Trans World Airlines - TWA

On December 16, 1960, at 1033 e.s.t., a collision between Trans World Airlines Model 1049A Constellation, N6907C, and a United Air Lines DC-8, N8013U, occurred near Miller Army Air Field, Staten Island, New York. Trans World Airlines Flight 266 originated at Dayton, Ohio. The destination was LaGuardia Airport, New York, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohio United Air Lines Flight 826 was a non-stop service originating at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, with its destination New York International Airport, New York. Both aircraft were operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Following the collision the Constellation fell on Miller Army Field, and the DC-8 continued in a northeasterly direction, crashing into Sterling place near Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All 128 occupants of both aircraft and 6 persons on the ground in Brooklyn were fatally injured. There was considerable damage to property in the area of the ground impact of the DC-8. TWA Flight 266 departed Port Columbus Airport at 0900, operating routinely under Air Traffic Control into the New York area The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) subsequently advised that radar contact had been established and cleared the flight to the Linden. Intersection, Control of the flight was subsequently transferred to LaGuardia Approach Control. When the flight was about over the Linden Intersection, LaGuardia Approach Control began vectoring TWA 266 by radar to the final approach course for a landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Shortly thereafter TWA 266 was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, and was twice advised of traffic in the vicinity on a northeasterly heading. Following the transmission of this information the radar targets appeared to merge on the LaGuardia Approach Control radar scope, and communications with TWA 266 were lost. United Air Lines Flight 826 operated routinely between Chicago and the New York area, contacting the New York ARTCC at 1012 Shortly thereafter the New York Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very high frequency omni directional radio range station (VOR) direct to the Robbinsville, New Jersey, VOR, and thence to the Preston Intersection via Victor Airway 123. At approximately 1021, UAL 826 contacted Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their company that the No. 2 receiver accessory unit was inoperative, which would indicate that one of the aircraft's two VHF radio navigational receivers was not functioning. A "fix" is established by the intersection of two radials from two separate radio range stations. With one unit inoperative the cross-bearings necessary can be taken by tuning the remaining receiver from one station to the other. This process consumes considerable time, however, and is not as accurate as the simultaneous display of information on two separate position deviation indicators While UAL 826 advised the company that one unit was inoperative, Air Traffic Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new routing which shortened the distance to Preston by approximately 11 miles. As a result, this reduced the amount of time available to the crew to retune the single radio receiver to either the Colt' s Neck, New Jersey, or Solberg, New Jersey, VOR in order to establish the cross-bearing with Victor 123, which would identify the Preston Intersection. In the event the crew would not attempt to retune the single VOR receiver, crossbearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken with the aircraft direction finding (ADF) equipment. This would be a means of identifying the Preston Intersection but, under the circumstances, would require rapid mental calculation in the interpretation of a display which could be easily misread. Several factors support the conclusion that this occurred. Instructions had been issued to UAL 826 for holding at the Preston Intersection the clearance limit, should holding be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewild Airport would be received from Idlewild Approach Control and the transfer of control of the flight from the New York Center to Idlewild Approach Control would normally take place as the aircraft was approaching Preston. UAL 826 was not receiving radar vectors, but was providing its own navigation. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewild Approach Control, stating "United 826 approaching Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. At the time UAL 826 advised it was approaching Preston it had in fact gone on by this clearance limit several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into the holding pattern. This is confirmed by the data obtained from the flight recorder which had been installed in the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the communication tapes At a point approximately 11 miles past the Preston Intersection a collision occurred between TWA 266 and UAL 826. Weather at the altitude of the collision and at the time of the accident was such as to preclude flight by visual means.

During the takeoff roll, the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft swung on runway and came to rest. All 60 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

Flight 595, loaded with cargo, took off on runway 31L of Midway at approximately 0531LT bound for Los Angles, California. As the aircraft began a left turn, the crew notified Midway Tower they had received a fire warning on the No. 2 engine and had shut it down. They also informed the tower the flight would return and land. The aircraft proceeded in a continuing left turn around the airport in an elliptical pattern and below the clouds which were based at an altitude of 500 to 600 feet. In the turn to final approach to runway 31 the aircraft banked in excess of 45 degrees during which it developed an excessive rate of sink. When the aircraft reached the tops of the trees its wings were nearly level and its nose was raised in a climbing attitude; however, the descent continued. The wing flaps were being retracted during the last 5 to 10 seconds of the final descent and were found to be symmetrically extended at 24 percent upon impact. The plane crashed into a residential area about one-fourth of a mile southeast of Midway Airport, Chicago, Illinois, killing all persons aboard, demolishing the aircraft, and fatally injuring eight persons on the ground.

About fifteen minutes after it departed Milan-Malpensa Airport, while cruising at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with thunderstorm activity. It is believed the airplane was hit by lightning when the right wing broke off shortly later. Out of control, the airplane entered a dive and eventually crashed in a field located 32 km northwest of Milan. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 68 occupants have been killed.
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Trans World Airlines Flight 163 is a regularly scheduled domestic operation between Kansas City, Missouri, and Los Angeles, California, with intermediate stops at Topeka and Wichita, Kansas; Amarillo, Texas; Santa Fe and Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Las Vegas, Nevada. A scheduled crew change is made at Albuquerque. There, on November 15, 1956. Captain Arthur G. deFabry, First Officer James P. Rapattoni, and Hostess Anne J. Zeman boarded Flight 163 as its crew to complete the remaining segments. The flight was routine to Las Vegas where it landed at 1440. During the short ground time at Las Vegas the aircraft was serviced and the crew performed routine duties for continuation of the flight to Los Angeles. There was no apparent need for maintenance on the aircraft and none was performed. An Instrument Flight Rules flight plan was prepared and filed because of instrument weather conditions over the latter portion of the flight segment to Los Angeles. Weather conditions at Las Vegas, however, were clear. At 1449 Captain deFabry, seated in the captain’s position, taxied N 40404 from the Las Vegas terminal to runup position beside runway 7 where the required pretakeoff checks were accomplished. The aircraft and equipment responded normally. The flight was issued an instrument clearance by Air Route Traffic Control. At this time, according to the company load manifest, the gross weight of the aircraft was 41.801 pounds, well under the maximum allowable for takeoff, 43,650 pounds. The load was properly distributed with respect to the center of gravity limitations of the aircraft. With Captain deFabry operating the aircraft, Flight 163 took off at 1456. The takeoff was routine and was followed by a climbing left turn to gain altitude and establish a southwesterly course toward Los Angeles. At 1501, when over the northern perimeter of the city, First Officer Rapattoni radioed the Las Vegas tower stating the flight was returning to the airport, engine out. The Las Vegas tower controllers immediately notified all other traffic to remain clear and alerted emergency equipment. Flight 163 was cleared to land, any runway, and informed that the wind was calm. Captain deFabry elected to use runway 7 and First Officer Rapattoni notified the tower. Emergency equipment was then dispatched into position on the taxiway parallel to that runway. N40404 was soon observed on a wide base leg for runway 7 and as it turned onto the final approach. Position and altitude of the flight seemed normal. As the aircraft drew closer its extended gear could be seen and its left propeller was clearly visible, stopped and feathered. As the aircraft passed over the runway threshold its alignment position, and altitude seemed good; however, to nearly all observers excessive speed was apparent. The aircraft floated a considerable distance down the runway before touching it. It then bounced several times, after which an application of power was heard, obviously :m an attempt to go around. The Martin climbed, veered to the left, and its left wing gradually lowered. It seemed to “struggle” to continue flight and its airspeed decreased visibly. Seconds later the aircraft struck the ground, left wing low, just inside the airport boundary. Weather conditions at the time of the accident were clear, visibility 65 miles, and the wind was calm. A large cloud of dust, raised by the accident, hung over the scene and gradually lifted nearly vertically in evidence of the calm wind.

On June 30, 1956, at 0901, Trans World Airlines Flight 2, a regularly scheduled passenger service, took off from runway 25 of the Los Angeles Inter-national Airport. Flight 2 was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from Los Angeles, California, to Kansas City, Missouri, via Green Airway 5, Amber Airway 2, Daggett direct Trinidad, direct Dodge City, Victor Airway 10 Kansas City. The flight plan also proposed a cruising altitude of 19,000 feet, a .JPG"> airspeed of 270 knots, and a departure time of 0830. The Trans World flight crew consisted of Captain Jack S. Gandy, Copilot James H. Ritner, Flight Engineer Forrest D. Breyfogle, night Engineer Harry H. Allen (aboard as an additional crew member), and Hostesses Tracine E. Armbruster and Beth E. Davis. Preparations for Flight 2 were routine except that departure was delayed a few minutes by minor maintenance on the aircraft. The flight was dispatched with 3,300 gallons of fuel and the load manifest showed the gross weight of the aircraft at takeoff was 108,115 pounds, well, under the maximum allowable of 113,200 pounds. The load was properly distributed with respect to center of gravity limitations of the aircraft. As requested. the flight, after takeoff, contacted the Los Angeles tower radar departure controller, and was vectored through an overcast which existed in the Los Angeles area. After reporting "on top" (2,400 feet) the flight switched to Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center (referred to as Los Angeles Center) frequency, 118.9 mcs., for its en route clearance. This clearance specified the routing as filed in the flight plan, however, the controller specified that the flight climb to 19,000 feet in VFR conditions. Immediately thereafter TWA 2 asked for a routing change to Daggett via Victor Airway 210. This was approved in a routine manner. At 0921, through company radio communications, Flight 2 reported that it was approaching Daggett and requested a change in flight plan altitude assignment from 19,000 to 21,000 feet. ARTC (Los Angeles Center) advised they were unable to approve the requested altitude because of traffic (United Air Lines Flight 718). Flight 2 requested a clearance of 1,000 feet on top. Ascertaining from the radio operator that the flight was then at least 1,000 on top, ARTC cleared the flight. At 0959 Trans World 2 reported its position through company radio at Las Vegas. It reported that it had passed Lake Mohave at 0955, was 1,000 on top at 21,000 feet, and estimated it would reach the 321-degree radial of the Winslow omni range station (Painted Desert) at 1031 with Farmington next. This was the last radio communication with the flight.

Flight 400 was regularly scheduled between Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Newark, New Jersey, with stops at Harrisburg. Reading. and Allentown, Pennsylvania. Captain Raymond F. McQuade, First Officer Harlan V. Jesperson, and Hostess Vary Jane Fanning, comprised the crew. Prior to departure the pilots were briefed on the en route weather and received the sequence and forecast reports. Although the en route weather was generally good the night was dispatched to Newark on an IFR flight plan via airways as is customary. Upon departure the gross weight of the aircraft was 41,822 pounds (the certificated allowable takeoff gross is 44,900 pounds and TWA's own limit is 43.,650 pounds) and the center of gravity of the loaded aircraft was located within the prescribed limits. Scheduled departure time was 1915; the flight asked for and received taxi clearance at 1916, was then given the wind as calm, and was cleared to runway 23. Takeoff clearance was requested and granted at 1919. About one minute later tower personnel observed a seemingly normal takeoff and initial climb immediately followed by a left turning descent, crash, and erupting fire just beyond the southwest boundary of the airport. Passengers extricated themselves from the jumbled wreckage through and ahead of the fire as best they could; some helped others while a few found themselves thrown out through tears and rents in the shattered fuselage. Although airport based fire fighting equipment was dispatched with no loss of tune some 20 minutes elapsed before it reached the site because of the necessity of traversing circuitous country lanes. Once there, the conflagration, which by that time had nearly consumed the wreckage, was quickly smothered. The stewardess and 21 passengers were killed while 14 other occupants were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed.

Flight 260 received an IFR clearance from the tower at 0703 hours: "ATC clears TWA260 for approach at the Santa Fe Airport via Victor 19 climb northbound on the back course of the ILS localiser". The flight departed Albuquerque at 0705 hours. The tower requested the flight to report over-the Weiler Intersection (formerly the Alameda Intersection), however, after taking off there were no further radio contacts with the flight. The aircraft was last seen at an estimated altitude of 3000 feet (8300 feet mean sea level) in a high speed shallow climb continuing its heading towards Sandia Ridge, the upper portion of which was obscured by clouds. The wreckage was sighted the following morning at 9243 feet mean sea level, just below the crest of Sandia Mountain, approximately 13 miles north-east of the Albuquerque Airport and almost directly on a straight line course of 30 degrees magnetic from that airport (elevation 5340 feet mean sea level) to the Santa Fe Airport (elevation 6 344 feet mean sea level). An investigation was initiated by the Civil Aeronautics Board immediately after the accident. This included examination of the wreckage at the crash site which was discontinued because of deep snow and dangerous footing in the mountainous terrain. On May 3, 1955, a second trip was made to the scene of the accident and study of the wreckage was continued. On October 12, 1955, the Board’s Accident Investigation Report was released. The probable cause was determined to have been lack of conformity with prescribed en route procedures and a deviation from airways at an altitude too low to clear obstructions ahead. Because of controversy over certain elements of the report of October 12, 1955, additional study was given to the facts and circumstances of the accident and an amended report thereon was issued by the Board on August 26, 1957. The probable cause of the accident in this report was identical to that of the first report although the analysis portion was altered to revise the statement that the direct course was intentional. On October 10, 1958, the Air Line Pilots Association presented to the Bureau of Safety certain factual information and theories concerning the cause of the accident. On November 24, 1958, a third trip to the accident site was made. While there a new determination was made of the airplane’s heading at the time of impact. Because of these developments since the August 26, 1957, accident report was issued, active investigation and study was resumed. Additional testimony and documentary material were received from representatives of the ALPA, TWA, CAB, Eclipse-Pioneer Division of the Bendix Aviation Corporation, and the Collins Radio Company at Kansas City, Missouri, on January 15 and 16, 1959. In addition, a later study and presentation of facts concerning the instrumentation of the airplane and an analysis of tests made of the fluxgate compass system by Eclipse-Pioneer and ALPA were considered.

Few minutes after takeoff from Cincinnati-Greater Cincinnati Airport runway 22, while climbing to a height of 700-900 feet, the pilot-in-command started a turn to the right when the aircraft collided with a DC-3 owned by Castleton Inc. Registered N999B, the aircraft was piloted by a crew of two from Battle Creek to Miami with an intermediate stop at Lexington. It appears that the left wing of the DC-3 hit the right engine of the Martin. Following the collision, both aircraft went into a dive and crashed in a snow covered field and a wooded area located in the suburb of Cincinnati. Both aircraft were completely destroyed upon impact and all 15 occupants on both airplanes were killed.

The four engine aircraft christened 'Star of Maryland' left Cairo-Faruk Airport at 0135LT and was cleared to climb to 14,000 feet. While flying to the northwest at an altitude of 10,000 feet, the engine number three caught fire. The propeller was feathered but the crew was unable to extinguish the fire. the Cairo control tower received a routine position report at 23:55Z "off Cairo 2335 25 miles out of Cairo at 2343 estimated time of arrival Rome 0530" which was acknowledged but the flight did not reply with the customary "Roger". No other message was received from the flight despite frequent attempts to contact it by several stations. At or about the time of the receipt of the above message a number of persons on the desert to the northwest of Cairo saw the aircraft afire in flight. The aircraft turned back as if intending to land at Cairo, but the fire rapidly increased, causing the burning engine to fall free. The crew attempted a night emergency landing in a desert area located about 100 km northwest of Cairo. The aircraft crashed and disintegrated on impact. All 55 occupants were killed, among them tourists, engineers and US diplomats.