Armenia

The accident involving aircraft CRJ-100LR registration number EW-101PJ was the result of an asymmetric loss of lift of the wing during take-off, which led to the toppling of the aircraft immediately after liftoff from the runway, the left wing tip contacting the ground, the subsequent destruction and fire. The reason for the loss of lift of the wing at the actual weather conditions, was the formation of frost, which "pollutes" the surface of the wing. The cause of formation of frost, most likely, was the fuel icing, while the aircraft was parked at the airport and during taxiing for the return flight, resulting in a difference in temperature of the surrounding air and cold fuel in the tanks after the flight. The situation could be aggravated when exceeding the values recommended by the operations manual of the angular velocity when lifting the nose wheel during takeoff with "contaminated" wings when it is impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally. Existing procedural methods of control of the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft before departure, along with the inefficiency, during takeoff, the existing system of protection from stalling due to increased sensitivity of the wing, even to a slight contamination of the leading edge, can not fully guarantee the prevention of similar accidents in future. An Airworthiness Directive on the need to include anti-icing systems on the wing in the final stage of taxiing at the actual weather conditions was issued by Transport Canada after the accident. This probably could have prevented the accident.

It was determined that the crew was cleared for takeoff while the bus driver did to establish any contact with the tower and elected to cross the runway without prior permission or traffic check. It was reported that ATC was not aware of the presence of the minibus at this time.

The following factors were reported:
- The visibility (200 metres) was below minimums at the time of the accident,
- The crew's decision to initiate a go-around was taken too late,
- The approach was unstable and the aircraft was not properly aligned with runway centerline,
- The crew failed to follow the approach published procedures,
- The aircraft was overloaded at takeoff and upon landing,
- Two cars stored in the cargo compartment were not properly secured,
- There were 31 passengers on board while only five were mentioned on the manifest.

The accident was the consequence of the combination of the following factors:
- Poor approach planning,
- The crew failed to follow the approach pattern,
- Lack of captain's experience,
- The aircraft was unstable on approach,
- No corrective action on part of the crew,
- The crew positioned the throttle below flight idle, causing negative thrust and a loss of ground speed and altitude,
- Shortcomings in crew interactions expressed in the absence of control by the copilot about the throttle position during the late stage of flight,
- Failure of the crew to initiate a go-around procedure.

It was determined that the aircraft was not properly aligned with the runway centerline upon landing after the crew mistook the runway edge lights with the runway centerline lights.

Attacked in flight by the pilot of an Azerbaijani Sukhoi Su-25.

The accident was the consequence of the following factors:
- Wrong altimeter setting on part of the crew with a value of 736 mm Hg pressure instead of the actual 637 mm Hg, causing the aircraft to descend below MDA,
- Failure to use the radio altimeters, which deprived the crew of additional information about their descent below MDA,
- Failure of the crew to respond to the recommendation by the flight engineer to climb and to initiate appropriate corrective actions,
- This was the instructor captain's first flight into Leninakan and the student pilot's (in the right hand seat) first flight on an Il-76,
- Poor crew resource management,
- Lack of crew training regarding the actions to be taken in case of a GPWS warning.

It is believed that the aircraft was approaching Yerevan at an insufficient altitude following wrong information transmitted to the crew by ATC.

The accident was caused by an error on part of the crew who set a wrong altimeter pressure prior to descend to Leninakan Airport. The wrong altimeter setting (734 mm instead of 634 mm) caused the aircraft to descent below the minimum prescribed altitude by 1,100 metres.