Landing (descent or approach)

After climbing to 18,400 feet msl, the pilot reported a turbocharger problem and reversed course. He said he 'may lose the left engine' and that he was unable to maintain altitude. He diverted to an alternate airport. During a right turn onto final approach, the airplane was observed to cross (overshoot) the extended centerline of the runway. It continued in a right turn back toward the centerline, and then entered a left turn to intercept the inbound course. The turn steepened, and then the airplane entered a spin and crashed 1/2 mile short of the runway. A warped flange and evidence of exhaust gas leakage were found on the Inconel exhaust system Wye collector, at the wastegate outlet of the left engine. Neither propeller was in a feather position. There was evidence that the left engine was providing low power during impact. A note on the pilot's clipboard indicated that the (left engine) fuel flow and cylinder head temperature went to zero, and the manifold pressure dropped to 10 inches. The note also indicated that the pilot switched the 'boost pump' to high, the fuel flow went to 260 psi, and manifold pressure increased to 18.5 inches. Calculations showed that the airplane's gross weight (GW) and center-of-gravity (CG) were 7,645 pounds and 158.32 inches. The maximum allowable GW and CG were 7,450 pounds and 158 inches. During impact, the flaps were fully extended. The 'Engine Inoperative Landing' procedure stated, 'Wing Flaps - DOWN when landing is assured.' Most of the pilot's flight time in the Cessna 421 was before 1985; no record was found of recurrent training in the airplane since 1984. Annual and turbocharger inspections were made at 78 and 120 flight hours, respectively, before the accident, but no logbook entries were made concerning maintenance or replacement parts for the exhaust system. All eight occupants were killed.

The aircraft was ferried from Kiev to Bamako with an intermediate stop in Tunis following a complete revision at the Antonov factory in Kiev. En route from Kiev to Tunis, while flying over the north part of Greece, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to divert to Thessaloniki-Makedonia Airport. As a radar (instrument) approach was not possible, the crew attempted to land under VFR mode in IMC conditions. On final, in limited visibility due to rain falls and fog, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 4 km short of runway. All six crew members were killed. It is possible that the crew encountered technical problems with fuel.

On approach to Posadas-Libertador General José de San Martín Airport, the crew encountered low visibility due to foggy conditions. Despite the fact he was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, the crew decided to continue the approach when the aircraft landed on the taxiway parallel to the runway. After a course of 800 metres, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was written off.

The local controller instructed the pilot to go-around because of inadequate spacing in the traffic pattern. While executing the go-around, the engine lost power and the airplane crashed on a bridge after colliding with the guard railing about 1 mile from the airport. The wreckage examination showed that the fuel line between the engine driven pump and the fuel control servo was empty. The left main tank leaked for about 5 minutes; the right main fuel tank was not compromised and contained between 5 and 10 gallons of fuel. Both auxiliary fuel tanks were empty. The fuel selector valve was found selected between the right main fuel tank and the off position. There were no other engine or airframe anomalies found.

The non-certificated pilot took a multiengine airplane without the owner's permission and attempted to fly around the traffic pattern. On base leg to final, the airplane was observed to stall, enter a nose down descent, and crash. The non-certificated pilot was apparently unaware that the static system ports had been taped over for avionics work.

Atlantic Southeast Airline Flight 529 was climbing through 18,000 feet, when a blade from the left propeller separated. This resulted in distortion of the left engine nacelle, excessive drag, loss of wing lift, and reduced directional control. The degraded performance resulted in a forced landing. While landing, the airplane passed through trees, impacted the ground, and was further damaged by post impact fire. An exam of the left propeller revealed the blade had failed due to a fatigue crack that originated from multiple corrosion pits in the taper bore surface of the blade spar. The crack had propagated toward the outside of the blade and around both sides of the taper bore. Due to 2 previous blade failures (separations), a borescope inspection procedure had been developed by Hamilton Standard to inspect returned blades (that had rejectable ultrasonic indications) for evidence of cracks, pits and corrosion. The accident blade was one of 490 rejected blades that had been sent to Hamilton Standard for further evaluation and possible repair. Maintenance technicians, who inspected the blade, lacked proper NDI familiarization training and specific equipment to identify the corrosion that resulted in fatigue. The captain and seven passengers were killed.

On August 20, 1995, about 1455 Atlantic standard time, a Government Aircraft Facilities N22B, registered to International Jet Center, operated by Hanaer Express as flight 501, collided with trees following loss of control, during the landing roll at the Jeremie Airport, Jeremie, Haiti. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and a VFR flight plan was filed for the scheduled, domestic, passenger flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and the airline transport-rated captain and first officer, and 12 passengers were not injured. The flight originated about 1405, from the Port-Au-Prince International Airport, Port-Au-Prince, Haiti.

As the flight approached the airport, radar data showed that it went into a shallow descending left turn away from the airport. Radar data was lost at about 650 feet agl with the ground speed about 100 knots. Witnesses observed the aircraft flying on a southerly heading and enter a spin or spiral from which it crashed nose first into the ground. Post-crash examination of the aircraft structure, flight controls, and engines showed no precrash failure or malfunction. Post-mortem examination of the pilot showed he had suffered a heart attack. The pilot had a history of heart disease, a previous heart attack, and heart bypass surgery. He held a special issuance faa medical certificate, due to his history of heart disease.

Following an uneventful cargo flight from Paris, the crew completed the landing on runway 05 by night. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure and selected spoilers and reverse thrust. The aircraft started to veer to the left so the captain decided to reduce the use of the reverse thrust systems. On a wet runway surface, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran at a speed of 10 knots. The aircraft sank on soft ground and the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft came to rest about 50 metres past the runway end and was damaged beyond repair. All six crew members escaped uninjured.

Following an uneventful flight from Guatemala City, the crew was cleared to start the descent to San Salvador-Comalapa Airport but encountered poor visibility due to the night and heavy rain falls. In thunderstorm activity, the crew was cleared to modify his route while descending to the airport. After being cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, the GPWS alarm sounded. The captain applied full power when the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located on the Mt San Vicente (Chichontepec Volcano - 2,181 metres high), about 25 km northeast from runway 25 threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 65 occupants were killed.