Russia

Most likely, the reason for the accident with the An-2 RA-81519 aircraft was the execution by the flight crew along the route in the mountainous terrain to the area of ​​the AHR at an altitude not ensuring its safety, which did not allow crossing the mountain pass, led to the need to perform an emergency landing and damage to the aircraft.
The contributing factors were most likely:
- Non-consideration by the crew of a significant increase of the outside air temperature during the day,
- The crew did not set the altimeter properly,
- Lack of instrument control over the flight altitude,
- Downdraft air currents on the leeward side of the mountain slope;
- Operating fatigue, leading to a weakening of attention and a decrease in level of situational awareness.

The accident was the result of the destruction of the right main landing gear strut upon landing.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Unsatisfactory performance of the welded joint in the manufacture of the strut with the formation of welding cracks in one of the most stressed zones of the strut,
- Pilot errors, which led to an early landing of the aircraft, possibly rough, on an unprepared (uncleared) area with possible obstacles.

The reason for the accident with the Gulfstream G200 4K-AZ88 was the stowing of the right-engine reverser by the pilot KVS from maximum thrust reversal while maintaining maximum thrust reversal on the left engine, which led to the appearance of a significant turning moment to the left. The aircraft turning to the left in the presence of a cross wind to the right, as well as turbulence of the airflow near the rudder due to the open thrust reversal mechanism of the left engine and possible ice deposition on the outer surfaces of the aircraft, which led to the development of a significant swing moment on the rudder. The development of a significant articulated moment on the rudder, in the absence of power steering in the rudder control system, led to its deviation to the leftmost position despite significant (up to 82 kg or 180 pounds) forces exerted by the crew on the pedals. The deviation of the rudder (pedals) to the left also led to the deviation of the nose wheel to the left. The total moment from the running reverse of the left engine, from the right engine in direct draft mode, and from the rudder and nose wheel deflection to the left, led to the aircraft rolling out of the runway and its damage. Separate braking applied by the crew could not prevent the aircraft from rolling out.

The following contributing factors were identified:
- The crew did not take into account the provisions of the AOM about the possible "destabilizing" effect of the thrust reverse when landing with a cross wind on the runway with a reduced braking coefficient;
- Increased psycho-emotional tension of the crew members due to long dissatisfaction and emotional discussion of instructions and actions of ATC controllers. At the same time, the instructions and actions of the ATC service controllers were in line with established procedures.

The accident with the An-2 RA-84674 aircraft occurred during a forced landing in the forest, the need for which was due to the impossibility of continuing the flight due to the effect of icing on the aerodynamic and traction characteristics of the aircraft (the inability to maintain altitude and speed even with the takeoff engine operating mode). The contributing factor, most likely, was the decision of the crew to climb over 150 m from the ground level, where the presence of stratus clouds and icing was predicted.

The cause of the aviation accident with the RRJ 95B RA-89011 aircraft when landing at night with one deactivated thrust reverser was the transfer to the crew of incorrect information about the value of the friction coefficient, which led to the landing on an icy runway, the average normative friction coefficient which was less than 0.3, which did not allow landing in accordance with current regulations. This led to a significant increase in landing distance, rolling the aircraft out of the runway and collision with the junction of the reconstructed section of the runway with a height of about 0.4 m, which led to the destruction of the main landing gear supports and damage to the engines with fuel leakage without causing a fire.
The contributing factors were the following:
- Absence of a connecting ramp (which was not envisaged by the reconstruction project) between the current and the part of the runway being reconstructed;
- inefficiency of the SMS of Yakutsk Airport JSC in terms of identification and control of risks associated with the possibility of ice formation at the runway, and insufficient control over the implementation of the SMS by aviation authorities;
- erroneous determination of the Xc value at the last measurement;
- inefficiency of ice removal procedure during runway cleaning due to lack of chemical reagents for ice removal and/or thermal machines at the airfield;
- lack of information from the RRJ-95LR-100 RA 89038 aircraft crew about actual rolling out of the runway, which was an aviation incident and was subject to investigation;
- failure by airport and ATC officials to take appropriate action after receiving the RRJ-95LR-100 RA-89038 low friction report from the aircraft crew.

The aircraft overrun, destroying and damage by fire were caused by the following factors:
- repeated disregarding of the windshear warnings which when entered a horizontal windshear (changing from the head wind to tail one) at low altitude resulted in landing at distance of 1285 m from the RWY threshold (overrunning the landing zone by 385 m) with the increased IAS and tail wind;
- landing to the runway, when its normative friction coefficient was less than 0.3 that according to the regulations in force, did not allow to land.
The factors contributed the accident:
- the crew violation of the AFM and Operator's OM requirements in regards to the actions required a forecasted or actual wind shear warning;
- use of the automatic flight mode (autopilot, autothrottle) in the flight under the windshear conditions which resulted in the aircraft being unstable (excess thrust) when turning to the manual control;
- lack of prevention measures taken by the Operator when the previous cases of poor crew response to windshear warning were found;
- insufficient crew training in regards to CRM and TEM that did not allow to identify committed mistakes and/or violations in good time;
- the crew members' high psychoemotional state caused by inconsistency between the actual landing conditions and the received training as well as the psychological limit which was determined by the individual psychological constitution of each member;
- insufficient braking both in auto and manual mode during the aircraft rollout caused by the insufficient tyre-to-ground friction aiming to achieve the specified rate of braking. Most probably the insufficient tyre-to-ground friction was caused by the significant amount of water on the RWY surface;
- the aerodrome services' noncompliance of Sochi International Aerodrome Manual requirements related to the RWY after heavy showers inspection which resulted in the crew provision of wrong normative friction coefficients. In obtaining of the increased overrun speed of about ≈75 kt (≈140 km/h) the later setting of engines into reverse mode was contributed (the engines were set into reverse mode 16 s later than the aircraft landed at distance of about ≈200 m from the runway end).