Positioning

A witness stated he observed the airplane on climbout from runway 32. The airplane started a right turn estimated at about 30 to 45° angle of bank. The airplane stopped climbing and began descending. Subsequently, it collided with a tree line, while in a right bank, and then it impacted the ground. Weather conditions at the time of accident were described by the witness as very dark, with no ambient light or visible horizon. Examination of the airframe, flight control system, engine assembly, and propeller assembly revealed no evidence of a precrash failure or malfunction. The autopilot was found in the off position, and the autopilot circuit breakers were not tripped. The pilot and passenger were seriously injured and had no memory of the flight. A radio transcript revealed that after taking off, the flight had made one radio transmission to request an ifr clearance.

During arrival at dawn, the pilot contacted Approach Control about 22 miles from the airport at 8,500 feet and requested an ILS runway 26 approach. The ATIS was reporting 1/8 mile visibility with fog; the minimum published visibility for the ILS landing was 3/4 mile. The controller vectored the aircraft so that it intercepted the ILS localizer at the outer marker at an intercept angle that was 5 degrees greater than the maximum allowable intercept of 30 degrees. The intercept point should have been at least 3 miles further away from the airport. The aircraft was 650 feet above the ILS glideslope at the outer marker (which was outside the ILS glideslope parameter). Instead of making a missed approach, the pilot elected to continue the ILS. As he attempted to intercept the glideslope from above, the airplane entered a high rate of descent and passed through the glideslope. The pilot was arresting the descent, when the airplane collided with level terrain about 1,000 feet short of the runway. After the accident, at 0646 edt, the visibility was 1/16 mile with fog.

The pilot had departed a remote airstrip on the return portion of a cargo flight. An instrument flight plan was on file with the ARTCC. After departure, the pilot attempted to contact ARTCC to open his flight plan but communications were not established. The airplane struck mountainous terrain about 6 miles south of the departure airport. Radar data showed that after departure, the airplane climbed westbound and then turned southbound toward higher terrain. It circled southwest of the airport and turned eastbound while climbing to 5,300 feet msl. The airplane then turned southbound again toward the accident site. The last recorded radar data was at 5,200 feet msl. The airplane struck a ridgeline about 4,800 feet msl. Airmets were in effect for IFR conditions, low ceilings, mountain obscurations, rain, fog, and icing in clouds and in precipitation. A witness reported that when the airplane arrived at the airport, the airframe had a coating of ice. When the airplane departed, snow was falling at the airport.

The DC-3 aircraft, with the captain, first officer, and an apprentice aircraft maintenance engineer on board, was to be ferried from Vancouver, British Columbia, to Whitehorse, Yukon. Just after take-off from runway 08, as the first officer was setting the engine power, the right propeller began to over-speed. The captain told the first officer to shut down and feather the right engine. The first officer did as instructed, and advised the Vancouver tower controller of the engine problem and that they would return to the airport to land on runway 08. The captain turned the aircraft to the right, onto downwind for runway 08; however, because the aircraft's altitude and airspeed were decreasing, the first officer advised the tower controller that they would land on runway 30. The aircraft continued to lose height, narrowly avoiding buildings in its path, and crashed to the ground, one mile short of runway 30. The three occupants were seriously injured during the impact and the post-crash fire; the captain died of his injuries eight days after the accident.

The aircraft crashed on a visual approach to runway 09 left at Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed. The airplane was destroyed. The airline transport pilot sustained serious injuries. The flight originated from Marsh Harbor, Bahamas, about 1 hour 14 minutes before the accident. Witnesses stated they observed the airplane descending to the right of the final approach path for runway 09 left with the landing gear down and an engine was heard sputtering. The wings of the airplane were observed to be rocking back and forth. The airplane rolled right 90 degrees. The nose pitched up, the airplane rolled over inverted, the nose pitched down, the airplane collided with a parking lot and slid in between a front end loader and a dump truck coming to a complete stop. Transcripts of recorded transmissions between Miami Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), N7884J, and review of Miami ATCT continuous data recording radar revealed there were no airplanes in the vicinity of N7884J at the time of the accident.

Shortly after takeoff from Liuli Airstrip, while climbing, the pilot made a sharp turn to avoid a sand dune when he lost control of the aircraft that crashed on the ground. There were no casualties but the aircraft was written off.

The pilot was informed by another company pilot that the higher passes were closed. He then attempted to fly through 'high pass' located near old harbor. The pilot described the weather as overcast with ceilings obscured, and flight visibility was 2 to 3 miles. The pass was snow covered. As he entered the pass he lost visual reference due to whiteout conditions and he initiated a left turn to exit the pass. Approx half way through the turn the left wing struck the mountain.

The pilot, sole on board, departed Kolonia Airport on a 5 hours and 45 minutes flight to Tarawa Island, Gilbert Islands. En route, radar and contact were lost with the airplane that crashed in the Pacific Ocean. SAR operations were initiated but abandoned after few days as no trace of the aircraft nor the pilot was found.

The airplane crashed immediately after liftoff during a three-engine takeoff. Flightcrew had shortened rest break; rest periods not required for ferry flights. Flight crew fatigue from lack of rest, sleep, and disruption of circadian rhythms. Flightcrew did not have adequate, realistic training in three-engine takeoff techniques or procedures. Flight crew did not adequately understand three-engine takeoff procedures, including significance of vmcg. Flight engineer improperly determined vmcg speed, resulting in value 9 knots too low. During first takeoff attempt, captain applied power to asymmetrical engine too soon, was unable to maintain directional control, and rejected the takeoff. Captain agreed to modify procedure by allowing flight engineer to advance throttle, a deviation of prescribed procedure. FAA oversight of operator was inadequate because the poi and geographic inspectors were unable to effectively monitor domestic crew training and international operations. Existing far part 121 flight time limits & rest requirements that pertained to the flights that the flightcrew flew prior to the ferry flights did not apply to the ferry flights flown under far part 91. Current one-engine inoperative takeoff procedures do not provide adequate rudder availability for correcting directional deviations during the takeoff roll compatible with the achievement of maximum asymmetric thrust at an appropriate speed greater than ground minimum control speed. All three crew members were killed.

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Magong to Taipei. While descending to Taipei-Songshan Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with a limited visibility due to heavy rain falls. The minimum descent altitude was fixed at 2,500 feet but for unknown reasons, the crew descended to 1,000 feet when the aircraft struck the slope of a wooded hill located 20 km from the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and all four crew members were killed.