San Diego-Montgomery-Gibbs

The pilot was on a cross-country flight, receiving vectors for an instrument approach while in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The approach controller instructed the pilot to descend to 2,800 ft mean sea level (msl) until established on the localizer, and subsequently cleared the flight for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 28R, then circle to land on runway 23. About 1 minute later, the controller told the pilot that it looked like the airplane was drifting right of course and asked him if he was correcting back on course. The pilot responded “correcting, 22G.” About 9 seconds later, the pilot transmitted “SoCal, is 22G, VFR runway 23” to which the controller told the pilot that the airplane was not tracking on the localizer and subsequently canceled the approach clearance and instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 3,000 ft. As the pilot acknowledged the altitude assignment, the controller issued a low altitude alert, and provided the minimum vectoring altitude in the area. The pilot acknowledged the controller’s instructions shortly after. At this time, recorded advanced dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the airplane on a northwesterly heading at an altitude of 2,400 ft msl. Over the course of the following 2 minutes, the controller issued multiple instructions for the pilot to climb to 4,000 ft, which the pilot acknowledged; however, ADS-B data showed that the airplane remained between 2,500 ft and 3,500 ft. The controller queried the pilot about his altitude and the pilot responded, “2,500 ft, 22G.” The controller subsequently issued a low altitude alert and advised the pilot to expedite the climb to 5,000 ft. No further communication was received from the pilot despite multiple queries from the controller. ADS-B data showed that the airplane had begun to climb and reached a maximum altitude of 3,500 ft before it began a descending right turn. The airplane remained in the right descending turn at a descent rate of about 5,000 ft per minute until the last recorded target at 900 ft msl, located about 1,333 ft northwest of the accident site. The airplane and two houses were destroyed. The pilot and the driver of a UPS truck were killed. Two other people on the ground were injured.

The flight crew was conducting a flight with two passengers and one flight attendant onboard the multiengine jet airplane. The flight crew later stated that at rotation speed, the captain applied back pressure to the control yoke; however, the nose did not rotate to a takeoff attitude. The captain attempted to rotate the airplane once more by relaxing the yoke then pulling it back again, and, with no change in the airplane’s attitude, he made the decision to reject the takeoff by retarding the thrust levers and applying maximum braking. The airplane overran the end of the runway onto a gravel pad where the landing gear collapsed. Continuity was confirmed from the flight controls to the control surfaces. No mechanical anomalies with the engines or airplane systems were noted during the investigation that would have precluded normal operation. A review of performance data indicated that the flight crew attempted to takeoff with the airplane 2,975 lbs over the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW), a center of gravity (CG) close to the most forward limit, and an incorrect stabilizer trim setting. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) data indicated that the captain attempted takeoff at a rotation speed 23 knots (kts) slower than the calculated rotation speed for the airplane at maximum weight. Takeoff performance showed the departure runway was 575 ft shorter than the distance required for takeoff at the airplane’s weight. The captain, who was the pilot flying, did not hold any valid pilot certificates at the time of the accident because they had been revoked 2 years prior due to his falsification of logbook entries and records. Additionally, he had never held a type rating for the accident airplane and had started, but not completed, training in the accident airplane model before the accident. The first officer had accumulated about 16 hours of flight experience in the make and model of the airplane and was not authorized to operate as pilot-in-command. The airplane’s flight management system (FMS) data were not recovered; therefore, it could not be determined what data the flight crew entered into the FMS that allowed the airspeed numbers to be generated. The investigation revealed that had the actual performance numbers been entered, a “FIELD LIMITED” amber message would have illuminated warning the crew that the MTOW was exceeded, and airspeed numbers would not have been generated. Therefore, it is likely that the crew entered incorrect data into the FMS either by manually entering a longer runway length and/or decreased the weight of the fuel, passengers, and/or cargo.

The pilot reported that, while conducting a night landing on a runway contaminated with ice and patchy packed snow, the airplane overshot the touchdown zone. The pilot tried to fly the airplane onto the runway to avoid floating. The airplane touched down firm and the pilot applied moderate braking, but the airplane did not decelerate normally. The airplane went off the end of the runway and collided with several Runway End Identifier Lights (REILs) and a tree. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left and right wings. The pilot reported that he did not feel modulation in the anti-lock braking system (ABS) and felt that might have contributed to the accident. An examination of fault codes from the airplane’s diagnostic storage unit indicated no ABS malfunctions or failures. An airport employee reported that he saw the airplane unusually high on the final approach and during the landing the airplane floated or stayed in ground effect before it touched down beyond the midpoint of the runway. The airplane’s long touchdown was captured by an airport surveillance video, which is included in the report docket.

The airplane touched down at night about 1,400 feet down the 3,864-foot runway and overran the runway surface, coming to rest about 851 feet beyond the departure end. The pilot was operating the airplane using a single-pilot waiver that he obtained two months prior to the accident. The airplane was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration with a flight crew of two. The pilot was returning from a personal event with his family, and landing at his home airport when the accident occurred. Witnesses stated that the pilot’s approach into the airport was not consistent with previous approaches in which the airplane would touch down directly on the runway numbers. They also stated that they heard the thrust reversers deploy, and then return to the stowed position. The airplane flight manual states that once the thrust reversers have been deployed, a pilot should not attempt to restow the thrust reversers and take off. Two sink rate warnings were issued during the approach to landing which should have alerted the pilot of the unstabilized approach. Performance calculations showed that the airplane would have required an additional 765 to 2,217 feet of runway for a full stop landing.

The aircraft concluded an aerial survey and landed at Brown Field to clear U.S. Customs. On restart, as the left engine began running, a witness noticed two short, yellow flame bursts exit the exhaust. During taxi, the witness heard a popping sound coming from the aircraft. As power was applied to cross runway 26L, the sound went away. The aircraft stopped for a few seconds prior to pulling onto the runway; the witness did not observe or hear a run-up. Witnesses reported hearing a series of popping sounds similar to automatic gunfire and observed the aircraft between 600 and 1,000 feet above the ground with wings level and the landing gear up. The aircraft was observed to make an abrupt, 45-degree banked, left turn as the nose dipped down. Witnesses reported the nose of the aircraft then raised up toward the horizon. This was followed by the aircraft turning to the left and becoming inverted in an estimated 30-degree nose low attitude. With the nose still low, the aircraft continued around to an upright position and appeared to be in a shallow right bank. Witnesses then lost sight of the aircraft due to buildings and terrain. A May 20, 1997, work order indicated the left manifold pressure fluctuated in flight. Both wastegates were lubricated and a test flight revealed the left engine manifold pressure lagged behind the right engine manifold pressure. On June 18, 1997, the left engine differential pressure controller was noted to have been removed and replaced. This was the corrective action for a discrepancy write up that the left engine manifold pressure fluctuated up and down 2 inHg and the rpm varied by 100 in cruise. A test flight that afternoon by the accident pilot indicated the discrepancy still occurred at cruise power settings, but the engine operated normally at high and low power settings. Post accident functional checks were performed on various components. No discrepancies were noted for the left governor. The left engine differential pressure controller was damaged and results varied on each test. The left density controller was too damaged to test. The right engine density and differential pressure controllers tested satisfactory. The left and right fuel pumps operated within specifications. Both fuel servos were damaged. One injection nozzle on the left engine was partially plugged; all others flow tested within specifications.

The twin engine airplane had been cleared for a night instrument approach to Galveston, Texas, after flying non-stop from San Diego, California, when the pilot reported that he had lost the right engine and did not have much fuel left. The controller vectored the airplane toward the closest airport, and the airplane was approximately 1 mile northeast of that airport when radar contact was lost. A witness observed the airplane enter a spin, descend in a nose down attitude, and impact near the center of a lake. When the pilot filed his flight plan for the cross country flight, he indicated the airplane carried enough fuel to fly for 7 hours and 30 minutes. At the time radar contact was lost, 7 hours and 32 minutes had elapsed since the airplane departed San Diego. Examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical discrepancies. The landing gear was down, the flaps were extended to about 15 degrees, and neither propeller was feathered. The single engine approach procedure in the airplane owner's manual indicated that the landing gear should be extended when within gliding distance of the field and the flaps placed down only after landing is assured.

The aircraft was destroyed after an uncontrolled descent into the Pacific ocean about 14 miles west-southwest of El Segundo, California. The pilot was presumed to have been fatally injured. According to a company search pilot, visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the accident area about 1.5 hours after the time of the accident. No flight plan was filed for the positioning flight which originated at Oxnard, California, on the morning of the accident for a flight to San Diego, California. The aircraft departed Oxnard on a special VFR clearance. The tops of the clouds were reported to be about 1,200 feet msl. The aircraft transitioned southbound through the NAWS Point Mugu airspace. The Point Mugu radar approach control monitored the aircraft on radar for about 25 miles. The pilot was subsequently given a frequency change to SOCAL Tracon. There was no contact made with that facility. A search was initiated when the aircraft failed to arrive at the intended destination. A review of the recorded radar data revealed the aircraft was level at 1,800 feet msl and then climbed to about 2,000 feet msl, at which time it disappeared from radar.

The local controller instructed the pilot to go-around because of inadequate spacing in the traffic pattern. While executing the go-around, the engine lost power and the airplane crashed on a bridge after colliding with the guard railing about 1 mile from the airport. The wreckage examination showed that the fuel line between the engine driven pump and the fuel control servo was empty. The left main tank leaked for about 5 minutes; the right main fuel tank was not compromised and contained between 5 and 10 gallons of fuel. Both auxiliary fuel tanks were empty. The fuel selector valve was found selected between the right main fuel tank and the off position. There were no other engine or airframe anomalies found.

Returning to the pilot's home base airport, the pilot indicated that he overflew the uncontrolled field and then entered the traffic pattern for runway 26 which was over 4,400 feet long. The pilot reported that he observed the wind sock was parallel to the runway but failed to initially observe that he was landing with a nearly direct 20 to 25 knot tailwind. The airplane touched down long, overran the runway's departure end, collided with a pole and caught on fire. All three occupants escaped with minor injuries.

While taking off, the aircraft climbed approximately 100 to 200 feet, then began loosing altitude. During a forced landing on a street, it hit a parked car and a light pole and burst in flames. The pilot, who later expired, said that neither engine developed full power (2575 rpm). He said this was not unusual when power was 1st applied, but said full rpm was generally obtained shortly after the roll was begun. After being committed for takeoff, both rpm's were reportedly between 2,300 and 2,400 rpm. Several witnesses stated the engines sounded like they were running rough. A witness reported the aircraft swerved 'as tho the pilot had difficulty with the left engine.' Reportedly, the pilot 'dropped some more flaps' below the 20° takeoff setting 'in order to pull it off' and raised the gear immediately after liftoff. Engine teardowns revealed excessive spark plug gaps, 1 magneto on the right engine had a .008 point gap (.016 required), its #1 and #4 distributor blocks were cracked and the #1 and #6 leads would not fire properly. Hartzell f-6-5a prop governors installed in place of f-6-35a. Aircraft was approximately 348 lbs over max weight limit. All five occupants were killed.