Training

The crew departed Wiesbaden-Erbenheim AFB on a local training flight. On approach, technical problem forced the crew to attempt an emergency landing in a cornfield 200 metres short of runway. Both pilots were slightly injured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The twin engine departed Guatemala City-La Aurora Airport at 0930LT on a flight to Rio Dulce with two pilots on board. En roue, the crew contacted ATC, modified his flight plan and was cleared to continue direct to Puerto Barrios. Following few touch-and-go manoeuvres at Puerto Barrios Airport, the crew completed a new approach and landing on runway 12. The pilot-in-command increased engine power and took off when he lost control of the airplane that crashed on a road, coming to rest upside down. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight with a certified flight instructor (CFI). During the climb-to-cruise phase of the flight, as the airplane was ascending through 16,000 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot noticed a reduction in manifold pressure. He advanced the throttle and observed an increase of one or two inches of manifold pressure. Shortly thereafter, the pilot heard a loud bang originate from the engine followed by an immediate loss of engine power. The pilot and CFI attempted to troubleshoot the engine anomalies and noted that it seemed to respond with the low boost "on", however it began to run rough whenever the throttle was advanced more than half way. They diverted to a nearby airport and conducted an emergency descent. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot descended through an overcast cloud layer and attempted to enter the airport traffic pattern. While on final approach to the airport, the pilot thought the airplane was high and extended the landing gear and applied flaps. Shortly thereafter, the airspeed and altitude decreased drastically and the pilot realized he was too low. The pilot applied throttle and noticed no change in engine performance. The airplane subsequently struck a fence and landed hard in an open field just short of the airport, which resulted in structural damage to the fuselage and wings. A postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the induction elbow for cylinders 1-3-5 (right side) was displaced from the throttle and metering assembly where the elbow couples with the throttle and metering assembly by an induction hose and clamp. The clamp was secure to the induction hose, however, the portion of the clamp that should have been installed
beyond the retention bead on the throttle and control assembly was observed on the inboard side of the bead on the induction elbow. Review of the aircraft maintenance logbooks revealed that cylinders 4 and 5 were recently replaced prior to the accident flight due to low compression. The replacement of these cylinders required removal of the induction system to allow for cylinder removal and installation. In addition, a manufacturer service bulletin stated that during the reinstallation of the induction system, one must slide the induction hose and clamp(s) onto one of the tubes to be joined and that the connection joint and both tube beads are to be positioned in the center of the induction hose. The clamps should be installed in a position centered between the tubing bead and end of the induction hose.

The pilot was receiving instruction and an instrument proficiency check (IPC) from a flight instructor. Following an hour of uneventful instruction, the IPC was initiated. During the first takeoff of the IPC, the pilot was at the flight controls, and the flight instructor controlled the throttles. Although the pilot normally set about 40 inches of manifold pressure for takeoff, the flight instructor set about 37 inches, which resulted in a longer than expected takeoff roll. Shortly after takeoff, at an altitude of less than 100 feet, with the landing gear extended, the flight instructor retarded the left throttle at 83 to 85 knots indicated airspeed; 85 knots was the minimum single engine control speed for the airplane. The pilot attempted to advance the throttles, but was unable since the flight instructor’s hand was already on the throttles. The airplane veered sharply to the left and rolled. The pilot was able to level the wings just prior to the airplane colliding with trees and terrain. The pilot reported that procedures for simulating or demonstrating an engine failure were never discussed. Although the flight instructor’s experience in the accident airplane make and model was not determined, he reported prior to the flight that he had not flown that type of airplane recently. The flight instructor was taking medication for type II diabetes. According to his wife, the flight instructor had not experienced seizures or a loss of consciousness as a result of his medical condition.

The crew departed Pensacola NAS, Florida, for a training flight. En route, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in unknown circumstances in a wooded area located 8 km northeast of Morganton. All four occupants were killed.

Aircraft crashed moments after takeoff from runway 29 at Darwin Airport, Northern Territory, fatally injuring both pilots. The flight was for the purpose of revalidating the command instrument rating of the pilot under check and was under the command of a training and checking captain, who occupied the copilot’s seat. The takeoff included a simulated engine failure. Data from the aircraft’s flight recorders was used to establish the circumstances leading to the accident and showed that the pilot in command (PIC) retarded the left power lever to flight idle to simulate an engine failure. That introduced a simulated failure of the left engine and propeller autofeathering system. The increased drag from the ‘windmilling’ propeller increased the control forces required to maintain the aircraft’s flightpath. The pilot under check allowed the speed to decrease and the aircraft to bank toward the inoperative engine. Additionally, he increased power on the right engine, and engaged the yaw damper in an attempt to stabilize the aircraft’s flight. Those actions increased his workload and made control of the aircraft more difficult. The PIC did not restore power to the left engine to discontinue the manoeuvre. The few seconds available before the aircraft became uncontrollable were insufficient to allow ‘trouble shooting’ and deliberation before resolving the situation.

The crew was departing Les Eplatures Airport on a training flight to Dole-Tavaux, Jura. During the takeoff roll on runway 24, the pilot-in-command realized that the aircraft' speed did not increase after 88 knots then dropped to 85 knots. He decided to reject the takeoff procedure and initiated an emergency braking procedure. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and collided with concrete blocks and the ILS equipment. All four occupants were injured, two seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Shortly after takeoff from Pisa-San Giusto-Galileo Galilei Airport, while climbing, the four engine aircraft went out of control and crashed on a railway road located 3 km southwest of the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forced and a post crash fire and all five occupants from the 46th Squadron were killed.

Following a training flight over the Okhotsk Sea, the four engine was returning to its base at Mongokhto AFB. While descending by night, the aircraft crashed in the Tatar Strait between the Island of Sakhalin and the Sikhote-Alin region. Some debris were found about 15 km off Sadinga Cape. All 11 occupants were killed.

The crew departed Tehran-Mehrabad Airport for a local training mission. While cruising south of the capital city, the crew declared an emergency following an engine failure and elected to return. During the emergency descent to runway 29L, the radome located on the roof detached and hit the tail. Out of control, the aircraft crashed in an open field located near Varamin. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all seven occupants were killed. It is believed that the radome detached because the aircraft' speed exceeded its certification during the emergency descent.