Central America

The aircraft departed Santiago de Querétaro Airport on a night cargo flight to Laredo, Texas, carrying two pilots and a load consisting of automotive parts. En route, the crew encountered engine problems and was clearted to divert to San Luis Potosí-Ponciano Arriaga Airport for an emergency landing. On approach, the crew realized he could not make it and decided to attempt an forced landing. The airplane struck the ground, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in an agricultural area located in Peñasco, about 6 km northeast of runway 14 threshold. The left wing was bent and partially torn off. Both crew members escaped with minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The takeoff from Durango-Guadalupe Victoria Airport was initiated in poor weather conditions as a thunderstorm just passed over the airport five minutes prior to the accident. The takeoff from runway 03 was completed with a wind from 047° at 33 knots. Eight seconds after liftoff, the aircraft climbed to a height of 8 feet with a speed of 145 knots. At this time, the wind came from 103° at 11 knots. The aircraft continued to climb to 30 feet when the wind changed with a tailwind component of 22 knots from 030°. The aircraft started to descend and impacted ground, causing both engines to be torn off. The aircraft continued, overran and slid for 380 metres before coming to rest, bursting into flames. All 103 occupants were evacuated and 39 were injured, 14 seriously. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor with thunderstorm activity, heavy rain falls and strong winds. Notable variations in wind components were noticed at the time of the accident.

On 5th June, 2018 at approximately 3:45pm local, (Eastern Daylight Time) , a Cessna 421B aircraft crashed in dense bushes shortly after departure from Runway 27 at Rocksound Int’l Airport, Rock Sound, Eleuthera, Bahamas. The crash site was located approximately 2,503 feet / .41 nautical mile (nm) north of the threshold of Runway 09 and 8,588 feet / 1.42 nm from threshold of runway 27. The pilot and 2 passengers were killed and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire. The aircraft made initial contact with trees before making contact with the ground and other trees in dense bushes. The aircraft descended right wing first, in an approximately 40 degree nose-down angle. A crater approximately 12 inches deep and 10 feet long by 5 feet wide was created when the aircraft hit the ground, subsequently crossing a dirt road, before coming to rest partially in an upward incline in trees. The nose of the aircraft came to rest on a heading of 355° degrees. The fuselage of the aircraft was located at Latitudes 24° 53’ 50”N and Longitude 076° 11’33”W. A fire ensued after the crash.

The twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in an open field located near Génova. The aircraft came to rest upside down and both occupants were killed. It is understood that the registration was false as N113FT is officially attributed to a Piper PA-46 according to the FAA. Thus, it is believed that the flight was illegal.

The crew was completing a training flight at Saltillo-Plan de Guadalupe Airport. After touchdown on runway 17, the airplane veered off runway to the left, lost its right main gear and came to rest about 600 metres from the runway threshold. All three crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On final approach to runway 02, the copilot informed the captain about the fact that the approach speed was too high by 20 knots to the reference speed. The captain replied he would correct this but the airplane landed too far down runway 02, about 993 metres before the end of the runway which is 2,010 metres long but with a displaced threshold, giving a landing distance available of 1,700 metres. Upon touchdown, the aircraft's speed was 142 knots, about 14 knots above the speed reference according to existing conditions and weight and balance. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the airplane overran, went down an embankment, crossed a road and came to rest against a second embankment, broken in two. All six occupants were slightly injured and the aircraft was destroyed. Owned by TVPX, it was operated by Silver Air.

After takeoff from runway 06 at Havana-José Martí Airport, while in initial climb, the undercarriage were raised when the aircraft entered an excessive nose-up angle of 30°. It rolled to the right then descended until it struck power cables and a railway track before it disintegrated in a field located less than one km east from the airport. Three female passengers were seriously injured while 110 other occupants were killed, among them 102 Cubans, 6 Mexicans (crew) and 2 Argentinians. Three days after the accident, one of the three survivors died from her injuries. A second survivor died one week later, on May 25. The aircraft was operated by Cubana de Aviacíon under a wet lease contract from the Mexican operator Global Air (Damojh Aéreolíneas), and the service was operated under callsign DMJ972.

The single engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in a wooded and hilly terrain located near Tuzantán. The airplane was totally destroyed by a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed. According to Mexican Authorities, the crew was completing an illegal flight.

By night, the pilot attempted to land in a prairie located in Blue Creek, west Belize. The airplane belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest, almost broken in two. The pilot leaved the scene but was quickly arrested by the local police. It is believed that it was an illegal flight as the registration on the aircraft (YV3224) is wrong. It appears that the correct registration was YV3284.

The two pilots were conducting a commercial charter flight to take 10 passengers to an international airport for connecting flights. The flight departed a nontower-controlled airport that was in a valley surrounded on all sides by rising terrain, with the exception of the area beyond the departure end of runway 21, which led directly toward the Pacific Ocean. The accident airplane was the second of a flight of two; the first airplane departed runway 3 about 15 minutes before the accident airplane and made an immediate right turn to the east/southeast after takeoff, following a pass in the hills over lower terrain that provided time for the airplane to climb over the mountains. Both a witness and surveillance video footage from the airport indicated that, 15 minutes later, the accident airplane also departed from runway 3 but instead continued on runway heading, then entered a left turn and descended into terrain. Analysis of the video determined that the airplane reached a maximum bank angle of about 75° and an airspeed below the airplane's published aerodynamic stall speed before impact. Examination of the airplane was limited due to impact and postcrash fire damage; however, no defects consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction were observed, and the engine exhibited signatures consistent with production of power during impact. The captain was appropriately rated and had extensive experience in the accident airplane make and model. He had been employed by the accident operator for about a year in 2006 and had recently been re-hired by the operator; however, records provided by the operator did not indicate that he had completed all of the training and check flights required by the operator's General Operations Manual (GOM). The first officer was appropriately rated but had little experience in the accident airplane. The GOM also stated that pilots would receive additional, airport-specific training before operating to or from airports with special characteristics; however, the operator provided no listing of such airports, including the airport from which the accident flight departed. The pilots' experience at the departure airport could not be determined. It is possible the psychiatric diagnoses in 2011 were correct and the pilot suffered from a number of conditions which can cause a variety of symptoms. However, given the extremely limited information, what his symptoms were around the time of the accident, whether they were being addressed or effectively treated, and what his mental state was at the time could not be determined from the available information. Therefore, whether or not the pilot's medical or psychological conditions or their treatment played a role in the accident circumstances could not be determined by this investigation. There were no weather reporting facilities in the vicinity of the airport. Although the airport was equipped with two frames for windsocks, no windsocks were installed at the time of the accident to aid pilots in determining wind direction and intensity. Although a takeoff from runway 21 afforded the most favorable terrain since the airplane would fly over lower terrain to the ocean, it is possible that a significant enough tailwind existed for runway 21 that the pilots believed the airplane's maximum tailwind takeoff limitation may be exceeded and chose to depart from runway 3 in the absence of any information regarding the wind velocity. Performance calculations showed that the airplane would have been able to take off with up to a 10-kt tailwind, which was the manufacturer limitation for tailwind takeoffs. The witness who saw the accident reported that he spoke with the pilots of both airplanes before the flights departed and that the pilots acknowledged the need to use the eastern pass in order to clear terrain when departing from runway 3. The reason that the flight crew of the accident airplane failed to use this path after takeoff could not be determined. It is likely that, after entering the valley ahead of the runway, with rising terrain and peaks that likely exceeded the climb capability of the airplane, they attempted to execute a left turn to exit the valley toward lower terrain. During the steep turn, the pilots failed to maintain adequate airspeed and exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Performance calculations using weights that would allow the airplane to operate within manufacturer weight and balance limitations at the time of the accident indicated that it was unlikely that the airplane would have had sufficient climb performance to clear the terrain north of the airport. However, the airplane would likely have had sufficient climb performance to clear terrain east of the airport had the crew performed a right turn immediately after takeoff like the previous airplane.