Landing (descent or approach)

Cebu Pacific Air flight 5J509, an ATR 72-500, took off from Tuguegarao Airport, Philippines, bound for Manila-Ninoy Aquino International Airport. The first officer was the Pilot Flying (PF) while the captain was the Pilot Not Flying (PNF). Approaching Manila, the flight was under radar vector for a VOR/DME approach to runway 24. At 7 miles on finals the approach was stabilized. A sudden tailwind was experienced by the crew at 500 feet radio altitude (RA) which resulted in an increase in airspeed and vertical speed. The captain took over the controls and continued the approach. Suddenly, the visibility went to zero and consequently the aircraft experienced a bounced landing three times, before a go-around was initiated. During climb out the crew noticed cockpit instruments were affected including both transponders and landing gears. They requested for a priority landing and were vectored and cleared to land on runway 13. After landing the aircraft was taxied to F4 where normal deplaning was carried out. No injuries were reported on the crew and passengers.

Flight ABQ202, operated by Airblue, was scheduled to fly a domestic flight sector Karachi - Islamabad. The aircraft had 152 persons on board, including six crew members. The Captain of aircraft was Captain Pervez Iqbal Chaudhary. Mishap aircraft took-off from Karachi at 0241 UTC (0741 PST) for Islamabad. At time 0441:08, while executing a circling approach for RWY-12 at Islamabad, it flew into Margalla Hills, and crashed at a distance of 9.6 NM, on a radial 334 from Islamabad VOR. The aircraft was completely destroyed and all souls on board the aircraft, sustained fatal injuries.

The aircraft departed Nouakchott in he evening of July 27 on a regular schedule service to Conakry with an intermediate stop in Dakar, carrying 91 passengers and a crew of six. Following an uneventful flight from Dakar, the crew started a night approach to Conakry-Gbessia Airport. After touchdown on a wet runway (due to recent rain falls), the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, collided with the ILS antenna and some approach lights, lost its nose gear and came to rest 500 metres further. Ten passengers were injured while all 87 other occupants escaped unhurt. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

After landing at Camp Dwyer AFB (Forward Operating Base Dwyer) located in the Helmand Province, the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway, collided with a fence and came to rest into a ravine, broken in two. All six occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was later dismantled by the US Air Force. The aircraft was carrying a load of fresh fruits and dairy products.

The accident occurred during the Experimental Aircraft Association’s Airventure 2010 fly-in convention. Because of the high density of aircraft operations during the fly-in, the Federal Aviation Administration implemented special air traffic control procedures to accommodate traffic demand and maximize runway capacity. Arriving aircraft were issued landing instructions and clearances by a tower controller using a specified tower radio frequency. Departing aircraft were handled by another team of controllers operating on a separate radio frequency that was associated with a mobile operations unit located near the runway. Air traffic control data indicated that the accident airplane established contact with the tower controller and entered a left traffic pattern for runway 18R. As the accident airplane was turning from downwind to base leg, the controller handling departures cleared a Piper Cub for an immediate takeoff and angled departure (a procedure used by slower aircraft to clear the runway immediately after liftoff by turning across the runway edge). The accident pilot was not monitoring the departure frequency, and, therefore, he did not hear the radio transmissions indicating that the departing Piper Cub was going to offset to the left of the runway after liftoff. The accident pilot reported that, while on base leg, he became concerned that his descent path to the runway would conflict with the Piper Cub that was on takeoff roll. He stated that he overshot the runway centerline during his turn from base to final, and, when he completed the turn, his airplane was offset to the right of the runway. The pilot stated that, at this point, he decided not to land because of a perceived conflict with the departing Piper Cub that was ahead and to the left of his position. The pilot reported that he initiated a go-around, increasing engine power slightly, but not to takeoff power, as he looked for additional traffic to avoid. He estimated that he advanced the throttle levers "probably a third of the way to the stop," and, as he looked for traffic, the stall warning stick-shaker and stick-pusher systems activated almost simultaneously as the right wing stalled. The airplane subsequently collided with terrain in a nose down, right wing low attitude. A postaccident review of available air traffic control communications, amateur video of the accident sequence, controller and witness statements, and position data recovered from the accident airplane indicated that the Piper Cub was already airborne, had turned left, and was clear of runway 18R when the accident airplane turned from base to final. The postaccident examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. The airplane flight manual states that, in the event of a go-around, the pilot should first advance engine thrust to takeoff power and then establish Vref (reference landing approach speed). The pilot's decision not to select takeoff power during the go-around directly contributed to the development of the aerodynamic stall at a low altitude.

The airplane operated on Flight LH8460, a scheduled cargo service operating from Frankfurt (FRA) to Riyadh (RUH). It carried 80 tons of cargo. The accident flight departed Frankfurt about 05:16 local time (03:16 UTC), 2.5 hours later than originally scheduled due to minor maintenance issues. The accident flight was the first time the captain and first officer had flown together. The captain decided that the first officer, who had been employed with Lufthansa Cargo for 7 months and had not flown into Riyadh before, would fly the leg because he believed it would be an easy leg appropriate for the first officer. Cruise flight and approach to Riyadh were uneventful. The first officer indicated that he completed the approach briefing about 25 minutes before landing, calculating that he would use a flap setting of 35°, target 72 percent N1 rpm on final approach, expect a pitch attitude of about 4.5° on final approach, and commence the flare about 40 feet above ground level (agl). The flight was radar vectored to the instrument landing system of runway 33L, and the first officer flew the approach with a planned Vref of 158 knots. Convective conditions prevailed, with a temperature of 39°C and winds at 15 to 25 knots on a heading closely aligned with the landing runway. The aircraft was centered on the glide slope and localizer during the approach, until 25 seconds before touchdown when it dipped by half a dot below the glide slope. During that period, the indicated airspeed oscillated between 160 and 170 kt, centered about 166 kt. The ground speed was 164 kt until 20 sec. prior to touchdown, when it began to increase and reached 176 kt at touchdown. The flare was initiated by the first officer between 1.7 and 2.0 sec. before touchdown, that is: 23 to 31 feet above the runway. The main gear touchdown took place at 945 ft from the runway threshold at a descent rate of -13 ft/sec. (780 ft/min) resulting in a normal load factor of 2.1g. The aircraft bounced with the main gear reaching a maximum height of 4ft above the runway with the spoilers deployed to 30 degrees following main-wheel spin up. During this bounce, the captain who was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) pushed on the control column resulting in an unloading of the aircraft. The aircraft touched down a second time in a flat pitch attitude with both the main gear and nose gear contacting the runway, at a descent rate of -11 ft/sec. (660 ft/min), achieving a load factor of 3.0g. Just prior to this second touchdown, both pilots pulled on the control column, which combined with the rebound of the nose gear from the runway, resulted in a 14° pitch angle during the second bounce. Additionally, the spoilers reached their full extension of 60° following the compression of the nose gear strut during the second touchdown. During this second bounce, the main gear reached a height of 12 ft above the runway. Early in this second bounce, the captain pushed the control column to its forward limit and the elevators responded accordingly. Prior to the third and final touchdown, both pilots pulled back on the control column at slightly different times. Although the elevators responded accordingly and started to reduce the nose-down pitch rate, the aircraft was still pitching down at the third touchdown. During this third touchdown, the aircraft contacted the runway at a descent rate of -17 ft/sec (1020 ft/min), thus achieving a load factor of 4.4g. At this point, the aft fuselage ruptured behind the wing trailing edge. Two fuel lines were severed and fuel spilled within the left hand wheel well. A fire ignited and travelled to the upper cargo area. The captain attempted to maintain control of the aircraft within the runway boundaries. Not knowing about the aft fuselage being ruptured and dragging on the runway, the captain deployed the engine thrust reversers, but only the no. 1 and the no. 3 engines responded. The captain maintained directional control of the aircraft as best he could and requested the First Officer to declare a Mayday. The aircraft then went towards the left side of the runway as the captain attempted, without success, to maintain the aircraft on the runway. As the aircraft departed the runway, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to a full stop 8800 ft from the threshold of the runway and 300 ft left from the runway centerline. The fuel to the engines was cut off and both pilots evacuated the aircraft by using the slide at the Left One (L1) door. The mid portion of the aircraft was on fire.

Upon landing, one of the main landing gear collapsed. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. All occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was conducting the first leg of a positioning flight in an experimental, amateur built, tail-wheel turboprop airplane. During landing, the airplane touched down to the right of the runway centerline and departed the right side of the runway. The pilot then added engine power to attempt an aborted landing. The airplane lifted off the runway, pitched up at a steep angle, stalled, and impacted the ground. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions; however, a postcrash fire consumed the majority of the wreckage. The airplane's pitch trim actuator was observed in the landing position, which was the full nose-up position and would have resulted in a steep nose-up attitude during climb-out, if not corrected by the pilot. The pilot had accumulated about 1,930 hours of total flight experience; however, he only had 5 total hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane.

Following an uneventful flight from Tirana, the crew started the approach to Brač Airport in good weather conditions. After landing on runway 04, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, went through a fence, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a rocky area, bursting into flames. All five occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was partially destroyed by a post crash fire.

During the 3.5-hour flight preceding the accident flight, the airplane used about 156 gallons of the 196 gallons of usable fuel. After landing, the airplane was topped off with 156 gallons of fuel for the return flight. During the preflight inspection, a line serviceman at the fixed based operator observed the right main fuel tank sump become stuck in the open position. He estimated 5 to 6 gallons of fuel were lost before the sump seal was regained, but the exact amount of fuel lost could not be determined. The lost fuel was not replaced before the airplane departed. Data from an on board GPS unit indicate that the airplane flew the return leg at an altitude of about 4,500 feet mean sea level for about 4 hours. About 4 minutes after beginning the descent to the destination airport, the pilot requested to divert to a closer airport. The pilot was cleared for an approach to runway 18R at the new destination. While on approach to land, the pilot reported to the air traffic control tower controller, “we exhausted fuel.” The airplane descended and crashed into a forested area about 1/2 mile from the airport. Post accident examination of the right and left propellers noted no leading edge impact damage or signatures indicative of rotation at the time of impact. Examination of the airplane wreckage and engines found no malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot did not report any problems with the airplane or its fuel state before announcing the fuel was exhausted. His acceptance of the approach to runway 18R resulted in the airplane flying at least 1 mile further than if he had requested to land on runway 18L instead. If the pilot had declared an emergency and made an immediate approach to the closest runway when he realized the exhausted fuel state, he likely would have reached the airport. Toxicological testing revealed cyclobenzaprine and diphenhydramine in the pilot’s system at or above therapeutic levels. Both medications carry warnings that use may impair mental and/or physical abilities required for activities such as driving or operating heavy machinery. The airplane would have used about 186 gallons of fuel on the 4-hour return flight if the engines burned fuel at the same rate as the previous flight. The fuel lost during the preflight inspection and the additional 30 minutes of flight time on the return leg reduced the airplane’s usable fuel available to complete the planned flight, and the pilot likely did not recognize the low fuel state before the fuel was exhausted due to impairment by the medications he was taking.