilot checked the loading documents and the freight and made a walk around inspection of the exterior of the aircraft. The pilot started the aircraft engines and established radio communication with air traffic control at 0139 hours. He was given a taxi clearance and an airways clearance for departure from runway 34. Upon request, he was granted approval to commence take-off from the taxiway "J" intersection, some 800 metres from the southern end of the runway. He reported "ready" at 0143 hours and was immediately given a clearance for take-off. The aircraft commenced to take-off, became airborne and, when it was at a height of 100 to 200 feet above the intersection of the two runways, the pilot advised "got a fire - fire in the ah starboard engine and ah doing a low circuit request two seven". Air traffic control immediately replied "make visual approach runway two seven clear to land". Acknowledgement of this clearance was the last communication received from the aircraft. As the aircraft passed over the northern end of runway 34 it commenced a turn to the right and gradually descended. It struck the ground in a right wing down attitude on a track of 070° magnetic and an intense fire broke out. The accident site was 1.8 kilometres to the north-east, and 88 feet above the elevation, of the northern end of runway 34. At the time of the accident the surface wind was 330°/9 knots, the visibility was 25 km in passing showers, there was 3 oktas stratus cloud base 1800 feet and 6 oktas cumulus cloud base 3500 feet. It is probable that below 1000 feet there was some wind shear, downdrafts from passing showers and intermittent moderate turbulence. It has been calculated that the gross weight of the aircraft was some 65 kilograms in excess of the maximum take-off weight and the centre of gravity was within limits. A detailed examination of the wreckage of the aircraft revealed that the landing gear and flaps were fully retracted, the cowl flaps of both engines were midway between the open and closed positions a considerable degree of nose left rudder trim was selected, the right engine was closed down and the propeller feathered. It was established that, as a result of excessively lean mixture operation, there was a hole burned through the piston rings and into the side of the No. 2 piston of the right engine. There was no evidence of fire within the engine but it was apparent that the hole in the piston had resulted in pressurisation of the crankcase cavity, ejection of the oil dipstick and the consequent venting of oil from the dipstick orifice and the engine breather pipe on to the exterior of the exhaust pipes. The engine had the capacity to continue to produce a substantial amount of power for a limited period. The turbo-charger density controller of the left engine was found to be incorrectly adjusted to the extent that the engine could develop only about 330 BHP instead of 350 BHP of which it was normally capable.

On approach to Landsborough Airfield, the twin engine airplane slipped between trees and power lines and ploughed into a swampy ground. Both pilots were slightly injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crashed in unknown circumstances while on approach to Garaina Airstrip. The pilot, sole on board, was killed. He was completing a cargo flight from Lae-Nadzab Airport.