Crash of a Pilatus U-28A at Cannon AFB: 3 killed

Date & Time: Mar 14, 2017 at 1835 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
08-0724
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Cannon - Cannon
MSN:
724
YOM:
2006
Flight number:
Demise 25
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
3400
Captain / Total hours on type:
3199.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
448
Copilot / Total hours on type:
213
Circumstances:
On 14 Mar 17, at 1835 local time (L), a U-28A, tail number 0724, crashed one-quarter mile south of Clovis Municipal Airport (KCVN), New Mexico (NM). This aircraft was operated by the 318th Special Operations Squadron, 27th Special Operations Wing, Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), NM. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crewmembers died upon impact. The Mishap Aircraft (MA) departed Cannon AFB at 1512L for tactical training over Lubbock, Texas, followed by pilot proficiency training at KCVN. The Mishap Crew (MC) entered Lubbock airspace at 1545L, completed their tactical training, and departed Lubbock airspace at 1735L enroute to KCVN. The MC entered the KCVN traffic pattern at 1806L, where they conducted multiple approaches and landings prior to executing the mishap maneuver, a practice turnback Emergency Landing Pattern (ELP). The MC entered the practice turnback ELP with 0° flaps led to increased aircraft nose-down attitudes and higher descent rates required to maintain a safe angle of attack versus a comparative 15° flap approach. In addition, 0° flap stall speeds are higher than 15° flap stall speeds – 15 to 25 knots higher for the range of bank angles flown by the MC during the practice turnback ELP. The MC was also late to achieve the bank angle required to enable the MA to align with the extended centerline for the runway resulting in an overshoot condition. The MC attempted to arrest their excessive nose-down attitude, descent rate, and shallow bank angle by pulling back on the aircraft yoke and increasing bank angle. The g-load from the MC pull back, coupled with the MA's increased bank angle, slowed the MA airspeed below 0° flap stall speed and it departed controlled flight. Subsequent power increase and flight control inputs would not have enabled the aircraft to recover from the stall within remaining altitude. After entering the stall, the MC increased power; however, it was not enough to overcome the MA descent rate. At no point during the practice turnback ELP did the MA performance reflect a MC intent to abort the maneuver. The MA impacted the ground with a 13° nose-high, 7° left-wing low attitude. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all three occupants were killed.
Crew:
Cpt Andrew Becker, pilot,
1st Lt Frederick Dellecker, copilot,
Cpt Kenneth Dalga, combat systems officer.
Probable cause:
By a preponderance of the evidence, the Accident Investigation Board concluded the aircrew lost control of the aircraft when it entered a stall at low altitude during a turn back Emergency Landing Pattern procedure. There were no indications of mechanical malfunction. The board also surmised the crew delayed actions necessary to prevent the aircraft from entering the stall envelope and failed to accurately assess increasing risk throughout execution of the practice turn back Emergency Landing Pattern, thereby substantially contributing to the mishap.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B60 Duke in Duette: 2 killed

Date & Time: Mar 4, 2017 at 1330 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
N39AG
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sarasota - Sarasota
MSN:
P-425
YOM:
1977
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1120
Captain / Total hours on type:
200.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
20900
Copilot / Total hours on type:
165
Aircraft flight hours:
3271
Circumstances:
The private pilot, who had recently purchased the airplane, and the flight instructor were conducting an instructional flight in the multi-engine airplane to meet insurance requirements. Radar data for the accident flight, which occurred on the second day of 2 days of training, showed the airplane maneuvering between 1,000 ft and 1,200 ft above ground level (agl) just before the accident. The witness descriptions of the accident were consistent with the airplane transitioning from slow flight into a stall that developed into a spin from which the pilots were unable to recover before the airplane impacted terrain. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal evidence of any preexisting mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. After the first day of training, the pilot told friends and fellow pilots that the instructor provided non-standard training that included stall practice that required emergency recoveries at low airspeed and low altitude. The instructor used techniques that were not in keeping with established flight training standards and were not what would be expected from an individual with his extensive background in general aviation flight instruction. Most critically, the instructor used two techniques that introduced unnecessary risk: increasing power before reducing the angle of attack during a stall recovery and introducing asymmetric power while recovering from a stall in a multi-engine airplane; both techniques are dangerous errors because they can lead to an airplane entering a spin. At one point during the first day of training, the airplane entered a full stall and spun before control was regained at very low altitude. The procedures performed contradicted standard practice and Federal Aviation Administration guidance; yet, despite the pilot's experience in multi-engine airplanes and in the accident airplane make and model, he chose to continue the second day of training with the instructor instead of seeking a replacement to complete the insurance check out. The spin encountered on the accident flight likely resulted from the stall recovery errors advocated by the instructor and practiced on the prior day's flight. Unlike the previous flight, the accident flight did not have sufficient altitude for recovery because of the low altitude it was operating at, which was below the safe altitude required for stall training (one which allows recovery no lower than 3,000 ft agl).
Probable cause:
The pilots' decision to perform flight training maneuvers at low airspeed at an altitude that was insufficient for stall recovery. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor's inappropriate use of non-standard stall recovery techniques.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B200T Super King Air at Butterworth AFB: 1 killed

Date & Time: Dec 21, 2016 at 1718 LT
Operator:
Registration:
M41-03
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kuala Lumpur – Butterworth
MSN:
BT-37
YOM:
1993
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a training flight from Kuala Lumpur-Subang Airport when on final approach to Butterworth Airbase, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed, coming to rest against the perimeter fence. The aircraft was partially destroyed by impact forces and one crew member was killed while three other occupants were injured. Weather conditions were considered as good at the time of the accident.

Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Iqaluit

Date & Time: Jul 17, 2016 at 1217 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FCGW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iqaluit - Iqaluit
MSN:
BB-207
YOM:
1977
Flight number:
BFF200
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
A Beech 200 Super King Air aircraft operated by Air Nunavut as flight 200, was on a training flight at Iqaluit, NU (CYFB) to upgrade a candidate to captain status. A VFR circuit was executed to simulate a flapless landing. While in the circuit, the crew experienced an actual communication failure on COM 1 while two other aircraft were inbound to Iqaluit. At the end of the downwind leg, a flap failure was simulated and the crew carried out the appropriate checklist. However, the landing checklist was not completed and the aircraft landed with the landing gear in the up position on runway 16. The aircraft skidded on the belly and came to a stop on the runway between taxiway A and G. The crew declared an emergency and evacuated the airplane with no injuries. The aircraft sustained damage to the belly pod and both propellers.

Crash of a Lockheed C-130H Hercules at Montijo AFB: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jul 11, 2016 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
16804
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Montijo AFB - Montijo AFB
MSN:
4777
YOM:
1978
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local training exercise at Montijo AFB, consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. During the takeoff roll on runway 26, the four engine aircraft deviated from the centerline to the left then went out of control, veered off runway to the right and eventually crashed 1,460 meters past the runway threshold, bursting into flames. Four crew members were injured while three others were killed. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.

Crash of a Swearingen SA226T Merlin IIIB in Farmingdale

Date & Time: Jun 20, 2016 at 1758 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N127WD
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
White Plains - Farmingdale
MSN:
T-297
YOM:
1978
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
11450
Captain / Total hours on type:
410.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1300
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
4500
Circumstances:
According to the pilot in command (PIC), he was conducting an instructional flight for his "new SIC (second in command)," who was seated in the left seat. He reported that they had flown two previous legs in the retractable landing gear-equipped airplane. He recalled that, during the approach, they discussed the events of their previous flights and had complied with the airport control tower's request to "keep our speed up." During the approach, he called for full flaps and retarded the throttle to flight idle. The PIC asserted that there was no indication that the landing gear was not extended because he did not hear a landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. He added that the landing gear position lights were not visible because the SIC's knee obstructed his view of the lights. He recalled that, following the flare, he heard the propellers hit the runway and that he made the decision not to go around because of unknown damage sustained to the propellers. The airplane touched down and slid to a stop on the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage bulkheads, longerons, and stringers. The SIC reported that the flight was a training flight in visual flight rules conditions. He noted that the airspace was busy and that, during the approach, he applied full flaps, but they failed to extend the landing gear. He added that he did not hear the landing gear warning horn; however, he was wearing a noise-cancelling headset. The Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Inspector that examined the wreckage reported that, during recovery, the pilot extended the nose landing gear via the normal extension process. However, due to significant damage to the main landing gear (MLG) doors, the MLG was unable to be extended hydraulically or manually. He added that an operational check of the landing gear warning horn was not accomplished because the wreckage was unsafe to enter after it was removed from the runway. The landing gear warning horn was presented by an aural tone in the cockpit and was not configured to be heard through the pilots' noise-cancelling headsets. When asked, the PIC and the SIC both stated that they could not remember who read the airplane flight manual Before Landing checklist.
Probable cause:
The pilot-in-command's failure to extend the landing gear before landing and his failure to use the Before Landing checklist. Contributing to the accident was the pilots' failure to maintain a sterile cockpit during landing.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2R in San Bernardino

Date & Time: May 6, 2016 at 1200 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N2AN
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Upland - San Bernardino
MSN:
1G210-55
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3350
Captain / Total hours on type:
58.00
Aircraft flight hours:
2924
Circumstances:
The commercial pilot was entering the airport traffic pattern for landing during a familiarization flight. He reported that he turned on the carburetor heat, switched the fuel tank selector to the right fuel tank, and shortly thereafter, the engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot attempted numerous times to restart the engine but was unsuccessful. After realizing that he would not be able to reach the runway, he decided to make a forced landing to a small field. During the landing approach, the airplane contacted a power line, nosed over, and came to rest inverted, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. During the postaccident examination of the airplane, about 16 ounces of water were removed from the fuel system. Water was present in the lower gascolator, the fine fuel filter (upper gascolator), and subsequent fuel line to the carburetor inlet. A brass screen at the carburetor inlet and 2 carburetor fuel bowl thumb screens also contained corrosion, water, and rust. The approved aircraft inspection checklist called for washing the carburetor and main fuel filter every 50 hours and cleaning and/or replacing the fine fuel filter every 100 hours. The fine fuel filter is not easily accessible and not able to be drained during a preflight inspection. The mechanic who completed the most recent inspection stated that he did not drain or check the fine fuel filter. The last logbook entry that specifically stated the fuel filters were cleaned was about 4 years before the accident.
Probable cause:
The mechanic's failure to inspect the fine fuel filter gascolator as required during the most recent inspection, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel contamination.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AT Merlin IVA in Girona

Date & Time: Apr 24, 2016 at 1520 LT
Operator:
Registration:
EC-GFK
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Girona - Girona
MSN:
AT-062
YOM:
1977
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2402
Captain / Total hours on type:
27.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
7992
Copilot / Total hours on type:
6868
Aircraft flight hours:
16128
Circumstances:
The crew (one pilot under supervision and one instructor) departed Girona-Costa Brava on a local training flight. Following two successful landings and touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew initiated a new approach to complete a full stop landing. The aircraft belly landed and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest on the runway. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
Probable cause:
The cause of the accident was that the crew failed to actuate the lever used to deploy the landing gear. Inadequate presentation, in the operator's operating manuals, of the flight tasks to be performed by each crew member and the timing of these tasks is identified as a contributing factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Grand Commander 690B in Hare: 2 killed

Date & Time: Apr 9, 2016 at 0951 LT
Registration:
N690TH
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Georgetown - Georgetown
MSN:
11487
YOM:
1978
Location:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
1351
Captain / Total hours on type:
65.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
25975
Aircraft flight hours:
9002
Circumstances:
The private pilot, who was the owner of the airplane, and a flight instructor were performing a recurrent training flight. Radar data showed that the airplane departed and climbed to an altitude about 5,000 ft above ground level. About 5 minutes after takeoff, the airplane conducted a left 360° turn followed by a right 360° turn, then continued in level flight for about 2 minutes as it slowed to a groundspeed of about 90 knots, which may have been indicative of airwork leading to slow flight or stall maneuvers. The airplane then entered a steep bank and impacted the ground in a nose-low attitude. Both engines and propellers displayed evidence of operation at the time of impact, and postaccident examination revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation of the airframe or engines. The instructor had a history of obstructive sleep apnea. The investigation was unable to determine how well the condition was controlled, if he had symptoms from the condition, or if it contributed to the accident. Toxicology testing revealed low levels of ethanol in specimens from both pilots; however, it is likely that some or all of the ethanol detected was a result of postmortem production, and it is unlikely that alcohol impairment contributed to the accident. Toxicology testing also detected the primary psychoactive compound of marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and its metabolite, tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid (THCCOOH), in specimens obtained from comingled remains; the investigation was unable to reliably determine which pilot had used the impairing illicit drug. Additionally, it is not possible to determine impairment from tissue specimens; therefore, the investigation was unable to determine whether THC impaired either of the pilots or if it may have contributed to the accident.
Probable cause:
A loss of control while maneuvering for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the
airplane.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I at Langebaanweg AFB

Date & Time: Mar 3, 2016
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
3004
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Langebaanweg - Langebaanweg
MSN:
208-0130
YOM:
1988
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local night training exercice at Langebaanweg AFB. While completing various manoeuvres, the airplane went out of control and crashed in an open field located near airbase, coming to rest upside down. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were injured.