Crash of a Short 360-100 in Sheffield

Date & Time: Feb 4, 2001 at 1921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
EI-BPD
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dublin – Sheffield
MSN:
3656
YOM:
1984
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
25
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4484
Captain / Total hours on type:
1392.00
Circumstances:
The crew were planned to fly a scheduled passenger flight from Dublin to Sheffield airport and the commander was the handling pilot for the flight. Both pilots had operated into Sheffield between five and ten times in the previous three months. The aircraft, which was serviceable, took off from Dublin at 1814 hrs and was routed to Sheffield via the VOR/DME navigation beacon at Wallasey at FL90. Prior to descent, the crew obtained the most recent information from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS); this report, timed at 1820 hrs, was identified as 'Information Hotel'. The reported conditions at Sheffield were: surface wind variable at 03 kt, visibility 4,000 metres in rain and snow, a few clouds at 600 feet, scattered cloud at 1,200 feet and broken cloud at 3,000 feet, the temperature and dew point were coincident at +1°C and the QNH was 989 hPa. Air traffic control was passed to the Sheffield approach controller when the aircraft was 12 nm from the overhead at which time it was descending to 5,000 feet on the QNH. The crew were informed that the current ATIS was now 'Information India' and the aircraft was cleared to descend to 3,000 feet when within 10 nm of the airport. 'Information India', timed at 1850 hrs, contained no significant changes from 'Information Hotel'. The aircraft weight for the landing was calculated to be 11,100 kg with an associated threshold speed of 103 kt. The aircraft was cleared for the ILS/DME procedure for Runway 28 and the crew requested the QFE which was 980 hPa. The decision height for the approach was 400 feet. During the initial stages of the manually flown ILS approach the commander's flight director warning flag appeared briefly but then disappeared and did not reappear during the remaining period of flight. The de-ice boots had been selected to 'ON' early in the descent when the aircraft had briefly encountered light icing. These de-ice boots were selected to 'OFF' when at 5 nm from the runway at which stage there were no indications of icing and the indicated outside air temperature was +5°C. (This is indicative of an actual air temperature of +2°C.) At 1918:11 hrs the crew reported that they were established on the localiser. When the aircraft intercepted the glidepath, the flaps were set to 15° correctly configuring the aircraft for the approach. The handling pilot recalled that initially the rate of descent was slightly higher than the expected 650 ft/min leading him to suspect the presence of a tailwind, however, the rate of descent returned to a more normal value when approximately 4 nm from the runway. The propellers were set to the maximum rpm at 1,200 feet agl. When the crew reported that they were inside 4 nm they were cleared to land and passed the surface wind, which was variable at 2 kt; they were also warned that the runway surface was wet. Both pilots saw the runway lights when approaching 400 feet agl; the flaps were selected to 30° and confirmed at that position. Both pilots believed that the airspeed was satisfactory but, as the commander checked back on the control column for the landing, the rate of descent increased noticeably and the aircraft landed firmly. Both pilots believed that the power levers were in the flight idle position and neither was aware of any unusual control inputs during the landing flare. Two separate witnesses saw the aircraft during the later stages of the approach and the subsequent landing, one of these witnesses was in the control tower and the other was standing in front of the passenger terminal. They both saw the aircraft come into view at a height of approximately 400 feet and apparently travelling faster than normal. They described the aircraft striking the ground very hard with the left wing low; both heard a loud noise coincident with the initial contact. They then reported that the aircraft bounced before hitting the ground again, this time with the nose wheel first, before bouncing once more. Crew statements and flight data evidence indicate that the aircraft lifted no more than 8 feet before settling on the runway and then remained on the ground. The aircraft was then seen to travel about half way along the runway before slewing to the left and running onto the grass. When the aircraft stopped the left wing tip appeared to be touching the grass. When the aircraft came to rest the tower controller asked the crew if they required assistance, this call was timed at 1921:15 hrs. The crew asked for the fire services to be placed on standby but the controller judged that the situation required an immediate and full emergency response and activated the fire and rescue services. The airfield fire services arrived at the aircraft at 1924 hrs and all the passengers had been evacuated by 1925 hrs. The South Yorkshire fire and rescue services arrived at 1933 hrs and assisted in ferrying passengers to the terminal building.
Probable cause:
Evidence from the CVR indicated that the flight was conducted in a thoroughly professional manner in accordance the operator's normal procedures until the final stages of the approach. The recorded data indicate that three seconds prior to touchdown the propeller blade angle changed from the flight range to the ground range. Coincident with this change the CVR recorded sounds consistent with the propellers 'disking' and the FDR indicated that the aircraft then decelerated longitudinally and accelerated downwards. The engineering investigation revealed that the propeller control rigging and the operation of the flight idle baulk were correct. Selection of ground fine requires the pilot to firstly release the flight idle baulk and then lift and pull the propeller levers further back, this combined action rapidly becomes a programmed motor skill in the routine of daily operations. It is therefore possible that the handling pilot unintentionally selected the propellers into the ground fine position whilst still in the air.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna 560 Citation V Ultra in Fairoaks

Date & Time: Sep 26, 1998 at 0703 LT
Registration:
VP-CKM
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sheffield - Fairoaks
MSN:
560-0413
YOM:
1997
Location:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
14500
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Circumstances:
The crew left Sheffield in VP-CKM at 0622 hrs for their flight planned destination of Fairoaks with London Heathrow Airport as an alternate. By 0650 hrs they were in contact with the Aerodrome Flight Information Service Officer (AFISO) at Fairoaks but the AFISO advised the crew not to land until the normal operating time at 0700 hrs when the airfield would have fire cover available. The current weather was reported to the crew by the AFISO as follows: Sky clear; mist with a visibility of 1,200 metres; surface wind 060° less than 5 kt; QNH 1002 mb and QFE 1005 mb. The commander, who was the handling pilot, approached the airfield on a track of 060° using the Fairoaks Non-directional Radio Beacon (NDB) and the aircraft's Flight Management System (FMS), and descended to 1,000 feet agl with the intention of landing on Runway 06. However, neither pilot saw the airfield until they were overhead and, in agreement with the AFISO, decided to make an approach to Runway 24 because of better visibility in that direction. The AFISO switched on the Abbreviated Precision Approach Path Indicators (APAPIs) for Runway 24 and the commander flew a tear drop pattern to the east of the airfield and then established the aircraft on a track of 240° towards the airfield. During the pattern, the gear had been selected down and the flaps set to an intermediate position. At 1.8 nm DME range, the co-pilot saw the APAPIs slightly left of the aircraft nose and pointed them out to the commander; at the time, the co-pilot recalled that the APAPIs were showing 'two whites', the aircraft was at 1,000 feet agl and at 124 kt IAS. By now, the crew had been advised to land at their discretion with the wind calm. Subsequently, full flap was selected and the commander noted his speed on short finals as 104 kt. As VP-CKM approached the threshold, the commander called for the deployment of speedbrakes; as the co-pilot deployed the speedbrakes, he noted the DME range as 0.5 nm and that the FMS indicated a tailwind of 5 kt. The commander considered that touchdown was positive and just beyond the threshold; the co-pilot considered that touchdown was just past the APAPIs. Immediately after touchdown, the commander selected full thrust reverse on both engines and applied moderate wheel braking. Initially, he considered that the retardation seemed adequate but then seemed to reduce. The co-pilot was not aware of retardation and remembered applying maximum brake pedal pressure while noticing that the runway was damp and seemed "shiny". When he realised that he could not stop the aircraft before the end of the runway, the commander stowed the thrust reversers and attempted to close down the engines. During the later part of the landing run, the co-pilot heard a call of "going round" and saw the commander stow the thrust reversers. After leaving the runway, the aircraft travelled for 250 metres before coming to rest. The passenger evacuated through the cabin escape hatch and the co-pilot followed him after an unsuccessful attempt to open the normal cabin door. The co-pilot was then able to open the cabin door from the outside and assist the commander to leave. The commander had sustained back injuries and the copilot had received some cuts and bruises.
Probable cause:
Investigation indicated that there was no technical reason for the aircraft to overrun the runway. One factor outside the crew's control was that the APAPIs were not set at the glideslope angle described in the Jeppesen approach charts. However, the error was one quarter of one degree and should not have affected the touchdown point of the aircraft. Additionally, the crew stated that the APAPIs showed 'two whites' when first acquired and made no mention of them during the approach; it seems likely that the commander was flying his approach to land close to the threshold. Prior to departure, the commander checked the landing distance required for the expected weight of VP-CKM at Fairoaks and calculated that he had 30 to 40 metres longer than required based on zero surface wind. This calculation was subsequently confirmed as reasonable for a landing on Runway 24. However, the initial approach into Fairoaks was for Runway 06 which has a landing distance some 53 metres less than Runway 24. Therefore, the landing distance available on Runway 06 was less than that required by the Flight Manual by at least 13 metres. The commander was unable to land on Runway 06 because of the into sun visibility and so landed on Runway 24. For the approach to Runway 06, the surface wind was reported as 060° less than 5 kt and, for the subsequent approach to Runway 24 the surface wind was reported as calm. The landing distance available on Runway 24 was more than that required by the Flight Manual on a dry runway with no wind. However, the reported surface winds indicated a possibility that the aircraft could experience some tail wind component during the landing and the co-pilot also noted that the FMS displayed a tailwind of 5 kt as he deployed the speedbrakes. The presence of mist could indicate a runway surface other than dry and the co-pilot also noted that the runway was damp and seemed "shiny". Against these factors, the commander would have considered the added advantage of using thrust reversers. Nevertheless, since the commander was not applying any recommended safety factors, it would have been prudent for him to ensure that his approach and touchdown were accurate. He considered that his speed was close to that required as he approached the threshold and that the landing was just beyond the threshold. However, the co-pilot considered that the touchdown was just past the APAPIs positioned 142 metres from the threshold. Outside observers noted the touchdown as between 1/3 and 1/2 way down the runway and this view was corroborated by calculations from the CVR and radar information. The speed on touchdown, as assessed from the recorded information, was close to that required. From touchdown to leaving the paved runway surface, took a period of 11.5 seconds. Thrust reverse was used for three seconds and deselected some 6 seconds before the aircraft left the runway. As thrust reverse was deselected, the commander called "we're going round". This would indicate that the commander became concerned during his landing roll that he would not be able to stop in the distance available and deselected thrust reverse in preparation for a Go-Around. However, the Flight Manual warns that a Go-Around should not be attempted once thrust reverse has been selected. Since there was no evidence from the CVR that power was subsequently advanced, it seems likely that the commander immediately decided against this option. However, the action of deselecting thrust reverse reduced the aircraft rate of deceleration as the runway end approached and resulted in a longer overrun. The commander subsequently stated that he cancelled reverse thrust to enable him to shut down the engines and reduce the risk of fire in what was, by then, obviously going to be an overrun.
Final Report:

Crash of a Cessna T303 Crusader near Nottingham

Date & Time: Jul 16, 1998 at 1833 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
G-BSPF
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Sheffield – Nottingham
MSN:
303-00100
YOM:
1982
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
290
Captain / Total hours on type:
68.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft was en route from Sheffield City Airport to Nottingham where it was based. The pilot joined the traffic zone at Burton Joyce, an unofficial but well used Visual Reporting Point, at a height of about 1,000 feet. The weather was fine with good visibility and the pilot took the opportunity to view the house of the aircraft's co-owner located in the vicinity of Burton Joyce. While orbiting the house, the pilot felt a moderate 'bumping' sensation which he attributed to thermal activity rather than pre-stall buffet. The left wing suddenly dropped and the aircraft rolled through the vertical. The pilot applied corrective rudder and moved the control column forward which rolled the aircraft erect but he was unable to arrest the rate of descent because the engines did not appear to be developing full power. He therefore elected to carry out a forced landing with the landing gear retracted. On approaching the field, the aircraft struck a telegraph pole, yawed to the left and landed with a very high rate of descent before coming to a halt after a short ground slide. The pilot was unable to evacuate the aircraft because of his injuries but was rescued by local people who were quickly on the scene. There was no fire. The pilot stated that at the time the aircraft departed from normal flight, he was flying at about 100 kt with 60° of bank. The basic stalling speed of the aircraft in the configuration at the time was about 70 kt. Application of the correction for load factor in the turn would have given a stalling speed of 100 kt. The majority of eye witnesses stated that the aircraft was very low at the point at which it departed from normal flight, probably in the region of 300 feet above ground level.
Final Report:

Crash of a Vickers 619 Wellington X in Sheffield

Date & Time: Oct 22, 1952
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
MF627
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crashed in unknown circumstances near Sheffield. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and all three crew members were injured.

Crash of a Vickers 619 Wellington X in Sheffield: 3 killed

Date & Time: Jun 29, 1951
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
MF633
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Sheffield - Sheffield
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Circumstances:
The crew was completing a local training sortie at Sheffield Airport, South Yorkshire. On final approach, the aircraft went of control, nosed down and crashed few miles short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.
Probable cause:
It was determined that during the final approach, the pilot-in-command was distracted by lights located in a coal mine. Investigations revealed that the pilot's attention was focused for a few seconds on these lights, a sufficient period of time to cause the loss of control of the aircraft.

Crash of a Vickers 416 Wellington IC on Rud Hill

Date & Time: Jul 17, 1942
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
Z8980
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Lichfield - Lichfield
Region:
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a night training flight. Few minutes after its departure from RAF Lichfield, the aircraft hit the slope of Rud Hill located near Sheffield. While all five occupants were injured, the aircraft was destroyed.
Crew (27th OTU):
Sgt Thomas Frank Thompson, pilot,
P/O John William Moore, navigator,
Sgt Joseph Howe Levett, navigator,
Sgt Kennington John Hythe Harris, wireless operator and air gunner,
Sgt Jacob Henry Roden, wireless operator and air gunner.

Crash of a Handley Page H.P.52 Hampden I in Sheffield: 1 killed

Date & Time: Apr 19, 1941 at 1625 LT
Operator:
Registration:
P1248
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Finningley - Finningley
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
The crew departed RAF Finningley (Doncaster) on a training exercise. While cruising over Sheffield in poor visibility, the airplane collided with a barrage balloon cable. The aircraft lost part of it's port wing and was a result entered an uncontrollable dive from which the pilot was the only one able to bale out before the aircraft crashed near Concord Park, Shiregreen, Sheffield. The instructor was killed and the survivor sustained injuries on landing.
Crew:
F/O Jeffrey Bohun Ranson, instructor, †
P/O Ralf Athelsie Pole Allsebrook, pilot.
Probable cause:
Collision with a barrage balloon cable.

Crash of a De Havilland DH.60X Moth in Sheffield

Date & Time: Mar 28, 1930
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-AAPB
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hanworth – Sheffield
MSN:
1165
YOM:
1930
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
While approaching Sheffield on a flight from Hanworth, the single engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances. The pilot, sole on board, was injured.