United States of America

The certificated airline transport pilot departed on a flight to a remote village about 37 miles away. The trip was the first since an annual inspection had been completed the day before. The pilot departed with fuel only in the left wing tank. The right wing tank was empty. About 35 minutes later, the pilot was on a return flight to his original departure airport that was within Class E airspace. During the pilot's absence, the airport visibility had decreased to 1 1/2 mile. Instrument meteorological conditions, and special VFR procedures were in use. A 'MAYDAY' was heard over the common traffic advisory frequency, and was monitored by the local flight service station. The voice of the pilot was recognized as the accident pilot. Search personnel found the airplane on a flat area of a frozen, snow-covered lagoon. The weather at the accident site was described as fog, with flat lighting conditions. The wreckage path was oriented away from higher terrain around the destination airport which is located on a peninsula. The airplane had crashed in a nose down attitude, and came to rest inverted. The engine separated completely from the airframe. An examination of the engine revealed fuel throughout, and mechanical continuity. The vacuum pump's internal support post, on which the internal block rotated, was found fractured through 70 percent of its diameter from fatigue, the remaining portion of fracture was overstress. The airplane was equipped with a standby vacuum system. An examination of the airframe located a combination screwdriver in the left wing. The handle was shattered. No flight control cable impingement was observed.

The pilot reported that prior to takeoff, he completed a preflight inspection of the airplane that included checking the engine oil quantity. The line personnel topped off the oil reservoirs, and reportedly secured the engine oil reservoir filler caps. Approximately two minutes into the flight, the right engine oil pressure warning light illuminated. The pilot informed Palm Beach Approach Control of the engine oil pressure problem, shut down the right engine, and returned to Lantana. As the flight approached runway 03, the pilot heard a radio transmission from another airplane taxiing for takeoff. As the pilot continued the approach, with full flaps extended, he elected to go-around 1500 feet from the approach end of the 3000-foot runway. The airplane collided with the ground during the go-around maneuver to runway 15. The wreckage examination also disclosed that the right cowling showed oil streaming back from behind the engine and onto the wing strut. Inspection of the oil filler cap revealed that it had not been properly installed.

While in cruise flight at 24,000 feet msl, the pilot of the Piper Malibu Mirage advised Memphis Center that he had encountered icing conditions and was experiencing a fuel imbalance. The pilot requested and was cleared to deviate to the north. Subsequently, radio and radar contact were lost. A witness reported hearing the sound of the airplane's engine stop running and observed the airplane descending from the dark clouds in a nose down attitude and rotating clockwise. Residents of the area reported that the weather at the time of the accident was high ceilings with heavy rain just before and after the accident. There were thunderstorms with lightning in the area at the time of the accident. The wreckage of the airplane was scattered along an area of about four miles. The airplane was equipped with an autopilot, weather radar, and an ice protection system. The pilot had recently purchased the 1999 model airplane and had completed a Mirage initial training course. At the time of the accident the pilot had accumulated a total of 21.4 hours in the make and model of the accident aircraft. No anomalies were found with the airframe or engine that would have prevented normal operation.

The airplane took off from Port Huron, Michigan, on April 1, 1999, at 1130 est. The airplane was scheduled to arrive in Freemont, Ohio. An employee of the pilot's company said that the pilot was going to meet a customer there. At 1230 est, the customer called the company inquiring about the pilot. The employee said that the pilot 'would have taken the shortest route, over [Lake] St. Clair, Ontario [Province], and [Lake] Erie,' to get to Freemont, Ohio. An ALNOT was issued at 1803 est. Search and rescue operations were conducted by the U. S. Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol, and the Canadian Search and Rescue Center. The search was suspended on April 10, 1999, at 2125 est. The passenger's body was discovered on May 1, 1999, in the Lake St. Clair shipping channel, approximately 6.9 miles east of St. Clair Shores, Michigan. On July 2, 1999, the pilot's body was found in Lake St. Clair. Parts of the airplane identified from the make and model of aircraft were recovered with the bodies.

The pilot was receiving a competency flight in the seaplane from an FAA inspector. The pilot was returning to their initial departure airport, descended to 1,000 feet, contacted the control tower for landing instructions, and was instructed to enter on a right base. Before he could acknowledge the landing instructions the engines started to make loud, rough, and unusual noises. The pilot informed the control tower that he was 2 miles south , declared an emergency, and stated he had a bad engine on the left side. The FAA inspector stated the pilot started the emergency procedure, the manifold pressure and rpm was fluctuating. The inspector could not determine the dead engine by the dead foot, dead engine method, because her rudder pedals were stowed. She pointed out a pasture and the pilot stated they were going to the water. She did not recall the pilot shutting down the engine or feathering the propeller. She could not recall the final seconds of the flight. The airplane collided with a tree, canal bank, and came to rest inverted in the canal. Examination of the airframe and flight control systems revealed no evidence of a precrash mechanical failure or malfunction. Examination of the left propeller revealed it was not feathered. The No. 6 front forward spark plug ignition lead was disconnected from the spark plug. The ignition lead shroud threaded coupling on the No. 4 front forward spark plug was unscrewed and the carbon wire was exposed. The left and right engines were removed from the airplane and transported to an authorized FAA approved repair station. The left engine was placed in an engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. The spark plug lead was removed from the No.6 forward cylinder. The left magneto had a 125 rpm drop during the magneto check. The right magneto had a 75 rpm drop. The magneto drop exceeded the allowable drop indicated by the engine overhaul manual. The right engine was placed in a engine test cell. The engine was started, developed rated power, and achieved takeoff power. Review of the FAA inspectors FAA Form 4040.6 revealed she was not Event Based Current (EBC) for the 4th quarter of the Flight Standards EBC program, and she did not meet the EBC quarterly events required by the end of the 14-day grace period. FAA Order 4040.9 states for an FAA inspector to be eligible / assigned to perform flight certification job function they must be EBC current., and inspectors should not accept assignments without being in compliance with the FAA Order. Managers and supervisors should not assign inspectors who are not current. The FAA inspector's supervisor was aware that the inspector was not current. He contacted the FAA Safety Regulation Branch, FAA Southern Region Headquarters, and stated that FAA Southern Region indicated that the inspector could administer the checkride. FAA Southern Region stated at no time did they approve or agree to an operation outside the parameters of the FAR's, Inspector Handbook or FAA Order.

Prior to departure the pilot believed that his airplane contained between 30 and 40 gallons of fuel, adequate for a 15-minute-long flight to another airport where he could purchase additional fuel. The pilot reported the fuel gauge registered 40 gallons, so he departed. During initial climb upon reaching an altitude of about 400 feet above the ocean, both engines simultaneously lost power. The pilot rocked the airplane's wings and experienced a 'short surge of power.' However, it lasted only a brief moment and all engine power was again totally lost. The pilot turned toward the shoreline, reduced airspeed, and ditched about 0.25 miles off shore. The overnight tide/wave action subsequently beached most of the airplane. In the pilot's report, he did not indicate having experienced any mechanical malfunctions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) coordinator examined recovered portions of the airframe and engines. In pertinent part, the FAA reported finding no physical evidence of any mechanical malfunction with the examined components. However, because of the airframe damage sustained during immersion in the salt water and the subsequent destruction to components, the Safety Board was unable to document the integrity of the fuel quantity indicator system.

After takeoff, the airplane returned to the departure airport for an emergency landing. The aircraft was observed in the vicinity of the runway threshold, about 500 feet above the ground, with it's left propeller feathered, when it entered a left bank which increased to about 90 degrees. The airplane then entered a spin, descended, and impacted the ground. Examination of wreckage revealed the camshaft of the left engine had failed as a result of a fatigue crack. No other abnormalities were observed of airframe or engine. The left engine had accumulated about 1,200 hours since overhaul. The pilot purchased the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident. At that time, he reported 700 hours of flight experience in multi-engine airplanes, of which, 10 hours were in the make and model of the accident airplane.

The aircraft declared an emergency following departure from runway 03R at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Romulus, Michigan. The aircraft was resting on a magnetic heading of 055 degrees located approximately 3,400 feet from and 1,900 feet to the left of the departure end and centerline of runway 03R at DTW. Inspection of the forward section of the fuselage door and surrounding fuselage, a circular impression with no exposure of the underlying metal was noted approximately 2 feet 6-1/2 inches from the door hinge line. The door was opened to a point nearly flush with the aircraft's fuselage. The door handle was found to match the circular impression in position and shape. There was no tearing or fracturing of the forward fuselage door pin tips or its door pin holes. Inspection of the door's latching mechanism revealed a brown colored nail connecting the handle and vertical latches. Both engine supercharger turbine wheels displayed scoring and deformation of the impeller blades in the plane of rotation. Aileron, elevator and rudder flight control continuity was established. The elevator trim was in the neutral position. The trailing edge flaps were in the retracted positions. Both engine oil screens showed no evidence of metal contamination.

Witnesses reported hearing the engines start and shortly thereafter, the airplane taxied to the runway. The pilot then contacted ATC for an IFR clearance. The clearance was given with a short void time. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and began the takeoff ground roll. Witnesses reported that the night-time takeoff roll and engine sound appeared normal. Witnesses near the end of the runway reported that the airplane was observed at about 50 feet above the runway with about 1,000 feet of runway remaining when engine power was reduced on both engines. The airplane was heard to touch down, then engine power was reapplied. Shortly thereafter, the sound of the impact was heard. The airplane collided with the terrain about 600 feet from the end of the runway. During the post-accident inspection of the airplane and engines, no evidence was found to indicate a mechanical failure or malfunction. Documentation of the events indicated that from the time the aircraft began its taxi to the runway, to the time the takeoff roll began, was approximately six minutes in duration. Before the takeoff roll began, the pilot had accepted a clearance with a void time of four minutes. By the time the pilot correctly read back the clearance, less than two minutes remained before the void time. Post accident documentation of the accident site revealed that neither the pilot nor the passenger were wearing their lap belts or shoulder harnesses. It was also noted that the pilot had not yet selected the discrete transponder code as indicated by the clearance.

Witnesses saw the airplane depart the airport to the south, turn left at an altitude of about 200 feet above the ground (agl), fly downwind to the departure runway, climb to an altitude of about 800 to 1,000 feet, and then turn right. A witness, who was operating a crane near the crash site said, he saw the airplane approaching from the south heading towards the north, turn to the right (east), and flew directly over him. He told police officers that he could see both propellers 'spinning,' and could 'actually see the pilot flying the plane.' The witness said, '...[the] motor sounded fine...[and the airplane] took a sharp downward fall, hit the road and bounced in the air, then fire started....' Other witnesses said they saw the angle of bank increase, the airplane descend rapidly, impact on a four-lane hard surface road right wing first, strike a wooden power pole, burst into flames, and come to rest in marshy area on the eastside of the road. Examination of the airframe, engine and propeller revealed no discrepancies.