Executive/Corporate/Business

On June 25, 2014, about 0750 central daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company C90A, N800MK, was substantially damaged following a runway excursion during an attempted go-around at Houston, Mississippi (M44). The commercial-rated pilot, co-pilot, and two passengers were not injured, while one passenger received minor injuries. The airplane was
operated by BECS, LLC under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. Day, visual meteorological conditions prevailed for corporate flight that originated at Memphis, Tennessee (MEM). According to the pilot, who was seated in the left, cockpit seat, he was at the controls and was performing a visual approach to runway 21. Just prior to touchdown, while at 90 knots and with approach flaps extended, the right wing "rose severely and tried to put the airplane into a severe left bank." He recalled that the co-pilot called "wind shear" and "go around." As he applied power, the airplane rolled left again, so he retarded the throttles and allowed the airplane to settle into the grass on the left side of runway 21. The airplane struck a ditch, spun around, and came to rest in the grass, upright. A post-crash fire ensued in the left engine area. The pilot and passengers exited the airplane using the main entry door. The pilot reported no mechanical anomalies with the airplane prior to the accident. The co-pilot reported the following. As they turned onto final, he noticed that the wind "picked up" a little by the wind sock. The final approach was stable, and as the pilot began to flare, he noticed the vertical speed indicator "pegged out." The airplane encountered an unexpected wind shear just above the runway. He called out for a go around. The pilot was doing everything he could to maintain control of the airplane. It was a "jarring" effect when they hit the shear. It felt like the wind was trying to lift the tail and cartwheel them over. He felt that the pilot did a good job of keeping the airplane from flipping over. In his 30,000-plus hours flying airplanes, he has never experienced anything quite like what they experienced with this shear. He has instructed on the King Air and does not feel that the pilot could have done anything different to avoid the accident.

The aircraft departed Goiânia on a flight to Aruanã, carrying two pilots and five passengers who should take part to the funeral of former football player Fernandão who died in an helicopter crash. Following an uneventful flight, the crew completed the landing on runway 24 which is 1,280 metres long. After touchdown, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance and overran. While contacting soft ground, the nose gear collapsed then the aircraft collided with a concrete fence and came to a halt 150 metres further against a second fence. All seven occupants were injured, the captain seriously. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On 12 June 2014, at about 1530 Eastern Standard Time (EST), a Piper PA-46 aircraft, registered VH-TSV, departed Dubbo, New South Wales for a private flight to the Sunshine Coast, Queensland with a pilot and one passenger on board. The planned route was to track via Moree and Toowoomba at 13,500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL). The pilot had operated the aircraft from Sunshine Coast to Lightning Ridge, Brewarrina and Dubbo earlier that day and reported that all engine indications were normal on those flights. About 1 hour after departing Dubbo, when about 26 NM south of Narrabri, at about 13,500 ft AMSL, the pilot observed the engine manifold pressure gauge indicating 25 inches Hg, when the throttle position selected would normally have produced about 28 inches Hg. The pilot selected the alternate air1 which did not result in any increase in power. He then elected to descend to 10,000 ft, and at that power setting when normally the engine would have produced about 29 inches Hg, the gauge still indicated only about 25 inches Hg. He turned the aircraft towards Narrabri in an attempt to fly clear of the Pilliga State Forest. The pilot assessed that the aircraft had a partial engine failure and performed troubleshooting checks. As the aircraft descended through about 8,000 ft, he observed the oil pressure gauge indicating decreasing pressure. When passing about 6,500 ft, the oil pressure gauge indicated zero and the pilot heard two loud bangs and observed the cowling lift momentarily from above the engine. The passenger observed a puff of smoke emanating from the engine and momentarily a small amount of smoke in the cockpit. The pilot established the aircraft in a glide at about 90 kt, secured the engine and completed the emergency checklist. He broadcast a ‘Mayday’ 2 call on Brisbane Centre radio frequency advising of an engine failure and forced landing. The pilot looked for a clear area below in which to conduct a forced landing and also requested the passenger to assist in identifying any cleared areas suitable to land. Both only identified heavily treed areas. The pilot extended the landing gear and selected 10º of flap and, when at about 1,000 ft, the pilot shut the fuel off, deployed the emergency beacon then switched off the electrical system. As the aircraft entered the tree tops, he flared to stall3 the aircraft. On impact, the pilot was seriously injured and lost consciousness. The passenger reported the wings impacted with trees and the aircraft slid about 10 m before coming to rest. The passenger checked for any evidence of fuel leak or fire and administered basic first aid to the pilot. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.

Owned by Grupo Kowzef (Federico Alejandro Bonomi), the twin engine aircraft departed San Fernando (Buenos Aires) at 1222LT on an executive flight to Carmelo, Uruguay. On approach to Carmelo-Zagarzazú Airport runway 35, the pilot encountered marginal weather conditions and initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, he attempted a second approach under VFR mode. While completing a slight turn to the left in descent, the aircraft impacted the surface of the Río de la Plata and came to rest in shallow water some 10 km southwest of Carmelo Airport. The pilot and four passengers were killed and four other occupants were injured. The aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft belly landed at Stella Maris-Estate Airport, Bahamas. No one was hurt but the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Apparently, the approach checklist was interrupted by the crew for unknown reason and the landing procedure was performed with the landing gear still retracted. The aircraft was owned by the private Canadian company Kelly Panteluk Construction and the airplane was inbound from Fort Lauderdale-Executive.

The airline transport pilot was conducting a business flight with six passengers on board. Radar data showed that, after crossing the final approach fix for an instrument approach at the destination airport, the airplane descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 2,480 ft mean sea level (msl); dark night, instrument meteorological conditions existed at that time. Subsequently, when the airplane was about 2 miles from the airport and about 2,070 ft msl, the airplane impacted a utility pole, which was 10 ft above ground level (agl). After impacting the pole, the pilot executed a missed approach, and about 40 minutes later, he landed the airplane without further incident at another airport. On-scene examination showed that the impact had scattered debris from the separated utility pole for about 200 ft into a snow-covered field. Examination of the airplane revealed that the impact resulted in substantial damage to the nose structure, lower and upper fuselage, and horizontal stabilizer. Further examinations of the airplane, including its static system, both altimeters, both vertical speed indicators, and the radar altimeter system revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot reported that he thought he had leveled the airplane at an altitude above the MDA and that at no time during the descent and approach did the airplane's radar altimeter sound an alert indicating that the airplane was below 400 ft agl radar altitude. He also reported that he never saw the terrain, any obstructions, nor the runway lights or airport environment. Despite the pilot's statement, given the radar data and the impact evidence, it is apparent that he descended the airplane below the MDA, which resulted in the subsequent impact with the utility pole. It could not be determined why the radar altimeter did not alert the pilot that the airplane was only 10 ft above the ground. The pilot's second-class medical certificate, which had been issued more than 20 months before the accident, had expired. The medical certificate limitation section in the expired certificate stated, "Not valid for night flying or by color signal control." There is no evidence that these restrictions contributed to the accident.

The pilot and two passengers were planning to fly from Rand Airport to Lanseria International Airport (FALA) in the early hours of the morning with the intention to clear customs. It was still dark and the weather forecast thunderstorms with rain for most areas of Gauteng. Rand Tower requested clearance from FAOR approach before departure. The aircraft took off from Runway 29 following the clearance given and proceeded in a westerly direction. At 6500 feet above mean sea level (AMSL), Rand handed the aircraft over to Approach for further clearances. Reported visibility at FALA was 600m and the cloud base was 600 feet AGL. The pilot then requested a VHF Omnidirectional range (VOR) Z approach for Runway 07. He started the approach at 8000 feet and approximately 14nm from LIV. At 12nm and established on Radial 245 Approach handed him over to FALA. Once in contact with FALA the pilot was advised of the heading to turn to at missed approach point (MAP). At MAP the pilot did not have the runway in sight and advised tower that they were going around. They turned left 360° and climbed to 8000 feet as instructed by FALA. FALA handed them back to Approach for repositioning for Radial 245. Approach advised the aircraft that visibility at Wonderboom was better but the pilot said if not successful they would route to Polokwane. At 12nm the aircraft was handed over to FALA. During the descent, the pilot started repeating messages more than twice. Close to MAP the pilot indicated that he had the field in sight. FALA gave them landing clearance. Soon after, the pilot said he did not have it in sight. When FALA instructed him to go around and route Polokwane, the pilot came back on frequency indicating that the aircraft was in distress. After that, the tower heard a loud bang accompanied by black smoke from behind a hangar.

After climbing to and leveling at 15,000 feet, the airplane departed controlled flight, descended rapidly in a nose-down vertical dive, and impacted terrain; an explosion and postaccident fire occurred. Evidence at the accident site revealed that most of the wreckage was located in or near a single impact crater; however, the outer portion of the left wing impacted the ground about 1/2 mile from the main wreckage. Following the previous flight, the pilot reported to a maintenance person in another state that he had several malfunctioning flight instruments, including the autopilot, the horizontal situation indicator, and the artificial horizon gyros. The pilot, who was not a mechanic, had maintenance personnel replace the right side artificial horizon gyro but did not have any other maintenance performed at that time. The pilot was approved under an FAA exemption to operate the airplane as a single pilot; however, the exemption required that all equipment must be operational, including a fully functioning autopilot, flight director, and gyroscopic flight instruments. Despite the malfunctioning instruments, the pilot chose to take off and fly in instrument meteorological conditions. At the time of the loss of control, the airplane had just entered an area with supercooled large water droplets and severe icing, which would have affected the airplane's flying characteristics. At the same time, the air traffic controller provided the pilot with a radio frequency change, a change in assigned altitude, and a slight routing change. It is likely that these instructions increased the pilot's workload as the airplane began to rapidly accumulate structural icing. Because of the malfunctioning instruments, it is likely that the pilot became disoriented while attempting to maneuver and maintain control of the airplane as the ice accumulated, which led to a loss of control.

After takeoff from runway 34 at Lyon-Bron Airport, while in initial climb at a height of 200 feet, the twin engine airplane deviated to the left, rolled to the left and then veered to the left with a low rate of climb. Shortly after passing the end of the runway, the airplane lost height then struck the ground and caught fire. The airplane was destroyed by a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed. For unknown reasons, the pilot-in-command was seating in the right seat.

The pilots reported that, during the approach, the main hydraulic system lost pressure. They selected the auxiliary hydraulic system "on," continued the approach, and extended the landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. During the landing roll, about two-thirds down the runway, the pilots noticed that the brakes were not working normally and then turned onto a taxiway to clear the runway. The captain reported that, once on the taxiway, he was unable to stop or steer the airplane as it proceeded across a parallel runway and into an adjacent field where it subsequently struck a metal beam. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed brake system continuity with the cockpit controls. The tires, brake assemblies, and brake pads were intact and undamaged. The hydraulic lines from the hydraulic pump to the wheel brakes were intact. No hydraulic fluid was observed leaking on the exterior or interior portions of the airplane. The hydraulic fluid reservoir was found about 1/4 full. Further, testing of the two hydraulic pumps revealed that they were both functional, and no mechanical failures or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation were noted. The airplane's hydraulic system failure emergency procedures state that, if hydraulic pressure is lost, the electrically driven hydraulic pump should be reset and that, if the hydraulic pressure was not restored, that the primary hydraulic system should be disengaged and the landing gear should be lowered using the emergency landing gear extension procedures. After the gear is extended, the auxiliary hydraulic system should be selected "on" for landing. However, the pilots stated that they did not attempt to reset the electric hydraulic pump and that they performed the emergency landing gear extension procedures with the auxiliary hydraulic pump engaged. It is likely that the pilots' failure to select the auxiliary hydraulic system "off" before extending the landing gear caused the hydraulic pressure in the auxiliary system to dissipate, which left only the emergency brake accumulator available for braking during the landing. The number of emergency brake applications that can be made by the pilots depends on the accumulator charge, which may be depleted in a very short time. The airplane's emergency braking procedures state that, as soon as the airplane is safely stopped, the pilots should request towing assistance. However, the pilots did not stop the airplane on the runway despite having about 3,900 ft of runway remaining; instead, they turned off the runway at an intersection, which resulted in a loss of directional control.