Crash of a Douglas DC-9-15F in Saltillo: 1 killed

Date & Time: Jul 6, 2008 at 0113 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N199US
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hamilton – Shreveport – Saltillo
MSN:
47153/185
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
JUS199
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
7146
Captain / Total hours on type:
2587.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6842
Copilot / Total hours on type:
88
Aircraft flight hours:
54141
Aircraft flight cycles:
69161
Circumstances:
The aircraft departed Hamilton, Ontario, on a cargo flight to Saltillo, Coahuila, with an intermediate stop in Shreveport, LA, carrying two pilots and a load consisting of 4 tons of auto parts. The aircraft arrived in Shreveport at 2319LT and departed at 2348LT. On approach to Saltillo-Plan de Guadalupe Airport, the crew encountered low visibility due to poor weather conditions and dark night. On final approach to runway 17, as the captain was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, he decided to abandon the approach and initiated a go-around procedure. Nine seconds later, the aircraft stuck the ground and crashed 550 metres to the east of the runway 17 threshold, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed, the captain was killed and the copilot was seriously injured.
Probable cause:
The continuation of an unstable final approach without having the runway in sight and the consequent loss of control at low altitude in view of the imminent impact.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Weather conditions at the airport,
- Unstabilized approach,
- Crew fatigue,
- Lack of experience of the copilot,
- Failure to follow proper procedures,
- Lack of operational procedures,
- Not following proper Saltillo tower controller procedures,
- Lack of supervision by the authority,
- The coincidence of factors that individually would not represent a substantial increase in the risk of the operations, but that in this case were added, that is; late night flight, little experience of the co-pilot, omission of briefing by the captain, a single Jeppesen for two pilots, DME #2 inoperative, captain command bars inoperative, DME arc, ILS/DME approach, omission of fog bank report and finally saturation in the communications with the Monterrey Control Center.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31T Cheyenne II in Charallave: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 2, 2008 at 2321 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
YV-1165
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
San Cristóbal – Charallave
MSN:
31-7820067
YOM:
1978
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed San Cristóbal-Paramillo Airport on a private flight to Charallave with two passengers and one pilot on board. At 2319LT, he was cleared for a VOR-DME approach to runway 10. It was dark but the visibility was about 10 km. Shortly later, another aircraft on approach declared an emergency and became priority. The pilot was instructed to follow a holding pattern when two minutes later, the aircraft struck trees and crashed in a wooded and hilly terrain, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found the following morning 5,5 km northeast of the airport. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three occupants were killed.
Probable cause:
Given the circumstances in which the accident occurred, it would be considered a CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) type accident, which occurs as a result of unintentional impact on the ground, when the aircraft is under the control of the pilot in command. It is considered that the most probable cause of the accident was the loss of situational awareness, caused mainly by the concern that he was becoming distracted by the emergency of the aircraft preceding him on the approach, because of his administrative relationship with this aircraft and its crew.
Final Report:

Crash of an Airbus A310-324 in Khartoum: 30 killed

Date & Time: Jun 10, 2008 at 2026 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ST-ATN
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Amman – Damascus – Khartoum
MSN:
548
YOM:
1990
Flight number:
SD109
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
203
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
30
Captain / Total flying hours:
14180
Captain / Total hours on type:
3088.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9879
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3347
Aircraft flight hours:
53233
Aircraft flight cycles:
21524
Circumstances:
The Airbus 310 serial number 548 owned by Sudan Airways Was entered in Sudan Civil Register on 15/09/2007 , designated registration marks ST-ATN in accordance to registration certificate No. 0493 dated 15/09/2007 and issued with Certificate of airworthiness No AWP/COA/0203/2007 dated 19/09/2007. On the morning of 10th June at 8:30 hrs (local time 05:30 UTC) after arriving from Cairo with a deactivated no 1 engine reverse as being a carry forward defect and being labeled according to MEL, the captain accepted the aircraft to carry out its scheduled flight to Amman via Damascus. The trip en-route to Amman was uneventful. Same day in the afternoon, the Airbus A310, ST-ATN, was en-route flying from Damascus (Syria) to Khartoum (Sudan) with 203 passengers and 11 crew members on board. The Airbus approached Khartoum in the afternoon and due to bad weather conditions, the captain decided to divert to Port Sudan. The aircraft landed Port Sudan Airport normally and was refuelled with 20 tons of Jet A1. As mentioned by the Captain that he was in contact with Khartoum enquiring about the weather. After staying on ground at Port Sudan for about 1:15 hour, and being informed that the weather was getting better, the Captain decided to return back to Khartoum. A310, ST-ATN, took off to Khartoum where the captain initiated a night approach for the runway 36 as pilot flying. He got the clearance to land after the controller provided him with wind information (320° / 7 Kt) and runway condition (wet). The left engine thrust reverser was unserviceable and inhibited as per Minimum Equipment List (MEL) procedures. The aircraft landed smoothly about 17:26 UTC. R/W 36 landing and within 900 meters range from the threshold of R/W 36 as stated by the flying pilot. The captain reported that he experienced some difficulties in maintaining the aircraft on the centre line just after setting both thrust levers in the reverse position. Then he did not succeed in slowing down the aircraft nor could stop it before the end of the runway. The aircraft longitudinally overran the runway and came to a stop 215 meters after the runway end. Then it caught fire on its right side. The right hand slides could not be deployed, the crew and the passengers evacuated the aircraft from the left front slide, twenty nine passengers and one cabin crew were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
The accident was due to a long flaring distance (900 meters from R/W threshold) on a wet slippery runway without selecting Auto brake and with one deactivated engine reverse in such rainy conditions. The remaining available landing distance turned out to be too short to allow the captain to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway.
Contributing factors:
The wind information was not appropriate as it was tailwind at time of landing. The crew was not aware about the aircraft ground speed and the tailwind.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S off Alice Town

Date & Time: Jun 9, 2008 at 1401 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N501AP
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nassau – Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
500-3224
YOM:
1974
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On June 9, 2008, about 1401 eastern daylight time, an Aero Commander 500S, N501AP, registered to and operated by Gramar 500, Inc., experienced a loss of engine power in both engines and was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean about 1/2 mile south of North Bimini, Bahamas. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area and a visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight from Nassau International Airport (MYNN), Nassau, Bahamas, to Ft. Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. The airplane was destroyed due to salt water immersion, and the airline transport rated pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured. The pilot stated that when the flight was past Bimini, the right engine started running rough and losing power. He turned southeast to enter a left base for runway 09 at South Bimini Airport, and the left engine also began to run rough and lost power. The pilot ditched the aircraft, evacuated into a life raft, and was rescued by a pleasure boater. The pilot also stated that 25 gallons of fuel were added while at MYNN, for a total fuel supply of 90 gallons. Both engines were test run 8 days after the accident using a test propeller. Both engines ran to near maximum RPM. One magneto from each engine was replaced prior to the test run.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 in Sidra

Date & Time: Jun 8, 2008
Operator:
Registration:
5A-DAU
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sidra - Sidra
MSN:
570
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local training flight at Sidra Airport when the accident occurred in unknown circumstances. The aircraft came to rest in a sandy area with its undercarriage and left wing sheared off. Both pilots evacuated safely.

Crash of a Beechcraft C90B King Air in Contadora Island

Date & Time: Jun 6, 2008
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
HP-1635
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Panama City - Contadora Island
MSN:
LJ-1663
YOM:
2002
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The twin engine aircraft departed Panama City-Marcos A. Gelabert Airport at 0734LT on a private flight to Contadora Island with five passengers and one pilot on board. Following an uneventful flight, the aircraft landed on wet runway 35. It skidded then veered off runway to the left and came to rest in bushes. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crash of an Airbus A320-233 in Tegucigalpa: 5 killed

Date & Time: May 30, 2008 at 0940 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EI-TAF
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
San Salvador – Tegucigalpa – Miami
MSN:
1374
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
TA390
Country:
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
118
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
11899
Captain / Total hours on type:
8514.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1607
Copilot / Total hours on type:
250
Aircraft flight hours:
21957
Aircraft flight cycles:
9992
Circumstances:
A TACA Airlines Airbus A320, flight TA390, with Irish Registry EI-TAF, with 135 passengers and crew on board, overran at the end of the runway during landing at Tegucigalpa caused the deaths of three people on board and two on the ground. The government of Honduras delegated the conduct of investigation to the Salvadoran Civil Aviation Authorities, as provided for in Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention. In accordance with international agreements, France sent two investigators from the BEA (Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses), accompanied by five technical advisors from Airbus; United States sent two investigators from the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), accompanied by one advisor from FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) and one technical Advisor from IAE (International Aero Engine); and Ireland sent one investigator. Both flight recorders (CVR and DFDR) were recovered and taken to the NTSB in order to perform the read out. The following data result from the analysis done by the BEA and Airbus of the accident recorders, which have been processed within the NTSB facilities under the leadership of the in-charge Authorities. It is confirmed that the aircraft was dispatched without any deferred MEL item. Prior to landing, the wind information given by the ATC to the crew was 190°/10kt and ATC also confirmed that the runway was wet. The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF). Landing configuration was established with Slats/Flaps fully extended, gear down, ground spoilers armed, autobrake selected to MED. The aircraft landing weight was 63.5t (max landing weight 64.5t), Vapp 137kt. The aircraft was cleared to land on runway 02 and landed with Autopilot and Flight Directors OFF, and autothrust engaged in managed speed mode. At time of touch down, IAS was 139kt and Ground Speed (GS) was 159kt (estimated tailwind was 12kt from DFDR data analysis). The aircraft landed on runway 02 (Runway 02 is 3297 feet high and has a displaced threshold of 213m). The Landing Distance Available (LDA) for runway 02 is of 1649m. The touch down occurred at approximately 400m from the runway 02 displaced threshold. Immediately after touchdown, the crew selected MAX REV, and both engine reversers and the Ground Spoilers (G/S) deployed normally. The nosewheel touch down occurred 7s after the Main Landing Gear (MLG) following PF inputs. The crew applied manual braking 4s after MLG touch down and commanded maximum pedal braking in 10s (14s after MLG touch down). At 70 knots Indicated Airspeed Speed (IAS), upon Pilot Non Flying (PNF) call-out, the PF selected IDLE REV. The remaining distance to the runway end was approximately 190m. The aircraft overran the runway at 54kt and dropped down the 20 m embankment sustaining severe damage on impact with the ground. The landing performance analysis confirms that the landing performances are consistent with runway condition and crew actions.
Probable cause:
Contributing factors:
- Wrong approach configuration,
- Excessive speed upon landing,
- The aircraft landed too far down the runway with a tailwind component,
- On approach, the crew failed to recalculate the aircraft weight for landing and the landing distance,
- The non precision approach was completed in poor weather conditions, which increased the cockpit crew workload,
- The absence of a stopping zone at the end of runway 02 contributed to the severity of the occurrence,
- The runway surface was wet and not equipped with a water drainage system, which reduced the braking coefficient.
Final Report:

Crash of an Antonov AN-32B in Goma

Date & Time: May 26, 2008 at 1500 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
9Q-CMG
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Goma – Kalima
MSN:
32 01
YOM:
1993
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Few minutes after takeoff from Goma Airport, en route to Kalima, the crew reported engine problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. After touchdown, control was lost. The aircraft veered off runway to the right and collided with lava blocs. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were injured.

Crash of Beechcraft T-1A Jayhawk in Lubbock

Date & Time: May 21, 2008 at 2144 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
93-0633
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lubbock - Lubbock
MSN:
TT-90
YOM:
1993
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a night training flight on behalf of the U.S. Air Force 86th Flying Training Squadron, 47th Flying Training Wing, Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas. After several manoeuvres in the vicinity of the Lubbock-Preston Smith Airport, the crew started an non precision approach to runway 17R. At that time, weather conditions were not so good with rain showers and winds up to 40 knots. On final approach, the aircraft seems to sink and pitched down. The captain increased both engines power but the aircraft hit the ground 1,1 mile short of runway 17R threshold. On impact, the nose gear was sheared off and the aircraft came to rest in a field. Both pilots were slightly injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
Conjunction of poor weather conditions and crew errors. The aircraft encountered windshear with downburst on descent and the crew ignored warnings. The combination of the following human factors placed the aircraft in a dangerous weather environment: poor mission planning, inattention, complacency, lack of procedural knowledge and restricted vision.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Stehekin: 2 killed

Date & Time: May 17, 2008 at 1645 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N9558Q
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chelan - Stehekin
MSN:
1151
YOM:
1958
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
5747
Captain / Total hours on type:
637.00
Aircraft flight hours:
12070
Circumstances:
The amphibious-float-equipped airplane departed from a paved runway for the 40-nautical mile flight to its destination, where a water landing on a lake was to be made. The pilot did not raise the landing gear after takeoff. During the flight, the air was bumpy and turbulent, and this resulted in the gear advisory system activating numerous times. The purpose of the system is to alert the pilot of the landing gear position--up for a water landing or down for a runway landing--when the airspeed decreased below a set threshold value. The pilot disabled the system by pulling its circuit breaker because the alerts were becoming a nuisance; he intended to reset the breaker during descent, but did not do so. Upon reaching the destination, the pilot set up a 150- to 200-feet-per-minute rate of descent for a glassy water landing on the lake. With the landing gear in the down position, the airplane contacted the water and abruptly nosed over. The airplane came to rest floating inverted, suspended by the floats. The pilot reported that the day of the accident was his nineteenth consecutive duty day, including office duty and flight duty. He stated that he feels the lack of days off during the previous 19 days was a contributing factor to this accident. When asked what would have prevented the accident, the pilot suggested consistency in using the checklist. On two flights earlier in the day he had used a written checklist; on the accident flight he did not.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to retract the landing gear wheels prior to performing a water landing. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's disabling of the landing gear warning/advisory system and possible fatigue due to his work schedule.
Final Report: