San Juan

During the takeoff roll at San Pedro Sula-Barandillas Airport, the airplane suffered a loss of power on one engine. It went out of control, veered off runway and eventually collided with a wooden house. Both crew members were unhurt while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

En route from San Juan to Managua on a cargo flight, the airplane disappeared from radar screens and crashed in unknown circumstances into the Caribbean Sea. No trace of the aircraft nor the crew was found.

While taxiing at Idlewild Airport, preparing for a cargo flight to San Juan, one of the main gear collapsed. The aircraft sank on its belly and came to rest in flames. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in San Juan while performing a cargo flight. Both pilots were injured and the aircraft was written off.

The crew of Flight 627 consisted of Captain C. C. Foxworth Captain E. M. Engle, (first officer), Flight Engineer L. P. Devries, Flight Attendant A. J. Folli, and Flight Attendant A. L., Krause. On departure from the ramp, the gross weight of the aircraft was 95,838 pounds; allowable gross takeoff weight was 105,530 pounds. The load was distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within the approved limits. Flight 627 initially taxied out at 2345, bar 18, for takeoff from Runway 7R. This flight and a preceding flight returned to the ramp because fog drifted in and reduced visibility below the approved minimum of one-fourth mile while they were awaiting clearance for takeoff. 2 Neither flight was issued off clearance, although according to Captain Foxworth, they held at Runway 7R about 15 minutes. The captains of flights reported that when they arrived at Runway 7R the existing visibility was well over the required one-quarter mile, as they could ace beyond the far end of the 8,200-foot runway, and so advised the control tower. About 15 minutes after returning to the ramp, Captain Foxworth was advised by Eastern Operations that visibility had improved, and the flight again taxied out, following another Eastern aircraft, Flight 623W. While they were taxing, the tower suggested that takeoff be made on Runway 22L and advised that visibility to the south-southeast, from tower location, was three miles. Since both flights had taxied beyond this runway at the time this information was conveyed to them, they turned around and Captain Foxworth, now in the lead, took position for takeoff near the end of Runway 22L. The tower advised Flight 627 that the weather was now being reported as thin obscuration, one and one-half miles visibility, fog, and smoke. 4 Captain Foxworth opened the left side "clear-view" window for maximum visibility. The runway lights were turned to full intensity, and the landing lights of the aircraft were on. Captain Foxworth observed that visibility appeared to be at least one-fourth mile, and stare could be seen. He could see the runway border lights and down the runway centerline for some distance. He said that he was unable to see past the intersection. The engines were run up, cockpit checks completed, and airways clearance via Long Beach, Sully, and Woolf intersections was received. Takeoff clearance was issued at 0055, October 19. Captain Foxworth, flying from the left, made the takeoff using the runway border lights and centerline as visual reference guides. The first officer also maintained visual reference except when he briefly directed his attention to retraction of the landing gear. In the takeoff run the captain noticed that visibility was variable due to fog and seemed to get progressively worse, but later stated that he had "expected to come out on top almost any second" after becoming airborne; he did not go on instruments. Takeoff seemed normal. Shortly after calling for retraction of the gear. Captain Foxworth observed that air speed was approaching 110 knots. He said that he lost all ground references at about the intersection of Runways 19L, 25L, and 22L, at or shortly after becoming airborne. A few seconds later he heard the first officer shout a warning and they struck the ground while at takeoff power. A second or two after the first officer moved the landing gear handle to retract position and again directed his attention outside, he saw they were quite low, grabbed for the control wheel to pull the nose up, and simultaneously shouted a warning. He did not recall whether he got his hands on the wheel before impact. The aircraft struck the ground to the left of Runway 22L at Taxiway F. It bounced, and following the second impact skidded to a stop in an undeveloped part of the airport south of Taxiway G. An intense fire immediately developed in the left wing at No. 2 engine position. The pilots, flight engineer, and one passenger left through the crew door, located just to the rear of the cockpit on the right side; all other occupants exited in orderly fashion through the main cabin door at the left rear side of the aircraft.

Crashed in unknown circumstances into the Atlantic Ocean about 200 km northeast of Turks & Caicos Islands while on a flight from San Juan to Plymouth, Massachusetts. All 11 occupants were killed.

Pan American World Airways’ Flight 526A originated at San Juan and departed there at 1211, April 11, 1952, for New York, New York. The crew consisted of Captain J. C. Burn, First Officer W. T. Hutchins, Second Officer J. R. Laubach, Purser A. Perez, and Steward R. Torres. According to company records, the air-craft at the time of takeoff weighed 31,868 kilograms (70,256 pounds), which was within the allowable gross takeoff weight of 33,113 kilograms (73,000 pounds). The load was properly distributed with respect to the approved center of gravity limits of the aircraft. Prior to departure, the captain filed with Air Route Traffic Control an IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) flight plan to New York International Airport, New York, to cruise at an altitude of 8,000 feet, estimating the flight time as eight hours and three minutes. This flight plan was approved. The crew testified that the aircraft was taxied to the end of Runway No. 9, the pre-takeoff check made, and the takeoff run started. During the takeoff and the initial climb, the aircraft appeared to be sluggish but not to an extent to cause concern. At an altitude of approximately 250 feet with the gear up, the flaps were raised and power was reduced to climb power. Climbing at an indicated air speed of 155 miles per hour, the first officer noticed that the oil pressure of No. 3 engine was falling and the oil temperature increasing. This condition was immediately pointed out to the captain, who requested that the San Juan tower be advised that they were returning to the airport. Accordingly, at 1213 the flight advised the tower of its intentions, and the tower replied, “Roger 526A, cleared to land, Runway 9, wind east one eight, altimeter two nine nine five. I’ll notify your company.” The company was notified and upon request, emergency field equipment was alerted. Because the oil pressure of No. 3 engine continued to drop rapidly and the oil temperature correspondingly increased, the propeller of this engine was feathered and power was increased to rated power on the remaining three engines. By this time the aircraft’s altitude was approximately 350 feet. When power was increased, the No. 4 engine backfired several times; however, immediately following these backfires, the engine continued to run in a normal manner. A climbing turn was initiated to a westerly heading, and the captain said that for best climbing conditions he reduced the aircraft’s air speed during the turn to 145 miles per hour. This reduction in air speed was accomplished by using up elevator. Upon reaching an altitude of about 550 feet, No. 4 engine again backfired and ran rough. Manifold pressure was reduced on this engine to approximately 32-35 inches, and again the engine ran smoothly. Subsequent attempts to operate No. 4 engine at increased power were unsuccessful due to recurrent roughness. At 1217 the tower asked the flight to report its position and received this reply: “We are still quite a way out.” And at 1218, the tower advised the U. S. Coast Guard Rescue Coordination Center at San Juan that the flight was in trouble and gave its position as seven miles, 300 degrees from the tower. The captain gradually reduced the air speed to 135 miles per hour, and at this time the heading of the aircraft was changed slightly to the right to maintain a course approximately parallel to the coast line. Because the aircraft was losing altitude, engines No. 1 and No. 2 were increased to takeoff power. The second officer was sent to the passenger compartment to advise the purser and steward that fuel was to be dumped, and all fuel dump valves were then opened. After the second officer returned to the cockpit, the flight advised the tower, at 1219, that it might have to ditch, and the captain instructed the second officer to alert the passengers. The second officer re-turned to the cabin, indicated that a ditching was imminent, took a forward seat in the cabin and fastened his safety belt. At 1220, an Air Force C-47 flying in the vicinity notified the San Juan tower that a DC-4 seemed to be ditching and accordingly was advised to circle the area. Flight 526A continued to settle, and the throttles of engines Nos. 1 and 2 were advanced to their stops. With the air speed near 120 miles per hour, the flaps were lowered to five degrees. Shortly after this, a landing on the water was made. The landing gear and flaps were lowered, and the fuel dump valves closed. The second officer obtained a life raft, which he carried to the main cabin and launched through a forward emergency exit on the right side. The first officer, after an unsuccessful attempt to loosen another life raft, abandoned the aircraft through a cockpit window. The captain entered the cabin and assisted passengers in evacuating the aircraft through the main cabin door until he was swept overboard by the action of the sea against the door. The aircraft sank approximately three minutes after landing on the water. At the time of the accident the weather was: high broken clouds at 35,000 feet with lower scattered clouds at 3,000 feet, visibility 20 miles and wind from east-southeast, 16 miles per hour.

The flight departed from Isle Grande Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico, at 1724, June 5, 1950, for Wilmington, North Carolina Joe M Halsey was the captain in command, William Holleran, copilot, and Hector Medina, steward In addition to the 62 passengers and three crew members, the aircraft carried 8,436 pounds of fuel and 1,363 pounds of baggage, which resulted in a total aircraft weight at the time of takeoff of 48,258 pounds This was 258 pounds in excess of the certificated limit. Prior to their departure from San Juan, the crew filed with the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration) air route traffic control (ARIC) at San Juan an instrument flight plan which described the intended route to he from San Juan to the Caribbean island of South Caicos, then to the Carp Intersection, which is a point located approximately 144 miles southeast of Wilmington, and from there to Wilmington 3 This over-water route carried the flight more than 400 miles east of the mainland of the United States and north of the Bahama Island chain Cruising altitude was to be 6,500 feet, and the estimated time to destination six hours and 50 minutes. No difficulty was experienced by the crew during the first four hours of flight, and in a report transmitted to the San Juan Communications Station at 2117 the crew estimated that its position at 2148 would be 28 degrees 33' north latitude and 74 degrees 58' west longitude This point is 390 miles east of Melbourne, Florida, and 300 miles northeast of Nassau in the Bahamas A few minutes before the flight arrived over this estimated position the crew noticed that the indicated right engine oil quantity had fallen from 32 gallons to 20 Immediately after this was observed, the left engine backfired and lost power. Application of carburetor heat and adjustment of fuel mixture and other engine controls were ineffectual, so the left propeller was feathered Captair Halsey then took over the flight controls from Copilot Holleran who had been piloting, and the aircraft was headed toward Nassau, the closest island with an adequate landing field He then sent a message at 2146 to the Overseas Foreign Aeronautics Communications Station (OFACS) at Miami, which was intercepted by the CAA Communications Station at San Juan, that the left propeller was feathered and the flight was proceeding toward Nassau Power settings for the right engine were increased to 2400 rpm and 30 in manifold pressure The cruising altitude of .6,500 feet was maintained for about five minutes During the transition to single-engine flight the air speed decreased from 178 to 140 miles per hour. Shortly before the left engine was feathered, a second C-46, N-1246N, operated by the same corporation, passed this flight flying in the opposite direction toward San Juan The crew in the second aircraft was contacted and requested to stand by This was done, and they were able to give assistance by maintaining communications with shore stations in the rescue operations which were to follow. Shortly after the 214,6 message that the left propeller was feathered, the crew in N-1248N observed that the indicated oil quantity for the right engine had fallen from 20 to 15 gallons At about the same time the crew also observed that the right engine was overheating with an indicated cylinder head temperature of nearly 300 degrees centigrade Because of this condition, Captain Halsey said that he began a voluntary descent to ditch before complete right engine failure occurred A message was sent at 2154, "Been losing altitude, at 1500" Six minutes later, at 2200, a second message was sent, "200 feet, losing altitude" And then a third, at 2203, "Just about in the drink". An attempt was made to hold altitude at 200 feet above the water until shore stations could obtain radio bearings According to the captain, the right engine speed decreased from 2400 to 2250 rpm and could not he increased Air speed was then reduced to between 100 and 110 miles per hour by retarding the right throttle, and the aircraft was ditched about 20 minutes after the malfunctioning of the left engine began The wing flaps and landing lights were not used. At the time, the weather was clear and the wind was from the southwest at approximately 10 miles per hour The moon had not risen, but the visibility was such that whitecaps could he seen. As soon as the aircraft came to rest in the water, the crew entered the cabin where they opened the main cabin door and the emergency exits The emergency exits were not opened prior to the ditching as prescribed in the company's Operation Manual Some of the passengers then climbed out onto the wings, and others jumped into the sea All seven of the 10-man life rafts were thrown overboard, five floated away in the darkness because their retaining ropes were not held, two were inflated The three crew members and 34 of the 62 passengers were able to swim to and board the two life rafts. The captain stated that he was the last person to leave the aircraft The crew did not take with them the emergency transmitter known as the "Gibson Girl" (which broadcasts on frequencies of 500 and 8280 kilocycles), and it went down with the aircraft The captain, however, saved a flashlight Much of the other emergency equipment on the two crowded life rafts was thrown overboard by the passengers. During the night five flares were fired at intervals but were not observed The second C-46, which had remained in the search area, reported at 2321, one hour and eighteen minutes after N-1248N had ditched, that they saw a blinking light on the water They requested Miami Communications to obtain a fix At 0018, about one hour after this fix was requested, the Federal Communications Commission reported a "fair" fix had been established on the second aircraft, the position being 28 degrees 10' north latitude and 75 degrees 12' west longitude The following morning a Coast Guard aircraft located the survivors, and shortly afterwards the USS Saufley, a U S Navy destroyer, drew alongside and rescued those in the two life rafts One survivor, who had clung to an uninflated raft during the night, was located, but was killed by sharks before he could be taken from the water The position of the rescue was 27 degrees 51' north latitude and 75 degrees 22' west longitude.

Shortly before midnight, June 6, seventy-five passengers, including five Infants in arms and 14 children between the ages of two and 12, boarded the air craft. There was also placed on board 1,116 pounds of baggage, and according to the Weight and Balance Manifest there was 7,125 pounds of fuel and oil on board. With the addition of a third pilot, Alfred Cockrill, and a Steward, Ismael Gonzalez, the crew for the northbound flight was the same as that of the flight of June 4 and 5 to San Juan. According to the crew, all occupants in the cabin were seated at the time of takeoff and had available safety belts. However, there were only 65 seats In the cabin which necessitated seating some of the passengers double in one seat. Although the Weight and Balance Manifest for the flight indicated a total weight of 44,500 pounds, the aircraft actually weighed 48.709 pounds, which was 3,709 pounds in excess of the 45,000 pounds certificated aircraft weight. At approximately 0010 with Alfred Cockrill acting as pilot, and John Connell as copilot, the aircraft taxied to Runway 27 where the "pre-takeoff cheek" was accomplished at which time engines and flight controls operated normally. Takeoff was accomplished at 0021 after the San Juan Tower had transmitted an instrument clearance to the flight authorizing it to cruise at 8,500 feet to Miami. The ceiling at San Juan was reported to be 12,500 feet, visibility, 12 miles, and the wind, calm. One minute after the aircraft left the ground and at an indicated air speed of approximately 115 miles per hour and at an indicated altitude of 250 feet, the right engine began to backfire severely and lose power. No attempt was made to feather the propeller of the right engine. An emergency was declared, and the tower cleared the flight to land on Runway 9. But, since air speed was low and altitude could not be maintained, the aircraft was flown straight ahead for a crash landing 200 yards off the shore at Punta Salinas. Immediately before impact with the water the landing lights were extended. During a six minute period that the aircraft remained afloat the crew pushed two uninflated life rafts into the water and furnished several passengers with life preservers. Considerable confusion existed during the ditching operation since none of the passengers had received any instruction in the location or use of emergency equipment. Of the 81 occupants, only 23 passengers and five crew members survived.

At 2203, 1 December 27, 1948, NC16002 departed from Isla Grande Airport, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for Miami, Florida. According to the company passenger manifest filed with the Customs Department al San Juan, there were 29 passengers aboard. The crew consisted of Captain Robert E. Linquist, Copilot E. E. Hill, and Stewardess Mary Burke. Captain Linquist had filed an instrument flight plan with the CAA Air Route Traffic Control Center and the Puerto Rican Transportation Authority; however, this flight plan was cancelled after a delay due t0 battery difficulties on the airplane. Subsequently the pilot was authorized a VFR takeoff with the understanding that the flight was to remain in the vicinity of San Juan, and attempt to establish radio contact with the tower. Once contact was established, an IFR flight plan would be filed enabling the aircraft to proceed to Miami. If this was impossible, the aircraft was to return to San Juan. Eleven minutes after takeoff the flight called the airport control tower. The control tower did not receive the call but it was intercepted by CM Communications at San Juan, to which the flight reported that it was proceeding to Miami, Florida, according to an IFR plan. CAA Communications at San Juan was unable to contact the flight again, although numerous attempts were made. At 2323, the Overseas Foreign Air Route Traffic Control Center at Miami, Florida, received a radio communication from NC16002 stating it was flying at 8.500 feet in accordance with instrument flight rules and that it estimated its time of arrival over South Caicos at 0033, and Miami at 0405, December 28, 1948. The New Orleans Overseas Foreign Air Route Traffic Control Center intercepted a position report from NC16002 at 0413, which stated it was 50 miles south of Miami. This was the last known contact with the aircraft. Unsuccessful attempts were made to contact the flight by CAA Communications from San Juan, Miami, and New Orleans. The Civil Aeronautics Board at Miami, Florida, was notified by CAA Communications on December 28, 1948, at 0830, that NC16002 was considerably overdue on a flight from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Miami. Florida. When it was definitely determined that the aircraft was missing, the United States Coast Guard was alerted and an extensive search was immediately started. Among those participating in the search were the U. S. Coast Guard, the U. S. Navy, the Fifth Rescue Squadron of the U. S. Air Forces and numerous civil aircraft. Also actively engaged in the search were agencies of the Government of Nassau, the Dominican Republic and the Cuban Government. The search covered an area from San Juan, Puerto Rico, to Cape San Blas in Florida, the peninsula of Florida and the southern coastal area of the United States to Cape Romain, which is located approximately 45 miles north of Charleston, South Carolina. The Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the coast of Florida, the island of Cuba, the north coast of Hispaniola and the Bahama Islands were also searched. 2 Over 1,300 plane hours were flown during the six days of search, from December 28, 1948, to January 3, 1940 in conjunction with the air search, a detachment from the Fifth Rescue Squadron, U. S. Air Forces, conducted a through investigation and ground search of portions of the north coast of Cuba. The terrain was both mountainous and jungle, making the search difficult.