United States of America

The airline transport pilot was repositioning the Beech C99 turboprop cargo hauler on a 73-mile trip without cargo. The pilot had been flying this route for some time and this was his last trip before upgrading to a larger aircraft and route. He told friends that he would take pictures of the scenic parts of the route on his last trip. Three witnesses reported seeing the airplane flying west at low altitude. Two of the witnesses were local ranchers who saw the airplane enter the White Mountains near Trace Plumas Canyon about 7,000 to 8,000 feet msl. White Mountain is 14,246 feet, tapering off north to 13,559 feet and south to 11,285 feet msl. The airplane was reported missing and 2 days later located on White Mountain about 9,400 feet msl. The company flight planned route is 15 miles south of the accident site through Westgard Pass, about 7,291 feet msl. Examination of the low energy impact and the subsequent recovery inspection failed to reveal any mechanical issues.

The airline transport pilot was cleared for the localizer approach. The airplane impacted the ground 3.2 nautical miles from the runway threshold. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the approach was 560 feet msl, which is 263 feet above touchdown. Night, instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The surrounding terrain was flat, snow-covered, and featureless. The reported weather was 200 feet overcast, 1 1/2 miles visibility in snow, and winds of 12 knots, gusting to 32 knots. The pilot reported he was established on the final approach course, descending to the MDA, and then woke up in the snow. He said he did not remember any problems with the airplane. No pre accident mechanical anomalies were discovered with the airplane during the investigation. The airport has high intensity runway lights, sequenced flashing lead-in lights, and visual approach slope indicator lights. All airport lights and navigation aids were functioning. The airplane was not equipped with an autopilot. Captains have the option of requesting a copilot, but, the captain's pay is reduced by a portion equal to one-half the copilot's pay. The pilot had returned from the previous nights trip at 0725. He had three rest periods, four hours, two hours, and five hours 15 minutes, since his previous nights flight. Each rest period was interrupted by contact with the company. The company indicated that it is the pilot's responsibility to tell the company if duty times are being exceeded. 14 CFR 135.267 states, in part: '(d) Each assignment ... must provide for at least 10 consecutive hours of rest during the 24 hours that precedes the planned completion of the assignment.'

After takeoff, the flight climbed to 1500 feet and the pilot reduced the engine RPM to 3000. The pilot also reported that within seconds of reducing the engine RPM the left engine sputtered. The pilot turned on the fuel boost pump in an effort to restore full engine power. Immediately afterward, the right engine sputtered and lost power. The pilot turned on the right engine boost pump again in an effort to restore full power. Attempts by the pilot to restore normal engine operation failed. The pilot selected an area for an emergency landing. The pilot recalled that as he prepared for an emergency landing, the airplane would yaw right and left as the engines momentarily gain and lose power. The airplane collided with tops of several trees. The airplanes subsequently collided with a single family home adjacent to the lake. Examination of the airframe and engine assemblies failed to disclose a mechanical malfunction or a component failure. During the examination of the fuel system, approximately 2 1/2 pints of fuel were recovered. The pilot reported that he thought he had about 50 gallons of fuel when he departed.

The airplane descended to 2,600 feet to the NDB, and initiated the approach upon crossing the NDB. As the airplane descended below 1,500 feet MSL, Huntsville lost radar contact. The next communication with the airplane was when the pilot radioed that he was initiating the missed approach. The published missed approach procedure is, 'Climbing lift turn to 2,700 direct CPP NDB and hold.' The airplane made a series of turns within the next one minute and 24 seconds. Additionally, the airplane's altitude varied but it never climbed above the altitude of 1,700 feet. The airplane wreckage was located approximately 3.5 miles north of the airport on a 345 degree heading on the opposite side of the outbound course to the NDB. Witnesses in the immediate area stated that they could hear the airplane flying low over their homes but could not see it due to the foggy conditions. A review of pilot records did not show the pilot having any fixed wing airplane experience.

The certificated commercial pilot and the pilot-rated, nonrevenue passenger, departed at night from a remote village airport on the last leg of a VFR scheduled air taxi flight. The destination airport was 17 nautical miles northeast of the departure point. After departure, the pilot said he encountered severe turbulence and entered a snow squall where the visibility dropped below 1 mile. The pilot said he was in instrument meteorological conditions, and a strong surface wind was blowing the airplane toward the southwest. He began correcting his course toward the southeast, and then collided with a snow-covered hill. The passenger said that light snow showers were falling in the area, along with turbulence and strong winds from the northeast. After departing on the accident flight, snow showers intensified, and the pilot turned toward the south, away from the intended destination. About 10 minutes after takeoff, the passenger inquired about the direction of flight, and the pilot said he was going to head to the coast and follow it to the destination. The visibility was about 1 mile. No ground features were visible until the passenger saw snow-covered terrain about 3 feet below the airplane. The airplane then collided with terrain. The pilot indicated he obtained a weather briefing from an FAA Flight Service Station.

The flight departed Fort Lauderdale's Executive Airport (FXE) at about 1833 on a northwesterly heading for the co-located Pahokee VOR/airport (PHK) on the second training session of the day for the 2 front seat occupants. This particular flight had a dual purpose, in that the left seat occupant/new-hire was getting a 'pre-check ride' by the right seat occupant/instructor/PIC, and the instructor was being observed by the air taxi's director of operations in anticipation of an endorsement for an FAA designation as a company check airman. The flight was not in contact with any ATC facility and was squawking a transponder code consistent with non-controlled, VMC flight. At 1902, the Miami ARTCC lost radar contact at the 334 degree radial/12 nmi from the PHK VOR at 1,300 feet agl. Eight days later, the wreckage with its 3 occupants still inside, was located and recovered from the lake bottom. The location roughly corresponds with the radial of the PHK VOR that would have to be tracked while performing the VOR Runway 17 approach. The wreckage was intact except for 2 nacelle doors, the nose cone, and the left propeller, and revealed no engine, airframe, or component failure or malfunction. There was no evidence of a bird strike. Evidence revealed that both engines were developing power and the airplane was wings level in the approach configuration and attitude at water contact.

The airplane collided with the tops of trees during an ILS approach near the middle marke. Witnesses heard the airplane strike the trees and a '...whop, whop, whop sound...' it made as it continued its flight. Other witnesses observed the airplane flying a curved, descending, flight path until the aircraft impacted the ground. Visibility was reported as 1/2 mile at the airport. The on-scene examination revealed no airframe or engine anomalies that would prevent flight. A section of the right propeller and other pieces of airframe were found along the approach path after initial impact with trees. The trees along the flight path were about 30 to 60 feet high. The tops of the taller trees were broken or had fresh cut marks on their limbs. The pilot's blood alcohol level was 216 (mg/dL, mg/hg).

A witness observed the airplane circle to land at the completion of an NDB approach. The nighttime meteorological conditions were an 800 feet ceiling, 1 mile visibility in blowing snow, and 26 knot winds. The surrounding terrain was essentially flat, snow covered, and featureless. The witness saw the airplane on final approach misaligned for the runway, and then disappear below an 18 feet msl bluff. He transmitted on the radio to 'get out of there,' and heard no response. About 10 minutes later the accident pilot walked up to the witness' airplane. The pilot told the investigator-in-charge that he was 'beat around by the winds, ...it was snowing pretty hard, I always had the lights, and I was concentrating on the runway. The next thing I knew I was on the ground short of the runway.' The pilot's previous experience to this airport was during daytime, and during visual conditions. The airport, which was being transferred from the Air Force to the North Slope Borough, has medium intensity runway lights (MIRL), and runway end identifier lights (REILS). It does not have visual approach slope indicator (VASI) lights.

The certificated commercial pilot picked up his newly painted airplane for a visual flight to the home base. About 17 miles south of the departure airport, witnesses initially observed the airplane in a 90 degree right bank. It continued to roll to an inverted position while simultaneously nosing down to a near vertical descent. The pilot's second class medical certificate application (July 7, 1997) indicated 3,700 hours flight time. A flight log indicted the pilot flew this aircraft 6.4 hours during the 60 days preceding the accident. No evidence was found that the pilot had not obtained sufficient rest before the flight. There was no evidence found to either suggest a medical cause for incapacitation or to rule out incapacitation for medical reasons. Aircraft maintenance records did not reveal any open discrepancies. All of the airplane was accounted for in the wreckage debris. No evidence of an in-flight fire and/or explosion, or in-flight mechanical and/or flight control malfunction was found.

During the landing roll, the nose gear settled onto the runway, and the aircraft veered hard to the right. Application of the left brake had no effect. The airplane skidded, exited the runway, struck a runway marker, and collapsed the nose landing gear. The steering actuator had failed, the hydraulic fluid was lost from the steering actuator, and the fuselage received structural damage. The steering actuator assembly, p/n 1501-4, had accumulated 5,938.0 hours since new and had not been repaired or overhauled. Examination of the nose gear steering actuator cylinder by the metallurgist revealed that the cylinder fracture was the result of fatigue cracking initiated by an abrupt machining transition from the 45 degree thread ring chamfer to the straight wall of the cylinder. The engineering drawings appear to depict the radius at the fatigue origin as a continuation of the 0.03 inch to 0.06 inch radius adjacent to the fracture. However, the drawing is not clear on the specific intent of the transition between the nearby radius and the internal threads for the nut.