Nigeria

On 3rd June, 2012 at about 1545:00hrs, 5N-RAM, a Boeing MD-83, a domestic scheduled commercial flight, operated by Dana Airlines (Nig.) Limited as flight 0992 (DANACO 0992), crashed into a densely populated area of Iju-Ishaga, a suburb of Lagos, following engine number 1 loss of power seventeen minutes into the flight and engine number 2 loss of power while on final approach to Murtala Muhammed Airport Lagos, Nigeria. Visual Meteorological Conditions prevailed at the time and the airplane was on an instrument flight plan. All 153 persons onboard the airplane, including the six crew were fatally injured. There were also six confirmed ground fatalities. The airplane was destroyed. There was post impact fire. The flight originated at Abuja (ABV) and the destination was Lagos (LOS). The airplane was on the fourth flight segment of the day, consisting of two round-trips between Lagos and Abuja. The accident occurred during the return leg of the second trip. DANACO 0992 was on final approach to runway 18R at LOS when the crew declared a Mayday call “Dual Engine Failure – negative response from the throttles.” According to records, the flight arrived ABV as Dana Air flight 0993 at about 1350:00hrs and routine turn-around activities were carried out. DANACO 0992 initiated engine start up at 1436:00hrs. Abuja Control Tower cleared the aircraft to taxi to the holding point of runway 04. En-route ATC clearance was passed on to DANACO 0992 on approaching holding point of runway 04. According to the ATC ground recorder transcript, the aircraft was cleared to line-up on runway 04 and wait, but the crew requested for some time before lining-up. DANACO 0992 was airborne at 1458:00hrs after reporting a fuel endurance of 3 hours 30 minutes. The aircraft made contact with Lagos Area Control Centre at 1518:00hrs and reported 1545:00hrs as the estimated time of arrival at LOS at cruising altitude of 26,000 ft. The Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) retained about 30 minutes 53 seconds of the flight and started recording at 1513:44hrs by which time the Captain and First Officer (F/O) were in a discussion of a non-normal condition regarding the correlation between the engine throttle setting and an engine power indication. However, they did not voice concerns then that the condition would affect the continuation of the flight. The flight crew continued to monitor the condition and became increasingly concerned as the flight transitioned through the initial descent from cruise altitude at 1522:00hrs and the subsequent approach phase. DANACO 0992 reported passing 18,100ft and 7,700ft, at 1530:00hrs and 1540:00hrs respectively. After receiving radar vectors in heading and altitude from the Controller, the aircraft was issued the final heading to intercept the final approach course for runway 18R. According to CVR transcript, at 1527:30hrs the F/O advised the Captain to use runway 18R for landing and the request was made at 1531:49hrs and subsequently approved by the Radar Controller. The crew accordingly changed the decision height to correspond with runway 18R. At 1531:12hrs, the crew confirmed that there was no throttle response on the left engine and subsequently the Captain took over control as Pilot Flying (PF) at 1531:27hrs. The flight was however continued towards Lagos with no declaration of any distress message. With the confirmation of throttle response on the right engine, the engine anti-ice, ignition and bleed-air were all switched off. At 1532:05hrs, the crew observed the loss of thrust in No.1 Engine of the aircraft. During the period between 1537:00hrs and 1541:00hrs, the flight crew engaged in prelanding tasks including deployment of the slats, and extension of the flaps and landing gears. At 1541:46hrs the First Officer inquired, "both engines coming up?" and the Captain replied “negative” at 1541:48hrs. The flight crew subsequently discussed and agreed to declare an emergency. At 1542:10hrs, DANACO 0992 radioed an emergency distress call indicating "dual engine failure . . . negative response from throttle." At 1542:35hrs, the flight crew lowered the flaps further and continued with the approach and discussed landing alternatively on runway 18L. At 1542:45hrs, the Captain reported the runway in sight and instructed the F/O to retract the flaps and four seconds later to retract the landing gears. At 1543:27hrs, the Captain informed the F/O, "we just lost everything, we lost an engine. I lost both engines". During the next 25 seconds until the end of the CVR recording, the flight crew attempted to recover engine power without reference to any Checklist. The airplane crashed into a densely populated residential area about 5.8 miles north of LOS. The airplane wreckage was approximately on the extended centreline of runway 18R, with the main wreckage concentrated at N 06o 40.310’ E 003o 18.837' coordinates, with elevation of 177ft. During the impact sequence, the airplane struck an uncompleted building, two trees and three other buildings. The wreckage was confined in a small area, with the separated tail section and engines located at the beginning of the debris trail. The airplane was mostly consumed by post crash fire. The tail section, both engines and portions of both wings representing only about 15% of the airplane, were recovered from the accident site for further examination.

5N-BMM departed Lagos at 1856 hrs for Port Harcourt on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and estimated Port Harcourt at 1940 hrs. The aircraft was cleared to maintain FL330. The aircraft’s first contact with Port Harcourt was at 1914 hrs. The pilot reported maintaining FL330 with six souls onboard, four hours fuel endurance and estimating POT VOR at 1940hrs. The aircraft was cleared to POT, to maintain FL330 with no delay expected for ILS Approach Runway 21, QNH 1011 and to report when released by Lagos. At 1921 hrs the pilot reported 100 NM to POT and requested for descent. The aircraft was cleared to descend to FL150. At 1927 hrs the pilot requested for further descent and was cleared to 3,300 feet on QNH 1011 but the pilot acknowledged 3500 feet. At 1931 hrs the aircraft was re-cleared to FL090 initially due to departing traffic on Runway 03. At 1934 hrs 5N-BMM reported maintaining FL090 and was re-cleared to FL050. The aircraft was re-cleared to 2,000 feet on QNH 1011 at 1936 hrs and cleared for the straight-in ILS Approach Runway 21 and to report on the localizer. At 1947 hrs the pilot reported final for Runway 21 and was asked to contact Tower on 119.2 and the Tower asked 5N-BMM to report on glide slope Runway 21. At 1950 hrs the Tower asked 5N-BMM to confirm on the glide slope and the crew confirmed “Charlie, we have three miles to run”. The Tower cleared 5N-BMM to land with surface wind calm but to exercise caution since the Runway surface was wet and 5N-BMM responded “wind calm”. At 1952:26 hrs the auto voice callout "minimums minimums” alerted the crew. At 1952:40 hrs the pilot flying (PF) said "I am not on the centerline". At 1952:48 hrs he said "I can't see down". At 1952:55 hrs the pilot monitoring (PM) said to the pilot flying; " I am telling you to go down" and the pilot flying said " I will go down", five seconds later the aircraft crashed. The crew exited the aircraft without accomplishing the Emergency Evacuation Checklist and therefore left the right engine running for about 28 minutes after the crash. The Fire Service eventually used their water hose to shutdown the running engine. At 19:54 hrs the Tower called 5N-BMM to pass on the landing time as 19:53 hrs, but no response from 5N-BMM. There was no indication that the aircraft was taxing on the Runway because it was dark and no light was visible hence the need to alert the Fire personnel. The watch room was asked to give the Tower information, which they could not give since they do not have a two – way contact with the Fire trucks. The Tower could not raise the Fire truck since there was no two - way communication between them; however, the Fire truck was later cleared to proceed to the Runway as the Tower could not ascertain the position of the aircraft. The aircraft was actually turned 90° because of the big culvert that held the right wing and made the aircraft spin and turned 90o facing the runway, two meters from the active runway, the culvert was uprooted due to the aircraft impact forces. The wheel broke off because of the gully that runs parallel to the runway.

On 24th May, 2011 at 11:54 h, a Beechcraft C90 aircraft with nationality and registration marks N364UZ, operated by Shoreline Energy International Limited (SEIL), departed Old Kaduna (Military) airport on a test flight with a pilot and another person onboard with three hours fuel endurance. The test flight was on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan. According to an eye witness, the aircraft sound was unusual and the aircraft seemed not to be gaining altitude after takeoff. Another eye witness (a local farmer), stated that he saw the aircraft moving up and down with increasing and decreasing engine sound. Thereafter, the aircraft impacted a mango tree, turned and crashed. The local farmer further stated that he and some military personnel tried all they could to rescue the occupants inside the aircraft but their efforts were not successful. At 11:59 h, the aircraft crashed on a farm-land 878 meters short of RWY 23 (military) and engulfed into flames. The two occupants were fatally injured. Dornier Aviation Nigeria AIEP (DANA) and Nigerian Air Force (NAF) fire-fighting personnel were dispatched immediately. There was no direct access between the runway and the accident site, which delayed the fire trucks from reaching the aircraft at accident site on time. The accident occurred in day light, in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

After landing at Port Harcourt Airport, the aircraft skidded then veered off runway and came to rest. All 52 occupants were rescued, among them 10 were slightly injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. All passengers were members of the intervention group taking part to a disaster response operation.

On 14th July, 2008 at 16:49 h, a Boeing 737–282 aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-BIG, operated by Chanchangi Airlines Ltd, commenced a scheduled domestic flight from Murtala Muhammed International Airport, (DNMM) with call sign NCH138 for Port Harcourt International Airport (DNPO). Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight. There were 47 persons on board (41 passengers, 2 flight crew and 4 flight attendants) and 3 hours fuel endurance. The Captain was the Pilot Flying (PF) and The First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). The FO stated that NCH138 was initially scheduled to depart at 15:30 h, but the flight was delayed due to loading of passenger baggage. The Captain stated that NCH138 was cleared to FL290 and the flight continued normally. According to the DNPO Air Traffic Control (ATC) watch supervisor on duty, NCH138 contacted DNPO Approach Control (APP) at 17:05 h with flight information estimating POT at 17:50 h. NCH138 was issued an inbound clearance to POT1 VOR2 with the following weather information for 17:00 h as: Wind calm, Visibility 10 km, Broken clouds 270 m, Scattered clouds 600 m, Cumulonimbus clouds scattered, temperature 25/24°C, Thunderstorms, Temporarily Variable 8 kt, gusting 18 kt, Visibility 3000 m, Thunderstorms and rain, and expect runway (RWY) 21 for landing. According to the First Officer NCH138 requested descent into POT at about 100 NM. The Captain added that due to ATC delay, the descent commenced at about 80 NM. The Control Tower Watch Supervisor stated that at 18:00 h, NCH138 requested to hold over POT at 3500 ft for weather improvement, because there was rain overhead the station with build-up closing in at the threshold of RWY 21. At about 15 NM, between radials 180° and 210°, NCH138 reported breaking out of weather. At 18:19 h, NCH138 requested weather information from the Tower. Tower advised the flight crew that RWY 03 was better for landing. At this time, NCH138 requested RWY 03 for approach and Approach Control cleared NCH138 for the approach to RWY 03. At 18:27 h, the flight crew reported established on approach to RWY 03, leaving 2000 ft. The Approach Control then transferred NCH138 to DNPO Tower for landing instructions. At 18:28 h, the Tower instructed NCH138 to report field in sight. The flight crew acknowledged and reported RWY 03 in sight. Tower cleared NCH138 to land on RWY 03 and NCH138 was cautioned that the runway was wet. At 18:34 h, NCH138 executed and reported a missed approach. NCH138 requested a climb to 3500 ft. NCH138 was cleared to climb and instructed to report overhead POT. At 18:39 h, NCH138 requested a descent and clearance for an approach to RWY 21. Approach Control cleared NCH138 to descend to 2000 ft and report to Tower when established on the approach and also to report leaving 2000 ft. At 18:42 h, NCH138 reported inbound maintaining 2000 ft. The Approach Control requested the distance from the runway and sought consent of NCH138 for Arik 514 at the holding point to take off. NCH138 declined, as they were about 10 miles to touchdown. At 18:45 h, NCH138 reported five miles to touchdown. Approach Control acknowledged and instructed NCH138 to report field in sight and thereafter handed over to Tower on 119.2 MHz. When contacting the Tower, NCH138 was cleared to land on RWY 21, wind 0100 /10 kt and was advised to exercise caution due to wet runway. NCH138 acknowledged the clearance. NCH138 landed hard and bounced three times on the runway. According to the ATC controller, after touch down the aircraft rolled in an s-pattern before it overran the runway. NCH138 made a 180° turn with the right engine hitting the ground. The aircraft came to a final stop on the left side and 10 m beyond the stopway. The accident occurred at night in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (ARFFS) arrived the scene and commenced rescue operations immediately. All occupants on board were evacuated; one passenger sustaining a minor injury.

The aircraft, Beech 1900D with flight number TWD8300 on a positioning flight, filed an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) with Air Traffic Services (ATS) at Murtala Muhammed Airport (MMA) Lagos for departure to Bebi airstrip, Obudu on a filed flight plan LAG – UA609 – POTGO – DCT – ENU – DCT - OBUDU. But the actual route flown was LAG – UA609 – POTGO – LIPAR – LUNDO – IKROP – BUDU. The aircraft departed MMA at 0736 hrs as per the flight plan, climbed to FL250, estimated MOPAD at 0755 hrs, BEN at 0814hrs, POTGO at 0837hrs, LIPAR at 0844hrs, LUNDO at 0902 hrs and OBUDU destination at 0917hrs. The aircraft was transferred to Port Harcourt at 0845 hrs thereafter the crew requested descent. It was cleared to FL110 but on passing through FL160 requested further descent and was then released to Enugu at 0856 hrs by Port Harcourt. Enugu cleared it to FL050. The aircraft deviated from the flight plan route, and flew on airway UA609 direct to IKROP from POTGO. The inputs into Global Positioning System (GPS) gave the crew different distances to Bebi. The crew agreed on a coordinate to input and thereafter were busy trying to locate the airstrip physically. During this process the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), warning signals and sound of “Terrain, terrain…..pull up” was heard several times without any of the pilot following the command. The aircraft flew into terrain, crashed and was destroyed. At 0923hrs, the Radio Operator at Bebi called the aircraft to confirm its position, but received no reply. The FDR showed that the aircraft crashed at about 0920:15 hrs at an altitude of about 3,400ft at Bushi Village during the hours of daylight with three fatalities. The aircraft flew for 103.75 minutes before impact.At 0924 hrs, Bebi Radio Operator called Calabar, to confirm if in contact with 5N-JAH, Calabar replied negative contact. The burnt wreckage was found by hunters in a dense wooded area on 30 August 2008.

The B737-200 aircraft which night-stopped at Calabar on Saturday the 28th of October, 2006, departed for Lagos in the morning of the 29th of October, 2006, and landed in Lagos at 0825 hrs. While on ground in Lagos, it uplifted some fuel. There was only cabin crew change. The aircraft departed Lagos on scheduled passenger service as ADK 063 at 0929 hrs and landed in Abuja at 1020 hrs. The aircraft uplifted 5000 litres of fuel and had 11000kg fuel for departure as ADK 053, a scheduled service to Sokoto. After boarding, it started raining and this compelled the crew to close the aircraft doors. Shortly after the rain had subsided, the doors were opened for the ground personnel to disembark. The crew then requested for start-up clearance. At 1115 hrs the aircraft was given a start up clearance for Sokoto. At 1121 hrs, the aircraft was given taxi clearance to holding position Runway 22. The pilot immediately requested for the wind, which was given as “210 variable at 8 kts”. Shortly after, the Control Tower transmitted the wind as south-westerly at 15 kts. While taxiing, the control tower advised Flight ADK 053 of gusty wind. The wind was initially given as 35 kts and then changed to 28 kts within 1 minute. At 1125 hrs while the aircraft was at the holding point, the crew was again advised of South-Westerly wind at 15 kts. At this juncture, the pilot of Virgin Nigeria 042 was heard on the radio saying “it looks like 35 kts to me” and then stated that he was going to wait for improvement in the weather, which he did. Thereafter, the ADK 053 crew requested for takeoff clearance and was cleared with right turn-out on course. Flight ADK 053 was airborne at 1129 hrs and was transferred to the Approach Control on 119.8MHZ but there was no acknowledgement from the crew. After three unsuccessful attempts to contact the aircraft, the Tower advised the Approach Control to call ADK 053. Other aircraft on the apron (Virgin Nigeria 042 and Trade Wings 2401), which were on that frequency were also asked to assist in contacting the aircraft but all attempts were unsuccessful. Kano and Lagos Area Controls were requested to contact ADK 053, but there was no response from the aircraft. Abuja Flight Communication Centre was then advised to inform National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in Kano about the loss of contact with the aircraft. At 1138 hrs, Flight Communication Centre called the Control Tower that someone came from a nearby village (Tungar Madaki) near the radar site and reported that a plane had crashed in their village. A search party from the airport was dispatched and they found and confirmed that the plane had crashed shortly after takeoff. The accident resulted in 96 fatalities out of 105 persons on board (POB). The accident occured at latitude N 08 59.691’ longitude E 007 14.772’ on an elevation of 1123 ft (ASL). The time of the accident was 1130 hrs during daylight and in rain.

The twin engine aircraft departed Abuja on a flight to Obudu, carrying 15 passengers and a crew of three. The pilots started the descent in poor weather conditions when the aircraft impacted hilly terrain near Vande Ikya, about 29 km northwest of Obudu. Five occupants were injured while 13 others were killed, among them several high ranking officers who were flying to Obudu to proceed to an inspection of the military equipments. At the time of the accident, the visibility was poor due to low ceiling.

On the day of the accident, Flight DV110 routing was Abidjan – Accra - Lagos. It departed Abidjan at 1015 hrs for Lagos via Accra. The aircraft finally departed Accra for Lagos at 1145 hrs with a total declared cargo weight of 50014 lbs (22733 kgs). The aircraft contacted Lagos Area Control at 1242 hrs, while maintaining FL 210 (21, 000ft) and was given an in-bound clearance to Lagos VOR (LAG) for ILS approach on runway 18L. At 1252 hrs, Lagos Approach cleared it to FL050 (5,000 feet) and at 12 NM, it was further cleared down to 3500ft on QNH 1013 hpa, and finally to 2,200 feet and to report established on the ILS. At 4 NM to the runway, the aircraft reported fully established on the ILS and was handed over to Control Tower for landing instructions. At 1303 hrs and 2 NM to the runway, the aircraft was cleared to land on runway 18L but to exercise caution, as the runway surface was wet. The cloud was low; the Captain said in his statement that the cloud base was about 100 feet above minimum. Speci weather was also available to the crew. The pilot was advised to exercise caution due to the rain and the weather at that time. In spite of all the warnings the copilot was still allowed to proceed with the landing. At the point of touch down the captain observed that it was impossible to stop on the runway and he called for a go-around. The procedure was not properly executed and thus the aircraft overshot the runway 400m into the grass area. There was no fire outbreak and no injury was sustained by any of the crew members. There was serious damage to the aircraft.

The aircraft with call sign OSL 1 145 which departed Abuja at 1225 hrs UTC (1.25 pm local time) with endurance of 2 hours 40 minutes was on a scheduled passenger flight enroute Port Harcourt with 110 Persons on Board (103 Passengers and 7 Crew) and the flight continued normally. At 1241 hours UTC, the aircraft cruising at FL240 (24,000ft) Above Sea Level (ASL) got in contact with Port Harcourt Approach Control. The Approach control gave the OSL 1145 in - bound clearance to expect no delay on ILS Approach to runway 21, QNH of 1008 and temperature of 33° C. At about 1242 hours UTC (1.42pm local), the Approach controller passed the 1230 hours UTC weather report to the aircraft as follows: Wind - 260° /02kts Visibility - 12km Weather - Nil Cloud - BKN 420m, few CB (N-SE) at 690m QNH - 1008HPA Temperature - 33° C. About 1250 hours UTC (1.50 pm local), the aircraft, which was 90 nautical miles to the station, contacted Approach Control for initial descent clearance and was cleared down to FL 160. The aircraft continued its descent until about 1300 hours UTC (2.00 pm local) when the crew asked Approach Control whether it was raining over the station to which the controller reported negative rain but scattered CB and the crew acknowledged. At 1304 hours UTC, the crew reported established on the glide and the localizer at 8 nautical miles to touch down. Then the Approach controller informed the aircraft of precipitation approaching the station from the direction of runway 21 and passed the aircraft to Tower for landing instructions. At 1305 hours UTC, the aircraft contacted Tower and reported established on glide and localizer at 6 nautical miles to touch down. The controller then cleared the airplane to land on runway 21 but to exercise caution as the runway surface was slightly wet and the pilot acknowledged. At about 1308 hours UTC, the aircraft made impact with the grass strip between runway 21 and taxiway i.e. 70m to the left of the runway edge, and 540m from the runway 21 threshold. At about 60m from the first impact, the aircraft tail section impacted heavily with a concrete drainage culvert. The airplane then disintegrated and caught fire along its path spanning over 790m. The cockpit section and the forward fuselage were found at about 330m from the rest of the wreckage further down on the taxiway creating a total wreckage trail of 1 120m. Fire and rescue operations were carried out after which 7 survivors and 103 bodies were recovered. Five of the survivors died later in the hospital. The accident occurred in `Instrument Meteorological Conditions' (IMC) during the day.