United States of America

The flight was to be flown across a 22 mile channel between islands on an overcast night with no moon and no ground reference lights. The aircraft disappeared from radar and, after extensive searches, could not be found. A three dimensional flight track was reconstructed using recorded radar data. The data indicated that in the last 60 seconds the aircraft slowed from 170 to 95 knots, gained 500 feet in altitude, and turned left 190° before abruptly disappearing from radar. Flight tests indicated that the movements of the aircraft in the last 60 seconds of the flight were consistent with a loss of the left engine, without compensation by the pilot. The operator's training program did not provide for night or instrument flight conditions. The last documented instrument time for the pilot was 15 months prior during a checkride. The pilot flew sporadic night flights. The pilot had previously flown during the day and was on his thirteenth hour of duty. The wreckage and all eight occupants were never found. However it is believed it crashed about 13 miles northwest of Maunaloa, on Molokai Island.

The pilot had just departed the runway when he reported to the flight service station that he had engine problems. The aircraft was observed by witnesses to be about 300 feet on a descending downwind. The pilot stated that he was circling for runway 01. Surviving passengers described the engines as running rough and uneven. The investigation revealed that the aircraft's weight was more than the pilot had calculated and the CofG was 3.4 inches further aft than was calculated. However, the weight and CofG were within limits. Examination of the engine disclosed that the right engine had an extensive cylinder head crack, a partially disconnected intake pipe, and was capable of producing 55% of rated power. The left engine had seven severely worn cam lobes. The rudder trim was deflected full left at impact. The evidence indicated that the pilot had retarded the throttle for the left engine and was using only the right engine to sustain flight. Exam of company checklist usage revealed several different improper versions. The pilot and five passengers were killed. Two others passengers and two people on the ground were injured.

The aircraft was on a flight to Chadron via Chadron VOR. About 30 miles south-southeast of the VOR, the pilot requested and was cleared to fly direct to Ackme IAF for an NDB runway 02 approach. The aircraft continued toward the VOR which was in the same general direction, but 11.9 miles south of Ackme. The NDB was at the airport. Ackme IAF was 9 miles southwest of the airport on a bearing of 227° and defined by an intersection with the 356° radial of the VOR. About 3 to 4 miles southeast of the VOR, radar service was transmitted and frequency change was made. Subsequently, the aircraft struck trees on a ridge and crashed. Initial impact occurred in wings level flight at approximately 4,480 feet on a direct route between the VOR and Ackme IAF. An investigation revealed that after the frequency change, the aircraft continued to the VOR, then maneuvered as if the pilot was flying the NDB approach, but was using the VOR as the IAF. Radar data showed contact was lost after a procedure turn was made and the aircraft was outbound about 6 miles northeast of the VOR. The crash site, however, was about 3 miles west-southwest of where radar contact was last recorded. The weather at Chadron was in part: 500 feet overcast, 1.5 mile visibility with light snow and fog. No preimpact part failure/malfunction was found. The passenger was seriously injured and both pilots were killed.

The aircraft had descended through a cloud layer enroute for the scheduled landing at IAD and according to the crew had picked up some trace rime ice on its wing surfaces. Although pitot and sas (stall avoidance system) heat were used the captain elected not to use engine inlet anti-ice. Just inside the outer marker the left engine lost power followed shortly by the right engine. The captain was able to set the aircraft down in an open field where the gear collapsed during the landing roll. The engines were successfully run-up at the Garrett facility. The flight manual contains a warning and a note stating that engine heat and continuous ignition must be used after leaving icing conditions until the pilot is confident that any significant residual ice will not be ingested into the engines. Ice was found lying beneath the right wing which matched the curvature of the leading edge of the wing. A round conical shaped piece of ice was found along the wreckage path which matched the nose of the propeller spinner.

The captain stated that he had planned the approach at a higher-than-normal airspeed and altitude due to a reported low level windshear. At 400 feet agl the aircraft entered a light downdraft but the crew corrected the descent profile with power. At 200 feet agl the aircraft suddenly, according to the captain, pitched down before impacting the runway. Witnesses stated that the aircraft pitched down on short final, leveled off, then slammed onto the runway on all wheels. It then bounced, pitched down again and impacted the runway nose-first. A subsequent inspection, operational test, and teardown of the airplane's stall protection system found it to be functioning satisfactorily. The two powerplants also tested within normal parameters.

Aircraft departed coastal airport at night with 400 feet partial obscuration in patchy fog. Ground witnesses who heard aircraft depicted a circling flight path to the right after takeoff. Engine, propellers and turbo teardowns demonstrated both engines were operating at high power and no evidence was found of a pre-impact malfunction. Aircraft never appeared on radar and no communication was attempted after takeoff. Review of pilot records showed atypically low total instrument flight hours. Pic was cleared to maintain runway heading after takeoff and climb to 2,000 feet. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot of the air taxi cargo flight was operating at night in marginal VFR conditions when the aircraft struck rising terrain. The aircraft was found the next day at approximately 1000 ast, some 15 miles off the intended route. The pilot was unconscious and suffering from hypothermia and other injuries. He was taken to a hospital, but died later that day. An investigation revealed the aircraft struck the south side of Bismark mountain at approximately 2,100 feet msl while in level flight. Another pilot, who was flying in the area about 2-1/2 hours after the accident, reported that classic white-out conditions existed with moderate snow fall and ice crystals reducing forward visibility to less than 1/2 mile. The pilot (of N9979M) had been recently hired by Bering Air and had only about 23 hours of known flight time in the general area. At the time of employment, he indicated he had approximately 1,536 hours of flight time; however, only 446 hours of flight time was verified by his logbook and other sources. Minimum flight time to act as a pic in the air taxi operation was 500 hours.

During arrival in heavy traffic, Reeve flight 726 (Boeing 727) and Wilburs flight 304 (Cessna 402B, N969JW) received radar advisories for visual approaches to runways 06L and 06R, respectively. Subsequently, both flights were cleared to land. At 1555:04, the local tower controller transmitted that the wind at the approach end of runway 06R was from 340° at 9 knots and the midfield wind was 330° at 7 knots. At approximately 1557, flight 726 landed on runway 06L. Approximately 69 seconds later, as flight 304 was crossing the threshold (thr) of runway 06R at about 100 feet agl, the aircraft encountered wake turbulences (w/t) and rolled sharply to the right, byd 90°. The pilot corrected with aileron and power, but the aircraft lost altitude and hit the ground before recovery. The wind during the 1601 weather observation was 020° at 5 kts. Runway centerlines were 700 feet apart, threshold of runway 06L was 4,600 feet byd the threshold of runway 06R. The approach control did not advise either flight of the other's position, nor did the tower controller give a w/t advisory to flight 304. Calculations showed vortices could have drifted from runway 06L to runway 06R in as little as 28 seconds. FAA handbook addressed w/t advisory for parallel runway options with less than 2,500 feet separation, but did not address offset thresholds. All five occupants were injured.

The right engine of the aircraft failed three times in flight. After the last failure near the middle marker the pilot feathered the propeller. The aircraft collided with power lines and the ground about 400 yards short of runway 31 at the Redbird Airport. The right fuel selector was positioned to the left rear tank and the left selector was positioned to the off position. The left wing tanks were intact and empty. Both engines had failed due to fuel exhaustion. Two airports were overflown that were adequate for landing and that had fuel available. This was the co-pilot's first flight.

The cross country business flight was uneventful from Concord, New Hampshire to white Plains, New York under clear sky. During final approach, the pilot extended the gear but did not notice that the circuit breaker had opened and the gear was not lowered. The aircraft landed gear up and the gear doors partially open. The gear warning horn did not operate. The pilot stated that he failed to check for 3 green lights.