Cargo

Upon landing on runway 07 at Le Bourget Airport, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft veered off runway to the left and came to rest. All 9 occupants evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair and withdrawn from use in LBG.

The aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Bukavu to Shabunda, carrying two pilots and a load of 1,500 kilos of various goods. Few minutes after takeoff from Bukavu-Kavumu Airport, while climbing, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed near the village of Bugulumisa located at the border of the Kahuzi-Biega National Park. The aircraft was totally destroyed and both pilots were killed.

The four engine aircraft departed Bagram AFB on a short flight to Kabul, carrying 8 crew members and a load of various equipment on behalf of the NATO forces based in Pakistan. En route, while cruising by night, the aircraft impacted a rocky face located 30 km east of Kabul. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 8 occupants were killed.

The four engine aircraft was completing a cargo flight from Hong Kong to Cologne with an intermediate stop in Dubai with two pilots on board. One minute after passing the BALUS waypoint, approaching the top of climb, as the aircraft was climbing to the selected cruise altitude of 32,000 feet, the Fire Warning Master Warning Light illuminated and the Audible Alarm [Fire Bell] sounded, warning the crew of a fire indication on the Main Deck Fire - Forward. The captain advised BAE-C that there was a fire indication on the main deck of the aircraft, informing Bahrain ATC that they needed to land as soon as possible. BAE-C advised that Doha International Airport (DOH) was at the aircraft’s 10 o’clock position 100 nm DME from the current location. The Captain elected to return to the point of departure, DXB. The crew changed the selected altitude from 32,000 feet to 28,000 feet as the aircraft changed heading back to DXB, the Auto Throttle [AT] began decreasing thrust to start the decent. The AP was manually disconnected, then reconnected , followed by the AP manually disconnecting for a short duration, the captain as handling pilot was manually flying the aircraft. Following the turn back and the activation of the fire suppression, for unknown reasons, the PACK 1 status indicated off line [PACKS 2 and 3 were off], in accordance with the fire arm switch activation. There was no corresponding discussion recorded on the CVR that the crew elected to switch off the remaining active PACK 1. As the crew followed the NNC Fire/Smoke/Fumes checklist and donned their supplemental oxygen masks, there is some cockpit confusion regarding the microphones and the intra-cockpit communication as the crew cannot hear the microphone transmissions in their respective headsets. The crew configured the aircraft for the return to DXB, the flight was in a descending turn to starboard onto the 095° reciprocal heading for DXB when the Captain requested an immediate descent to 10,000 ft. The reason for the immediate descent was never clarified in the available data. The AP was disengaged, the Captain then informed the FO that there was limited pitch control of the aircraft when flying manually. The Captain was manually making inputs to the elevators through the control column, with limited response from the aircraft. The flight was approximately 4 minutes into the emergency. The aircraft was turning and descending, the fire suppression has been initiated and there was a pitch control problem. The cockpit was filling with persistent continuous smoke and fumes and the crew had put the oxygen masks on. The penetration by smoke and fumes into the cockpit area occurred early into the emergency. The cockpit environment was overwhelmed by the volume of smoke. There are several mentions of the cockpit either filling with smoke or being continuously ‘full of smoke’, to the extent that the ability of the crew to safely operate the aircraft was impaired by the inability to view their surroundings. Due to smoke in the cockpit, from a continuous source near and contiguous with the cockpit area [probably through the supernumerary area and the ECS flight deck ducting], the crew could neither view the primary flight displays, essential communications panels or the view from the cockpit windows. The crew rest smoke detector activated at 15:15:15 and remained active for the duration of the flight. There is emergency oxygen located at the rear of the cockpit, in the supernumerary area and in the crew rest area. Due to the persistent smoke the Captain called for the opening of the smoke shutter, which stayed open for the duration of the flight. The smoke remained in the cockpit area. There was a discussion between the crew concerning inputting the DXB runway 12 Left [RWY12L] Instrument Landing System [ILS] data into the FMC. With this data in the FMC the crew can acquire the ILS for DXB RWY12L and configure the aircraft for an auto flight/auto land approach. The F.O. mentions on several occasions difficulty inputting the data based on the reduced visibility. However, the ILS was tuned to a frequency of 110.1 (The ILS frequency for DXB Runway 12L is 110.126), the Digital Flight Data Recorder [DFDR] data indicates that this was entered at 15:19:20 which correlates which the CVR discussion and timing. At approximately 15:20, during the emergency descent at around 21,000ft cabin pressure altitude, the Captain made a comment concerning the high temperature in the cockpit. This was followed almost immediately by the rapid onset of the failure of the Captain’s oxygen supply. Following the oxygen supply difficulties there was confusion regarding the location of the alternative supplementary oxygen supply location. The F.O either was not able to assist or did not know where the oxygen bottle was located; the Captain then gets out of the LH seat. This CVR excerpt indicates the following exchange between the Captain and F.O concerning the mask operation and the alternative oxygen supply bottle location. The exchange begins when the Captain’s oxygen supply stops abruptly with no other indications that the oxygen supply is low or failing. Based on the pathological information, the Captain lost consciousness due to toxic poisoning. After the Captain left the LH cockpit seat, the F.O. assumed the PF role. The F.O. remained in position as P.F. for the duration of the flight. There was no further interaction from the Captain or enquiry by the F.O as to the location of the Captain or the ability of the Captain to respond. The PF informed the BAE-C controllers that due to the limited visibility in the cockpit that it was not possible to change the radio frequency on the Audio Control Panel [ACP]. This visibility comment recurs frequently during the flight. The Bahrain East controller was communicating with the emergency aircraft via relays. Several were employed during the transition back to DXB. The aircraft was now out of effective VHF radio range with BAE-C. In order for the crew to communicate with BAE-C, BAE-C advised transiting aircraft that they would act as a communication relay between BAE-C and the emergency aircraft. BAE-C would then communicate to the UAE controllers managing the traffic in the Emirates FIR via a landline, who would then contact the destination aerodrome at Dubai, also by landline. The crew advised relay aircraft that they would stay on the Bahrain frequency as they could not see the ACP to change frequency. All of the 121.5 MHz transmissions by the PF were keyed via the VHF-R, all other radio communication with BAE-C and the relay aircraft are keyed from the VHF-L audio panel. There are several attempts by the UAE’s Area Control [EACC] to contact the flight on the guard frequency in conjunction with aircraft relaying information transmitting on the guard frequency to the accident flight. The PF of the accident flight does not appear to hear any of the transmissions from the air traffic control units or the relay aircraft on the guard frequency. Around this time, given the proximity of the aircraft to the RWY12L intermediate approach fix, Dubai ATC transmits several advisory messages to the flight on the Dubai frequencies, for example DXB ARR on 124.9 MHz advise that ‘Any runway is available’. The Runway lights for RWY30L were turned on to assist the return to DXB. The Aircraft condition inbound as the flight approached DXB for RWY12L. The computed airspeed was 350 knots, at an altitude of 9,000 feet and descending on a heading of 105° which was an interception heading for the ILS at RWY12L. The FMC was tuned for RWY12L, the PF selected the ‘Approach’ push button on the Mode Control Panel [MCP] the aircraft captures the Glide Slope (G/S). The AP did not transition into the Localizer Mode while the Localizer was armed. ATC, through the relay aircraft advised the PF, ‘you're too fast and too high can you make a 360? Further requesting the PF to perform a ‘360° turn if able’. The PF responded ‘Negative, negative, negative’ to the request. The landing gear lever was selected down at 15:38:00, followed approximately 20 seconds later by an the aural warning alarm indicating a new EICAS caution message, which based on the data is a Landing Gear Disagree Caution. At 15:38:20 the PF says: ‘I have no, uh gear’. Following the over flight of DXB, on passing north of the aerodrome abeam RWY12L. The last Radar contact before the flight passed into the zone of silence was at 15:39:03. The flight was on a heading of 89° at a speed of 320 knots , altitude 4200 feet and descending. The flight was cleared direct to Sharjah Airport (SHJ), SHJ was to the aircraft’s left at 10 nm, the SHJ runway is a parallel vector to RWY12L at DXB. The relay pilot asked the PF if it was possible to perform a left hand turn. This turn, if completed would have established the flight onto an approximate 10 mile final approach for SHJ RWY30. The flight was offered vectors to SHJ (left turn required) and accepts. The relay aircraft advised that SHJ was at 095° from the current position at 10 nm. The PF acknowledged the heading change to 095° for SHJ. For reasons undetermined the PF selected 195° degrees on the Mode Control Panel [MCP], the AP was manually disconnected at 15:40:05, the aircraft then banked to the right as the FMC captured the heading change, rolled wings level on the new heading, the throttles were then retarded, the aircraft entered a descending right hand turn at an altitude of 4000 feet, the speed gradually reduced to 240 kts. The PF made a series of pitch inputs which had a limited effect on the descent profile; the descent is arrested temporarily. There then followed a series of rapid pitch oscillations. These were not phugoid oscillations, these were commanded responses where the elevator effectiveness decreased rapidly as the airspeed decayed and the elevators could not compensate for the reduced thrust moment from the engines to maintain level flight in a steady state. This was due to the desynchronization of the control column inputs and the elevators. At this point had the aircraft remained on the current heading and descent profile it would have intercepted the terrain at or near a large urban conurbation, Dubai Silicone Oasis. The PF was in VHF communication with the relay aircraft requesting positional, speed and altitude information. From this point onwards, approximately 50 seconds elapse prior to the data ending. The effectiveness of the pitch control immediately prior to the end of the data was negligible. The control column was fully aft when the data ended, there was no corresponding elevator movement. The aircraft lost control in flight and made an uncontrolled descent into terrain.

On 25th August 2010 cargo aircraft An-26B, registration SP-FDP started from Tallinn-Lennart Meri-Ülemiste Airport to Helsinki. After uneventful flight preparations, the aircraft started its take-off roll on runway 08. Based on pilots statements and FDR/CVR recordings the aircraft entered runway 08 from taxiway B on the West end of the runway and lined up for takeoff. On 16:47:22 the aircraft started its takeoff roll. The calculated V1 was 182 and Vr was 201 km/h. 10 seconds later PF started rotation without Vr callout at 123 km/h. The aircraft pitch angle increased to 4.6˚ 2 seconds later. At 16:47:38 the navigator made V1 call-out at 160.5 km/h. 1 second later flight engineer called “Retracting” in Polish. The aircraft started to pitch down and 3 seconds later it contacted the runway and continued on its belly for 1,228 m before coming to its rest position 3 m right from the runway centerline. No persons were injured and no fire broke up. The occurrence was classified as an accident due to the substantial damage to the aircraft structures.

The pilot, co-pilot and the passenger departed on a day VFR cross country flight in a large, 1950's era former military transportb category airplane to deliver cargo. The pilot did not file a flight plan, and had no communication with any air traffic control facility during the flight. While en route, witnesses saw the airplane fly slowly across a valley near the entrance of a national park, which was not the intended route of flight. The airplane suddenly pitched up, stalled, and dived into wooded terrain within the park. Two pilot-rated witnesses said the engines were operating at the time of the accident, and the landing gear was retracted. An on-scene examination of the burned airplane structure and engines revealed no evidence of any preaccident mechanical deficiencies, or any evidence that the cargo had shifted during the flight. A former military pilot who had experience in the accident type airplane, stated that the airplane was considered unrecoverable from a stall, and for that reason, pilots did not typically practice stalls in it. He also indicated that if a problem was encountered with one of the two piston engines on the airplane, the auxiliary jet engine on the affected side should be started to provide additional thrust. Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies discovered during postaccident inspection, the absence of any distress communications, and the fact that neither of the two auxiliary jet engines had been started to assist in the event of a piston engine malfunction, it is likely the pilot allowed the airplane to lose airspeed and enter a low altitude stall from which he was unable to recover.

After landing at Camp Dwyer AFB (Forward Operating Base Dwyer) located in the Helmand Province, the aircraft went out of control, veered off runway, collided with a fence and came to rest into a ravine, broken in two. All six occupants were uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. It was later dismantled by the US Air Force. The aircraft was carrying a load of fresh fruits and dairy products.

The airplane operated on Flight LH8460, a scheduled cargo service operating from Frankfurt (FRA) to Riyadh (RUH). It carried 80 tons of cargo. The accident flight departed Frankfurt about 05:16 local time (03:16 UTC), 2.5 hours later than originally scheduled due to minor maintenance issues. The accident flight was the first time the captain and first officer had flown together. The captain decided that the first officer, who had been employed with Lufthansa Cargo for 7 months and had not flown into Riyadh before, would fly the leg because he believed it would be an easy leg appropriate for the first officer. Cruise flight and approach to Riyadh were uneventful. The first officer indicated that he completed the approach briefing about 25 minutes before landing, calculating that he would use a flap setting of 35°, target 72 percent N1 rpm on final approach, expect a pitch attitude of about 4.5° on final approach, and commence the flare about 40 feet above ground level (agl). The flight was radar vectored to the instrument landing system of runway 33L, and the first officer flew the approach with a planned Vref of 158 knots. Convective conditions prevailed, with a temperature of 39°C and winds at 15 to 25 knots on a heading closely aligned with the landing runway. The aircraft was centered on the glide slope and localizer during the approach, until 25 seconds before touchdown when it dipped by half a dot below the glide slope. During that period, the indicated airspeed oscillated between 160 and 170 kt, centered about 166 kt. The ground speed was 164 kt until 20 sec. prior to touchdown, when it began to increase and reached 176 kt at touchdown. The flare was initiated by the first officer between 1.7 and 2.0 sec. before touchdown, that is: 23 to 31 feet above the runway. The main gear touchdown took place at 945 ft from the runway threshold at a descent rate of -13 ft/sec. (780 ft/min) resulting in a normal load factor of 2.1g. The aircraft bounced with the main gear reaching a maximum height of 4ft above the runway with the spoilers deployed to 30 degrees following main-wheel spin up. During this bounce, the captain who was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) pushed on the control column resulting in an unloading of the aircraft. The aircraft touched down a second time in a flat pitch attitude with both the main gear and nose gear contacting the runway, at a descent rate of -11 ft/sec. (660 ft/min), achieving a load factor of 3.0g. Just prior to this second touchdown, both pilots pulled on the control column, which combined with the rebound of the nose gear from the runway, resulted in a 14° pitch angle during the second bounce. Additionally, the spoilers reached their full extension of 60° following the compression of the nose gear strut during the second touchdown. During this second bounce, the main gear reached a height of 12 ft above the runway. Early in this second bounce, the captain pushed the control column to its forward limit and the elevators responded accordingly. Prior to the third and final touchdown, both pilots pulled back on the control column at slightly different times. Although the elevators responded accordingly and started to reduce the nose-down pitch rate, the aircraft was still pitching down at the third touchdown. During this third touchdown, the aircraft contacted the runway at a descent rate of -17 ft/sec (1020 ft/min), thus achieving a load factor of 4.4g. At this point, the aft fuselage ruptured behind the wing trailing edge. Two fuel lines were severed and fuel spilled within the left hand wheel well. A fire ignited and travelled to the upper cargo area. The captain attempted to maintain control of the aircraft within the runway boundaries. Not knowing about the aft fuselage being ruptured and dragging on the runway, the captain deployed the engine thrust reversers, but only the no. 1 and the no. 3 engines responded. The captain maintained directional control of the aircraft as best he could and requested the First Officer to declare a Mayday. The aircraft then went towards the left side of the runway as the captain attempted, without success, to maintain the aircraft on the runway. As the aircraft departed the runway, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to a full stop 8800 ft from the threshold of the runway and 300 ft left from the runway centerline. The fuel to the engines was cut off and both pilots evacuated the aircraft by using the slide at the Left One (L1) door. The mid portion of the aircraft was on fire.

The pilot had been advised by the Federal Aviation Administration flight service station (FSS) specialist to remain clear of the destination airport until the specialist could issue a special visual flight rules clearance. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the airport, with a strong southeasterly wind. About 8 minutes after initial contact, the FSS specialist attempted to contact the pilot to issue the clearance but received no response. A witness about 0.5 mile southeast of the accident site said he saw the accident airplane flying very low over the treetops. He said the weather conditions consisted of low clouds, rain, and gusty southeasterly wind estimated at 30 to 40 knots. He said that, as the airplane passed overhead, it turned sharply to the left. As he watched the airplane, the wings rocked violently from side to side, and the nose pitched up and down. As the airplane passed low over hilly, tree-covered terrain, it rolled to the right, the right wing struck a large tree and separated, and the airplane descended behind a stand of trees. Pilots flying in the accident area reported strong wind with significant downdrafts and turbulence. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not disclose any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Given the lack of mechanical deficiencies and the reports of turbulence and downdrafts, as well as the witness’ account of the airplane’s physical movements, it is likely that the pilot encountered significant terrain-induced turbulence and downdrafts while flying at low altitude. The area surrounding the accident site and portions of the pilot's earlier flight path were bordered by large areas of open and protected water, several of which were suitable for landing the float-equipped airplane.

During the takeoff roll on runway 27 at Keperveyem Airport, the four engine aircraft deviated to the left, went out of control and veered off runway. It lost its undercarriage and slid before coming to rest 120 metres to the left of the runway and after a course of 880 metres. All 8 occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond economical repair.