Landing (descent or approach)

An inspection the left wings outboard tank was full and the main tank was empty. Both fuel selectors were also found on main tanks (left and right) position. Unsuccessful forced landing due to fuel starvation and the cause of the fire was undetermined. The left engine failed because of fuel exhaustion and the cause of fire could not be determined.

The non-fatal accident with An-26B RA-26061 aircraft was caused by its RWY overrun that resulted in aircraft structure damage. The accident was possible due to combination of the following factors:
- Pilot's error resulted in approach procedure correction up to the moment of landing resulted in offset approach towards unpaved RWY axis and considerably to the left from its axis;
- Non-compliance of unpaved RWY of "Deputatsky" Airport" condition with Civil aerodrome operation manual requirements RF-94, in part of interface between cleaned and uncleaned surface of unpaved RWY with slope no more than 1:10;
- Nose-left moment during main landing gear movement along interface from recent snow up to 30-50 cm as a result of both left landing gear wheels dipping into snow.

It was determined that the pilot continued the descent under VFR mode in IMC conditions, resulting in a controlled flight into terrain.

Collision with a deer during the landing roll, which resulted in a compromised fuel tank and a postimpact fire. In a telephone interview, the manager of the Greenwood County Airport explained that Greenwood was not an FAR Part 139 Airport, and while there was no published Wildlife Management Program for the airport, she had been very proactive about eradicating wildlife that could pose a hazard to safety on the airport property, primarily deer and wild turkey. She contacted the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for guidance and advice and she attended a wildlife management course. Among the suggestions offered by the USDA, was to remove the deer habitat. The manager proposed adding the area between the runway and taxiway to an approach clearing project in order to reduce the habitat. The manager worked with a local charity and local hunters with depredation permits to take deer on the airport property, and their efforts averaged 50 deer a year. The hunts were conducted in stands away from runways and on property not aviation related. The nearest deer stand was 1 mile from the runway, and the hunters fired only shotguns. The hunts were conducted between the hours of 0700 and 1000. On the morning of the accident, the last shot was fired at 0930.When asked why the hunters were still on the property at the time of the accident, the manager said they had stayed to eat lunch, and repeated that the hunt was long over and that the last shot was fired hours before the accident. She offered that the deer struck by the airplane was probably flushed from the woods by another deer or a coyote, whose population has also grown in recent years.After the accident, the Federal Aviation Administration contacted the state and had the Greenwood County Airport added to a list of airports where funding for improvements had been allotted. A second 10-foot perimeter fence was added around the existing 6-foot fence, and since its construction only 4 deer have been taken inside the perimeter, and no wild turkeys have been sighted

Incorrect installation of one or more washers on the nose gear torque link centre hinge made it impossible to lock the hinge shaft nut effectively. The unscrewing and the detachment of the latter in service caused the loss of nose gear steering. Free on its axle, the nose gear bogie began to shimmy, which made the aeroplane veer to the left. The aeroplane exited the runway and the nose gear collapsed during the collision with a concrete inspection pit for access to the runway lighting electric cables.The runway excursion was due to the incorrect and undetected re-assembly of the nose gear torque links. Despite the presence of a detailed diagram, the absence of clear and detailed instructions in the text of the manufacturer’s AMM, allowing the operator to ensure that the assembly was correct, contributed to the incorrect assembly. The failure of the nose gear was due to the collision with an obstacle in the runway  strip. The absence of any regulation requiring that equipment in the immediate vicinity of a runway or of a runway overrun area be designed so as to limit as much as possible any damage to aeroplanes, in case of a runway excursion, contributed to the accident.

The following findings were identified:
- The commander was overconfident in himself and the aircraft which led him to lose the critical capacity to discern the risks involved in the procedure that was adopting. Corroborating was the fact that the pilot judged he had much knowledge in this operation and knew exactly how the aircraft responded. It can be inferred there was complacency by the copilot on the actions of the commander, during the approach at high speed, because even feeling uncomfortable, he did not make an incisive interference because he believed in the idea that the commander had done this kind of approach, with high speed, and so knowing what he was doing.
- The pilot failed to identify the location of touch down during landing and not knowing how much runway was remaining, he decided he should not rush, thus demonstrating low situational awareness and lack of awareness, impacting the proper reaction time for the situation (Rush), which was not performed , leading the occurrence in question.
- The crew failed to properly assess the information available like speed and the runway length for the realization of a safe landing, which led to a poor judgment of the situation at hand, making the decision not to adopt the missed approach procedure.
- The distance between the crew, caused unconsciously by the commander's position with excess knowledge in the operation and the aircraft, and the insecurity of the copilot in considering new and inexperienced, resulted in a lack of assertiveness of the copilot to inform, with little emphasis, the commander of his perception of excessive airspeed.
- The crew did not adopt good crew resource management, failing to communicate with assertiveness and share critical information in time prior to landing, allowing the speeding remained present until the touchdown.
- Despite having adequate experience and training, the commander did not use the resources available, such as speed brakes to reduce the aircraft approach speed.
- The variable wind direction and predominantly tail intensity equal to or greater than 10 knots, allowed excessive speed during landing.
- The crew did not adopt good crew resource management, allowing the high speed to remain present until the touchdown.
- The commander thought he would be able to perform the approach and landing with the speed above the expected.

The following findings were identified:
- Fatigue is likely to have occurred, since there are reports of high workload, capable of affecting the perception, judgment, and decision making of the crew.
- In view of the fact that the captain displayed an attitude of gratefulness toward the company which hired him, working for consecutive hours and many times more than was prescribed for his daily routine, it is possible that such high motivation may have been present in the accident flight, harming his capacity to evaluate the conditions required for a safe flight.
- The crew neither gathered nor properly evaluated the available pieces of information for the correct refueling of the aircraft, something that led to their decision of not refueling the aircraft in SBDO.
- The company crews did not usually keep fuel records, and made approximate calculations based on the fuel remaining from previous flights, whose control parameters were not dependable. Such attitudes reflected a work-group culture that became apparent in this accident.
- The pilots were presumably undergoing a condition of stress on account of the company flight routine, in which they flew every day, with little time dedicated to rest or even holidays. Under such condition, the pilots may have had their cognitive processes affected, weakening their performance in flight.
- The flights had the objective of transporting valuables, causing concern in relation to security issues involving the aircraft on the ground. Thus, it is suspected that decisions made by the pilots may have been affected by this complexity, such as, for example, deciding not to refuel the aircraft on certain locations.
- The way the work was structured in the company was giving rise to overload due to the routine of many flights and few periods of rest or holidays. This situation may have affected the crew’s performance, interfering in the analysis of the conditions necessary for a safe flight.
- The company did not monitor the performance of its pilots for the identification of contingent deviations from standard procedures, such as non-compliance with the MGO.
- Failures in the application of operational norms, as well as in the communication between the crew members, may have occurred on account of inadequate management of tasks by each individual, such as, for example, the use of the checklist and the filling out of control forms relative to fuel consumption contained in the company MGO.
- The crew judged that the amount of fuel existing in the aircraft was sufficient for the flight in question.
- The fact that the fuel gauges were not indicating the correct quantity of fuel had direct influence on the flight outcome, since the planning factors and the pilots’ situational awareness were affected.
- The crew did not analyze appropriately the amount of fuel necessary for the flight leg between SBDO and SBBI. The Mission Order did not establish the minimum amount of fuel necessary for the flight legs, and the crew had to take responsibility for the decision.
- The company was not rigorous with the filling out of aircraft logbooks and cargo manifestos, resulting that it did not have control over the operational procedures performed by the crews, and this may have contributed to the aircraft taking off with an amount of fuel that was insufficient for the flight. Although the MGO had parameters established for calculating the endurance necessary for VFR/IFR flights, the company did not define the fuel necessary in the Mission Orders, transferring the responsibility for the decision to the aircraft captain.

The total loss of engine power as a result of a fractured compressor turbine blade due to high-cycle fatigue.