Saint Petersburg-Clearwater

The flight crew was operating the business jet on an on-demand air taxi flight with passengers onboard. During landing at the destination airport, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the sound of the airplane touching down followed by the pilot's and copilot's comments that the brakes were not operating. Air traffic controllers reported, and airport surveillance video confirmed, that the airplane touched down "normally" and the airplane's thrust reverser deployed but that the airplane continued down the runway without decelerating before overrunning the runway and impacting terrain. Postaccident examination of the airplane's brake system revealed discrepancies of the antiskid system that included a broken solder joint on the left-side inboard transducer and a reversal of the wiring on the right-side outboard transducer. It is likely that these discrepancies resulted in the normal braking system's failure to function during the landing. Before the accident flight, the airplane had been in long-term storage for several years and was in the process of undergoing maintenance to bring the airplane back to a serviceable condition, which in-part required the completion of several inspections, an overhaul of the landing gear, and the resolution of over 100 other unresolved discrepancies. The accident flight and four previous flights were all made with only a portion of this required maintenance having been completed and properly documented in the airplane's maintenance logs. A pilot, who had flown the airplane on four previous flights along with the accident pilot (who was acting as second-in-command during them), identified during those flights that the airplane's normal braking system was not operating when the airplane was traveling faster than 20 knots. He remedied the situation by configuring the airplane to use the emergency, rather than normal, braking system. That pilot reported this discrepancy to the operator's director of maintenance, and it is likely that maintenance personnel from the company subsequently added an "INOP" placard near the switch on the date of the accident. The label on the placard referenced the antiskid system, and the airplane's flight manual described that with the normal brake (or antiskid) system inoperative, the brake selector switch must be positioned to use the emergency braking system. Following the accident, the switch was found positioned with the normal braking system activated, and it is likely that the accident flight crew attempted to utilize the malfunctioning normal braking system during the landing. Additionally, the flight crew failed to properly recognize the failure and configure the airplane to utilize the emergency braking system, or utilize the parking brake, as described in the airplane's flight manual, in order to stop the airplane within the available runway.

The pilot performed a preflight inspection of the turboprop airplane and an engine run-up with no anomalies noted. The takeoff roll and lift off from the runway were normal; however, when the pilot initiated a landing gear retraction, the engine torque decreased, but the rpm did not change. The torque then surged back to full power and continued to surge as the pilot attempted to return to the runway. The left wing of the airplane struck the ground, and the airplane came to rest in the grass on the side of the runway. Examination of the engine, engine accessories, and propeller revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation before the accident. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available
information.

An annual inspection had been completed on the airplane the same day, and on its first flight after the annual inspection, as the airplane was departing from runway 05, at Naples Municipal Airport, witnesses said the engine ceased operating. They also said that the propeller was rotating either slowly or had stopped, and they then observed the airplane enter a steep turn, followed by an abrupt and uncontrolled nose-low descent and subsequent impact with the ground. The airplane came to rest in a nose-low, near vertical position, suspended at its tail section by a fence and some trees along the eastern perimeter of the airport. It had incurred substantial damage and the pilot and two passengers who were onboard the airplane were fatally injured. Postaccident examination of the airframe, flight controls and the engine did not reveal any mechanical failure or malfunction. The flaps were found to have been set to 10 degrees, and the propeller showed little or no evidence of rotation at impact. The FAA Toxicology Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological studies on specimens obtained from the pilot and the results showed that diphenhydramine was found to be present in urine, and 0.139 (ug/ml, ug/g) diphenhydramine was detected in blood. Diphenhydramine, commonly known by the trade name Benadryl, is an over-the-counter antihistamine with sedative side effects, and is commonly used to treat allergy symptoms. Published research (Weiler et. al. Effects of Fexofenadine, Diphenhydramine, and Alcohol on Driving Performance. Annals of Internal Medicine 2000; 132:354-363), has noted the effect of a maximal over the counter dose of diphenhydramine to be worse than the effect of a 0.10% blood alcohol level on certain measures of simulated driving performance. The level of diphenydramine in the blood of the pilot was consistent with recent use of more than a typical maximum single over-the-counter dose of the medication.

The pilot was on an IFR flight in IMC and received clearance to climb and maintain FL220. During climb, he informed ARTCC, '. . . We're having a problem.' When asked to say again, he began the same reply, then no further radio communication was received from the aircraft. Subsequently an inflight breakup occurred and wreckage was scattered over a wide area. The right outboard wing panel, horizontal stabilizer, elevators, right aileron and parts of the rudder were found at a distance from the main wreckage. These displayed evidence of overstress failure. No preexisting cracks or fatigue was found. Radar and weather data showed deviation from normal flight began at or near moderate convective weather echo (vip 2) as the aircraft was climbing thru 17,300 feet in freezing conditions. At that time, the rate of climb was about 200 feet/min and the ground speed was 150 to 160 knots. At 1032:18, a descent begun. During the next 2 to 3 minutes, the aircraft's altitude, heading and speed deviated. At 1035:17, other primary radar targets appeared, then radar contact was lost. Gross weight of the aircraft was estimated to be 4,311 lbs; max allowable weight was 4,100 lbs. CofG was estimated to be 1.59 inches behind the aft limit. All four occupants were killed.

The pilot stated that he experienced a loss of power in both engines, made an emergency landing in a cow pasture, and struck a cow on landing rollout. Due to the extent of post crash fire no determination could be made as to the nature of the malfunction of the engines described by the pilot.

After a local maintenance flight the crew returned to St. Petersburg to practice full stop landings. Shortly after becoming airborne during the second takeoff, the right engine experienced a power loss. The aircraft was observed to climb to about 50 feet agl, then veer right and crash east of the runway. Other than a malfunctioning right fuel tank selector which allowed fuel to bypass to other fuel tanks, there was no pre-impact failure/malfunction. Both right tanks were empty and the left tanks contained about 175 gallons of fuel. However, subsequent tests showed that fluid in the right tank would bypass the right fuel selector and leak into the left tank when the aircraft sat left wing low for about 12 hours. The aircraft was not airworthy in that all the requirements of an approved 91.217 inspection program were not complied with. The pilot-in-command had 5 hours as pic of DC-3 during the last 5 months with one hour and two takeoff and landings the last 90 days. This was the first flight in a DC-3 for the copilot with no record of any training in the DC-3.

On approach to St Petersburg-Clearwater Airport, while in traffic pattern, the pilot lost control of the airplane that stalled, entered a spin and crashed. All six occupants were killed.