Landing (descent or approach)

The approach to Thessaloniki Airport was completed in poor weather conditions. The aircraft landed too far down the runway and after touchdown, the crew realized he could not stop the aircraft within the remaining distance so he decided to veer off runway to the right. While contacting soft ground, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft came to rest. All 35 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the wind was from 360° at 18 knots gusting to 28 knots with thunderstorm activity, rain falls and a visibility of 5 km.

On final approach to Matsu Nangan Airport, the twin engine aircraft struck the top of the Jade Hill located about one km short of runway and disintegrated on impact. A female passenger was seriously injured while 15 other occupants were killed. The only survivor died from his injuries few hours later. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to six km in rain. It was reported that the crew was initiating a go-around procedure when the aircraft struck the hill. Few hours after the accident, a man in charge to transmit weather conditions to the crew committed suicide at the airport.

On August 7, 1997, about 1248 Atlantic Standard Time, two Britten-Norman BN-2 airplanes, collided in flight, over the landing threshold of runway 08, at the Diego Jimenez Airport, Fajardo, Puerto Rico (PR). Both airplanes were conducting a visual approach at the uncontrolled airport. The pilot of N1202S, was executing a non-standard right traffic pattern approach to landing, while the pilot of N26JA was executing a standard left traffic pattern approach to landing. The airplanes collided over the approach threshold of runway 08, about 100 feet agl. Passengers on N26JA, stated that the other airplane was coming from the right much lower then their airplane and disappeared under them. The next time they saw the other airplane they were colliding into its tail section. Examination of both airplanes revealed no mechanical discrepancies.

Korean Air Flight 801 was a regular flight from Seoul to Guam. The Boeing 747-300 departed the gate about 21:27 and was airborne about 21:53. The captain was pilot-flying. Upon arrival to the Guam area, the first officer made initial contact with the Guam Combined Center/Radar Approach Control (CERAP) controller about 01:03, when the airplane was level at 41,000 feet and about 240 nm northwest of the NIMITZ VOR/DME. The CERAP controller told flight 801 to expect to land on runway 06L. About 01:10, the controller instructed flight 801 to "...descend at your discretion maintain two thousand six hundred." The first officer responded, "...descend two thousand six hundred pilot discretion." The captain then began briefing the first officer and the flight engineer about the approach and landing at Guam: "I will give you a short briefing...ILS is one one zero three...NIMITZ VOR is one one five three, the course zero six three, since the visibility is six, when we are in the visual approach, as I said before, set the VOR on number two and maintain the VOR for the TOD [top of descent], I will add three miles from the VOR, and start descent when we're about one hundred fifty five miles out. I will add some more speed above the target speed. Well, everything else is all right. In case of go-around, since it is VFR, while staying visual and turning to the right...request a radar vector...if not, we have to go to FLAKE...since the localizer glideslope is out, MDA is five hundred sixty feet and HAT [height above touchdown] is three hundred four feet...." About 01:13 the captain said, "we better start descent;" shortly thereafter, the first officer advised the controller that flight 801 was "leaving four one zero for two thousand six hundred." During the descent it appeared that the weather at Guam was worsening. At 01:24 requested a deviation 10 miles to the left to avoid severe weather. At 01:31 the first officer reported to the CERAP controller that the airplane was clear of cumulonimbus clouds and requested "radar vectors for runway six left." The controller instructed the flight crew to fly a heading of 120°. After this transmission, the flight crew performed the approach checklist and verified the radio frequency for the ILS to runway 06L. About 01:38 the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to "...turn left heading zero nine zero join localizer;" the first officer acknowledged this transmission. At that time, flight 801 was descending through 2,800 feet msl with the flaps extended 10° and the landing gear up. One minute later the controller stated, "Korean Air eight zero one cleared for ILS runway six left approach...glideslope unusable." The first officer responded, "Korean eight zero one roger...cleared ILS runway six left;" his response did not acknowledge that the glideslope was unusable. The flight engineer asked, "is the glideslope working? glideslope? yeh?" One second later, the captain responded, "yes, yes, it's working." About 01:40, an unidentified voice in the cockpit stated, "check the glideslope if working?" This statement was followed 1 second later by an unidentified voice in the cockpit asking, "why is it working?" The first officer responded, "not useable." The altitude alert system chime sounded and the airplane began to descend from an altitude of 2,640 feet msl at a point approximately 9 nm from the runway 06L threshold. About 01:40:22, an unidentified voice in the cockpit said, "glideslope is incorrect." As the airplane was descending through 2,400 feet msl, the first officer stated, "approaching fourteen hundred." About 4 seconds later, when the airplane was about 8 nm from the runway 06L threshold, the captain stated, "since today's glideslope condition is not good, we need to maintain one thousand four hundred forty. please set it." An unidentified voice in the cockpit then responded, "yes." About 01:40:42, the CERAP controller instructed flight 801 to contact the Agana control tower. The first officer contacted the Agana tower: "Korean air eight zero one intercept the localizer six left." The airplane was descending below 2,000 feet msl at a point 6.8 nm from the runway threshold (3.5 nm from the VOR). About 01:41:01, the Agana tower controller cleared flight 801 to land. About 01:41:14, as the airplane was descending through 1,800 feet msl, the first officer acknowledged the landing clearance, and the captain requested 30° of flaps. The first officer called for the landing checklist and at 01:41:33, the captain said, "look carefully" and "set five hundred sixty feet" (the published MDA). The first officer replied "set," the captain called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer began reading the landing checklist. About 01:41:42, as the airplane descended through 1,400 feet msl, the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) sounded with the radio altitude callout "one thousand [feet]." One second later, the captain stated, "no flags gear and flaps," to which the flight engineer responded, "no flags gear and flaps." About 01:41:46, the captain asked, "isn't glideslope working?" The captain then stated, "wiper on." About 01:41:53, the first officer again called for the landing checklist, and the flight engineer resumed reading the checklist items. About 01:41:59, when the airplane was descending through 1,100 feet msl at a point about 4.6 nm from the runway 06L threshold (approximately 1.3 nm from the VOR), the first officer stated "not in sight?" One second later, the GPWS radio altitude callout sounded: "five hundred [feet]." About 01:42:14, as the airplane was descending through 840 feet msl and the flight crew was performing the landing checklist, the GPWS issued a "minimums minimums" annunciation followed by a "sink rate" alert about 3 seconds later. The first officer responded, "sink rate okay". At that time the airplane was descending 1,400 feet per minute. About 01:42:19, as the airplane descended through 730 feet msl, the flight engineer stated, "two hundred [feet]," and the first officer said, "let's make a missed approach." About one second later, the flight engineer stated, "not in sight," and the first officer said, "not in sight, missed approach." About 01:42:22, as the airplane descended through approximately 680 feet msl, the nose began to pitch up and the flight engineer stated, "go around." When the captain stated "go around" power was added and airspeed began to increase. As the airplane descended through 670 feet msl, the autopilot disconnect warning sounded. The GPWS radio altitude callouts continued: "one hundred...fifty...forty...thirty...twenty [feet]." About 01:42:26, the airplane impacted hilly terrain at Nimitz Hill, Guam, about 660 feet msl and about 3.3 nm from the runway 06L -threshold. It struck trees and slid through dense vegetation before coming to rest. A post-impact fire broke out. It was established a.o. that the software fix for the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) system at Agana Center Radar Approach Control (CERAP) had rendered the program useless. A software patch had been installed since there had been complaints of the high rate of false MSAW alarms at Guam. This made KAL801's descent below MDA go undetected at the Agana CERAP.

The aircraft was on a private flight from Elstree to Shobdon in Herefordshire. The meteorological forecast indicated that a warm front was approaching Southern England from the south-west and conditions were generally deteriorating. The visibility on departure from Elstree at 1437 hrs was greater than 10 km with a broken cloud base at 2,500 feet. When the aircraft arrived at Shobdon the visibility was estimated to be 3 to 4 km in light drizzle with a cloud base at approximately 1,200 feet, and the surface wind was 090_/5 kt. The first radio contact between the aircraft and Shobdon was made at about 1502 hrs when the pilot called to say that he was inbound from Elstree. In response to this call he was passed the airfield details. The pilot later called when approaching Leominster and subsequently called downwind for Runway 09 which has a right-hand circuit. The operator of the ground to air radio facility at Shobdon saw the aircraft on the downwind leg abeam the tower at what appeared to be a normal circuit height. He did not observe the aircraft downwind but shortly afterward she heard a brief and indecipherable radio transmission which sounded like a scream. This same transmission was heard by an aircraft enthusiast who was monitoring the radio transmissions on his 'airband' radio. The radio operator repeatedly attempted to make contact with the aircraft but to no avail and so he instructed an aircraft refueller to inform the emergency services that an aircraft had crashed. Analysis of recorded radar data from the radar head at Clee Hill,Shropshire, indicates that the aircraft joined the downwind leg from the east at a height of 1,100 feet. This radar data shows that the aircraft then followed a normal ground track until towards the end of the downwind leg when there was an alteration of track to the left of about 20_ before the aircraft entered a right turn onto the base leg. At the same time as the aircraft altered track to the left it began a slow descent, at about 350 ft/min, from 1,100 feet to 600 feet, at which stage it disappeared below radar coverage. The average ground speed on the downwind leg was 112kt and this reduced to 100 kt as the aircraft descended. Two witnesses saw the aircraft in a position that equates to the base leg. The witness to the east of the aircraft track first heard the sound of an aircraft engine that was unusually loud and then saw the aircraft at an estimated height of 150 to 200 feet, it was descending slowly with the wings level. A loud "cough"from one of the engines was heard "as if it had backfired"followed by a puff of white smoke and then the sound of an engine increasing in RPM. The wings were then seen to rock from side to side as the aircraft went out of sight. The second witness,to the west of the aircraft track, described the aircraft flying very low, between 50 and 100 feet, and slowly descending. He saw that the wings were "wavering", the left wing then suddenly dropped until it achieved a bank angle of about 90_ at which stage the nose dropped and the aircraft disappeared behind some low trees and was heard to hit the ground. Some local farmers immediately went to the crash site. Initially there was no fire or smoke, but a small fire soon developed in the area of the right wing and this was quickly extinguished by the farmers.

The aircraft crashed while landing on runway 22R at Newark International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. The regularly scheduled cargo flight originated in Singapore on July 30 with intermediate stops in Penang, Malaysia; Taipei, Taiwan; and Anchorage, Alaska. The flight from Anchorage International Airport (ANC), Anchorage, Alaska, to EWR was conducted on an instrument flight rules flight plan and operated under provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. On board were the captain and first officer, who had taken over the flight in Anchorage for the final leg to EWR, one jumpseat passenger, and two cabin passengers. All five occupants received minor injuries in the crash and during subsequent egress through a cockpit window. The airplane was destroyed by impact and a post crash fire. According to flight plan and release documents, the airplane was dispatched to ANC with the No. 1 (left engine) thrust reverser inoperative. The flight plan time from ANC to EWR was 5 hours and 51 minutes—47 minutes shorter than the scheduled time of 6 hours and 38 minutes because of 45-knot tailwinds en route. The flight crew stated that at flight level (FL) 330 (about 33,000 feet mean sea level [msl]), the flight from ANC to EWR was routine and uneventful. At 0102:11, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Boston Air Route Traffic Control Center air traffic controller instructed flight 14 to descend and maintain FL180, according to the airplane’s cockpit voice recorder (CVR). About 0103, the captain and first officer discussed the approach and landing to runway 22R and the airplane’s landing performance. Using the airport performance laptop computer (APLC), the first officer determined that the airplane’s runway stopping distance would be approximately 6,080 feet using medium (MED) autobrakes. According to the CVR, at 0103:33, the flight crew then compared the APLC approximate landing distance for MED braking (6,080 feet) to the after-glideslope touchdown distance (6,860 feet) provided on the instrument approach plate. Based on the flight crew's calculation (6,860 – 6,080), MED braking provided a 780-foot margin after stopping. The flight crew then compared the APLC approximate landing distance for maximum (MAX) braking (5,030 feet) to the same 6,860-foot after-glideslope touchdown distance provided on the instrument approach plate. Based on the flight crew's calculation (6,860 – 5,030), MAX braking provided a 1,830-foot margin after stopping. On the basis of these calculations, the first officer suggested using MAX autobrakes. The captain agreed, stating “we got a lot of stuff going against us here so we’ll…start with max.” The first officer added, “I mean…I mean if we don’t have the reverser.” At 0114:22, the captain asked the first officer to advise the passengers that “we’re gonna have a pretty abrupt stop because of those brakes and the thrust reversers and all that stuff.” Twice during the approach, the captain asked the first officer to remind him to only use the No. 2 and No. 3 thrust reversers. At 0116:16, the captain noted that the left landing light was inoperative, adding “… just the right’s working.” The EWR tower controller cleared flight 14 to land at 0129:45 and advised the flight crew “winds two five zero at five.” At 0130:02, the first officer stated “max brakes” during the before-landing checklist. The captain replied “max brakes will be fine,” and the first officer responded “if they work.” At 0130:34, the captain stated “[landing gear] down in four green” and called for “flaps fifty.” At 0130:45, the captain disengaged the autopilot at an altitude of 1,200 feet during the approach and “hand flew” the airplane to touchdown. The autothrottles were engaged, as recommended by McDonnell Douglas and FedEx procedures. According to information from the airplane’s flight data recorder (FDR), the approach was flown on the glideslope and localizer until touchdown, and the airplane’s approach airspeed was about 158 knots until the flare. According to the CVR, the pilots had selected an approach reference speed of 157 knots, or Vref plus 5 knots. Altitude callouts were made by the on board central aural warning system (CAWS) at 1,000 feet and 500 feet, and the first officer called out minimums (211 feet) at 0132:03. At 0132:09, the first officer stated “brakes on max,” and CAWS callouts followed for 100, 50, 40, 30, 20, and 10 feet until the sound of initial touchdown at 0132:18.75. One-half second later, the CVR recorded an expletive by the captain. At 0132:20.26, the CVR recorded increasing high-frequency tones consistent with engine spool-up (accelerating engine rpms), and at 0132:21.06, the CVR recorded a decrease in high-frequency tones consistent with engine spool-down. The sound of a “loud thump” consistent with another touchdown was recorded at 0132:21.62. A series of expletives by the captain and first officer followed until sounds of “metallic breakup” were recorded at 0132:27. FDR data indicated that after the airplane’s initial touchdown, it became airborne and rolled to the right as it touched down again (see section 1.1.1 for a detailed description of the airplane’s performance during the landing sequence). The airplane continued to roll as it slid down the runway, coming to rest inverted about 5,126 feet beyond the runway threshold and about 580 feet to the right of the runway centerline. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The twin engine aircraft departed Nice-Côte d'Azur Airport on a regular schedule service to Florence, carrying 14 passengers and three crew members. On approach to Florence-Peretola Airport runway 23, the aircraft' speed was too high and after touchdown, it bounced several times and landed firmly 350 metres from the runway end. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, it overran, went through fences and eventually collided with an embankment and came to rest on the emergency lane of the motorway Florence - Pisa. The aircraft broke in two and the cockpit was destroyed on impact. All 15 people seating in the main cabin (14 passengers and the stewardess) were evacuated with minor injuries while both pilots were seriously injured. Two days later, one of them died from his injuries.

The approach to Calabar Airport runway 03 was completed in poor weather conditions with heavy rain falls, turbulences, clouds down to 240 metres and a visibility limited to 2,800 metres. On final, the aircraft was unstable and not properly aligned with the runway centerline. Upon touchdown, the left main gear landed on the grassy area to the left of the runway. The captain attempted to correct when the aircraft veered to the right back onto the runway and overran. It struck a ditch and came to rest 1,500 metres further, bursting into flames. A crew member was killed and 10 other occupants were injured.

The single engine aircraft landed at the Philip S. W. Goldson International Airport from San Pedro Airport, Ambergris Caye, with two passengers. The pilot remained in the aircraft on the apron while the two passengers disembarked. After receiving clearance from the Air Traffic Control Tower, V3-HFD, with no passengers, took off at 0720LT for the Belize City Municipal Airport. At 0722LT, the pilot reported by the Haulover Bridge and was instructed by ATC to change to frequency 122.8 MHz, which is the common broadcast frequency where pilots transmit their positions and intentions to each other. No further radio transmissions or distress calls were made to ATC after the pilot reported to Haulover Bridge. While approaching Belize City Municipal Airport at a very low altitude, the aircraft struck power cables and crashed onto a house located in the district Belama Phase 2, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found about 3 km southwest of runway 12 threshold. The pilot was killed and one people on the ground was injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

The crew was completing a training flight from Phuket to Ranong. While descending to Ranong Airport in poor weather conditions, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 48 km south of Ranon. Both pilots were killed.