Landing (descent or approach)

The descent to Athens-Ellinikon was initiated by night and marginal weather conditions with mist. On approach, the captain informed ATC he was established on the ILS runway 33R when he realized something was wrong and initiated a go-around. This decision was too late and the aircraft struck the slope of Mt Hymettus (2,000 feet high) located 4,8 km southeast of the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all seven occupants were killed.

The crew completed a non precision approach to Žilina Airport in rainy conditions with a strong tailwind. As the aircraft was too long for landing, the crew decided to force the aircraft to land when it struck the runway surface and bounced to a height of 7 metres. It came down again and the nose gear touched the ground first and was torn off upon impact. Out of control, the aircraft veered to the right and came to rest in a grassy area. All nine occupants were rescued and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Upon landing, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 14 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew departed Wilmington-Air park (Clinton County Airport) on a local training flight. On final approach to runway 22, the crew forgot to lower the undercarriage and the aircraft landed on its belly. It slid for few dozen yards and came to rest on the main runway. All three occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The heavily loaded fuel tanker landed with an approximate 3 knot tailwind, overran the departure end of the runway, and came to a stop on a frozen river. The last two thirds of the 3,150 feet long gravel runway was covered with ice. The crew stated that the propellers either failed to go into reverse, or were slow in reversing, to assist in stopping. Examination revealed that all propeller blades were in the reversed position. Outside air temperature was minus 30 to minus 35° F. The airplane performance chart used to calculate the landing distance was for 'concrete runways'. Stopping distance was not predicated on the use of reverse propeller thrust. Post accident calculations, using the same chart, found the estimated landing distance needed for the accident flight to be 100 to 200 feet more than the length of the runway.

Damaged beyond repair following a very hard landing at Friedrichshafen-Bodensee Airport. There were no injuries.

The Dornier 228 originated from Lagos (LOS) at 07:00 UTC. Destination was Eket. Enroute, the captain briefed his copilot that the wind was northerly at 2 knots. He decided to use runway 19. He also briefed that they would descend to the Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) of 500 ft. and if they did not have the field in sight by then, they would carry out a missed approach, maintain runway heading and climb to 1,500 ft. From Lagos, they were cruising at 11,000 ft. and started the descent at about 77 nm from Port Harcourt, which was close to Eket. On clearance to 5000 ft by Port Harcourt Approach Control, the crew called Eket Control who descended them to 3,500 ft. At about 10 nm from Eket the NDB frequency was picked up and the crew informed Eket that they were leaving 3500ft for 1500. When the aircraft came overhead the NDB they shot the approach. On the outbound leg of 195 they turned 45° for a right procedure turn and still maintaining 1500ft. Flap 1 was selected with the speed lever set in the high RPM position. With the runway inbound on track 105 magnetic, the landing gear was selected in the down position and the aircraft was descended to 500ft. After 90 seconds into the final approach on runway 01, the co-pilot called out "runway-in-sight" but the captain thought the aircraft was high, so he announced he was overshooting, whereas, while giving evidence the co-pilot said she advised the overshoot when the ADF needle swung. Another approach was attempted. They came back to the same runway 01 to maintain the MDA and the runway was sighted from about 2 miles out at 400 feet height. The co-pilot thought the aeroplane was high and called for a missed approach. Then another landing attempt was made for runway 19. At about between 600 - 700 feet height above the approach path, the captain instructed his co-pilot "when you see the field, give me flaps 2, I am going to land". As soon as the co-pilot sighted the runway at about 2nm out, she selected flap 2. The captain descended for the field and while they came over the threshold, the speed was between 95 and 98 knots. Height above threshold was 300ft; the co-pilot felt that the aeroplane was high, but she thought that at flap 2 the aircraft was committed to land. This time the First Officer did not warn the captain though she felt that the aircraft was high. The captain said that he descended fast from 300ft with the target aim of touching down at about the 6th centre line marking from the threshold. After the touchdown, the captain applied reverse pitch but no effect of the deceleration was felt. He then moved the throttle levers to the maximum reverse position, yet there was no deceleration effect. The next action was to go on the brakes while the aircraft still had the rolling speed of about 80 knots. The captain felt that only the right brakes were effective because-the aeroplane skidded to the right; when there was no directional control, the captain said that he then used the opposite rudder for control. The commander was still fighting with the directional control when the aeroplane overran the end of the paved way at about 40 knots with the brakes still applied. The airplane sustained damage to the wheels and propellers. The fuselage was buckled just forward of the left wing leading-edge and at the fuselage/wing rear attachment point. Also the right hand side of the fuselage had bucklings at the forward section.

The commercial pilot was on a part 135 cargo flight. Since the destination airport had no weather reporting facility, company policy and far 135 required a VFR descent and landing from the MVA. The pilot requested and received clearance for a localizer approach to the airport, although a nearby airport was reporting 400' broken/3 miles with fog. The pilot reported to ATC that he had missed his first approach, and requested a second approach to the same airport. After executing the missed approach, the aircraft impacted mountainous terrain while aligned with the extended centerline of the localizer. Cap personnel reported that the accident site was obscured in clouds at the time of the accident. The investigation revealed that the aircraft descended about 1,500 feet below a minimum altitude on the first approach attempt. Mode c altitude data was lost during the missed approach. Four years earlier, this pilot descended below glidepath on an ILS approach and crashed into trees with weather below approach minimums. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

On approach to Stuttgart-Echterdingen Airport, the pilot apparently forgot to lower the landing gear. It is believed he tried to lower them just before touchdown but the aircraft landed on its belly (the undercarriage were partially extended) and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. The pilot was uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Landing at Teniente Rodolfo Marsh-Presidente Eduardo Frei Montalva Airport was completed on an icy and snowy runway. After touchdown, control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway, went down an embankment and came to rest. All 11 occupants were injured and the aircraft was destroyed.