Takeoff (climb)

The aircraft left Nanaimo, British Columbia, and landed at Penticton Airport at 1232 Pacific daylight time (PDT). The aircraft was fueled with 184 litres of fuel, filling all three belly tanks. At this time, the rear portion of the aircraft cabin was observed to be loaded with luggage and cargo. The pilot/aircraft owner was planning his flight to Calgary (Springbank), Alberta, and spent at least an hour flight planning and talking with the Kamloops Flight Information Centre by telephone. He had some difficulty determining a route to fly to Springbank, because of airspace restrictions due to forest fires, but decided on a routing of Penticton, Kelowna, Vernon, Revelstoke, and Springbank. The aircraft took off from Penticton Airport at 1420 PDT, with the pilot and two passengers on board and crashed approximately seven minutes later in a ravine of Penticton Creek, 11 nautical miles northeast of Penticton Airport. A post-impact fire broke out and consumed most of the fuselage area. The fire caused a small forest fire, seen by a firefighting aircraft crew. There were no radio calls from the occurrence aircraft, and the three occupants were fatally injured.

The accident flight was the first flight after maintenance personnel replaced the forward elevator trim cable. When the flightcrew received the airplane, the captain did not address the recent cable change noted on his maintenance release. The captain also did not perform a first flight of the day checklist, which included an elevator trim check. Shortly after takeoff, the flightcrew reported a runway trim, and manually selected nose-up trim. However, the elevator trim then traveled to the full nose-down position. The control column forces subsequently increased to 250 pounds, and the flightcrew was unable to maintain control of the airplane. During the replacement of the cable, the maintenance personnel skipped a step in the manufacturer's airliner maintenance manual (AMM). They did not use a lead wire to assist with cable orientation. In addition, the AMM incorrectly depicted the elevator trim drum, and the depiction of the orientation of the cable around the drum was ambiguous. The maintenance personnel stated that they had completed an operational check of the airplane after maintenance. The Safety Board performed a mis-rigging demonstration on an exemplar airplane, which reversed the elevator trim system. An operational check on that airplane revealed that when the electric trim motor was activated in one direction, the elevator trim tabs moved in the correct direction, but the trim wheel moved opposite of the corresponding correct direction. When the manual trim wheel was moved in one direction, the elevator trim tabs moved opposite of the corresponding correct direction.

Shortly after a night takeoff from runway 05 at Cap Haïtien Airport, while in initial climb, the crew reported technical problems, declared an emergency and was cleared to return. While on base leg, the aircraft lost height and crashed in a sugar cane field located 2 km from the airport, bursting into flames. All 21 occupants were killed. It was later reported that the door of the forward baggage hold opened during takeoff.

While taking off from Old Fangak Airstrip, the single engine aircraft hit trees located past the runway end, nosed down and crashed in a marsh. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft took off from runway 24 right (24R) at Jandakot Airport, WA. One pilot and five passengers were on board the aircraft. The flight was being conducted in the aerial work category, under the instrument flight rules. Shortly after the aircraft became airborne, while still over the runway, the pilot recognized symptoms that he associated with a failure of the right engine and elected to continue the takeoff. The pilot retracted the landing gear, selected the wing flaps to the up position and feathered the propeller of the right engine. The pilot later reported that he was concerned about clearing a residential area and obstructions along the flight path ahead, including high-voltage powerlines crossing the aircraft’s flight path 2,400 m beyond the runway. The aircraft was approximately 450 m beyond the upwind threshold of runway 24R when the pilot initiated a series of left turns. Analysis of radar records indicated that during the turns, the airspeed of the aircraft reduced significantly below the airspeed required for optimum single-engine performance. The pilot transmitted to the aerodrome controller that he was returning for a landing and indicated an intention to land on runway 30. However, the airspeed decayed during the subsequent manoeuvring such that he was unable to safely complete the approach to that runway. The pilot was unable to maintain altitude and the aircraft descended into an area of scrub-type terrain, moderately populated with trees. During the impact sequence at about 1537, the outboard portion of the left wing collided with a tree trunk and was sheared off. A significant quantity of fuel was spilled from the wing’s fuel tank and ignited. An intense postimpact fire broke out in the vicinity of the wreckage and destroyed the aircraft. Four passengers and the pilot vacated the aircraft, but sustained serious burns in the process. One of those passengers died from those injuries 85 days after the accident. A fifth passenger did not survive the post-impact fire.

During a nighttime takeoff initial climb, the airplane collided with terrain near the airport. Witnesses reported watching the airplane accelerate on runway 12, rotate, and climb to 200 to 300 feet above ground level. The climb rate decreased and the airplane appeared to initiate a left turn, with the roll continuing to a wings vertical attitude. At this point the airplane descended into the terrain. One witness north of the accident site described the landing lights going from horizontal to vertical followed by a decrease in engine sound just before impact. According to the airplane owner, the pilot had never flown the accident airplane before the first leg to the accident location to drop off the owner and another passenger. Examination of the pilot records failed to locate any previous flight time in Cessna 300 or 400 series airplanes. In the last 30 days he had given instruction in a smaller light twin engine airplane. Post accident examination of the wreckage revealed the landing gear to be in the down position at the time of impact. The retractable landing lights were extended and the nose gear taxi light was destroyed. Both propellers exhibited symmetrical power signatures. No preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures were identified. The impact site was east of the airport about 0.68 nautical miles. The departure direction is towards a mountain range with sparse population and few ground reference lights. The moon's disk was 25 degrees above the southeastern horizon and was 89 percent illuminated. The FAA AC61-23C Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge addresses the environmental factors and potential in-flight visual illusions, which could affect pilot performance. The reference material describes Somatogravic Illusion as, "a rapid acceleration during takeoff can create the illusion of being in a nose up attitude. The disoriented pilot will push the airplane into a nose low, or dive attitude. A rapid deceleration by a quick reduction of the throttles can have the opposite effect, with the disoriented pilot pulling the airplane into a nose up, or stall attitude."

During the takeoff roll from runway 14 at Dhaka-Zia Ul-Haq Airport, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and the captain decided to abandon the takeoff procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (runway 14 is 3,200 metres long), the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest 450 metres further. All five crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Boufarik AFB on a local training flight. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the crew informed ATC about an engine fire and elected to return for an emergency landing. Few seconds later, control was lost and the aircraft crashed in the district of Beni Mered, less than 2 km from the end of runway 22. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire as well as eight houses. All four crew members were killed as well as 11 people on the ground. Six other people on the ground were seriously injured.

The aircraft was subject to major maintenance during the last two months, especially with the rudder actuators that were replaced. As there were still problems with the actuators during the last flight, decision was taken to make the appropriate adjustments followed by a flight to Salekhard. During the takeoff roll on runway 16/34, at a speed of 150 km/h, the aircraft deviated to the left and the captain decided to counter this deviation by using the nosewheel steering system. This caused the right front tyre to burst. At a speed of 250 km/h, the takeoff procedure was abandoned but this decision was taken too late. Unable to stop within the remaining distance (the runway 16/34 is 2,530 metres long), the aircraft overran, lost its nose gear and rolled for 577 metres before coming to rest. All 11 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A witness at the airport stated the airplane appeared to use half of the 8,000-foot runway on takeoff roll, and the climb out appeared "very flat." During climbout, the pilot reported to the tower controller the airplane "lost an engine," and he announced intentions to return to the runway. The controller stated he noticed the airplane continued straight out and appeared to be losing altitude. Witnesses north of the airport observed the airplane flying low and described its engine noises as "erratic," "skipping," "sputtering," and "some sort of backfire." One witness stated the airplane was moving slowly to the north with a high nose-up angle, and the airplane "appeared to stall" then dove vertically into the trees. Examination of the accident site revealed wreckage debris and broken trees were scattered approximately 120 feet. The airframe, engines, and the right propeller sustained fire damage. The left propeller, top forward portion of the left engine case, and the left propeller gear shaft and bearings were not located. Examination of recovered components revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunction could be determined. According to the Pilot's Operating Handbook for the Piper PA-31P, the stall speed for the airplane with the gear and flaps up is: "(7800 lbs) 80 KCAS, 81 KIAS."