Scheduled Revenue Flight

Following an uneventful flight from Kyzylorda, the crew initiated the descent to Astana Airport and configured the aircraft for landing. After the crew lowered the landing gear, he realized that the nose gear remained stuck in its wheel well. The captain abandoned the approach and initiated a go-around. During the holding circuit, the crew elected to lower the gear manually, without success. After a 50 minutes circuit, the crew decided to land without the nose gear. After touchdown on runway 22, the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. All 121 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

At the overnight into 19.03.2016 the Flydubai airline flight crew, consisting of the PIC and F/O, was performing the round-trip international scheduled passenger flight FDB 981/982 on route
Dubai (OMDB) – Rostov-on-Don (URRR) – Dubai (OMDB) on the B737-8KN A6-FDN aircraft. At 18:37 on 18.03.2016 the aircraft took off from the Dubai airport. The flight had been performed in IFR. At 18:59:30 FL360 was reached. The further flight has been performed on this very FL. The descent from FL has been initiated at 22:17. Before starting the descent, the crew contacted the ATC on the Rostov-on-Don airport actual weather and the active RWY data. In progress of the glide path descent to perform landing with magnetic heading 218° (RWY22) the crew relayed the presence of “windshear” on final to the ATC (as per the aboard windshear warning system activation). At 22:42:05 from the altitude of 1080 ft (330 m) above runway level performed go-around. Further on the flight was proceeded at the holding area, first on FL080, then on FL150. At 00:23 on 19.03.2016, the crew requested descent for another approach. It was an ILS approach. The A/P was disengaged by the crew at the altitude of 2165 ft QNH (575 m QFE), and the A/T at the altitude of 1960 ft QNH (510 m QFE). . In the progress of another approach the crew made the decision to initiate go-around and at 00:40:50, from the altitude of 830 ft (253 m) above the runway level, started the maneuver. After the reach of the altitude of 3350 ft (1020 m) above the runway level the aircraft transitioned to a steep descent and at 00:41:49 impacted the ground (it collided the surface of the artificial runway at the distance of about 120 m off the RWY22 threshold) with the nose-down pitch of about 50⁰ and IAS about 340 kt (630 km/h). The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 62 occupants were killed.

The single aircraft departed Nepalgunj at 1230LT bound for Jumla. About 35 minutes into the flight, the crew encountered an unexpected situation and attempted an emergency landing in a field. The aircraft eventually collided with an earth bank and came to rest near the village of Chilkhaya. Both pilots were killed and all 9 passengers were injured. The aircraft destroyed.

As per the flight plan submitted on 23rd February 2016, the aircraft was scheduled for VFR flight to Jomsom (VNJS) on 24th February with estimated off-block time of 01:00, intended cruising speed of 150 knots, intended level of 10,500 ft and via direct track. The first and second alternate aerodromes were Bhairahawa (VNBW) and Pokhara (VNPK) respectively and estimated elapsed time was 20 minutes with the fuel endurance of 2 hours and 30 minute. Based on the information from the CVR, FDR and ATC records, the following description of the history of the flight was reconstructed: At 01:55, the first-officer contacted Pokhara tower requesting Jomsom and Bhairahawa weather. Upon receiving Jomsom weather which was 8 km visibility towards Lete (arrival track) and foothill partially visible; at 01:56 F/O requested start-up for Jomsom. First-officer then briefed the weather to the captain, in response to this the captain responded by saying 'Let‘s have a look, if not possible we will return' (Translated from Nepali conversation). While performing the 'before start checklist', they received weather of Bhairahawa as closed. After completing the checklist and start-up the first-officer at 02:00 requested taxi clearance. The ATC informed runway change to 22 instead of runway 04 and gave taxi clearance. At 02:03 while taxiing the captain considering bad weather condition expressed his concern over the runway change with F/O but failed to express it to the ATC. As briefed by captain earlier, the control was transferred to F/O and at 02:04 F/O made a normal take-off. At 02:08 the captain reported 5 miles at 6,200 ft to ATC. At 02:09, while passing through 7,000 ft the captain informed the actual weather, which was light haze, mountain not visible but had ground contact, to an ultra-light aircraft upon his request. As per the cockpit conversation, the crew were comparing the base of the cloud which was higher than the day before and proposed to continue climb to 12,500 ft if not on-top of the cloud at 10,500 ft. Around 5 miles before Ghorepani passing 10,100 ft, the captain told that cells were still present so advised F/O to continue climb to 12,000 ft and told that they will proceed till TATOPANI and decide to continue or divert. At 02:14 approaching GHOREPANI and passing 11,400 ft, Captain told F/O to maintain level to be in between the cloud layers and briefed F/O that if they had to divert it would be a left turn. At the same time captain asked repeatedly to F/O if his side was raining for which F/O told and confirmed not visual, after which captain told they would see and decide (regarding continuation of flight). At 02:14:50 while over Ghorepani area at 11,500 ft the EGPWS TERRAIN alert and at 02:14:52 PULL UP warning came while they were not visual and at 02:15:01 it was stated that they were visual and by 02:14:53 the warning stopped. At 02:15 while maintaining 11,500 ft the captain reported ATC that they are at Ghorepani at level 10,500 ft after which frequency changeover to Jomsom tower was given. At 02:15:27 the captain instructed F/O to maintain heading of 3300 and flight level just below the cloud, after which a shallow descent was initiated. At this time captain asked F/O if his side was visual, in response F/O replied somewhat visual. The Captain then instructed F/O to descent to 10,000 ft. Once the descent was started at 02:15:55 passing 11,000 ft an OVERSPEED warning sounded in the cockpit for 2 seconds as the speed reached 152 knots. At 02:16 while passing 10,700 ft captain advised F/O to make a left turn so that it would be easy to turn if required as he was able to see his side. Then F/O asked if left side was visual for which the captain informed that not that side (towards the track) but somewhat visual to the left of him and told that the TRACK TO GO was TO THE LEFT whereas they were actually left of the track and had descended to 10,300 ft. At 02:17:58 EGPWS TERRAIN alert sounded when the aircraft was at 10,200 ft and descending on heading of 3210 with right bank angle of around 30 . At 02:18:06 when the aircraft had descended to 10,100 ft the PULL UP WARNING sounded for which the captain said not to worry and at 02:18:12; when the aircraft was at 10,000 ft the captain took-over the control, continued descent and asked F/O if his side was visual. The F/O informed that right side was not visual at all by which the aircraft had continued shallow descent on heading 3250 with right bank angle reaching up to 130 at 2:18:19 and by 02:18:23 the aircraft once again returned back to 0° bank angle. At 02:18:23 the captain started left bank followed by right bank again while still on a shallow descent until 02:18:27.Upon reaching 9,850 ft (lowest altitude) the aircraft started very shallow climb. At 02:18:35 when aircraft was 9,920 ft the captain told F/O that they reached Landslide (a checkpoint which is on track to Jomsom on the right side of the Kali-Gandaki River). At 02:18:44 when aircraft reached 10,150 ft captain told ―what I will do is now I will turn to heading of LETTE‖ (another way point on route to Jomsom); while the PULL-UP warning was continuously sounding. At 02:18:49 when the aircraft was at 10,300 ft right bank angle increased up to 16° with pitch up attitude of 7°. At 02:18:52 the captain told that he would start climb when the aircraft had reached 10,350 ft; pitch attitude of 10° and still on right bank. The aircraft reached zero degree bank at 02:18:53 and started shallow left bank with pitch attitude of 12° nose up. By 02:18:57 the bank angle reached 200 left with pitch attitude of 11.8 and altitude of 10,550 ft and captain was still questioning F/O about the visibility towards his side but F/O informed his side not visible completely. The last data recorded in FDR was at 02:19:03 when the altitude had reached around 10,700 ft; pitch attitude of 7° nose up and left bank angle of 25° heading of 335° with EGPWS PULL-UP warning ON.

Following an uneventful flight from Isfahan, the crew initiated the approach to Mashhad Airport by night and poor weather conditions with low visibility due to snow falls. After touchdown on runway 31R, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the reverse thrust systems. The aircraft skidded then veered off runway to th left, lost its both main undercarriage and came to rest 55 metres to the left of the runway, some 1,311 metres from the runway threshold. All 162 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 28 January 2016 the pilot of a Cessna Aircraft Company Caravan 208 amphibian aircraft, registered VH-WTY (WTY) was conducting a series of charter flights in the Whitsunday region of Queensland. The pilot was conducting his third flight of the day when the aircraft departed Hamilton Island Airport at about 1415 Eastern Standard Time with 10 passengers on board. The tour included a scenic flight over the Great Barrier Reef for about 50 minutes before heading to Chance Bay, on the south-east tip of Whitsunday Island, about 11 km north east of Hamilton Island Airport. Following a water landing at Chance Bay, the group was to spend 90 minutes at the beach before a short flight back to Hamilton Island. The tour was originally planned to include a landing at Whitehaven Beach, however wind conditions at the time required the water landing be altered to Chance Bay. Radar surveillance data showed WTY approach Whitsunday Island from the north and conduct an orbit about 2 km north of Whitehaven Beach at about 1510, before heading toward Whitehaven Beach. WTY flew over the southern end of Whitehaven Beach and the strip of land that separates it from Chance Bay. At about 1515, after crossing Chance Bay beach in a southerly direction, WTY descended below radar surveillance for the remainder of the flight. The pilot advised that he flew WTY over the western end of Chance Bay’s main beach in order to conduct a visual pre-landing check of the bay. The pilot noted the positions of various vessels moored in the bay to determine the best taxi path to the beach. During this fly-over, the pilot also noted the sea state and observed evidence of wind gusts on the water surface. The pilot then initiated a right downwind turn toward the landing area. The approach was from the south with the intent to land in the most suitable location within the designated landing area and then taxi to the beach. The pilot reported setting up for landing at about 50 ft above the water and then delayed the landing in order to fly through an observed wind gust. Passenger video footage indicated that, during the subsequent landing, WTY bounced three times on the surface of the water. After the second bounce, with WTY getting closer to the beach and terrain, the pilot increased engine power and initiated a go-around. The third bounce, which occurred almost immediately after the second, was the most pronounced and resulted in the aircraft rebounding about 30 to 50 ft above the water. While increasing power, the pilot perceived that the torque was indicating red, suggesting an over-torque for the selected propeller configuration. Noticing that the climb performance was less than expected with the flaps at 30˚, the pilot stopped increasing power and reduced the flap to 20˚. As the aircraft climbed straight ahead towards a saddle, climb performance was still below the pilot’s expectations and he assessed that WTY would not clear the terrain. In response, the pilot turned right to avoid the surrounding rising terrain. WTY clipped trees during this turn, before colliding with terrain and coming to rest in dense scrub about 150 m from the eastern end of the main beach, near the top of the ridge. The pilot promptly advised the passengers to exit and move away from the aircraft. Some of the 11 people on board suffered minor injuries but all were able to quickly leave the aircraft. There was no post-impact fire. The aircraft’s fixed emergency beacon self-activated during the collision with terrain and was detected by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), resulting in a search and rescue response being initiated by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Australia. The pilot reported also activating his personal locator beacon, however this was not detected by AMSA. In addition, the pilot used the company satellite phone to advise the operator of the occurrence and current status of all on board. At about the same time, several witnesses who were located in Chance Bay made their way to the aircraft before assisting everyone down to the beach. A tourist boat was utilized to transfer the pilot and passengers to Hamilton Island, arriving at about 1600. From there, one passenger was transferred by helicopter to Mackay for further treatment.

On 21 December 2015, an ERJ 190-200 (Embraer 195) aircraft, registered PK-KDC, was being operated by Kalstar Aviation on a scheduled passenger flight. The crew was scheduled to fly three sectors from I Gusti Ngurah Rai International Airport (WADD) Bali – H. Hasan Aroeboesman Airport (WATE) Ende – El Tari International Airport (WATT) Kupang – Sultan Hasanuddin International Airport (WAAA), Makassar. The aircraft departed Bali at 0734 UTC which was delayed for 74 minutes from the normal schedule, due to late arrival of the aircraft from the previous flight. On the flight from Bali to Ende, the Pilot in Command (PIC) acted as pilot monitoring (PM) and the Second in command (SIC) acted as pilot flying (PF). The aircraft landed in Ende at 0839 UTC. During transit, the PIC received a short message from a flight operations officer of Kalstar Aviation in Kupang which informed him that the visibility at Kupang was 1 km. Considering the weather forecast in the Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAFOR) showed that the visibility at Kupang would improve at the time of arrival, the PIC decided to depart to Kupang. Another consideration was the operating hours of Ende which would be closed at 0900 UTC. The operating hours of Ende was extended and the aircraft departed Ende at 0916 UTC, with flight number KD676. On board this flight were two pilots, three flight attendants, and 125 passengers. The PIC acted as PM and the SIC acted as PF. There was no departure briefing performed by the PF. After takeoff, the pilot set the Flight Management System (FMS) to fly direct to KPG VOR and climbed to a cruising altitude of Flight Level (FL) 175 (17,500 feet). During climbing, the PIC instructed the SIC to reduce the aircraft speed by 20 knots with the intention to wait for the weather improvement at Kupang. During cruising, the pilots monitored communication between El Tari Tower controller with another pilot. El Tari Tower controller advised that the visibility at Kupang was 1 km while the minima for approach was 3.9 km. At 0927 UTC, the pilot established communication with El Tari Tower controller and requested for direct to initial approach point SEMAU. At 0932 UTC, the aircraft was at 62 Nm, the aircraft started to descend which was approved to 10,000 feet. When the aircraft passed FL 150, the pilot requested to turn left to fly direct to the inbound track of the VOR/DME approach for runway 07 in order to avoid cloud formation which was indicated by magenta color on the aircraft weather radar. At 0941 UTC, the El Tari Tower controller informed that the visibility on runway 07 was 4 km and issued clearance for RNAV approach to runway 07 and requested that the pilot report when the runway was in sight. Both pilots discussed the plan to make an RNAV approach to runway 07, with landing configuration with flap 5 and auto-brake set to position low. At 0943 UTC, the pilot reported that the runway was in sight when passing 2,500 feet and the El Tari Tower controller informed that the wind was calm and issued a landing clearance. During the approach, the PF noticed that all Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights indicated a white color, which indicated that the aircraft was too high for the approach. Recognizing that the aircraft was too high, the crew performed a non-standard configuration setting by extending the landing gear down first with the intention to increase drag. The landing gear was extended at approximately 7 Nm from the runway 07 threshold and afterwards selected the flaps to 1 and 2. The published approach procedure stated that the sequence for establishing landing configuration is by selecting flap 1, flap 2, landing gear down, flap 3 and flap 5. On final approach, the crew noticed the aural warning “HIGH SPEED HIGH SPEED”. The SIC also noticed that the aircraft speed was about 200 knots. The pilots decided to continue the approach considering the runway was 2,500 meters long and would be sufficient for the aircraft to stop with the existing conditions. The pilots compared the runway condition at Kupang with the condition at Ende which had 1,650 meter length runway. On short final approach, the aircraft was on the correct glide path and the speed was approximately 205 knots. The PF noticed the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) warning of “TOO LOW TERRAIN” activated. The aircraft then touched down at approximately the middle of the runway. After touchdown, the PF immediately applied thrust reverser. Realizing that the aircraft was about to overrun the end of the runway, and with the intention to avoid the approach lights on the end of the runway, the PIC turned the aircraft to the right. The aircraft stopped approximately 200 meters from the end of runway 07. At 0946 UTC, the El Tari Tower controller saw the aircraft overrun, then pushed the crash bell and informed the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF).

On December 15, 2015, at 5:23pm central standard time (CST), Southwest Airlines flight 31, a Boeing 737-300, N649SW, exited the taxiway while taxing to the gate and came to rest in a ditch at the Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee. Nine of the 138 passengers and crew onboard received minor injuries during the evacuation and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from William P. Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas. Weather was not a factor, light conditions were dark just after sunset. The airplane landed normally on runway 20R and exited at taxiway B2. The flight crew received and understood the taxi instructions to their assigned gate. As the crew proceeded along taxiway T3, the flight crew had difficulty locating taxiway T4 as the area was dark, and there was glare from the terminal lights ahead. The crew maneuvered the airplane along T3 and onto T4, and then turned back to the right on a general heading consistent with heading across the ramp toward the assigned gate. The flight crew could not see T4 or the grassy area because the taxiway lights were off and the glare from the terminal lights. As a result, the airplane left the pavement and came to rest in a drainage ditch resulting in substantial damage to airplane. The cabin crew initially attempted to keep the passengers seated, but after being unable to contact the flight crew due to the loud alarm on the flight deck, the cabin crew properly initiated and conducted an evacuation. As a result of past complaints regarding the brightness of the green taxiway centerline lights on taxiways H, J, L and T-6, BNA tower controllers routinely turned off the taxiway centerline lighting. Although the facility had not received any requests on the day of the accident, about 30 minutes prior to the event the tower controller in charge (CIC) turned off the centerline lights as a matter of routine. In doing so, the CIC inadvertently turned off the "TWY J & Apron 2" selector, which included the taxiway lights in the vicinity of the excursion. The airfield lighting panel screensaver feature prevented the tower controllers from having an immediate visual reference to the status of the airfield lighting.

Bombardier Q-400 aircraft VT-SUC belonging to M/s Spice jet Ltd. was involved in wild life strike accident during landing roll at Jabalpur while operating scheduled flight SG2458 from Mumbai to Jabalpur on 04.12.2015. The aircraft was under the command of pilot holding ATPL & duly qualified on type with First Officer also an ATPL holder and qualified on type. There were 49 passengers and 02 cabin crew on board the aircraft. The aircraft VT-SUC took-off from Mumbai for Jabalpur at around 1200 UTC. The enroute flight was uneventful. The aircraft came in contact with ATC Jabalpur at around 1323 UTC. The ATC reported prevailing weather at Jabalpur as surface winds calm, visibility 5000 meters, weather Haze, nonsignificant clouds, and temp 24° C. At 1342 UTC the pilot requested ATC for visual approach runway 06. The ATC cleared VT-SUC for visual approach runway 06 and asked to confirm when runway in sight. At 1347 UTC the pilot confirmed the runway in sight and requested for landing clearance and the same was acknowledged by ATC. The aircraft landed on runway 06 and about 05 to 06 seconds after touch down at around 1350 UTC the aircraft hit wild boars on the runway. The pilot stated that as it was dawn they did not see the wild boars on runway during approach, and saw the wild boars only after touch down and when they were very close to them, also they did not had adequate time to react so as to take any evasive action. Hence, one of the wild boars on runway impacted with LH main landing gear due which the LH Main landing gear got collapsed and the aircraft started drifting towards left. Thereafter LH engine propeller blades came in contact with ground and got sheared off. The aircraft dragged on its belly for around 182 feet and in the process the nose landing gear also collapsed. The aircraft then veered to the left of the center line and subsequently exited the runway onto the left side and came to final halt position in Soft Ground. The pilot then confirmed with first officer about fire and once getting assured that there was no fire gave evacuation call outs. The pilot then contacted ATC for assistance and informed that there were 10 to 11 pigs on the runway and the aircraft had hit the pig and gone off the runway. The Crash Fire Tender (CFT) team along with operational jeep reached the accident site. The pilot shut down the engines. All the passengers were then evacuated safely from the RH side. There was no injury to any of the occupants on board the aircraft and there was no fire.

The aircraft departed Cancún on a regular schedule flight to Mexico City, carrying 139 passengers and five crew members. The flight was uneventful. Following an unstabilized approach, the aircraft landed on runway 05L at an excessive speed. After touchdown, severe vibrations occurred when the left main gear collapsed after a course of 1,097 metres. The airplane slid for 980 metres before coming to rest. All 144 occupants evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.