Landing (descent or approach)

Suffered an accident while landing in an airfield somewhere in Namibia. There were no casualties but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. The mishap occurred somewhere in July 1994 (exact date unknown).

Crashed upon landing for unknown reasons. There were no casualties while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On approach to Dera Ismail Khan Airport, the crew encountered technical problems with the left engine. The captain decided to initiate a go-around. Flaps and undercarriage were retracted when the aircraft entered a stall condition, lost height and crashed in an open field. It slid on the ground for about 300 metres before coming to rest against trees. All 42 occupants were evacuated, among them three passengers were injured.

After landing at Siwandu Airfield, the twin engine airplane collided with a giraffe. The animal was killed and the aircraft was destroyed. The pilot escaped uninjured.

USAir Flight 1016 was a domestic flight from Columbia (CAE) to Charlotte (CLT). The DC-9 departed the gate on schedule at 18:10. The first officer was performing the duties of the flying pilot. The weather information provided to the flightcrew from USAir dispatch indicated that the conditions at Charlotte were similar to those encountered when the crew had departed there approximately one hour earlier. The only noted exception was the report of scattered thunderstorms in the area. Flight 1016 was airborne at 18:23 for the planned 35 minute flight. At 18:27, the captain of flight 1016 made initial contact with the Charlotte Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) controller and advised that the flight was at 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The controller replied "USAir ten sixteen ... expect runway one eight right." Shortly afterward the controller issued a clearance to the flightcrew to descend to 10,000 feet. At 18:29, the first officer commented "there's more rain than I thought there was ... it's startin ...pretty good a minute ago ... now it's held up." On their airborne weather radar the crew observed two cells, one located south and the second located east of the airport. The captain said "looks like that's [rain] setting just off the edge of the airport." One minute later, the captain contacted the controller and said "We're showing uh little buildup here it uh looks like it's sitting on the radial, we'd like to go about five degrees to the left to the ..." The controller replied "How far ahead are you looking ten sixteen?" The captain responded "About fifteen miles." The controller then replied "I'm going to turn you before you get there I'm going to turn you at about five miles northbound." The captain acknowledged the transmission, and, at 18:33, the controller directed the crew to turn the aircraft to a heading of three six zero. One minute later the flightcrew was issued a clearance to descend to 6,000 feet, and shortly thereafter contacted the Final Radar West controller. At 18:35 the Final Radar West controller transmitted "USAir ten sixteen ... maintain four thousand runway one eight right.'' The captain acknowledged the radio transmission and then stated to the first officer "approach brief." The first officer responded "visual back up ILS." Following the first officer's response, the controller issued a clearance to flight 1016 to "...turn ten degrees right descend and maintain two thousand three hundred vectors visual approach runway one eight right.'' At 18:36, the Final Radar West controller radioed flight 1016 and said "I'll tell you what USAir ten sixteen they got some rain just south of the field might be a little bit coming off north just expect the ILS now amend your altitude maintain three thousand." At 18:37, the controller instructed flight 1016 to ''turn right heading zero niner zero." At 18:38, the controller said "USAir ten sixteen turn right heading one seven zero four from SOPHE [the outer marker for runway 18R ILS] ... cross SOPHE at or above three thousand cleared ILS one eight right approach." As they were maneuvering the airplane from the base leg of the visual approach to final, both crew members had visual contact with the airport. The captain then contacted Charlotte Tower. The controller said "USAir ten sixteen ... runway one eight right cleared to land following an F-K one hundred short final, previous arrival reported a smooth ride all the way down the final." The pilot of the Fokker 100 in front also reported a "smooth ride". About 18:36, a special weather observation was recorded, which included: ... measured [cloud] ceiling 4,500 feet broken, visibility 6 miles, thunderstorm, light rain shower, haze, the temperature was 88 degrees Fahrenheit, the dewpoint was 67 degrees Fahrenheit, the wind was from 110 degrees at 16 knots .... This information was not broadcast until 1843; thus, the crew of flight 1016 did not receive the new ATIS. At 18:40, the Tower controller said "USAir ten sixteen the wind is showing one zero zero at one nine." This was followed a short time later by the controller saying "USAir ten sixteen wind now one one zero at two one." Then the Tower controller radioed a wind shear warning "windshear alert northeast boundary wind one nine zero at one three.'' On finals the DC-9 entered an area of rainfall and at 18:41:58, the first officer commented "there's, ooh, ten knots right there." This was followed by the captain saying "OK, you're plus twenty [knots] ... take it around, go to the right." A go around was initiated. The Tower controller noticed Flight 1016 going around "USAir ten sixteen understand you're on the go sir, fly runway heading, climb and maintain three thousand." The first officer initially rotated the airplane to the proper 15 degrees nose-up attitude during the missed approach. However, the thrust was set below the standard go-around EPR limit of 1.93, and the pitch attitude was reduced to 5 degrees nose down before the flightcrew recognized the dangerous situation. When the flaps were in transition from 40 to 15 degrees (about a 12-second cycle), the airplane encountered windshear. Although the DC-9 was equipped with an on-board windshear warning system, it did not activate for unknown reasons. The airplane stalled and impacted the ground at 18:42:35. Investigation revealed that the headwind encountered by flight 1016 during the approach between 18:40:40 and 18:42:00 was between 10 and 20 knots. The initial wind component, a headwind, increased from approximately 30 knots at 18:42:00 to 35 knots at 18:42:15. The maximum calculated headwind occurred at 18:42:17, and was calculated at about 39 knots. The airplane struck the ground after transitioning from a headwind of approximately 35 knots, at 18:42:21, to a tailwind of 26 knots (a change of 61 knots), over a 14 second period.

On approach to Tidjikdja Airport, the crew encountered poor visibility due to a sandstorm. Unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, the captain initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, the crew attempted a second approach while the weather conditions did not improve. At a height of about 25 metres above the airfield, the aircraft nosed down and violently struck the runway surface. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and out of control, the aircraft veered off runway and eventually collided with rocks, bursting into flames. Thirteen passengers were rescued while 80 other occupants were killed.

On approach to Lyon-Satolas Airport, the crew realized he was not properly aligned with the runway centerline and decided to initiate a go-around procedure. Power was added on both engines but the left engine failed to respond. The aircraft lost height and struck the runway surface with its left wing, bounced, overturned and came to rest upside down, bursting into flames. All 27 occupants were evacuated, among them nine were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

While descending to Abidjan-Félix Houphouët-Boigny Airport runway 21 by night, the captain reported runway in sight and was instructed by ATC to report on final. Few seconds later, the aircraft nosed down, entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed 4 km short of runway, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed and all 17 occupants were killed.

The pilot, sole on board, was taking part to an airshow at Aichach Airport. On final approach, the aircraft was too low when it struck an embankment located short of runway threshold. On impact, both main landing gears were torn off and the aircraft landed on its belly and came to rest. The pilot escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Buffalo Air Flight 526, a Douglas DC-3C freighter based in Yellowknife, was hauling jet fuel to Trout Lake from Fort Simpson, Northwest Territories, in support of forest fire suppression operations. Before the departure from Yellowknife to Trout Lake, the flight crew checked the en route weather and filed a company flight itinerary. Dispatch issued the flight crew an aircraft-fuel-load receipt which indicated that the aircraft had been fuelled the night before with a total fuel quantity of about 436 imperial gallons (imp. gal.): full main tanks (336 imp. gal.), and 50 gallons in each auxiliary tank (100 imp. gal.). The first officer confirmed this quantity with a fuel dip-stick borrowed from the refueller. At 07:40 mountain daylight saving time, the flight crew departed Yellowknife in accordance with visual flight rules (VFR). On board the aircraft were 17 full 45-imperial-gallon drums of Turbo-B jet fuel. At 09:25 the aircraft landed at Trout Lake, and the 17 drums of jet fuel were off-loaded; the aircraft then departed for Fort Simpson at 0945. The 82-nautical-mile (nm) flight to Fort Simpson was flown at an altitude of about 2,500 feet above sea level (asl); the flight crew reported encountering light headwinds. At 10:20 the aircraft landed at Fort Simpson. Once again 17 drums of jet fuel were loaded on board, then the aircraft departed at 10:49. The captain climbed the aircraft to an altitude of 3,500 feet asl. After he levelled off the aircraft, the captain adjusted the engines to 575 brake horsepower (bhp) settings. At 11:20, the aircraft landed at Trout Lake and the drums were off-loaded, and at 11:35 the aircraft was once again airborne on the second round-trip shuttle flight. Thirty-five minutes later the aircraft landed at Fort Simpson. While the cargo was being loaded on the aircraft, the flight crew discussed their different calculations regarding the aircraft's fuel quantity. The first officer indicated that the aircraft required fuel. The captain calculated that the aircraft had sufficient fuel remaining. The captain decided that they would refuel at Fort Simpson on the next shuttle flight; nonetheless, since the flight crew considered the cockpit fuel gauges unreliable, the captain requested that the first officer confirm the fuel quantity using a dip-stick. At 12:28, the aircraft departed Fort Simpson and climbed to 5,000 feet asl. About eight minutes later, the flight crew noticed that the fuel pressure was fluctuating, indicating that the auxiliary tanks were empty. The captain repositioned the fuel tank selectors to their respective main tanks and enquired about the dip-stick measurements. The first officer responded that he had not checked the fuel quantity because the fuel dip-stick was missing. The crew discussed the fuel quantity remaining and the captain calculated that the aircraft had approximately 45 minutes of fuel remaining. Following the 13:00 touchdown at Trout Lake, the cargo was unloaded and 31 empty fuel drums were loaded on board the aircraft for Fort Simpson. At 13:25 the aircraft departed Trout Lake. The first officer was the pilot flying (PF) the aircraft, and was in the right seat. The captain performed the duties of the pilot not flying (PNF). Twenty miles southwest of Fort Simpson, the PNF reported their position to Fort Simpson Flight Service Station (FSS). He also requested that the aircraft refueller be advised that they would require fuel on arrival. The flight crew then completed the descent checks and, at 10 miles southwest of the airport, the PNF updated FSS of their position and received the airport advisory. Approximately six miles from the airport, at an altitude of about 400 to 500 feet above ground level (agl), the PF advised the PNF that the left engine was losing fuel pressure. Shortly thereafter, the left engine lost power. Immediately, the PNF switched the left fuel boost pump to the ON position, and the left fuel selector from LEFT MAIN to LEFT AUXILIARY tank position. The engine resumed power momentarily, but lost power again. The PNF then switched the left fuel selector to the RIGHT AUXILIARY tank position and the engine regained power; however, it promptly lost power again. Realizing that the fuel had been depleted in three of the four tanks, the captain took control of the aircraft and headed straight for runway 31. As the captain called for the engine failure check for the left engine, the first officer advised the captain that the right engine was losing power. With a loss of power in both engines, and without sufficient altitude to glide to the airport, the first officer called the Fort Simpson FSS to advise that the flight crew would attempt a landing on the road (Mackenzie Highway) north of the Liard River. However, the approach to the road was unsuccessful and the aircraft crash-landed into a treed area. At about 14:03, several witnesses at the Liard River ferry crossing observed the aircraft flying low in a northwesterly direction. The aircraft was estimated to be at about 40 feet agl when it crossed overhead the ferry terminal and was descending. The witnesses reported that they heard the sound of the engines cutting in and out before the aircraft passed overhead their vantage points. They also reported seeing the landing gear being extended. The aircraft then disappeared from view behind the trees. Immediately thereafter, the aircraft struck trees near the road, and crashed about 1/2 nm short of runway 31. The aircraft had been flown for approximately 4 hours and 37 minutes since its last refuelling.