Landing (descent or approach)

Following an uneventful flight from San José-Tobías Bolaños Airport, the crew started the descent to Tamarindo Airport runway 07. On short final, at a height of about 500 feet, control was lost and the aircraft crashed in a wooded area located 2 km short of runway. All eight occupants were injured while the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft with call sign OSL 1 145 which departed Abuja at 1225 hrs UTC (1.25 pm local time) with endurance of 2 hours 40 minutes was on a scheduled passenger flight enroute Port Harcourt with 110 Persons on Board (103 Passengers and 7 Crew) and the flight continued normally. At 1241 hours UTC, the aircraft cruising at FL240 (24,000ft) Above Sea Level (ASL) got in contact with Port Harcourt Approach Control. The Approach control gave the OSL 1145 in - bound clearance to expect no delay on ILS Approach to runway 21, QNH of 1008 and temperature of 33° C. At about 1242 hours UTC (1.42pm local), the Approach controller passed the 1230 hours UTC weather report to the aircraft as follows: Wind - 260° /02kts Visibility - 12km Weather - Nil Cloud - BKN 420m, few CB (N-SE) at 690m QNH - 1008HPA Temperature - 33° C. About 1250 hours UTC (1.50 pm local), the aircraft, which was 90 nautical miles to the station, contacted Approach Control for initial descent clearance and was cleared down to FL 160. The aircraft continued its descent until about 1300 hours UTC (2.00 pm local) when the crew asked Approach Control whether it was raining over the station to which the controller reported negative rain but scattered CB and the crew acknowledged. At 1304 hours UTC, the crew reported established on the glide and the localizer at 8 nautical miles to touch down. Then the Approach controller informed the aircraft of precipitation approaching the station from the direction of runway 21 and passed the aircraft to Tower for landing instructions. At 1305 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Tower and reported established on glide and localizer at 6 nautical miles to touch down. The controller then cleared the airplane to land on runway 21 but to exercise caution as the runway surface was slightly wet and the pilot acknowledged. At about 1308 hours UTC, the aircraft made impact with the grass strip between runway 21 and taxiway i.e. 70m to the left of the runway edge, and 540m from the runway 21 threshold. At about 60m from the first impact, the aircraft tail section impacted heavily with a concrete drainage culvert. The airplane then disintegrated and caught fire along its path spanning over 790m. The cockpit section and the forward fuselage were found at about 330m from the rest of the wreckage further down on the taxiway creating a total wreckage trail of 1 120m. Fire and rescue operations were carried out after which 7 survivors and 103 bodies were recovered. Five of the survivors died later in the hospital. The accident occurred in `Instrument Meteorological Conditions' (IMC) during the day.

The pilot had flown the airplane the day before the accident and after landing on the morning of the accident; she ordered fuel for the airplane. While exiting the airplane another pilot informed her that he had heard a "popping noise" coming from one of the engines. The pilot of the accident airplane elected to taxi to a run up area to conduct an engine run up. The fuel truck arrived at the run up area and the pilot elected not to refuel the airplane at that time and continued the run up. No anomalies were noted during the run up and the airplane was taxied back to the ramp and parked. The pilot arrived back at the airport later on the day of the accident and did not re-order fuel for the airplane nor did she recall checking the fuel tanks during the preflight inspection of the airplane. The pilot departed and was in cruise flight when she noticed the fuel light on the annunciator panel flickering. The pilot checked the fuel gauges and observed less than 100 pounds of fuel per-side indicated. The pilot declared low fuel with Columbia Approach Control controllers and requested to divert to the nearest airport, Orangeburg Municipal. The controller cleared the pilot for a visual approach to the airport and as she turned the airplane for final, the left engine lost power followed by the right engine. The pilot made a forced landing into the trees about 1/4 mile from the approach end of runway 36. The pilot exited the airplane and telephoned 911 emergency operators on her cell phone. The pilot stated she did not experience any mechanical problems with the airplane before the accident. Examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector revealed the fuel tanks were not ruptured and no fuel was present in the fuel tanks.

The four engine aircraft departed Tehran-Mehrabad Airport on a flight to Bandar Abbas, carrying 84 passengers and a crew of 10, among them several journalists from local newspapers and the Iranian National TV who were flying to Bandar Abbas to cover important military manoeuvres. Some eight minutes after takeoff, while climbing, the captain informed ATC about technical problems with the engine n°4 and elected to return to Tehran for an emergency landing. After being cleared to return, the crew started the descent when the aircraft stalled and crashed in a residential area located in the district of Yaft Abad, about 2 km south of runway 29L threshold. All 94 occupants were killed as well as 12 people leaving in a 9-floor building that was struck by the airplane. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced to 1,500 metres due to haze.

The airplane was on the final approach segment of an instrument flight rules (IFR) cross country flight that originated approximately 3 hours and 45 minutes prior to the accident when radio communications with the aircraft were lost. The aircraft wreckage was located the following day approximately 2.8 miles from the destination airport. The airplane impacted terrain in a vertical descent and flat attitude and came to rest upright on its fuselage and wings. The cockpit and cabin were intact and both wing assemblies remained attached to the fuselage. Evidence of forward velocity and/or leading edge deformation was not observed to the wings or fuselage. Mixed ice was noted along the leading edge of both wings. At the time of the accident, weather conditions were reported as low ceilings and low visibility due to snow and mist. The accident occurred during dark night conditions. Air traffic control (ATC) transcripts indicated that shortly after entering the holding pattern at 11,000 feet the pilot was issued an approach clearance for the ILS. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and approximately two minutes later ATC communications with the pilot were lost. Pilot logbook records showed that the pilot's total flight time was approximately 1,987 hours. In the six-month period preceding the accident, the pilot logged approximately 40 hours total time, 9 hours of actual instrument time and 7 instrument approaches in the accident airplane. The pilot's total night flying experience was approximately 51 hours. The pilot made no entries in his pilot logbook indicating that he had flown at night in the six-month time frame preceding the accident. Pilots flying the ILS approach prior to the accident aircraft reported mixed icing during the descent and final approach. Post accident examination of the aircraft revealed no evidence to indicate a mechanical malfunction or failure.

On 21 November 2005, the day before the accident, the pilot had completed a day of aerial topdressing in ZK-DZG, a New Zealand Aerospace Industries Fletcher FU24-950, then flown the aircraft with his loader-driver as a passenger to Whangarei Aerodrome. That evening the pilot contacted his operator’s (the company’s) chief engineer in Hamilton and said that the airspeed indicator in ZK-DZG was stuck on 80 knots. The chief engineer told him the pitot-static line for the indicator was probably blocked and to have a local aircraft engineer blow out the line. Early the next morning, the day of the accident, the pilot flew ZK-DZG with his loader-driver on board to an airstrip 50 km north-west of Whangarei to spread fertiliser on a farm property. As the morning progressed, the weather conditions became unsuitable for aerial topdressing. At about 1020, the pilot used his mobile telephone to talk to another company pilot at Kerikeri, and told him that the wind was too strong for further work. The conversation included general work-related issues and ended about 1045, with the pilot saying that he was shortly going to return to Whangarei and go to his motel. Before leaving for Whangarei, the pilot spoke with a truck driver who had delivered fertiliser to the airstrip about 1100. The driver commented later that the pilot said the wind had picked up enough to preclude further topdressing. After they had covered the fertiliser, the pilot told the driver that he and the loader-driver would fly to Whangarei. The driver did not recall anything untoward, except that the pilot had casually mentioned there was some electrical fault causing an amber light in the cockpit to flicker and that it would only be a problem if a second light came on. He said the pilot did not appear to be concerned about the light. The driver then left and did not see the aircraft depart. The pilot used his mobile telephone to tell an aircraft engineer at Whangarei Aerodrome about the airspeed indicator problem and asked him if he could have a look at it and blow out the pitot-static system. The engineer believed the call was made from the ground at about 1130, but he could not be certain of the time. The engineer agreed to rectify the problem and the pilot said he would arrive at the Aerodrome about noon. The engineer said he did not know that the pilot had spent the previous night in Whangarei or that the aircraft had been parked at the Aerodrome overnight. ZK-DZG was equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) and its navigation data was downloaded for analysis. From the data it was established that the aircraft departed from the airstrip at 1131 and flew for about 39 km on a track slightly right of the direct track to Whangarei Aerodrome, before altering heading direct to the aerodrome and Pukenui Forest located 5 km west of Whangarei city. A witness who had some aeroplane pilot flying experience, and was on a property close to the track of ZK-DZG, said he saw the aircraft fly past shortly after about 1130 at an estimated height of 500 feet. He watched it fly in the direction of Pukenui Forest for about 40 seconds before turning his head away. A short time later he turned again to look at the aircraft, which by then was just above the horizon about 2 ridges away. He said there was a strong, constant wind blowing from the right (south) of the aircraft, which appeared to be drifting sideways and rocking its wings. He then saw the aircraft enter a steep descending turn that seemed to tighten before it disappeared from view. He estimated it to have turned about 270 degrees. Another witness near the aircraft track and accident site reported seeing the aircraft at about 1140 flying just above the tree line and thought it might have been “dusting” the forest. The aircraft then turned and disappeared behind some trees. Other witnesses who heard or saw the aircraft described the weather as squally throughout the morning with strong winds from the south, and said that near the time of the accident there was no rain. The witnesses noticed nothing untoward with the aircraft itself, and at the time none was concerned that the aircraft may have been involved in an accident. The local aircraft engineer said he was not concerned when ZK-DZG did not arrive at Whangarei, because from his experience it was not unusual for agricultural pilots to change their plans at the last minute and to not inform the engineers. He described his conversation with the pilot as being casual and said the pilot did not mention that he was finishing topdressing for the day because of the weather. He thought the pilot was just trying to fit in the maintenance work and that his plans had changed. The pilot had not asked him to provide any search and rescue watch, nor did the engineer expect him to because he could not recall any pilot having asked him to do so. There was no evidence that the pilot made any radio calls during the flight. The frequency to which the radio was selected and its serviceability could not be determined because of the accident damage. At about 2200 a member of the pilot’s family contacted the emergency services when she became concerned that there had been no contact from the pilot. An extensive aerial search began at first light the next morning, and at about 1120 the wreckage of ZK-DZG was located about 50 metres (m) below a ridge in a heavily wooded area of Pukenui Forest, at an elevation of 920 feet above sea level. Both occupants were fatally injured.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft struck the right side of the runway while landing at Ratanakiri Airport. Upon impact, the right main gear collapsed and out of control, the aircraft veered off runway and came to rest. All 65 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft was performing a charter flight from Belize City to the private airstrip of Privacion desserving Blancaneaux Lodge with two US citizens in honeymoon and one pilot on board. At 1016LT, the pilot reported over La Democracia and all on board seems to be ok. While descending to Privacion Aerodrome, weather conditions deteriorated when the twin engine aircraft crashed in a wooded area located about 5 km from the destination. The wreckage was found at the end of the day in a mountainous terrain. Weather conditions deteriorated due to the tropical storm Gamma approaching Belize. All three occupants were killed.

The airplane was operated as an on-demand cargo flight that impacted trees and terrain about one mile from the destination airport during a non-precision approach. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The airplane was equipped with an "icing protection system" and a report by another airplane that flew the approach and landed without incident indicated that light rime icing was encountered during the approach. Radar data shows that the accident airplane flew the localizer course inbound and began a descent past the final approach fix. No mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation were noted with the airplane.

Following an uneventful flight from Manila, the crew started the approach to Catarman Airport. Weather conditions were marginal and the runway was wet due to rain falls. After landing on runway 04/22 which is 1,350 metres long, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran and came to rest in a paddy field. All 38 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair. Aquaplaning may be a factor.