Africa

It was determined that the left main gear collapsed after the tire burst on touchdown.

The primary cause of the accident was a faulty navigation on part of the Captain of the airplane inasmuch as he set off on an incorrect course and thereafter his visual identification of towns en route was incorrect and based purely on assumptions. Had he checked his assumed ground speed between what he assumed to be Mahalapye and Warmbaths he would have found this to be approximately 318 mph which check would have alerted him. The secondary cause of the accident was the failure of those responsible to alert Pietersburg Aeradio Station and Beacon and the excessive degree of radio interference on the Rand on the evening of 15 September due to electrical storms. The tertiary cause was an attempted landing on a unidentified and unlighted aerodrome, of which the altitude was not known. Thereafter in a low approach the wheels of the airplane struck a rock outcrop approximately 1-1/4 miles from the airfield.

According to the Sudanese Authorities, the accident was caused by a faulty navigation on part of the crew due to poor communication between the crew and the ATC and a lack of navigation aids in the area.

The primary cause of the accident was that extremely bad weather forced the Captain of the airplane to divert from his original destination. No proper preparation had been made for a possible landing at an alternate airfield prior to commencement of flight. The secondary cause was due to the Captain's attempt to execute a landing at Kosti aerodrome which was not equipped with night landing facilities. The Captain landed on the runway but was unable to align himself with the centre line and in consequence ran off the runway and struck a steel windsock support and thereafter struck various obstructions such as trees which lay in the path.
The following factors were considered as contributory:
- Because of radio interference due to a storm, proper use could not be made of the radio navigational facilities carried on the aircraft,
- The lack of appreciation by the Captain of his final responsibility for the operational control of the aircraft, which includes diversionary action, and his apparent failure to appreciate the purely advisory responsibility of Khartoum as a flight information centre.

The exact cause of the failure of the engine number one could not be determined with certainty. However, it would appear that the pilot showed a poor knowledge of the airplane, especially on the following items:
- The fire warning system had not operated nor had the automatic extinguishers, indicating that the nacelle temperature could not have risen appreciably. The extinguisher had been manually operated.
- He should not have restarted the defective motor after a fire and with almost a full load.
- If the main undercarriage systems had failed to function, he should have operated the first and the second emergency systems.

Technical issue on the left engine during takeoff.

Causes of the accident, in chronological order, are set out by the report as follows:
- Faulty use by the navigator of the variation setting control on the CL2 Gyrosyn compass,
- Faulty checking of compasses by incorrect astral bearing and without the aid of radio bearings,
- Incorrect inference drawn by the captain in pronouncing the CL2 Gyrosyn compass correct and the P.12 magnetic compass unserviceable,
- Fault on the part of the captain in not returning to Tripoli when the P.12 compass was regarded as unserviceable (in breach of BOAC regulations),
- Inability of the crew to realize that astro shots were being taken on the wrong stars,
- Inability of the crew to determine the aircraft's position properly by the standard methods when the VSC setting error was discovered,
- Lack of decisive action on the part of the captain once he knew he had lost his way,
- Ignorance, on the part of those on board, of the assistance which could have been afforded by Atar airfield.