Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

At 16:14 on 4 August 2018, the historic Junkers Ju 52/3m g4e commercial aircraft, registered as HB-HOT and operated by Ju-Air, took off from Locarno Aerodrome (LSZL) for a commercial VFR flight to Dübendorf (LSMD). On this flight, pilot A was sitting in the left-hand seat in the cockpit and piloting the aircraft as the commander, while pilot B was assisting him as the co-pilot sitting on the right. Following take-off from concrete runway 26R westwards and a 180-degree turn over Lake Maggiore, the flight led into the Blenio valley via Bellinzona and Biasca. HB-HOT steadily gained altitude in the process. North of Olivone, the aircraft turned into the valley of the Lago di Luzzone reservoir and thus into the Adula/Greina/Medels/Vals countryside preservation quiet zone. This zone was crossed at between 120 and 300 m above ground and at times with a minimal lateral separation from the terrain. At 16:45, as the aircraft was flying over Alp Nadels, the ISP sent a text message to a friend in Ruschein (municipality of Ilanz) to say that the Ju 52 was approaching the area. The flight subsequently continued eastwards into the Surselva region at approximately 2,500 m AMSL. At 16:51, the aircraft crossed the Vorderrhein valley in the region of Ilanz on a north-easterly heading and initially made a relatively tight left turn, taking it over Ruschein. The flight path then led generally northwards past the Crap Sogn Gion mountain and towards the basin south-west of Piz Segnas. At first, the aircraft approached this basin on the left-hand, western side of the valley. HB-HOT was climbing at this time, and reached an altitude of 2,833 m AMSL in the Nagens region. The aircraft made a slight right turn when flying past the Berghaus Nagens lodge (see figure 2). During this phase, at 16:55, one of the pilots informed the passengers of the scenery over the speakers in the cabin and through the passengers’ personal headphones. To start with, the aircraft was flying at a ground speed of 165 km/h during this phase. By point F2, the ground speed had decreased to 135 km/h, and roughly remained so until shortly before point F3. Towards point F3, the aircraft’s altitude dropped slightly and the ground speed briefly increased by around 65 km/h to approximately 200 km/h. During this time, its pitch attitude3 was 5 to 7 degrees. Towards the end of this phase, just before point F4, the flight path angle4 changed from -3 degrees to approximately -1 degree and the speed of each of the three engines decreased steadily by approximately 20 revolutions per minute (rpm). At point F4, the aircraft was at an altitude of 2,742 m AMSL. At 16:56:02, shortly after point F4, the speed of each of the three engines increased by approximately 40 rpm. At 16:56:09, HB-HOT entered the basin southwest of Piz Segnas at an altitude of 2,755 m AMSL (point F5, see also figure 14) and was therefore approximately 130 m above the elevation of the Segnes pass. The flight crew then navigated the aircraft on a north-north-easterly heading almost in the centre of the valley. HB-HOT climbed slightly during this phase and its flight path angle was approximately 2 degrees; its pitch angle remained at 5 to 7 degrees. At 16:56:17, the aircraft reached an altitude of 2,767 m AMSL at point F7 and was therefore approximately 140 m above the elevation of the Segnes pass. HB-HOT flew past the Tschingelhörner mountain peaks and began to reduce in altitude, dropping more than 15 m in approximately 6 seconds. During this phase, the power of the engines was rapidly reduced by 30 to 50 rpm, which meant that the engines were increasingly running at a similar speed5 . During this process, the pitch angle increased and the flight path angle continuously became more negative. When the aircraft was approximately abeam the Martinsloch and at an altitude of approximately 2,766 m AMSL (point F8), the flight crew initiated a right turn during their descent and then made a left turn (point F109, see figure 5). The ground speed was approximately 170 km/h and the difference between the aircraft’s pitch and flight path angles increased to approximately 15 degrees during the right turn. When transitioning into the left turn (between points F9 and F10), the pitch angle was approximately 11 degrees and the flight path angle was around -10 degrees. At this time, the aircraft was flying at approximately 125 m above the elevation of the Segnes pass (see figure 3). During roughly the next 4 seconds, the aircraft descended by 25 m and the already negative flight path angle became even more negative, which is clearly apparent when comparing figures 3 and 4 as well as in figure 5. After point F13, the roll to the left increased steadily and did not decrease even when a significant aileron deflection to the right was made. The ailerons were then brought into a neutral position and temporarily deflected into a position for a left turn. At the same time, the pitch attitude began to decrease and the flight path ran increasingly steeper downwards whilst the left bank attitude constantly increased (see figure 6). During this last flight phase, the aircraft experienced low-frequency vibrations. Ultimately, when the aircraft was 108 m above ground (point F16, see figures 6 and 7), its longitudinal axis was pointing downwards by 68 degrees from horizontal. By this time, the elevator had deflected upwards by approximately 13 degrees and the rudder was pointing 2 degrees to the right. The speeds of the three engines had increased slightly compared to the beginning of the downward spiral trajectory and were between 1,720 and 1,750 rpm shortly before impact. The roll to the left accelerated significantly during this phase. Shortly after 16:57, the aircraft hit the ground in a vertical flight attitude with an almost vertical flight path and at a speed of approximately 200 km/h (see figure 8). All 20 people on board the aircraft lost their lives in the accident. The aircraft was destroyed. Fire did not break out. Reconstructions revealed that, at the time of the accident, HB-HOT’s centre of gravity was at 2.071 m behind the wing’s leading edge (see annex A1.6). In the images and video footage available that had been captured from inside HB-HOT, there was no evidence of anyone moving within the aircraft or not sitting in their seat between the period when the aeroplane entered the basin south-west of Piz Segnas and up to the beginning of its downward spiral trajectory. A detailed description of the reconstruction of the flight path and an illustration of the relevant parameters between position F1 and the site of the accident can be found in section 1.11.2. More information regarding the background and history of the flight can be found in annex A1.1.

The pilot was conducting an on-demand air taxi flight in a float-equipped airplane from a seaplane base on a public lake to a remote lakeside home, with a passenger and her young son. The passenger brought cargo to transport as well, including an unexpected 800 lbs of mortar bags. Witnesses who labored to push the airplane out after loading reported that the airplane appeared very aft heavy and the pilot said he would offload "cement blocks" if he could not take off. A review of witness videos revealed that the pilot attempted one takeoff using only 3/4 of the available waterway, then step taxied around the lake and performed a step-taxi takeoff, again not using the full length of the lake. The airplane eventually lifted off, and barely climbed over trees on the south end of the lake, before descending and impacting terrain. A home surveillance video that captured the airplane seconds before the crash revealed that 3 seconds before ground impact, the estimated altitude of the airplane was 115 ft above ground level (agl) and the groundspeed was about 64 miles per hour (mph), which was low and much slower than normal climb speed (80 mph). As the airplane banked to the left to turn on course, it rolled through 90° likely experiencing an aerodynamic stall. Analysis of the engine rpm sound revealed that the engine was operating near maximum continuous power up until impact, and a postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. A calculation performed by investigators postaccident revealed the airplane's estimated gross weight at the time of the accident was 75 lbs over the approved maximum gross takeoff weight, and the airplane's estimated center of gravity was 1.76 inches aft of the rear limit. The pilot had been recently hired by the operator and he flew his first commercial flight in the same make and model, float-equipped airplane the week before the accident. He had accumulated 12.9 flight hours, and 13 sea landings/takeoffs in the accident model airplane since being hired as a part-time pilot. Although the airplane was able to takeoff, the aircraft's out-of-limit weight-and-balance condition increased its stall speed and degraded its climb performance, stability, and slow-flight characteristics. When the pilot turned the airplane left, the critical angle of attack was exceeded resulting in an aerodynamic stall at low altitude. If the pilot had performed a proper weight and balance calculation, he may have recognized the airplane was overweight and out of balance and should not have attempted the flight without making a load adjustment.

The airline transport pilot was conducting a commercial visual flight rules (VFR) flight transporting 10 passengers from a remote fishing lodge. According to the pilot, while in level cruise flight about 1,100 ft mean sea level (msl) and as the flight progressed into a mountain pass, visibility decreased rapidly. In an attempt to turn around and return to VFR conditions, the pilot initiated a climbing right turn. Before completing the 180° right turn, he saw what he believed to be a body of water and became momentarily disoriented, so he leveled the wings. Shortly thereafter, he realized that the airplane was approaching an area of snow-covered mountainous terrain, so he applied full power and initiated a steep climb; the airspeed decayed, and the airplane collided with an area of rocky, rising terrain, which resulted in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported no mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, and the examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. The weather forecast at the accident time included scattered clouds at 2,500 ft msl, overcast clouds at 5,000 ft msl with cloud tops to 14,000 ft and clouds layered above that to flight level 250, and isolated broken clouds at 2,500 ft with light rain. AIRMET advisory SIERRA for "mountains obscured in clouds/precipitation" was valid at the time of the accident. Conditions were expected to deteriorate. Passenger interviews revealed that through the course of the flight, the airplane was operating in marginal visual meteorological conditions and occasional instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) with areas of precipitation, reduced visibility, obscuration, and, at times, little to no forward visibility. Thus, based on weather reports and forecasts, and the pilot's and passengers' statements, it is likely that the flight encountered IMC as it approached mountainous terrain and that the pilot then lost situational awareness. The airplane was equipped with a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS); however, the alerts were inhibited at the time of the accident. Although the TAWS was required to be installed per Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, there is no requirement for it to be used. All company pilots interviewed stated that the TAWS inhibit switch remained in the inhibit position unless a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) escape maneuver was being accomplished. However, the check airman who last administered the accident pilot's competency check stated that the TAWS inhibit switch was never moved, even during a CFIT escape maneuver. The unwritten company policy to leave the TAWS in the inhibit mode and the failure of the pilot to move the TAWS out of the inhibit mode when weather conditions began to deteriorate were inconsistent with the goal of providing the highest level of safety. However, if the pilot had been using TAWS, due to the fact that he was operating at a lower altitude and thus would have likely received numerous nuisance alerts, the investigation could not determine the extent to which TAWS would have impacted the pilot's actions. At the time of the accident, the director of operations (DO) for the company resided in another city and served as DO for another air carrier as well. He traveled to the company's main base of operation about once per month but was available via telephone. According to the chief pilot, he had assumed a large percentage of the DO's duties. The president of the company said that the chief pilot had taken over "officer of the deck" and "we're just basically using him [the DO] for his recordkeeping." The FAA was aware that the company's DO was also DO for another commuter operation. FAA Flight Standards District Office management and principal operations inspectors allowed him to continue to hold those positions, although it was contrary to the guidance provided in FAA Order 8900.1. The company's General Operations Manual (GOM) only listed the DO, the chief pilot, and the president by name as having the authority to exercise operational control. However, numerous company personnel stated that operational control could be and was routinely delegated to senior pilots. The GOM stated that the DO "routinely" delegated the duty of operational control to flight coordinators, but the flight coordinator on duty at the time of the accident stated that she did not have operational control. In addition, the investigation revealed numerous inadequate and missing operational control procedures and processes in company manuals and operations specifications. Based on the FAA's inappropriate approval of the DO, the insufficient company onsite management, the inadequate operational control procedures, and the exercise of operational control by unapproved persons likely resulted in a lack of oversight of flight operations, inattentive and distracted management personnel, and a loss of operational control within the air carrier. However, the investigation could not determine the extent to which any changes to operational control, company management, and FAA oversight would have influenced the pilot's decision to continue the VFR flight into IMC.

The twin engine airplane was carrying two technicians and two pilots bound for a mine field located near Lero, Kankan. It made an intermediate stop at Conakry on a flight from Sal, Cape Verde. En route, the crew encountered poor weather conditions with low clouds and fog when the airplane struck the slope of a mountain and disintegrated on impact. All four occupants were killed.

On June 14, 2018, according to the flight assignment, BAY 4406 charter flight en-route Antalya - Kyiv (Zhulyany) on MD-83 aircraft, state and registration number UR-CPR of Bravo Airways, was operated by PIC, co-pilot and five flight attendants. According to PIC’s Statement, the flight was delayed by 6 hours (departure time - 03:30 pm.) The Investigation Team did not establish the departure time from Antalya Airport. According to the PIC, the crew arrived at the airport at 02:00 pm. The takeoff time was 03:41 pm. The airline said the flight was delayed because of the aircraft non-arrival. Bravo Airways is the aircraft operator responsible for the flight and technical operation of the aircraft, maintaining its airworthiness and ensuring the flight safety. The Pilot Flying duties were performed by the PIC, and the Pilot Monitoring was the co-pilot. In accordance with the flight assignment, the PIC cross checked the copilot. According to his Statement, the flight preparation of the crew was carried out one and a half hours before the actual departure at Antalya Airport (PIC received aeronautical and meteorological information from a representative of Turkish Ground Services), after which, the PIC took a decision to perform the flight. Climb and level flight were performed in a normal mode. Landing approach was carried out to RW08 in the conditions of thunderstorm activity with ILS system. At 05:40 pm, at landing on the aerodrome of the Kyiv International Airport (Zhulyany) (hereinafter – Kyiv (Zhulyany) Aerodrome), during the landing run, at the distance of 1260 m from the entrance threshold, the aircraft suffered a runway excursion to the left of the air strip and stopped outside the cleared and graded area of the air strip at the distance of 123 m from the runway center line (according to the tire footprints at the occurrence site.) As a result of the accident, the aircraft has sustained substantial damage, in particular, to the structural elements. None of passengers or crew members received serious injuries.

Before the air taxi flight, the commercial pilot obtained a weather briefing via the company computer system and reviewed the weather information with the company chief pilot. The pilot stated that based on the computer briefing, which did not include icing conditions, he was aware of the forecasted weather conditions along the route of flight and at the intended destination. However, the briefing was incomplete as it did not contain any in-flight weather advisories, which would have alerted the pilot of moderate icing conditions expected over the flight route in the form of AIRMET Zulu. After takeoff and during the climb to 12,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the airplane encountered light rime ice, and the pilot activated the de-ice equipment with no issues noted. After hearing reports of better weather at a lower altitude, the pilot requested a descent to between 5,000 and 6,000 ft. During the descent to 6,000 ft msl and with the airplane clear of ice, the airplane encountered light to moderate icing conditions. The pilot considered turning back to another airport but could not get clearance until the airplane was closer to his destination. Shortly thereafter, the pilot stated that it felt “like a sheet of ice fell on us” as the airplane encountered severe icing conditions. The pilot applied full engine power in an attempt to maintain altitude. The airplane exited the overcast cloud layer about 500 ft above ground level. The pilot chose to execute an off-airport emergency landing because the airplane could not maintain altitude. During the landing, the landing gear separated; the airplane came to rest upright and sustained substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation and that the airplane was within its maximum gross weight. Structural icing was observed on the airframe after the landing. Based on the weather information, which indicated the probability of icing between 5,000 and 9,000 ft over the region and a high threat of supercooled large droplets between 5,000 and 7,000 ft, it is likely that the airplane, which was equipped for flight in icing conditions, inadvertently encountered severe icing conditions consistent with supercooled large droplets, which resulted in structural icing that exceeded the airplane’s capabilities to maintain altitude.

The airplane suffered a right main landing gear collapse during landing at the destination airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right lower wing skin when it contacted the runway after the landing gear collapse. The crew stopped the airplane on the runway and an emergency evacuation was performed through three of the four doors on the airplane. The escape slide at the left forward door did not deploy or inflate due to the depletion of the gas charge in the reservoir. The reservoir depleted due to a leak in the valve assembly and was not caught during multiple inspections since installation of the slide assembly in the airplane. The landing gear cylinder fractured under normal landing loads due to the presence of a fatigue crack on the forward side of the cylinder in an area subject to an AD inspection for cracks. The most recent AD inspection of the cylinder was performed 218 landings prior when the fatigue crack was large enough to be detectable. A previous AD inspection performed 497 landings prior to the accident also did not detect the crack that would have been marginally detectable at the time.

Weather conditions at Abbotsford at the time of departure consisted of a temperature of -2°C in moderate to heavy snowfall with winds of approximately 10 knots. Prior to the departure, the fuel tanks were filled to capacity and the pilot and passengers boarded the aircraft inside the operator's heated hangar. The aircraft was towed outside of the hangar without being treated with anti-ice fluid, and taxied for the departure on runway 07. Due to an inbound arrival at Abbotsford, C-GIAE was delayed for departure. Once cleared for takeoff, the aircraft had been exposed to snow and freezing conditions for approximately 14 minutes. After becoming airborne, the aircraft experienced power and control issues shortly after the landing gear was retracted. The aircraft collided with terrain within the airport perimeter. Four passengers and the pilot sustained serious injuries as a result of the accident which destroyed the aircraft.

In unclear circumstances, the single engine aircraft crashed while taking off from Akobo Airstrip. It struck a house and several cows before coming to rest, bursting into flames. One person on the ground was killed while all 11 occupants escaped uninjured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The single engine airplane was departing Bazaruto Island on a flight to Vilanculos, carrying six passengers and one pilot. During the takeoff roll on runway 20, after a course of about 400 metres, the aircraft started to veer to the left, departed the runway despite successive attempt to correct the flight trajectory. The aircraft crashed into bushed and came to rest in the opposite direction of the takeoff, some 60 metres from the runway centerline.