Pittsburgh-Intl

The airplane was on an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in instrument meteorological conditions. The captain initially stated that the airplane was on the ILS approach with the engine power set at flight idle. About 300 feet above the ground, and 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the threshold, the captain made visual contact with the runway. The captain stated that the left engine then surged, which caused the airplane to yaw right and drift left. At the time, the airplane was in visual conditions, and on glideslope, with the airspeed decreasing through 106 knots. The captain aligned the airplane with the runway and attempted to go-around, but the throttles were difficult to move. The airplane began to stall and the captain lowered the nose. The airplane subsequently struck terrain about 500 feet prior to the runway. After the captain was informed that the engine power should not be at flight idle during the approach, he amended his statement to include the approach power setting at 1,000 lbs. of torque. The co-pilot initially reported that the engine anomaly occurred while at flight idle. However, the co-pilot later amended his statement and reported that the anomaly occurred as power was being reduced toward flight idle, but not at flight idle. Examination of the left engine did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical malfunctions. Examination of the airplane cockpit did not reveal any anomalies with the throttle levers. Review of a flight manual for the make and model accident airplane revealed that during a normal landing, 1,100 lbs of torque should be set prior to turning base leg. The manual further stated to reduce the power levers about 30 feet agl, and initiate a gentle flare. The reported weather at the airport about 5 minutes before the accident included a visibility 3/4 mile in mist, and an overcast ceiling at 100 feet. The reported weather at the airport about 7 minutes after the accident included visibility 1/4 mile in freezing fog and an overcast ceiling at 100 feet. Review of the terminal procedure for the respective ILS approach revealed that the decision height was 200 feet agl, and the required minimum visibility was 1/2 mile.

A commercial pilot, who observed the airplane during the takeoff attempt, stated that it used "lots" of runway, and that the nose lifted "too early and way too slow." The airplane "struggled" to get in the air, and it appeared tail heavy, with "extreme" pitch, about 45 degrees nose-up. It also appeared that the only thing keeping the nose up was ground effect. The airplane became airborne for "a very short time," then sank to the ground, and veered off the left side of the runway. The nose was "up" the whole time, the airplane never "rolled off on a wing," and the wings never wobbled. The engines were "really loud," like a "shriek," and engine noise was "continuous until impact." Another witness at a different location confirmed the extreme nose high takeoff attitude and the brief time the airplane was airborne. It seemed odd to him that an airplane with that much power used so much runway. A runway inspection revealed no evidence of foreign objects or aircraft debris. Tire tracks from the airplane's main landing gear veered off the left side of the paved surface, at a 20-degree angle, about 3,645 feet from the runway's approach end. They continued for about 775 feet, then turned back to parallel the runway for another 650 feet, before ending about 50 feet prior to a chain link fence. There was no evidence that the nose wheel was on the ground prior to the fence. The fence, which was about 1,300 feet along the airplane's off-runway ground track and 200 feet to the left of the runway edge stripe, was bent over in the direction of travel. Ground scars began about 150 feet beyond the fence, and the main wreckage came to rest 300 feet beyond the beginning of the ground scars. The first officer advised a witness that he'd be making the takeoff; however, the pilot at the controls during the accident sequence could not be confirmed. When asked prior to the flight if he'd be making a high-performance takeoff, the captain replied that he didn't know. There was no evidence of mechanical malfunction.

The pilot had flown this route in make and model airplane for nearly 4 years. He calculated 900 pounds of fuel were required for the flight, and saw 956 pounds on the fuel totalizer. The pilot was told by the ground controller of weather delays to his destination that ranged up to 2.5 hours. En route he was issued holding instructions with an EFC of 50 minutes later. After released from holding, 52 minutes after takeoff, the pilot was told that he was being vectored for a 35 mile final approach. The pilot then told the controller that he was fuel critical and the controller vectored him ahead of other airplanes. Ten minutes later, 84 minutes after takeoff, the controller asked his fuel status, and the pilot responded 'pretty low, seems like I'm losing oil pressure.' The pilot then advised the controller, 85 minutes after takeoff, that he shut down the right engine. He then declared an emergency and advised that he was not going to make the airport. Examination of the wreckage revealed the fuel tanks were intact, the fuel caps were secured, and the amount of fuel recovered from both tanks was 1.5 gallons, which was less than the specified unusable quantity. Company records showed that similar flights took about 48 minutes, and the airplane's average fuel flow was 580 pounds per hour.

The aircraft crashed while maneuvering to land at Pittsburgh International Airport, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Flight 427 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Chicago-O'Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, to Pittsburgh. The flight departed about 1810, with 2 pilots, 3 flight attendants, and 127 passengers on board. The airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and impacted terrain near Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, about 6 miles northwest of the destination airport. All 132 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and fire. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.

On December 3, 1990, at 1345 est, Northwest flight 1482, a DC-9 (N3313L), and Northwest flight 299, a Boeing 727 (N278US), collided near the intersection of runway 09/27 and 03C/21C in dense fog at Detriot-Metropolitan-Wayne County Airport, MI. At the time of the collision, the B-727 was on its takeoff roll, and the DC-9 had just taxied onto the active runway. The B-727 was substantially damaged, and the DC-9 was destroyed. Seven of the 40 passengers and 1 crew member aboard the DC-9 received fatal injuries. None of the 146 passengers and 8 crewmembers aboard the B-727 were injured.

The flight was from Monongahela to Pittsburgh to Teterboro, NJ, then return to Pittsburgh and back to Monongahela. The flight departed Monongahela with 100 gallons of fuel; 160 gallons were added at Pittsburgh; and 80 gallons were added at Teterboro. The pilot wanted to add more fuel at Teterboro but the owner did not due to the higher cost of fuel and the fuel gage indications. During the return trip no fuel was added at Pittsburgh because the pilot did not have a credit card provided by the owner or money to buy fuel. The flight experienced a two-engine power loss due to fuel exhaustion while approaching the Monongahela Airport. Subsequent examination of the cockpit fuel gages showed a total of 125 gallons in the left tank and 90 gallons in the right tank; the reading remained the same with or without power.

The aircraft suffered a right landing gear leg breakage due to a fracture in the area where the fork assembly separated during landing roll. The pilot, sole on board, was uninjured.

The aircraft was observed flying at low altitude along about a 5 mile distance. Some witnesses described the aircraft altitude as just above treetops. Witness heard engine sounds and saw lights on the aircraft. The aircraft flight was on a southeast direction before it collided with rising terrain at a height of about 1,250 feet. The wreckage was scattered along a distance of 375 feet and oriented on a 160° magnetic heading. The destination, Pittsburgh, is located southwest of the departure point, State College. Evidence of aircraft malfunction was not disclosed. The aircraft had 1,902 lbs of cargo including 65 lbs of dry ice which was contained in styrofoam boxes. Autopsy and toxicological findings were negative. The pilot flew nightly, from State College to Pittsburgh and returned the following morning. He operated a business during the day. Witnesses stated the pilot was well rested and in good spirits before the flight.

En route on a cargo flight from New York-LaGuardia Airport to Pittsburgh, while cruising by night in poor weather conditions, the twin engine airplane entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed on a mountain located near Troxelville, Pennsylvania. The wreckage was found three days later and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was reduced due to foggy conditions and weather was poor with icing conditions.

Shortly after takeoff from Pittsburgh-Intl Airport, while climbing, the right engine failed. The pilot-in-command initiated a right turn and attempted to return to the airport when the airplane stalled and crashed in flames in a residential area located in Coraopolis, about three miles northeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were seriously injured. There were no injuries on the ground.