Keene-Dillant-Hopkins

The private pilot was conducting a local, personal flight. The pilot reported that he checked the weather conditions at three local airports before the flight but stated that he did not trust the wind reports. He added that he did not get a preflight weather briefing. Once at the destination airport, he conducted two go-arounds due to gusting wind conditions. During the third attempted landing, he made a steep approach at a normal approach speed and flared the airplane about midway down the 3,000-ft-long runway. The airplane floated down the runway for much longer than the pilot expected before touching down. Despite applying maximum braking, there was insufficient remaining runway to stop, and the airplane skidded off the runway, impacted trees, and subsequently caught fire, which resulted in substantial damage to the airframe. The wind conditions reported at an airport located about 13 miles away included a tailwind of 16 knots, gusting to 27 knots. Given the tailwind conditions reported at this airport and the pilot's description of the approach and landing, it is likely that the pilot conducted the approach to the runway in a tailwind that significantly increased the airplane's groundspeed, which resulted in a touchdown with insufficient runway remaining to stop the airplane, even with maximum braking.

En route to the company's home airport, the twin-engine airplane either experienced a loss of power to the right engine, or the pilot decided to shut the engine down. Although the home airport had night visual meteorological conditions, and there was no evidence of any malfunction with the remaining engine, the pilot opted to fly a night precision instrument approach to an airport 45 nautical miles closer, with a 1-mile visibility and a 100-foot ceiling. Unknown to the pilot, there was also fog at the airport. The pilot did not advise or seek assistance from air traffic control or the company. When the airplane broke out of the clouds, it was not stable. Approaching the runway, at full flaps and exceeding the 25 percent maximum for a go-around, the pilot added full power to the left engine. The high power setting, slow airspeed, and full flaps combination resulted in a minimum control speed (Vmc) roll. No determination could be made as to why the right engine was inoperative, and there were no mechanical or fuel-related anomalies found that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot was flying inbound for the ILS runway 02 approach via the Gardner VOR transition. While on the transition, the aircraft descended below the 4,000 feet msl minimum altitude to 2,600 feet msl. The pilot was alerted by ATC. He responded that his chart read 3,000 feet. The aircraft then climbed above 2,700 feet, but descended again (to 1,500 feet msl) until about 2 miles outside the outer marker. The minimum published altitude to intercept the glide slope was 2,600 feet and the recommended (glide slope) altitude for crossing the outer marker was 2,548 feet. Before reaching the outer marker, the aircraft made an abrupt turn to the southwest, entered a steep descent and crashed in a wooded area. An exam of the aircraft did not disclose any evidence of a malfunction. A flight inspection of the nav aids disclosed satisfactory operation. A post mortem exam was inconclusive to possible physical impairment. The procedure turn altitude for the approach was 3,000 feet, but the Gardner transition did not require a procedure turn. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.