Takeoff (climb)

The pilot and passengers flew in the day before the accident and the airplane remained parked outside on the airport ramp overnight. Light to moderate snow and freezing drizzle persisted during the 12 to 24-hour period preceding the accident. In addition, low instrument meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident takeoff. Before the flight, the pilot removed snow and ice from the airplane wings. However, the horizontal stabilizer was not accessible to the pilot and was not cleared of accumulated snow. In addition, the airplane was loaded over the maximum certificated gross weight and beyond the aft center-of-gravity limit. A total of 12 occupants were on board the airplane, though only 10 seats were available. None of the occupants qualified as lap children under regulations. The takeoff rotation was initiated about 88 kts which was about 4 kts slower than specified with the airplane configured for icing conditions. After takeoff, the airplane entered a left turn. Airspeed varied between 89 and 97 kts during the initial climb; however, it decayed to about 80 kts as the airplane altitude and bank angle peaked. The airplane ultimately reached a left bank angle of 64° at the peak altitude of about 380 ft above ground level. The airplane then entered a descent that continued until impact. The stall warning and stick shaker activated about 1 second after liftoff. The stick pusher became active about 15 seconds after liftoff. All three continued intermittently for the duration of the flight. A witness located about 1/2-mile northwest of the airport reported hearing the airplane takeoff. It was cloudy and snowing at the time. He was not able to see the airplane but noted that it entered a left turn based on the sound. He heard the airplane for about 4 or 5 seconds and the engine seemed to be “running good” until the sound stopped. The airplane impacted a dormant corn field about 3/4-mile west of the airport. A postaccident airframe examination did not reveal any anomalies consistent with a preimpact failure or malfunction. On board recorder data indicated that the engine was operating normally at the time of the accident. An airplane performance analysis indicated that the accumulated snow and ice on the empennage did not significantly degrade the airplane performance after takeoff. However, the effect of the snow and ice on the airplane center-of-gravity and the pitch (elevator) control forces could not be determined. Simulations indicated that the pitch oscillations recorded on the flight could be duplicated with control inputs, and that the flight control authority available to the pilot would have been sufficient to maintain control until the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall about 22 seconds after lifting off (the maximum bank angle of 64° occurred after the critical angle-of-attack was exceeded). In addition, similar but less extreme pitch oscillations recorded on the previous flight (during which the airplane was not contaminated with snow but was loaded to a similar center-of-gravity position) suggest that the pitch oscillations on both flights were the result of the improper loading and not the effects of accumulated snow and ice. Flight recorder data revealed that the accident pilot tended to rotate more rapidly and to a higher pitch angle during takeoff than a second pilot who flew the airplane regularly. Piloted simulations suggested that the accident pilot’s rotation technique, which involved a relatively abrupt and heavy pull on the control column, when combined with the extreme aft CG, heavy weight, and early rotation on the accident takeoff, contributed to the airplane’s high angle-of attack immediately after rotation, the triggering of the stick shaker and stick pusher, and the pilot’s pitch control difficulties after liftoff. The resulting pitch oscillations eventually resulted in a deep penetration into the aerodynamic stall region and subsequent loss of control. Although conditions were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, the circumstances of this accident are more consistent with the pilot’s efforts to respond to the activation of the airplane stall protection system upon takeoff. These efforts were hindered by the heightened airplane pitch sensitivity resulting from the aft-CG condition. As a result, spatial disorientation is not considered to be a factor in this accident.

The twin engine airplane departed runway 17 at Goma International Airport on a schedule service to Butembo (first service of the day). After takeoff, while in initial climb, the airplane lost height and crashed onto several houses located in the district of Birere, south of the airport, and burst into flames. All 19 occupants were killed as well as 10 people on the ground.

On October 11, 2019 at about 0902 Kenya daylight time, a Silverstone Air Services Fokker 27 Mark 050 registration 5Y-IZO experienced runway excursion on takeoff runway 14 at Wilson Airport with 55 occupants onboard (5 crew and 50 passengers). The aircraft was performing a scheduled flight from Wilson airport to Mombasa, Lamu and back to Wilson airport. The aircraft was fueled then the passengers boarded the plane before the normal pre take off procedures which were reported as uneventful as collaborated by the information from the FDR. The Right Hand engine receded the Left Hand engine in startup as depicted by the parameters from the recorders. From engine startup, taxi, lineup runway 14, power up and including the initial stages of ground roll were uneventful. At 06.02.50 GMT, while still on ground roll take off, the LH engine ITT began to fluctuate, dropped from 707.8 to 175.8. The RH ITT remained stable. The other parameters of both engines were stable. Subsequent power down ensued at 06.03.01, IAS dropped from 110.2Knots and the aircraft magnetic heading increased gradually to 144 consistent with the deviation of the aircraft to the right of the runway axis when it left the paved surface of the runway, before colliding with the airport perimeter fence, went through an embankment before coming to rest tilted to the right after the starboard wing made contact with a tree. The passengers were deplaned through the two left hand side front and rear exit doors. Immediately the event occurred, ATS Wilson airport issued a crash alert and Wilson Airport Fire Service (AFS) responded without delay, found the passengers already evacuated from the aircraft and applied foam to the sections of the aircraft with leaking fuel. Runway 14/32 was closed and all inbound and departure traffic made use of the remaining runway. Preliminary information retrieved from the Flight Data Recorder Radar regarding the engine ITT seems to correlate with the flight crew statements regarding the observed fluctuations on the LHS engine ITT.

Shortly after takeoff from runway 11 at Monterrey-Del Norte Airport, while in initial climb, the single engine airplane lost height and crashed on a highway located past the runway end. Fortunately, the airplane did not struck any vehicles and eventually crashed in a field, about 15 meters below the motorway. The pilot, sole on board, was seriously injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airline transport pilot arrived at the departure airport in the reciprocating engine-powered airplane where it was fueled with Jet A jet fuel by an airport employee/line service technician. A witness stated that she saw a "low flying" airplane flying from north to south. The airplane made a "sharp left turn" to the east. The left wing "dipped low" and she then lost sight of the airplane, but when she approached the intersection near the accident site, she saw the airplane on the ground. The airplane impacted a field that had dry, level, and hard features conducive for an off-airport landing, and the airplane was destroyed. The wreckage path length and impact damage to the airplane were consistent with an accelerated stall. Postaccident examination of the airplane found Jet A jet fuel in the airplane fuel system and evidence of detonation in both engines from the use of Jet A and not the required 100 low lead fuel. Use of Jet A rather than 100 low lead fuel in an engine would result in detonation in the cylinders and lead to damage and a catastrophic engine failure. According to the Airplane Flying Handbook, the pilot should witness refueling to ensure that the correct fuel and quantity is dispensed into the airplane and that any caps and cowls are properly secured after refueling.

The owner of the airplane had purchased the airplane with the intent to resell it after repairs had been made. As part of that process, a mechanic hired by the owner had assessed the airplane’s condition, proposed the necessary repairs to the airplane’s owner, and had identified a pilot who would, once the repairs and required inspection annual inspection had been completed, fly the airplane from where it was located to where the owner resided. While the mechanic had identified a potential pilot for the relocation flight, he had not yet completed the repairs to the airplane, nor had he completed the necessary logbook entries that would have returned the airplane to service. The pilot-rated passenger onboard the airplane for the accident flight, was the pilot who had been identified by the mechanic for the relocation flight. Review of the pilot-rated passenger’s flight experience revealed that he did not possess the necessary pilot certificate rating, nor did he have the flight experience necessary to act as pilot-in-command of the complex, highperformance, pressurized, multi-engine airplane. Additionally, the owner of the airplane had not given the pilot-rated-passenger, or anyone else, permission to fly the airplane. The reason for, and the circumstances under which the pilot-rated passenger and the commercial pilot (who did hold a multi-engine rating) were flying the airplane on the accident flight could not be definitively determined, although because another passenger was onboard the airplane, it is most likely that the accident flight was personal in nature. Given the commercial pilot’s previous flight experience, it is also likely that he was acting as pilot-in-command for the flight. One witness said that he heard the airplane’s engines backfiring as it flew overhead, while another witness located about 1 mile from the accident site heard the accident airplane flying overhead. The second witness said that both engines were running, but they seemed to be running at idle and that the flaps and landing gear were retracted. The witness saw the airplane roll to the left three times before descending below the tree line. As the airplane descended toward the ground, the witness heard the engines make “two pop” sounds. The airplane impacted a wooded area about 4 miles from the departure airport, and the wreckage path through the trees was only about 75-feet long. While the witnesses described the airplane’s engines backfiring or popping before the accident, the postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, examination of both propeller blades showed evidence of low rotational energy at impact, and that neither propeller had been feathered in flight. Given the witness statement describing the airplane “rolling three times” before it descended from view toward the ground, it is most likely that the pilot lost control of the airplane and while maneuvering. It is also likely that the pilot’s lack of any documented previous training or flight experience in the accident airplane make and model contributed to his inability to maintain control of the airplane. Toxicology testing was performed on the pilot’s chest cavity blood. The results identified 6.7 ng/ml of delta-9-tetrahydracannabinol (THC, the active compound in marijuana) as well as 2.6 ng/ml of its active metabolite, 11-hydroxy-THC and 41.3 ng/ml of its inactive metabolite delta9-carboxy-THC. Because the measured THC levels were from cavity blood, it was not possible to determine when the pilot last used marijuana or whether he was impaired by it at the time of the flight. As a result, it could not be determined whether effects from the pilot’s use of marijuana contributed to the accident circumstances.

The single engine airplane departed Seronera Airstrip in the early morning on a short flight to Grumeti Hills, about 40 km northwest, according to a statement from the operator. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane went out of control, struck a concrete wall and crashed upside down. The pilot and the sole passenger were killed.

Statement from the operator:
https://www.auricair.com/About-Us/5HAAM_Accident_23Sept2019

The single engine airplane departed Manaus-Eduardo Gomes Airport Runway 29 in heavy rain falls as weather conditions deteriorated shortly prior to takeoff. After liftoff, while in initial climb, the airplane lost altitude and crashed in a dense wooded area located 600 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and all 10 occupants were injured, among them six seriously. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were poor with heavy rain falls, turbulence and windshear.

The twin engine airplane departed Popayán-Guillermo León Valencia Airport runway 26 at 14:06:06. The aircraft encountered difficulties to gain sufficient height. About 20 seconds after liftoff, at a speed of 82 knots, the aircraft rolled to the right then entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed onto two houses located 530 metres past the runway end. Two passengers were seriously injured and seven other occupants were killed.

The pilot reported that, while holding short of the runway, he set the parking brake while waiting for his takeoff clearance. Upon receiving takeoff clearance, he reached down to the parking brake handle and, "quickly pushed the parking brakes back in"; however, he did not visually verify that he disengaged the parking brake. During the takeoff roll, he noticed that the airplane was not accelerating beyond about 70 knots and decided to abort the takeoff. The airplane subsequently veered to the left, exited the departure end of the runway, and impacted an airport perimeter fence. The pilot reported that he must have not fully disengaged the parking brake before takeoff and that there were no mechanical issues with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the parking brake handle was partially extended, which likely resulted in the airplane’s decreased acceleration during the takeoff roll.