Cargo

The four engine aircraft departed Sharjah Airport on a cargo flight to Nyala with an intermediate stop in Khartoum, carrying 46 tons of humanitarian aid for refugees in Darfur. On board were sisx Russian crew members and one Sudanese translator. While approaching Khartoum-Haj Yusuf Airport, the crew reported fuel issues and elected to make an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in a desert area located 800 metres from the Ad Babkr District, about 15 km East of Khartoum. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all seven occupants were killed.

The aircraft landed at Helsinki–Vantaa airport at around 02:47 on Monday, 31.1.2005. After landing, the pilot taxied to apron number four in the southeastern corner of the aerodrome and unloaded the cargo from Sweden. After having done that he left the airport and went to a suite the company reserves for the crew to rest before the return leg to Sweden, which was planned for the following afternoon. The pilot has worked for the company for approximately five years. As per standard policy, the company operates the aircraft with a two person crew. On the day in question the co-pilot had taken ill and the pilot had flown alone. The return leg to Sweden was also planned as a one-person crew flight. The following morning the aircraft was refuelled with 420 l of Jet A-1, in accordance with the pilot’s instructions. All in all ca. 725 kg of fuel was reserved for the return leg. According to his account, the pilot checked in for duty at the airport at around 14:30. After arriving, the pilot began to brush the accumulated snow and frozen snow melt off the upper surfaces of the aircraft. He said that there was a great deal of snow and ice on the aircraft. The cargo that was to go to Sweden did not arrive in time for him to fly it to Skavsta, his primary destination. Therefore, he phoned in a change to the flight plan, choosing Örebro instead as his destination. Örebro was a better choice regarding follow-on transport of the freight. The pilot had outdated meteorological information for the return leg and the operational flight plan form was inadequately filed in. The flight plan was inadvertently filed for another tail number. Information which should be included such as date, crew, prevailing upper winds, estimates to different waypoints, fuel calculations and pilot signatures were omitted from the flight plan. The pilot had not left a copy of the operational flight plan for the ground crew. No weight and balance calculation for the flight was to be found in the cockpit. It had been left in the ground handling service’s briefing room but had been correctly calculated. The pilot did not have access to the latest aeronautical information for the return leg. Printouts of aeronautical information for the inbound leg were found in the cockpit of the wreckage. At 16:52:45 the pilot acknowledged on Helsinki Control Tower (TWR) frequency 118.600 MHz that he was taxiing to takeoff position RWY 22L at intersection Y. At 16:54:40 TWR gave him takeoff clearance from that intersection and gave him the wind direction. The pilot later said that he executed a normal takeoff, using 10 degrees of flaps. The aircraft lifted off at the normal speed of 80-90 KT. At 16:56:05 the pilot called TWR on 118.600 MHz saying “TOWER” just once. As per the pilot’s account everything went well until he reached the height of 800-1000 ft (250-300 m) at which point he retracted the trailing edge flaps. Immediately after flap retraction, the pilot lost control of the aircraft, which began turning to the right. The pilot attempted to fly the aircraft to the end section of runway 22R for an emergency landing. Shortly before crashing to the right side of the extension of runway 22L the pilot managed to get the wings level. He lost consciousness in the crash.

The aircraft departed Dubai on a cargo flight to Düsseldorf with three crew members on board. Following an uneventful flight, the crew established radio contact with Düsseldorf Radar at 0543LT. The crew were told that runway 23L was in use. Two minutes later the radar controller contacted flight 8995: "I just talked to the tower and ah for the time being braking action on all parts of the runway is supposed to be good. They are measuring again right now because it started to snow again and I'll keep you advised." The flight was then cleared to descend to FL80. The flight crew decided to set the autobrakes for landing on Medium, to account for the snow. At 05:50 the radar controller again contacted the flight about the current weather circumstances: "...latest update on the weather situation ahm the friction tester has reported braking action to be good for the moment however as its continuing to snow they are ah afraid that it might worsen, so they are going to do another friction test right before you land." In the following minutes the flight was given descent instructions and vectors for an approach to runway 23L. At 05:54 the controller radioed: "weather update we now have a surface wind of three four zero degrees eleven knots, that's slight tail wind component by two knots. Visibility is down to one thousand five hundred meters, still in snow showers and ah cloud base is now five hundred feet only." The flight was subsequently cleared for the approach. At 05:57 the radar controller instructed the crew to contact Düsseldorf Tower. The Tower controller stated: "Good morning,... we are just waiting for the braking action values from the friction tester stand by a second. The surface wind is actually three three zero degrees one two knots." Two minutes later the controller radioed: "... the braking action was measured to be medium at all parts. And ah the visibility dropped right now due to the heavy snow showers at the field ah. The RVR value at the touchdown zone is presently nine hundred meters, at the mid-point one thousand one hundred meters and ah stop end one thousand one hundred meters." At that moment the flight was 3,5 nautical miles out. The flight was subsequently cleared to land. The airplane touched down about 1700 ft (518 m) past the runway threshold. Ground spoilers and thrust reversers deployed and the autobrakes activated. Still the airplane did not decelerate as expected and the pilot applied manual braking. The airplane failed to stop and overran the runway end. It collided with ILS equipments, which caused a fire in engines n°2 and 3. All three crew members evacuated safely and the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair.

En route to the company's home airport, the twin-engine airplane either experienced a loss of power to the right engine, or the pilot decided to shut the engine down. Although the home airport had night visual meteorological conditions, and there was no evidence of any malfunction with the remaining engine, the pilot opted to fly a night precision instrument approach to an airport 45 nautical miles closer, with a 1-mile visibility and a 100-foot ceiling. Unknown to the pilot, there was also fog at the airport. The pilot did not advise or seek assistance from air traffic control or the company. When the airplane broke out of the clouds, it was not stable. Approaching the runway, at full flaps and exceeding the 25 percent maximum for a go-around, the pilot added full power to the left engine. The high power setting, slow airspeed, and full flaps combination resulted in a minimum control speed (Vmc) roll. No determination could be made as to why the right engine was inoperative, and there were no mechanical or fuel-related anomalies found that would have precluded normal operation.

The aircraft departed Entebbe Airport at 1148LT on a cargo flight to Kinshasa, carrying six crew members and a load consisting of two cars, t-shirts and 10 tons of beans. Five minutes after takeoff, the crew informed ATC that one of the engine caught fire and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. Seven minutes later, out of control, the aircraft crashed in a wooded area located near Bukalaza, about 11 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all six occupants were killed.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight to Banda Aceh, taking part to relief operation following the recent tsunami that affected the Aceh province. After landing by night, the crew started the braking procedure when the aircraft collided with a buffalo. Upon impact, the left main gear was torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The Ilyushin 76 was chartered to fly a consignment of 28938 kg of humanitarian aid from Billund, Denmark to Kabul, Afghanistan. The airplane departed Billund at 18:00 and landed at Baku, Azerbaijan for a refueling stop. Visibility at Kabul was reported as 3000 m, and forecast worsening to 1200 m between 00:00 and 06:00 h due to snow and haze. Minima for Kabul airport however were a visibility of 5000 m and a cloud base at 450 m. The captain nevertheless departed Baku. While approaching Kabul the weather was reported to be: wind 340 degrees at 4 kts, visibility 2000 m, 1-2 octas clouds at 480 m, 5-7 octas clouds at 3000 m and a QNH of 1020 hPa. During the approach low clouds were moving in from the north. The visibility was limited to 500 m in fog and the wind direction changed. The crew of the Ilyushin were not informed of these changed values. The approach was continued and flaps and gear were selected down. At decision height the spoilers were extended and the descent was continued. The captain ordered the spoilers to be retracted, but this command was not carried out. At a height of 310 m, 4230 m short of the runway 29 threshold, the flaps were selected down to 43 degrees. The Il-76 was at that stage 365 m to the right of the extended centreline. The flight descended below the glideslope until it contacted the ground 910 m short of the runway threshold, at a speed of 230 km/h. The left undercarriage was destroyed and separated from the aircraft. The lower aft fuselage and cargo door were severely damaged and the pressure in the no. 1 and no. 2 hydraulic systems fell. The crew applied takeoff power, retracted the spoilers and selected flaps back to 30 degrees. The aircraft climbed away and the captain decided to head for Termez, Uzbekistan, but this airport was closed due to fog. It was decided to continue to Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The airplane made a low pass over the field so the air traffic controllers could observe the nature of the damage. A forced landing was then carried out.

Air Cargo Carriers, Inc. Flight SNC2917, a Short Brothers SD3-60 aircraft (registration N748CC, serial number SH3748), was on a charter cargo flight from Toledo, Ohio, USA, to Oshawa, Ontario, with two pilots on board. The crew conducted an instrument flight rules approach to Oshawa Municipal Airport in night instrument meteorological conditions. At approximately 2000 eastern standard time, the aircraft landed on Runway 30, which was snow-covered. During the landing roll, the pilot flying noted poor braking action and observed the runway end lights approaching. He rejected the landing and conducted a go-around procedure. The aircraft became airborne, but it started to descend as it flew over lower terrain, striking an airport boundary fence. It continued until it struck rising terrain and then a line of forestation, where it came to an abrupt stop. The flight crew exited the aircraft and waited for rescue personnel to render assistance. The aircraft was substantially damaged, and both pilots sustained serious injuries. There was no post-crash fire.

Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported to air traffic control he needed to return to the airport to land. The controller asked the pilot if he required any assistance, and the pilot responded, "negative for right now uh just need to get in as soon as possible." The controller then asked the pilot what the problem was, in which the pilot responded, "stand by one minute." Approximately 30 seconds later and while the airplane was on a left downwind to runway 35R, the pilot stated he was declaring an emergency and "...we've got an air an engine ta shut down uh please roll the equipment." The controller and other witnesses observed the airplane on the base leg and then overshoot the final approach to runway 35R. After observing the airplane overshoot the final approach, the controller then cleared the pilot to the next runway, runway 28, and there was no response from the pilot. The controller observed the airplane's landing lights turn down toward the terrain, and "the MU2 was gone." A witness observed the airplane make an "immediate sharp bank to the left and descend to the ground. The impact appeared to be just less than a 45 degree angle, nose first." A performance study revealed that while the airplane was on downwind, the airplane started to bank to the left. The bank angle indicated a constant left bank angle of about 24 degrees as the airplane turned to base leg. Twenty-three seconds later, the bank angle began to increase further as the airplane turned to final approach, overshooting the runway, while the angle of attack reached stall angle of about 17 degrees. The flight path angle then showed a decrease by 22 to 25 degrees, the calibrated airspeed showed a decrease by 40 to 70 knots, and the vertical speed indicated a 3,000 feet per minute descent rate just before impact. Examination of the airframe revealed the flaps were in the 20 degree position, and the landing gear was retracted. According to the airplane flight manual, during the base leg, the flaps should remain in the 5 degree position and the landing gear extended; and when landing is assured, the flaps then extended to 20 degrees and maintain 125 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS) during final and 110 KCAS when over the runway. Minimum controllable airspeed (Vmc) for the airplane is 99 KCAS. Examination of the propellers revealed that at the time of impact, the left propeller was in the feathered position and the right propeller was in the normal operating range. Examination of the left engine revealed static witness marks on several internal engine components, and no anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal operation. The reason for the precautionary shutdown of the left engine was not determined. Examination of the right engine revealed rotational scorring and metal spray deposits on several internal engine components. Four vanes of the oil pump transfer tube were separated and missing. The gearbox oil-scavenge pump was not free to rotate and was disassembled. Disassembly of the oil-scavenge pump revealed one separated oil pump transfer tube vane was located in the pump. Pitting and wear damage was noted on all of the roller bearing elements and the outer bearing race of the propeller shaft roller bearing. No additional anomalies were noted.

The pilot was conducting a cargo flight in night instrument meteorological conditions, and was cleared for the ILS Runway 6L approach. The pilot reported that he was established on the localizer, and the control tower stated that the touchdown and mid-point "RVR" was 1,800 feet, and the roll-out "RVR" was 1,600 feet. The pilot also was instructed, and acknowledged, to make a right turn off the runway, after landing. There were no further communications from the airplane. The airplane's last radar target was observed at an altitude of 1,200 feet msl, and a ground speed of 130 knots. The airplane impacted trees, and came to rest inverted on airport property, on a bearing of 053 degrees, and a distance of 1/2 mile to the runway. Examination of the airplane did not reveal any pre-impact mechanical failures. A weather observation taken at the airport about the time of the accident included, winds from 140 degrees at 9 knots, 1/8 mile visibility, runway 06L visual range variable between 1,800, and 2,000 feet in fog, vertical visibility 100 feet, and a temperature and dew point 54 degrees F. The airport elevation was 1,009 feet msl. Review of the approach diagram for the ILS Runway 6L approach revealed a decision height of 1,198 feet msl, and an approach minimum of 1,800 feet runway visual range (RVR), or 1/2 mile visibility. The pilot had accumulated about 3,800 hours of total flight experience, which included about 350 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane, and 250 total hours logged in instrument meteorological conditions.