Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver in Mollet Lake: 3 killed

Date & Time: Oct 8, 2001 at 1730 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GPUO
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iyachisakus Lake - Mollet Lake
MSN:
810
YOM:
1955
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
6
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
900
Aircraft flight hours:
13140
Circumstances:
The float-equipped Beaver de Havilland DHC-2 Mk 1, registration C-GPUO, serial number 810, took off at 1710 eastern daylight time from Iyachisakus Lake, Quebec, with the pilot and six passengers on board, for a visual flight rules flight to an outfitter on Mollet Lake, 26 nautical miles (nm) to the east. At about 1730, a witness at the outfitter heard the seaplane flying on an easterly heading to the south of the lake. About 20 minutes later, noting that the aircraft had not arrived at the dock, the manager of the outfitter sent a boat to look for C-GPUO. The Beaver was found 1 nm east of the outfitter. It was lying partly submerged in Mollet Lake near the north shore, with the nose in the water and leaning backward. Four injured occupants who were clinging to the fuselage were rescued. The pilot and two of the passengers were fatally injured.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The seaplane stalled at an altitude that did not allow the pilot time to recover from the stall.
2. The stall occurred in circumstances conducive to illusions created by drift.
Findings as to Risks:
1. The aircraft was not equipped with a stall warning device, which could have alerted the pilot to the onset of a stall.
2. The chances of surviving the impact would have been improved if the front seat occupants had been wearing their shoulder harnesses as prescribed by aviation regulations.
3. Life jackets were available, but the occupants who evacuated the aircraft do not seem to have had time to find, retrieve, and don them.
4. The emergency locator transmitter was not capable of emitting a distress signal because a short circuit occurred when the antenna came into contact with the water.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226AT Merlin IV in Kuujjuaq

Date & Time: Sep 20, 2001 at 1757 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-GWSL
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Kangiqsualujjuaq – Kuujjuaq
MSN:
AT-028
YOM:
1975
Flight number:
MAX226
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The approach to Kuujjuaq-Fort Chimo Airport was stable but slightly below the VASIS descent profile. Just before the flare when power was reduced to idle, the crew was surprised by how rapidly the aircraft decelerated. Touchdown on the runway was hard. After the engines were shut down at the terminal, the crew noted structural deformations around the nose wheel attachment point and on the wings, where the deformations caused fuel to leak. Runway 31 slopes upward 1.3%. The landing was made at twilight, and the runway environment appeared very dark to the crew due to the lack of reflection from the gravel surface.

Crash of a Beechcraft 1900C in Saint John's

Date & Time: Sep 14, 2001 at 2118 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GSKC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
UB-27
YOM:
1984
Flight number:
SLQ621
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
On take off from runway 11 at St. John's, the crew felt the nose of the aircraft rise to a high-pitch attitude. The aircraft climbed to about 150 to 200 feet, and was about to enter cloud when the crew reduced power. The crew lowered the nose, and force-landed the aircraft on the runway. The main gear, wings, engines and fuselage sustained substantial structural damage. Weather conditions at the time of the crash were reported as: winds 090° at 25 knots gusting to 35 knots, horizontal visibility 1/2 statute mile in light rain and fog, vertical visibility 100 feet, temperature 15° Celsius, dew point 15° Celsius, altimeter 29.31 Hg., pressure dropping.

Crash of a Beechcraft UC-45-J Expeditor in Swan Lake: 3 killed

Date & Time: Sep 13, 2001 at 1735 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N45N
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Swan Lake – Mayo
MSN:
5715
YOM:
1943
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
2
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
700
Captain / Total hours on type:
200.00
Circumstances:
The privately owned and operated Beech UC45-J was flying out of an outfitter's camp located near Swan Lake, Yukon Territory. The aircraft departed the clay-and-gravel strip for Mayo with one pilot, two passengers, luggage, and a reported load of 800 pounds of moose and caribou meat. The aircraft accelerated down the runway in a normal fashion, with the tail becoming airborne first. The aircraft left the surface of the runway and began a steep climb, followed by a yaw and bank to the left. The aircraft entered the Pleasant Creek valley off the end of the runway in a near-vertical, nose-down attitude. An explosion occurred, followed by a plume of smoke. Two persons immediately attempted to rescue the pilot and the passengers but discovered the aircraft partly submerged in the creek and engulfed in flames from the post-crash fire. There were no survivors.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The meat was loaded into the aircraft on a slippery surface and not adequately secured.
2. The manner in which the meat was loaded and secured most likely allowed the load to shift to the rear of the cabin during take-off. This rearward shift resulted in the loss of pitch control and an aerodynamic stall from which the pilot could not recover.
Other Findings:
1. The aircraft's C of G was most likely at or aft of the aft limit before engine start.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-3 Otter in Otter Creek

Date & Time: Sep 12, 2001 at 1100 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-FQOS
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
398
YOM:
1960
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The single engine aircraft departed Otter Creek near Goose Bay on a charter flight to a fishing lodge with three passengers and one pilot on board. The pilot reported he was in climb mode when the aircraft pitched forward and then nosed up before entering an uncontrollable nose-down descent, although it did not exhibit characteristics normally associated with an aerodynamic stall. It impacted the water hard, resulting in structural failure of the float supports and extensive damage to the fuselage. 'Lab Air 911', a Twin Otter medevac flight bound for Nain witnessed the incident and raised the alarm. All four occupants were rescued by boat while the aircraft sank in 55 feet of water.
Source: http://www.dhc-3archive.com/DHC-3_398.html

Crash of a Cessna 208 Caravan I near La Grande

Date & Time: Aug 31, 2001 at 1157 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GAWM
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
208-0196
YOM:
1991
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Sole on board, the pilot was completing a positioning flight to La Grande-4 Airport. En route, while cruising at a relative low height, the pilot modified the position of the fuel selector when the engine stopped about five minutes later. He attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft collided with trees and crashed 22 km north of La Grande, bursting into flames. The pilot escaped uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Crash of a Dassault Falcon 10 in Kuujjuaq

Date & Time: Aug 14, 2001 at 1331 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GNVT
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Iqaluit – Kuujjuaq
MSN:
138
YOM:
1978
Flight number:
BFF10
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
8
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Iqaluit, the twin engine aircraft bounced twice upon landing. The crew completed the braking procedure 'normally' then vacated the runway and parked the airplane on the apron. After all 10 occupants disembarked, technicians realized that the fuselage was severely damaged and the aircraft was declared as damaged beyond repair.

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver near Mackenzie Lake: 5 killed

Date & Time: Aug 13, 2001 at 1706 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
C-GVHT
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Campbell River - Mackenzie Sound
MSN:
257
YOM:
1952
Country:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
4
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Aircraft flight hours:
11325
Circumstances:
A de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver floatplane, C-GVHT (serial number 257), took off from Campbell River, British Columbia, at 1530 Pacific daylight time, with a pilot and four passengers on board. The aircraft was on a visual flight rules flight to a logging camp on Mackenzie Sound, 76 nautical miles northwest of Campbell River, and was scheduled to arrive at 1700. When the aircraft arrived over the Mackenzie logging camp, the pilot informed ground personnel by radio that he was overhead at 2800 feet, between cloud layers with no place to descend, and that because of unfavourable weather conditions, he was returning, presumably to Campbell River. The aircraft then flew to a clear area north of the camp and entered the Frederic Creek valley. When company ground personnel could not contact the aircraft by radio, they began a ground search, later followed by an aerial search. The searches were hampered by poor weather. The aircraft wreckage was found three days later, about four nautical miles northeast of the camp. The accident occurred at 1706 in daylight conditions. All occupants were fatally injured, and the aircraft was destroyed. The emergency locator transmitter was destroyed on impact and did not transmit a signal. No fire occurred.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The pilot abandoned his attempt to fly through the pass because of unsuitable weather conditions. He flew into a confined area that required him to manoeuvre the aircraft aggressively to avoid the rising terrain, causing the aircraft to stall.
2. The aircraft weight exceeded the certificated MAUW, and the CG was outside the floatplane aft limit. The out-of-limit weight and balance aggravated aerodynamic stall and produced rapid and
uncontrolled aircraft attitudes from which the pilot could not recover before striking the trees.
3. Basic weight and balance of the aircraft was incorrectly recorded in several aircraft documents, leading to remarkable discrepancies in take-off weight and CG calculations. As a result, a pilot could not calculate an accurate weight and balance. In certain conditions, calculations erroneously showed that the aircraft was below maximum allowable gross weight.
Findings as to Risk:
1. The practice of using a non-standard passenger weight led to inaccurate take-off weight calculations and provided an estimated total passenger weight that was 185 pounds less than actual.
2. Weight and balance calculations performed using inaccurate figures would not have revealed that the aircraft was overloaded until it was approximately 450 pounds beyond the maximum limit.
3. Aircraft weight exceeded the maximum allowable gross weight, and the CG was outside the aft CG limit. This weight and balance combination placed the aircraft outside the manufacturer’s
original design envelope, to where slow speed and stall handling characteristics are neither proven nor certificated.
4. Cargo was not secured by the available cargo restraint and might have shifted during aircraft manoeuvring. Such cargo movement would have exacerbated the effects of the existing aft CG and likely increased the level of injury to the occupants.
Other Findings:
1. The pilot chose to fly above cloud in accordance with the visual flight rules and could not descend through the cloud at his intended landing site.
2. The Alaska cargo door installation increases the volume of the cargo compartment. The installation is thereby conducive to larger loads being stowed farther aft and possible overloading of the cargo compartment.
3. The DHC-2 Beaver is not equipped with an aural or visual stall warning system, nor is it required by regulation. Warning of an impending stall is dependent on juddering or some other aerodynamic indication.
Final Report: