Scheduled Revenue Flight

Lion Mentari Airline (Lion Air) as flight number LNI-793, departed from Sultan Hasanuddin Airport (WAAA), Makassar, Ujung Pandang, Sulawesi at 0636 UTC for Soekarno-Hatta International Airport (WIII), Jakarta. The estimated flight hour from Makassar to Jakarta was 2 hours. The crew consisted of two pilots and four flight attendants. There were 166 adult passengers. The copilot was the pilot flying for the sector, and the pilot in command (PIC) was the support/monitoring pilot. During the approach to runway 25L at Jakarta, the weather at the airport was reported as wind direction 200 degrees, wind speed 20 knots, visibility 1,000 meters, and rain. The PIC reported that he decided to take over control from the copilot. The PIC later reported that he had the runway in sight passing through 1,000 feet on descent, and he disengaged the autopilot at 400 feet. At about 50 feet the aircraft drifted to the right and the PIC initiated corrective action to regain the centreline. The aircraft touched down to the left of the runway 25L centerline and then commenced to drift to the right. The PIC reported that he immediately commenced corrective action by using thrust reverser, but the aircraft increasingly crabbed along the runway with the tail to the right of runway heading. The investigation subsequently found that the right thrust reverser was deployed, but left thrust reverser was not deployed. The aircraft stopped at 0835 on the right side of the runway 25L, 1,095 meters from the departure end of the runway on a heading of 152 degrees; 90 degrees to the runway 25L track. The main landing gear wheels collapsed, and still attached to the aircraft, were on the shoulder of the runway and the nose wheel was on the runway. The passengers and crew disembarked via the front right escape slide and right emergency exit windows. None of the occupants were injured

Turkish Airlines Flight 1951, a Boeing 737-800, departed Istanbul-Atatürk International Airport (IST) for a flight to Amsterdam-Schiphol International Airport (AMS), The Netherlands. The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a line training captain who occupied the left seat, a first officer under line training in the right seat and an additional first officer who occupied the flight deck jump seat. The first officer under line training was the pilot flying. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. The flight was descending for Schiphol and passed overhead Flevoland at about 8500 ft. At that time the aural landing gear warning sounded. The aircraft continued and was then directed by Air Traffic Control towards runway 18R for an ILS approach and landing. The standard procedure for runway 18R prescribes that the aircraft is lined up at least 8 NM from the runway threshold at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glidepath is then approached and intercepted from below. Lining up at a distance between 5 and 8 NM is allowed when permitted by ATC. Flight 1951 was vectored for a line up at approximately 6 NM at an altitude of 2000 feet. The glide slope was now approached from above. The crew performed the approach with one of the two autopilot and autothrottle engaged. The landing gear was selected down and flaps 15 were set. While descending through 1950 feet, the radio altimeter value suddenly changed to -8 feet. And again the aural landing gear warning sounded. This could be seen on the captain’s (left-hand) primary flight display. The first officer’s (right-hand) primary flight display, by contrast, indicated the correct height, as provided by the right-hand system. The left hand radio altimeter system, however, categorised the erroneous altitude reading as a correct one, and did not record any error. In turn, this meant that it was the erroneous altitude reading that was used by various aircraft systems, including the autothrottle. The crew were unaware of this, and could not have known about it. The manuals for use during the flight did not contain any procedures for errors in the radio altimeter system. In addition, the training that the pilots had undergone did not include any detailed system information that would have allowed them to understand the significance of the problem. When the aircraft started to follow the glidepath because of the incorrect altitude reading, the autothrottle moved into the ‘retard flare’ mode. This mode is normally only activated in the final phase of the landing, below 27 feet. This was possible because the other preconditions had also been met, including flaps at (minimum) position 15. The thrust from both engines was accordingly reduced to a minimum value (approach idle). This mode was shown on the primary flight displays as ‘RETARD’. However, the right-hand autopilot, which was activated, was receiving the correct altitude from the right-hand radio altimeter system. Thus the autopilot attempted to keep the aircraft flying on the glide path for as long as possible. This meant that the aircraft’s nose continued to rise, creating an increasing angle of attack of the wings. This was necessary in order to maintain the same lift as the airspeed reduced. In the first instance, the pilots’ only indication that the autothrottle would no longer maintain the pre-selected speed of 144 knots was the RETARD display. When the speed fell below this value at a height of 750 feet, they would have been able to see this on the airspeed indicator on the primary flight displays. When subsequently, the airspeed reached 126 knots, the frame of the airspeed indicator also changed colour and started to flash. The artificial horizon also showed that the nose attitude of the aircraft was becoming far too high. The cockpit crew did not respond to these indications and warnings. The reduction in speed and excessively high pitch attitude of the aircraft were not recognised until the approach to stall warning (stick shaker) went off at an altitude of 460 feet. The first officer responded immediately to the stick shaker by pushing the control column forward and also pushing the throttle levers forward. The captain however, also responded to the stick shaker commencing by taking over control. Assumingly the result of this was that the first officer’s selection of thrust was interrupted. The result of this was that the autothrottle, which was not yet switched off, immediately pulled the throttle levers back again to the position where the engines were not providing any significant thrust. Once the captain had taken over control, the autothrottle was disconnected, but no thrust was selected at that point. Nine seconds after the commencement of the first approach to stall warning, the throttle levers were pushed fully forward, but at that point the aircraft had already stalled and the height remaining, of about 350 feet, was insufficient for a recovery. According to the last recorded data of the digital flight data recorder the aircraft was in a 22° ANU and 10° Left Wing Down (LWD) position at the moment of impact. The airplane impacted farmland. The horizontal stabilizer and both main landing gear legs were separated from the aircraft and located near the initial impact point. The left and right engines had detached from the aircraft. The aft fuselage, with vertical stabilizer, was broken circumferentially forward of the aft passenger doors and had sustained significant damage. The fuselage had ruptured at the right side forward of the wings. The forward fuselage section, which contained the cockpit and seat rows 1 to 7, had been significantly disrupted. The rear fuselage section was broken circumferentially around row 28.

The scheduled commuter flight was about 10 miles north of the destination airport, operating under a special visual-flight-rules clearance, and descending for landing in instrument meteorological conditions. According to the pilot he started a gradual descent over an area of featureless, snow-covered, down-sloping terrain in whiteout and flat light conditions. During the descent a localized snow shower momentarily reduced the pilot’s forward visibility and he was unable to discern any terrain features. The airplane collided with terrain in an all-white snow/ice field and sustained substantial damage. At the time of the accident the destination airport was reporting visibility of 1.5 statute miles in light snow and mist, broken layers at 900 and 1,600 feet, and 3,200 feet overcast, with a temperature and dew point of 25 degrees Fahrenheit. The pilot reported that there were no pre accident mechanical problems with the airplane and that the accident could have been avoided if the flight had been operated under an instrument-flight-rules flight plan.

Following a normal touchdown, the fracture of the nose landing gear main fitting allowed the nose gear to collapse rearwards and penetrate the lower fuselage, causing significant damage to the equipment bay and the battery to become disconnected. The penetration of the fuselage allowed smoke and fumes produced by the consequent release of hydraulic fluid to enter the cockpit and passenger cabin. With the battery disconnected and after the engines were shut down, all power to the aircraft PA systems was lost and the remote cockpit door release mechanism became inoperative. No pre-accident defects were identified with the manual cockpit door release mechanism or the PA system.

On February 12, 2009, about 2217 eastern standard time, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

Flight SEH102/103 of 12 February 2009 was a scheduled passenger carrying flight performing the route Heraklion – Rhodes – Heraklion. The crew that was going to perform the flight reported for duty at 16:00 h. The aircraft had earlier on the same day performed, with a different flight crew, four routes (Heraklion – Rhodes – Heraklion and Heraklion – Samos – Heraklion), without any problems being reported. Nothing had been observed during the pre-flight check. The aircraft departed Heraklion at 16:55 h and landed at Rhodes at 17:35 h without incident. At 18:30 h the aircraft departed Rhodes for Heraklion, carrying three crew members and 15 passengers. The pilot flying (PF) this particular sector was the Pilot in Command (PIC). At a distance of 30 nm from Heraklion and at a altitude of 7700 ft on its descent to 3000 ft, the crew informed the Air Traffic Control that it had the runway in sight and requested and was granted clearance to perform a visual approach. The aircraft, fully configured for landing from a distance of 7nm, approached the airport for landing at runway 27. The wind information provided by the Air Traffic Control was 18 kt – 25 kt, from 210°. While approaching the runway, the PF asked the First Officer (FO) to check the angle of descent based on the APAPIs’ of the runway. The FO confirmed the correct angle of descent, saying “one white, one red”. The aircraft crossed the threshold with a speed of 112 kt and after flaring the PF reduced speed to Flight Idle and touched down with a speed of 86 kt. As the speed was being gradually reduced, the PF had difficulty with controlling the aircraft along its longitudinal axis and noticing that the aircraft was leaning somewhat to the right, reported to the FO that “the gear has broken”. Immediately afterwards, the blades of the right propeller of the aircraft struck the runway. As the aircraft continued to move with the left main landing gear wheel operating normally and the collapsed right main landing gear, folded backwards under the wing, being dragged along the runway, the crew stopped the engines, reported to the Airport Control Tower that the right landing gear had broken and requested evacuation. The aircraft stopped in the runway with its nose wheel at 4.6 m to the right of the center line, at a distance of 930 m from the point of the propeller’s first contact with the runway. Immediately afterwards the PF ordered the cabin crew to open the cabin door and evacuated the aircraft, and the FO, who observed some fuel leaking from the right engine, switched off the electrical systems and requested through the Airport Control Tower that the fire trucks, which were on their way, to throw foam on the right wing to prevent any fire being started. The passengers disembarked from the left aft door without any problems with the assistance of the cabin crew, while the fire trucks covered the right wing with foam as a preventive measure. The airport, applying the standing procedures, removed the aircraft and released the runway for operation at 22:30 h. During the period of time that runway 09/27 remained out of operation, two flights approaching the airport for landing were diverted to Chania Airport, and the departures of another three flights were delayed.

After landing on runway 29L at Tehran-Mehrabad Airport, the right main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the right and came to rest. All 114 occupants were uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Aircraft experienced an almost complete loss of thrust in both engines after encountering a flock of birds and was subsequently ditched on the Hudson River about 8.5 miles from La Guardia Airport (LGA), New York City, New York. The flight was en route to Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina, and had departed LGA about 2 minutes before the in-flight event occurred. The 150 passengers, including a lap held child, and 5 crew members evacuated the airplane via the forward and overwing exits. One flight attendant and four passengers were seriously injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged.

Following an uneventful flight from Djibouti City, the crew started the approach to Bosaso Airport. When the undercarriage were selected down, the crew realized that the nose gear was stuck in its wheel well. The crew elected to get it down manually but without success. The decision was taken to land in such configuration. Upon touchdown, the aircraft landed on its nose and slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 15 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On or about 0613LT 11 January 2009, flight 6K865 RP-C8893 departed NAIA (RPLL) for Caticlan Airport (RPVE) with 22 passengers and 5 crew members on board. The flight was uneventful until a go-around was initiated during the first approach, A second attempt to land was made which ended with the aircraft undershooting the runway. After the first touchdown the aircraft bounce and landed on the runway and veered to the left side of the runway due to the left landing gear failure upon the contact with the embankment before the road at the end of the runway. The aircraft settled down at the concrete wall of the ramp facing the passenger lounge of the Zest Air. Three (3) passengers suffered serious injuries, and 19 passengers with minor one, the crew member escape injuries except the Captain suffering slight injury. The aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair.