Lubbock

The captain and first officer were assigned a two-leg overnight on-demand cargo flight. The flight crew were accustomed to flying night cargo flights, had regularly flown together, and were experienced pilots. The first leg of the trip was uneventful and was flown by the captain; however, their trip was delayed 2 hours and 20 minutes at the intermediate stop due to a delay in the freight arriving. The flight subsequently departed with the first officer as the pilot flying. While enroute, about forty minutes from the destination, the flight crew asked the air traffic controller about the NOTAMs for the instrument landing system (ILS) instrument approach procedure at the destination. The controller informed the flight crew of two NOTAMs: the first pertained to the ILS glidepath being unserviceable and the second applied to the localizer being unserviceable. When the controller read the first NOTAM, he stated he did not know what “GP” meant, which was the abbreviation for the glideslope/glidepath on the approach. The controller also informed the flight crew that the localizer NOTAM was not in effect until later in the morning after their expected arrival, which was consistent with the published NOTAM. The flight crew subsequently requested the ILS approach and when the flight was about 15 miles from the final approach fix, the controller cleared the flight for the ILS or localizer approach, to which the captain read back that they were cleared for the ILS approach. As the flight neared the final approach fix, the captain reported that they had the airport in sight; he cancelled the instrument flight rules flight plan, and the flight continued flying towards the runway. The airplane crossed the final approach fix off course, high, and fast. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript revealed that the captain repeatedly instructed the first officer to correct for the approach path deviations. Furthermore, the majority of the approach was conducted with a flight-idle power setting and no standard altitude callouts were made during the final approach. Instead of performing a go-around and acknowledging the unstable approach conditions, the captain instructed the first officer to use the air brakes on final approach to reduce the altitude and airspeed. Shortly after this comment was made, the captain announced that they were low on the approach and a few seconds later the captain announced that trees were observed in their flight path. The CVR captured sounds consistent with power increasing; however, the audible stall warning tone was also heard. Subsequently, the airplane continued its descent and impacted terrain about .70 nautical mile from the runway. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and both occupants were killed.

The instrument-rated private pilot was conducting a personal cross-country flight in the airplane. A review of the air traffic control transcripts and radar data revealed that the pilot was executing the RNAV GPS Y instrument approach to the runway. The air traffic controller then canceled the pilot's approach clearance and issued a heading change off of the approach course to provide spacing between a preceding aircraft. The pilot acknowledged the heading assignment. Radar data indicated that, after the controller cancelled the approach, the airplane began a left climbing turn from 5,600 to 5,800 ft, continued the left turn through the assigned 270 heading, and then descended rapidly. At that point, the airplane was no longer visible on the controller's radar display, and contact with the pilot was lost. The final recorded radar return showed the airplane at 5,100 ft. The airplane impacted a television tower guy wire, several power lines, and terrain, and then came to rest in an open field about 800 ft from the tower. A postaccident examination of the airplane and engine revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed rotational signatures on the first stage compressor blades and light rotational signatures in the compressor and power turbines, and debris was found in the engine's gas path, all of which are consistent with engine rotation at impact. A witness in the parking lot next to the television tower stated that he heard the accident airplane overhead, saw a large flash of light that filled his field of view, and then observed the television tower collapse on top of itself. Surveillance videos located 1.5 miles north-northeast and 0.3 mile north-northwest of the accident site showed the airplane in a left descending turn near the television tower. After it passed the television tower, multiple bright flashes of light were observed, which were consistent with the airplane impacting the television tower guy wire and then the power lines. Further, the radar track and accident wreckage were consistent with a rapid, descending left turn to impact. Weather conditions were conducive to the accumulation of ice at the destination airport about the time that the pilot initiated the left turn. It is likely that the airplane accumulated at least light structural icing during the descent and that this affected the airplane's controllability. Also, the airplane likely encountered wind gusting up to 31 knots as it was turning; this also could have affected the airplane's controllability. The night, instrument meteorological conditions at the time of the accident were conducive to the development of spatial disorientation, and the airplane's rapid, descending left turn to impact is consistent with the pilot's loss of airplane control due to spatial disorientation. Therefore, based on the available evidence, it is likely that, while initiating the climbing left turn, the pilot became spatially disoriented, which resulted in his loss of airplane control and his failure to see and avoid the tower guy wire, and that light ice accumulation on the airplane and the gusting wind negatively affected the airplane's controllability.

The pilot reported that he performed the takeoff with the airplane at gross weight and with the flaps up and the engine set for maximum power, which he verified by reading the instruments. During the takeoff, the airplane accelerated and achieved liftoff about 65 to 70 mph and then climbed a couple hundred feet before the pilot began to lower the nose to accelerate to normal climb speed (90 to 100 mph). The airplane then stopped climbing and would not accelerate more than 80 mph. While the pilot attempted to maintain altitude, the airplane decelerated to 70 mph with the engine still at the full-power setting. With insufficient runway remaining to land, the pilot made a shallow right turn toward lower terrain and subsequently made a hard landing in a field. The pilot likely allowed the airplane to climb out of ground effect before establishing a proper pitch attitude and airspeed for the climb, which resulted in the airplane inadvertently entering a “region of reversed command” at a low altitude. In this state, the airplane may be incapable of climbing and would require either more engine power or further lowering of the airplane’s nose to increase airspeed. Because engine power was already at its maximum and the airplane was at a low altitude, the pilot was unable to take remedial action to fly out of the region of reversed command.

Aircraft was on an instrument approach when it crashed short of the runway at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport, Lubbock, Texas. The captain sustained serious injuries, and the first officer sustained minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to FedEx Corporation and operated by Empire Airlines, Inc., as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 supplemental cargo flight. The flight departed from Fort Worth Alliance Airport, Fort Worth, Texas, about 0313. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.

The crew was completing a night training flight on behalf of the U.S. Air Force 86th Flying Training Squadron, 47th Flying Training Wing, Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas. After several manoeuvres in the vicinity of the Lubbock-Preston Smith Airport, the crew started an non precision approach to runway 17R. At that time, weather conditions were not so good with rain showers and winds up to 40 knots. On final approach, the aircraft seems to sink and pitched down. The captain increased both engines power but the aircraft hit the ground 1,1 mile short of runway 17R threshold. On impact, the nose gear was sheared off and the aircraft came to rest in a field. Both pilots were slightly injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While in cruise flight at 9,000 feet MSL, the left engine began to 'run rough and lose power.' The pilot said he interpreted the problem as carburetor icing and applied carburetor heat. With the engine still running rough, the left propeller was feathered and the left engine shut down. Restart attempts were not successful. Unable to maintain altitude, the pilot requested to land at a nearby airport. After descending through IMC weather, the pilot realized that he would not make it to the airport, and executed a forced landing to rough/uneven terrain. Examination of the engines revealed that the alternate air doors were missing on the right and left engine. The hinges for the doors were attached to both carburetors and showed no evidence of distortion or impact damage. The doors were not found at the wreckage site. A missing alternate air door would allow ambient air to enter the carburetor, rendering the carburetor heating system ineffective. According to carburetor icing probability charts, the reported temperature and dew point values would be favorable to the formation of induction system icing.

During the night before the accident, freezing rain followed later by snow, fell on the ramp where the airplane was parked. A witness reported that while assisting the pilot in removing snow from the airplane, he noted that 80% of the wing was covered with a coarse layer of ice, from 1/16 to 3/16 in thickness, that was not removed before flight. After the accident, a fireman from the city of lubbock fire department noted ice on the wing approximately 1/16th of an inch thick that had a rough texture that looked as if deposited by freezing rain. The pilot reported that shortly after take off she heard a power decrease and felt surges in the aircraft. The pilot then looked for a place to land. A detailed examination of the engine revealed no mechanical deficiencies.

The pilot did not declare an emergency or mention to the tower controller that his fuel was low. He was first told to enter right traffic for runway 17R but was subsequently told to enter right traffic for runway 26. (This was to allow a DEA aircraft, at its pilot's request, to land before the Cessna 340A aircraft. DEA aircraft reportedly had been trailing the Cessna since it crossed the border from Mexico into the United States). Shortly afterwards the Cessna pilot informed the Lubbock control tower that he was landing on runway 17. The aircraft experienced fuel exhaustion and impacted in a cotton field about two miles northeast of the airport before the landing could be accomplished. A post accident examination reportedly revealed that illegal cargo was aboard the aircraft. Both occupants were injured.

The crew was completing a single engine positioning flight from El Paso to Lubbock. En route, the remaining engine failed, forcing the crew to attempt an emergency landing. The airplane belly landed in a desert area located in the region of Seminole. Both occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew was engaged in a check of the Lubbock Airport facilities. During the takeoff roll, the airplane became uncontrollable, veered off runway and came to rest with its undercarriage raised. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.