Private

Before departing on the flight, the private pilot, who did not hold a current medical certificate, fueled the multiengine airplane and was seen shortly thereafter attempting to repair a fuel leak of unknown origin. The pilot did not hold a mechanic certificate and review of the maintenance logbooks revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed 2 years before the accident. After performing undetermined maintenance to the airplane, the pilot reported to a witness that he had fixed the fuel leak. The pilot then taxied to the runway for takeoff. Witnesses reported that a large fuel stain was present on the ramp where the airplane had been parked; however, the amount of fuel that leaked from the airplane could not be determined. The pilot aborted the first takeoff shortly after becoming airborne. Although he did not state why he aborted the takeoff, he told the tower controller that he did not need assistance; shortly thereafter, he requested and was cleared for a second takeoff. During the initial climb, the pilot declared an emergency and was cleared to land on any runway. Witnesses reported that the airplane was between 400 ft and 800 ft above the ground in a left bank and appeared to be turning back to land on an intersecting runway. They thought the airplane was going to make it back to the runway, but the airplane's bank angle increased past 90° and the nose suddenly dropped; the airplane subsequently impacted terrain. One of the pilots likened the maneuver to a stall/spin, Vmc roll, or snap roll. Examination of the flight controls and engines did not reveal any anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. The position of the fuel valves was consistent with the fuel being shut off to the left engine. The fuel valves, with the exception of the left main valve, functioned when power was applied. The left main valve was intact, but the motor was found to operate intermittently. The amount of fuel found in the left engine injection servo was less than that in the right engine; however, the cylinder head temperatures and exhaust gas temperatures were consistent between both engines for the duration of the flight, and whether or to what extent the left engine may have experienced a loss of power could not be determined. The available evidence was insufficient to determine why the pilot declared an emergency and elected to return to the airport; however, the airplane's increased left bank and nose-down attitude just before impact is consistent with a loss of control.

The private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in his high-performance, turbine-powered airplane with full tanks of fuel. He landed and had the airplane serviced with 150 gallons of fuel. He subsequently departed on the return flight. As the airplane approached the destination airport, the pilot asked for priority handling and reported that the airplane "lost a transfer pump and had a little less fuel than he thought," and he did not want to come in with a single engine. When asked if he needed assistance, he replied "negative." The pilot was cleared to perform a visual approach to runway 19 during night conditions. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot requested the runway lights for runway 25 be turned on and reported that the airplane lost engine power in one engine. The controller advised that the lights on runway 25 were being turned on and issued a landing clearance. The airplane impacted terrain before the threshold for runway 25. During examination of the recovered wreckage, flight control continuity was established. No useable amount of fuel was found in any of the airplane's fuel tanks; however, fuel was observed in the fuel lines. All transfer pumps and boost pumps were operational. The engine-driven fuel pumps on both engines contained fuel in their respective fuel filter bowls. Both pumps were able to rotate when their input shafts were manipulated by hand. Disassembly of both pumps revealed that their inlet filters were free of obstructions. Bearing surfaces in both pumps exhibited pitting consistent with pump operation with inadequate fuel lubrication and fuel not reaching the pump. The examination revealed no evidence of airframe or engine preimpact malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Performance calculations using a flight planning method described in the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane could have made the return flight with about 18 gallons (119 lbs) of fuel remaining. However, performance calculations using a fuel burn simulation method developed from the fuel burn and data from the airplane flight manual indicated that the airplane would have run out of fuel on approach. Regulations require that a flight depart with enough fuel to fly to the first point of intended landing and, assuming normal cruising speed, at night, to fly after that for at least 45 minutes. The calculated 45-minute night reserves required about 56 gallons (366 lbs) of fuel using a maximum recommended cruise power setting or about 37.8 gallons (246 lbs) of fuel using a maximum range power setting. Regardless of the flight planning method he could have used, the pilot did not depart on the accident flight with the required fuel reserves and exhausted all useable fuel while on approach to the destination. The airplane was owned by Edward B. Noakes III.

The pilot performed a preflight inspection of the turboprop airplane and an engine run-up with no anomalies noted. The takeoff roll and lift off from the runway were normal; however, when the pilot initiated a landing gear retraction, the engine torque decreased, but the rpm did not change. The torque then surged back to full power and continued to surge as the pilot attempted to return to the runway. The left wing of the airplane struck the ground, and the airplane came to rest in the grass on the side of the runway. Examination of the engine, engine accessories, and propeller revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available
information.

On 22 November 2017, the pilot-in-command (PIC) accompanied by the first officer (FO) took off from the Cape Town International Airport (FACT) on a private flight to the Rand Airport (FAGM). The flight was conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR) by day and the approach was conducted under visual flight rules (VFR). The PIC was the pilot flying (PF) and was seated on the left seat and the FO was occupying the right seat. The air traffic controller (ATC) on duty at FAGM tower stated that the FO reported in-bound for a fullstop landing at FAGM. The last wind direction data for Runway 29 was transmitted to the FO as 230°/11 knots (kts) and Query Nautical Height (QNH): 1021. The FO acknowledged the transmission and the crew elected to land on Runway 11. The PIC stated that the approach for landing was stable and that the touchdown was near the first taxiway exit point. According to the FO, the aircraft floated for a while before touchdown. This was confirmed during the investigation. During the landing rollout, the PIC applied the brakes and the brakes responded for a short while, however, the aircraft continued to roll without slowing down. At approximately 300 metres (m) beyond the intersection of Runway 35 and Runway 11, the PIC requested the FO to apply emergency brakes. The FO applied the emergency brakes gradually and the aircraft continued to roll before the brakes locked and the tyres burst. The aircraft skidded on the main wheels and continued for approximately 180m until it overshot the runway. The undercarriage went over a ditch of approximately 200 millimetres in depth at the end of the runway into the soft ground and the aircraft came to a stop approximately 10m from the threshold facing slightly left off the extended centre line Runway 11. The aircraft was substantially damaged during the impact sequence and none of the occupants sustained injuries. The crash alarm was activated by the tower and the fire services responded to the scene.

The aircraft took off from the Bom Futuro Municipal Aerodrome (SILC), Lucas do Rio Verde - MT, to the Anápolis Aerodrome (SWNS) - GO, in order to carry out a transfer flight, with a pilot and three passengers on board. During the flight, the pilot identified conflicting information related to the amount of fuel remaining and chose to make an intermediate landing on an unapproved runway, located in the city of Goiás Velho - GO, in order to check the data visually. After the conference, the N154KQ took off from that location and, reaching approximately 300ft height, the aircraft lost power, colliding with vegetation 1.86 km from the runway used for takeoff. The aircraft was destroyed by the fire. The pilot suffered serious injuries and the three passengers suffered minor injuries.

The pilot of the turbine-powered airplane reported that, while landing in a gusting crosswind, it was "obvious" the wind had changed directions. He performed a go-around, but "the wind slammed [the airplane] to the ground extremely hard." Subsequently, the airplane veered to the right off the runway and then back to the left before coming to rest. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The automated weather observation system located at the accident airport reported that, about the time of the accident, the wind was from 270° at 19 knots, gusting to 25 knots. The pilot landed on runway 20.

The commercial pilot and passenger departed on a local flight in the twin-engine airplane. According to a witness, the pilot took off from the private grass runway and departed the area for about 10 minutes. The airplane then returned to the airport, where the pilot performed a low pass over the runway and entered a steep climb followed by a roll. The airplane entered a nose-low descent, then briefly leveled off in an upright attitude before disappearing behind trees and subsequently impacting terrain. The pilot's toxicology testing was positive for ethanol with 0.185 gm/dl and 0.210 gm/dl in urine and cavity blood samples, respectively. The effects of ethanol are generally well understood; it significantly impairs pilot performance, even at very low levels. Federal Aviation Administration regulations prohibit any person from acting or attempting to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft while having 0.040 gm/dl or more ethanol in the blood. While the identified ethanol may have come from sources other than ingestion, such as postmortem production, the possibility that the source of some of the ethanol was from ingestion and that pilot was impaired by the effects of ethanol during the accident flight could not be ruled out. Toxicology also identified a significant amount of diphenhydramine in cavity blood (0.122 µg/ml, which is within or above the therapeutic range of 0.0250 to 0.1120 µg/ml; diphenhydramine undergoes postmortem redistribution, and central postmortem levels may be about two to three times higher than peripheral or antemortem levels.). Diphenhydramine is a sedating antihistamine that causes more sedation than other antihistamines; this is the rationale for its use as a sleep aid. In a driving simulator study, a single dose of diphenhydramine impaired driving ability more than a blood alcohol concentration of 0.100%. The pilot had been diagnosed with memory loss about 8 months before the accident. It appears that he had some degree of mild cognitive impairment, but whether his cognitive impairment was severe enough to have contributed to the accident could not be determined from the available evidence. However, it is likely that the pilot's mild cognitive impairment combined with the psychoactive effects of diphenhydramine and possibly ethanol would have further decreased his cognitive functioning and contributed to his decision to attempt an aerobatic maneuver at low altitude in a non-aerobatic airplane.

Apparently following technical issues, the pilot was forced to attempt an emergency landing at Dabajuro Airport. The twin engine aircraft crash landed near the runway and struck two motorcyclists. One of them was killed while the second was injured. The airplane was damaged beyond repair and the pilot was uninjured.

The instrument-rated private pilot departed on a cross-country flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with an overcast cloud layer at 500 ft above ground level (agl)
and visibility restricted to 1 ¾ miles in mist, without receiving an instrument clearance or opening his filed instrument flight rules flight plan. There was an outage of the ground communications system at the airport and there was no evidence that the pilot attempted to open his flight plan via his cellular telephone. In addition, there was a low-level outage of the radar services in the vicinity of the accident site and investigators were unable to determine the airplane's route of flight before impact. The airport manager observed the accident airplane depart from runway 35 and enter the clouds. Witnesses located to the north of the accident site did not see the airplane but reported hearing an airplane depart about the time of the accident. One witness reported hearing a lowflying airplane and commented that the engines sounded as if they were operating at full power. The witness heard a thud as he was walking into his home but attributed it to a thunderstorm in the area. The airplane impacted a field about 3.5 miles to the northeast of the departure end of the runway and off the track for the intended route of flight. The airplane was massively fragmented during the impact and debris was scattered for about 300 ft. The damage to the airplane and ground scars at the accident site were consistent with the airplane impacting in a left wing low, nose low attitude with relatively high energy. A postaccident examination of the engines and propeller assemblies did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Signatures were consistent with both engines producing power and both propellers developing thrust at the time of impact. While the massive fragmentation precluded functional testing of the equipment, there was no damage or failure that suggested preimpact anomalies with the airframe or flight controls.Several days before the accident flight, the pilot encountered a "transient flag" on the air data attitude heading reference system. The pilot reported the flag to both the co-owner of the airplane and an avionics shop; however, exact details of the flag are not known. The unit was destroyed by impact forces and could not be functionally tested. If the flag affecting the display of attitude information had occurred with the unit after takeoff, the instrument panel had adequate stand-by instrumentation from which the pilot could have continued the flight. It is not known if this unit failed during the takeoff and investigators were unable to determine what role, if any, this transient issue may have played in the accident. Based upon the reported weather conditions, the location of the wreckage, and the attitude of the airplane at the time of impact with the ground, it is likely that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation shortly after takeoff which resulted in a loss of control and descent into terrain.

En route from Toluca to Acapulco, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions. In limited visibility, the twin engine airplane struck hilly and wooded terrain in the Sierra de Chilpancingo, near San Vicente. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and both occupants were killed.