Flight

While performing a training mission in the vicinity of Okcheon, the aircraft suffered an engine failure. The pilot-in-command decided to ditch the aircraft in a river located in the suburb of Okcheon. Upon landing, both left wings were partially torn off and the aircraft came to rest in shallow water. All four crew members evacuated safely and the airplane was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane collided with mountainous, tree-covered terrain about 24 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska. The commercial pilot and eight passengers sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The airplane was owned by Pantechnicon Aviation, of Minden, Nevada, and operated by Promech Air, Inc., of Ketchikan. The flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand sightseeing flight; a company visual flight rules flight plan (by which the company performed its own flight-following) was in effect. Marginal visual flight rules conditions were reported in the area at the time of the accident. The flight departed about 1207 from Rudyerd Bay about 44 miles east-northeast of Ketchikan and was en route to the operator’s base at the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base, Ketchikan. The accident airplane was the third of four Promech-operated float-equipped airplanes that departed at approximate 5-minute intervals from a floating dock in Rudyerd Bay. The accident flight and the two Promech flights that departed before it were carrying cruise-ship passengers who had a 1230 “all aboard” time for their cruise ship that was scheduled to depart at 1300. (The fourth flight had no passengers but was repositioning to Ketchikan for a tour scheduled at 1230; the accident pilot also had his next tour scheduled for 1230.) The sightseeing tour flight, which the cruise ship passengers had purchased from the cruise line as a shore excursion, overflew remote inland fjords; coastal waterways; and mountainous, tree-covered terrain in the Misty Fjords National Monument Wilderness. Promech pilots could choose between two standard tour routes between Rudyerd Bay and Ketchikan, referred to as the “short route” (which is about 52 nautical miles [nm], takes about 25 minutes to complete, and is primarily over land) and the “long route” (which is about 63 nm, takes about 30 minutes to complete, and is primarily over seawater channels). Although the long route was less scenic, it was generally preferred in poor weather conditions because it was primarily over water, which enabled the pilots to fly at lower altitudes (beneath cloud layers) and perform an emergency or precautionary landing, if needed. Route choice was at each pilot’s discretion based on the pilot’s assessment of the weather. The accident pilot and two other Promech pilots (one of whom was repositioning an empty airplane) chose the short route for the return leg, while the pilot of the second Promech flight to depart chose the long route. Information obtained from weather observation sources, weather cameras, and photographs and videos recovered from the portable electronic devices (PEDs) of passengers on board the accident flight and other tour flights in the area provided evidence that the accident flight encountered deteriorating weather conditions. Further, at the time of the accident, the terrain at the accident site was likely obscured by overcast clouds with visibility restricted in rain and mist. Although the accident pilot had climbed the airplane to an altitude that would have provided safe terrain clearance had he followed the typical short route (which required the flight to pass two nearly identical mountains before turning west), the pilot instead deviated from that route and turned the airplane west early (after it passed only the first of the two mountains). The pilot’s route deviation placed the airplane on a collision course with a 1,900-ft mountain, which it struck at an elevation of about 1,600 ft mean sea level. In the final 2 seconds of the flight, the airplane pitched up rapidly before colliding with terrain. The timing of this aggressive pitch-up maneuver strongly supports the scenario that the pilot continued the flight into near-zero visibility conditions, and, as soon as he realized that the flight was on a collision course with the terrain, he pulled aggressively on the elevator flight controls in an ineffective attempt to avoid the terrain. Although Promech’s General Operations Manual specified that both the pilot and the flight scheduler must jointly agree that a flight can be conducted safely before it is launched, no such explicit concurrence occurred between the accident pilot and the flight scheduler (or any member of company management) before the accident flight. As a result, the decision to initiate the accident tour rested solely with the accident pilot, who had less than 2 months’ experience flying air tours in Southeast Alaska and had demonstrated difficulty calibrating his own risk tolerance for conducting tour flights in weather that was marginal or below Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) minimums. Further, evidence from the accident tour flight and the pilot’s previous tour flights support that the pilot’s decisions regarding his tour flights were influenced by schedule pressure; his attempt to emulate the behavior of other, more experienced pilots whose flights he was following; and Promech’s organizational culture, which tacitly endorsed flying in hazardous weather conditions, as evidenced (in part) by the company president/chief executive officer’s own tour flight below FAA minimums on the day of the accident.

The twin engine airplane departed Nuquí Airport at 1256LT on a flight to Quibdó, carrying two passengers and one pilot. Two minutes after takeoff, the pilot informed ATC he was flying at an altitude of 1,500 feet and estimated his ETA at Quibdó-El Caraño Airport at 1315LT. Nine minutes into the flight, while cruising in IMC conditions, the aircraft contacted trees and crashed in a dense wooded area located near Serranía del Baudó, some 50 km north of Nuquí. SAR operations were initiated but the wreckage was found five days later only. Both passengers, a female aged 18 and her baby aged 8 months were evacuated with minor injuries while the pilot was killed. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces.

The single engine aircraft departed Kodinsk at 1400LT on a survey flight, carrying five fire bombers and four crew members (two pilots and two observers). About two hours into the flight, the occupant spotted a fire. All five fire bombers were dropped with their materials in two groups. Then the crew increased engine power and continued at an altitude of about 150-200 metres. The engine oil temperature started to increase and reached 150°. Five minutes later, the engine failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft impacted 20 metres tall trees, stalled and crashed in a wooded area. The wreckage was found south of Kezhma, some 126 km east of Kodinsk. All four occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was destroyed.

The single engine aircraft was engaged in a crop spraying mission on behalf of the Mikhail Farm located in the Tatsinsky District of the Rostov Region. The aircraft was carrying 400 kilos of fuel, 1,200 liters of pesticides, one pilot and one boy aged 13, the son of the farmer. Few minutes after takeoff, while approaching the area to be treated at a height of about 20-25 metres and at a speed of 130 km/h, the engine failed. The aircraft lost height, collided with power cables and crashed in a field, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found 2 km from the Mikhail farmhouse. The pilot escaped unhurt while the boy was injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The crew departed Chennai NAS at 1730LT on a maritime patrol flight along the Tamil Nadu coast and over the Palk Bay. The last radio contact was established at 2100LT and the last radar contact was observed at 2123LT while the aircraft was cruising at an altitude of 9,000 feet some 176 km offshore. SAR operations were initiated and some debris were found the following morning. All three occupants, two pilots and one observer, were killed. On July 10, the wreckage was found at a depth of 995 metres some 30 km off Pichavaram.

The pilot departed on a postmaintenance test flight during day visual meteorological conditions. According to the operator, the purpose of the flight was to break in six recently installed engine cylinders, and the flight was expected to last 3.5 hours. Recorded automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast data showed that the airplane was operating at altitudes of less than 500 ft mean sea level for the majority of the flight. The data ended about 3 hours after takeoff with the airplane located about 23 miles from the accident site. There were no witnesses to the accident, which occurred in a remote area. When the airplane did not return, the operator reported to the Federal Aviation Administration that the airplane was overdue. Searchers subsequently discovered the fragmented wreckage submerged in a swift moving river, about 40 miles southeast of the departure/destination airport. Postmortem toxicology tests identified 21% carboxyhemoglobin (carbon monoxide) in the pilot's blood. The pilot was a nonsmoker, and nonsmokers normally have no more than 3% carboxyhemoglobin. There was no evidence of postimpact fire; therefore, it is likely that the pilot's elevated carboxyhemoglobin level was from acute exposure to carbon monoxide during the 3 hours of flight time before the accident. As the pilot did not notify air traffic control or the operator's home base of any problems during the flight, it is unlikely that he was aware that there was carbon monoxide present. Early symptoms of carbon monoxide exposure may include headache, malaise, nausea, and dizziness. Carboxyhemoglobin levels between 10% and 20% can result in confusion, impaired judgment, and difficulty concentrating. While it is not possible to determine the exact symptoms the pilot experienced, it is likely that the pilot had symptoms that may have been distracting as well as some degree of impairment in his judgment and concentration. Given the low altitudes at which he was operating the airplane, he had little margin for error. Thus, it is likely that the carbon monoxide exposure adversely affected the pilot's performance and contributed to his failure to maintain clearance from the terrain. According to the operator, the airplane had a "winter heat kit" installed, which modified the airplane's original cabin heat system. The modification incorporated an additional exhaust/heat shroud system designed to provide increased cabin heat during wintertime operations. Review of maintenance records revealed that the modification had not been installed in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration field approval procedures. Examination of the recovered wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Examination of the airplane's right side exhaust/heat exchanger did not reveal any leaks or fractures that would have led to carbon monoxide in the cabin. Because the left side exhaust/heat exchanger was
not recovered, it was not possible to determine whether it was the source of the carbon monoxide.

The twin engine airplane departed Miranda-Estância Caimam Airfield at 0915LT on a charter flight to Campo Grande, carrying seven passengers and two pilots. About 35 minutes into the flight, while flying 79 km from the destination in good weather conditions, the left engine failed. The crew was unable to feather the propeller and to maintain a safe altitude, so he decided to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft belly landed in an agriculture area, slid for few dozen metres and came to rest. All nine occupants suffered minor injuries and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The crew took off from a small airfield located in the suburb of Manaus at the end of the day with a load of 616 small packages containing cocaine. After entering the Venezuelan Airspace without clearance, the crew was contacted twice by ATC but failed to answer. Authorities decided to send two fighters to establish a visual and radio contact with the crew but without success as, due to the low visibility caused by night and poor weather conditions, the crew of the Navajo was able to continue the flight without further problem. Nevertheless, three hours later, the twin engine aircraft was again localized passing over the State of Cojedes, and the decision was taken to shoot it down. Out of control, the Navajo crashed in a pasture located in the region of Ricaurte, and was totally destroyed by impact forces. Both pilots were killed and a load of narcotics was found. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was illegally registered YV1246 as a sticker has been affixed above the official Brazilian registration PT-RCN.

The aircraft took off in the day from an airfield located in Venezuela with two passengers, two pilots and a load of 1,3 ton of narcotics, en route to Central America. While cruising over the Caribbean Sea off the Colombian coast, the aircraft was intercepted by a Colombian Air Force fighter. In unclear situation, the right engine of the Hawker caught fire (shot down ?). The crew descended in a low nose down attitude until the aircraft impacted the sea and disintegrated. All four occupants were killed and the load of narcotics was found floating on water. Three dead bodies and some debris of the aircraft were found few days later on a beach located northeast of Puerto Colombia. The aircraft was identified as N917TF which departed Fort Lauderdale-Executive Airport, Florida for Toluca, Mexico on May 1, 2015. It was formally cancelled from the U.S. register on June 2, 2015 as exported to Mexico.