New York-JFK

The four engine airplane was completing flight LO007 from Montreal to Warsaw via New York-JFK. On final approach to Warsaw-Okecie Airport runway 15, the crew reported problems with the landing gears that seemed to be down but not locked. At a height of about 250 meters, the captain was cleared to initiate a go-around and increased engine power when the engine n°2 exploded, damaging the engine n°1. Debris damaged the rudder and elevator control cables, causing the aircraft to enter an uncontrolled descent. In a 20° nose-down attitude, the aircraft speed increased to 380 km/h when it crashed in an embankment located by the Okecie Fort, about 900 meters short of runway 15 threshold. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 87 occupants were killed. On board were 14 members of the US boxing team and 10 coaches as well as Anna Jantar, a Polish singer.

American Airlines Flight 625 was a scheduled flight from Providence Airport (PVD) to St.Thomas (STT) on the U.S Virgin Islands with an intermediate stop in New York (JFK). The Boeing 727 departed New York at 12:00 AST. On approach to St. Thomas, at 15:04, the flight crew cancelled their IFR flight plan and proceeded VFR. The captain elected to use the runway 09 ILS for vertical guidance. The glide slope was intercepted at 1500 feet msl (flaps 15° and at a 160 KIAS airspeed). The flaps were lowered to 25 and later to 30 degrees. The company prescribed 40 degrees was never selected. The speed was still 10 KIAS above Vref when the aircraft passed the threshold at an estimated altitude of 30-40 feet. At 1000 feet down the runway, while initiating the flare, turbulence caused the right wing to drop. The wings were leveled and the aircraft floated a while until touchdown 2200-2300 feet down the runway. The captain decided that the aircraft couldn't be stopped on the remaining runway. He immediately initiated a go-around. Because of the absence of any sensation either of power being applied or of aircraft acceleration, the throttles were closed again. The aircraft, in a 11 degree nose up attitude, ran off the runway and struck a localizer antenna. The right wingtip clipped a hillside just south of the antenna and the aircraft continued, hit an embankment, became airborne and contacted the ground on the opposite side of the perimeter road. The aircraft continued and came to rest 83 feet past the perimeter road, bursting into flames.

Just after liftoff from an ice/slush covered runway, the airplane shuddered then rolled left and right, causing the wings to drop. The airplane leveled, crash landed and came to rest in flames. All seven passengers and a pilot were evacuated to safety while a pilot was seriously injured.

The approach to Milan-Malpensa Airport was completed in limited visibility due to foggy conditions. During the last segment, the airplane struck the ground to the left of the main runway. On impact, all landing gears and all four engines were torn off. The aircraft slid for few hundred meters then came to rest in a grassy area with the fuselage bent and the cockpit that separated from the rest of the aircraft. All 122 occupants were evacuated, 26 of them were injured, among them the Italian tenor Luciano Pavarotti.

The airplane was engaged in a positioning flight from New York to Jeddah via Frankfurt, carrying ONA employees only. The aircraft taxied to runway 13R and commenced takeoff at 13:10. Shortly after accelerating through 100 knots, but before reaching the V1 speed, a flock of birds were seen to rise from the runway. The aircraft struck many birds and the takeoff was rejected. Bird strikes had damaged the no. 3 engine's fan blades, causing rotor imbalance. Fan-booster stage blades began rubbing on the epoxy micro balloon shroud material; pulverized material then entered into the engine's HPC area, ignited and caused the compressor case to separate. A fire erupted in the right wing and no. 3 engine pylon. The aircraft couldn't be stopped on the runway. The pilot-in-command steered the aircraft off the runway onto taxiway Z at a 40 knots speed. The main undercarriage collapsed and the aircraft came to rest against the shoulder of the taxiway. The successful evacuation may be partially attributed to the fact that nearly all passengers were trained crew members.

Eastern Air Lines Flight 66, a Boeing 727-225 operated as a scheduled passenger flight from New Orleans to New York-JFK. The flight departed New Orleans about 13:19. It proceeded on an IFR flight plan. Eastern 66 arrived in the New York City terminal area without reported difficulty, and, beginning at 15:35:11, Kennedy approach control provided radar vectors to sequence the flight with other traffic and to position it for an ILS approach to runway 22L at the Kennedy airport. The automatic terminal information service (ATIS) reported: "Kennedy weather, VFR, sky partially obscured, estimated ceiling 4,000 broken, 5 miles with haze... wind 210° at 10, altimeter 30.15, Expect vectors to an ILS runway 22L, landing runway 22L, departures are off 22R... " At 15:52:43, the controller transmitted, "All aircraft this frequency, we just went IFR with 2 miles very light rain showers and haze. The runway visual range is---not available, and Eastern 66 descend and maintain four thousand, Kennedy radar one three two four." Eastern 66 acknowledged the transmission. At 15:53:22, the flight contacted the Kennedy final vector controller, who continued to provide radar vectors around thunderstorms in the area, to sequence the flight with other traffic, and to position the flight on the localizer course. The flight crew then discussed the problems associated with carrying minimum fuel loads when confronted with delays in terminal areas. One of the crewmembers stated that he was going to check the weather at the alternate airport, which was LaGuardia Airport (LGA). Less than a minute later, one of the crewmembers remarked, "... one more hour and we'd come down whether we wanted to or not." At 15:59:19, the final vector controller transmitted a message to all aircraft on his frequency that "a severe wind shift" had been reported on the final approach and that he would report more information shortly. Eastern Air Lines Flight 902, a Lockheed L-1011 TriStar, had abandoned its approach to runway 22L earlier. At 15:59:40, Eastern 902 re-established radio communications with the Kennedy final vector controller, and the flight crew reported, "... we had... a pretty good shear pulling us to the right and... down and visibility was nil, nil out over the marker... correction... at 200 feet it was... nothing." The final vector controller responded, "Okay, the shear you say pulled you right and down?" Eastern 902 replied, "Yeah, we were on course and down to about 250 feet. The airspeed dropped to about 10 knots below the bug and our rate of descent was up to 1,500 feet a minute, so we put takeoff power on and we went around at a hundred feet." While Eastern 902 was making this report, the captain of Eastern 66, said, "You know this is asinine." An unidentified crewmember responded, "I wonder if they're covering for themselves." The final vector controller asked Eastern 66 if they had heard Eastern 902's report. Eastern 66 replied, "...affirmative." The controller then established the flight's position as being 5 miles from the outer marker (OM) and cleared the flight for an ILS approach to runway 22L. Eastern 66 acknowledged the clearance at 16:00:54, "Okay, we'll let you know about the conditions." One minute later, the first officer, who was flying the aircraft, called for completion of the final checklist. While the final checklist items were being completed, the captain stated that the radar was, "Up and off... standby." At 16:02:20, the captain said, "...I have the radar on standby in case I need it, I can get it off later." At 16:02:42, the final vector controller asked Eastern 902, "..would you classify that as severe wind shift, correction, shear?" The flight responded, "Affirmative." The first officer of Eastern 66 then said, "Gonna keep a pretty healthy margin on this one. An unidentified crewmember said, "I...would suggest that you do" the first officer responded, "In case he's right." At 16:02:58, Eastern 66 reported over the OM, and the final vector controller cleared the flight to contact the Kennedy tower. The first officer requested 30° of flaps and the aircraft continued to bracket the glideslope with the airspeed oscillating between 140 and 145 knots. At 1603:12, the flight established communications with Kennedy tower local controller and reported that they were, "outer marker, inbound." The Kennedy tower local controller cleared Eastern 66 to land. The captain acknowledged the clearance and asked, "Got any reports on braking action...?" The local controller did not respond until the query was repeated. The local controller replied, "No,none, approach end of runway is wet... but I'd say about the first half is wet--we've had no adverse reports." At 1603:57.7, the flight engineer called, "1000 feet" and at 1604:25, the sound of rain was recorded. The flight was nearly centered on the glideslope when the flight engineer called, "500 feet." The airspeed was oscillating between 140 and 148 knots and the sound of heavy rain could be heard as the aircraft descended below 500 feet. The windshield wipers were switched to high speed. At 16:04:40, the captain said, "Stay on the gauges." The first officer responded, "Oh, yes. I'm right with it." The flight engineer reported, "Three greens, 30 degrees, final checklist," and the captain responded, "Right." At 16:04:52, the captain said, "I have approach lights," and the first officer said, "Okay." The captain then again said, "Stay on the gauges," and the first officer replied, "I'm with it." N8845E then was passing through 400 feet, and its rate of descent increased from an average of about 675 fpm to 1,500 fpm. The aircraft rapidly began to deviate below the glideslope, and 4 seconds later, the airspeed decreased from 138 kts to 123 kts in 2.5 seconds. The Boeing 727 continued to deviate further below the glideslope, and at 16:05:06.2, when the aircraft was at 150 feet, the captain said, "runway in sight." Less than a second later, the first officer said, "I got it." The captain replied, "got it?" and a second later, at 16:05:10, an unintelligible exclamation was recorded, and the first officer commanded, "Takeoff thrust." The airplane contacted the top of the No. 7 approach light tower at an elevation of 27 feet above the mean low-water level and 2,400 feet from the threshold of runway 22L. The aircraft continued and struck towers 8 and 9. The aircraft’s left wing was damaged severely by impact with these towers--the outboard section was severed. The aircraft then rolled into a steep left bank, well in excess of 90°. It contacted the ground and the fuselage struck five other towers. The aircraft then continued to Rockaway Boulevard, where it came to rest. The approach light towers and large boulders along the latter portion of the path caused the fuselage to collapse and disintegrate. A fire had erupted after the left wing failed.

Flight NW6231 departed New York-JFK at 19:14 for a ferry flight to Buffalo and was cleared by departure control to climb to FL140. At 19:21 the flight was cleared to climb to FL310. The aircraft began to climb 2,500 fpm at an airspeed of 305 knots. As the aircraft climbed through FL160, both the airspeed and the rate of climb began to increase. Reaching FL230, the airspeed had reached 405 knots and the rate of climb had exceeded 6,500 fpm. The overspeed warning horn sounded a little later, followed 10 seconds later by a stick shaker stall warning. The aircraft then leveled at 24800 feet with a speed of 420 knots until it turned rapidly to the right, 13 seconds later. The airplane started to descend out of control, reaching a vertical acceleration of +5g until it struck the ground in a slightly nose down and right wing-down attitude. The aircraft had descended from 24000 feet to 1090 feet in 83 seconds.

Following an uneventful flight from New York-JFK, the crew started the descent to Los Angeles Airport runway 06R over the sea. Weather was clear but on short final, the crew encountered local patches of fog and visual control with the ground was lost. The airplane continued the approach and landed nose wheel first with a vertical g load of 4.6. This caused the nose wheel to collapse rearward and a fire started in the nose wheel well area. The fire in the nose wheel well was initiated by the burning nose gear tires. The fire was fed by hydraulic fluid that escaped from broken nose wheel steering hydraulic lines. Evacuation of the aircraft resulted in minor or serious injuries to eight passengers. Firefighting personnel were unable to extinguish the fire in the nose wheel well before it spread to the fuselage and destroyed the cockpit and the passenger cabin.

Pan American World Airways Clipper Flight 160 was a scheduled cargo flight from New York-JFK to Frankfurt (FRA), Germany, with a scheduled stop at Prestwick (PIK), Scotland. At 08:25 the flight departed JFK. The aircraft was carrying 52912 lb (24000 kg) of cargo, 15,360 lb (6967 kg) of which were chemicals. After departure, Clipper 160 was vectored on course while climbing to FL330. At 08:44, Clipper 160's clearance was amended, and it was instructed to maintain FL310 as a final cruising altitude. Clipper 160 reported level at FL310 at 08:50. As the flight approached Sherbrooke VORTAC 100 miles east of Montreal, Canada, at about 09:04, it advised Pan American Operations (PANOP) in New York that smoke had accumulated in the "lower 41" electrical compartment, and that the flight was diverting to Boston. At 09:08, Clipper 160 advised Montreal Center that they were level at FL310 and wanted to return to JFK. Montreal Center cleared Clipper 160 for a right turn to a heading of 180 degrees. At 09:10, Clipper 160 advised PANOP that it was returning to New York and that the smoke seemed to be "getting a little thicker in here." At 09:11, the crew advised PANOP that they were now going to Boston and that "this smoke is getting too thick." They also requested that emergency equipment be available when they arrived at Boston. During this conversation, the comment was made that the "cockpit's full back there." During its return to Boston, the flight was given preferential air traffic control treatment, although it had not declared an emergency. After issuing appropriate descent clearances en route so that fuel could be burned off more rapidly at lower altitudes, at 09:26:30 Boston Center advised Boston Arrival Radar that the flight was at 2,000 feet. At 09:29, Clipper 160 asked Boston Center for the flight's distance from Boston, and added, "The DME's don't seem to be working." The Center answered, "You're passing abeam, Pease Air Force Base, right now, sir, and you're about 40 to 45 miles to the northwest of Boston." The first communication between Clipper 160 and the arrival radar controller was at 09:31:21. The flight was cleared "direct Boston, maintain 2,000." The controller asked if the flight was declaring an emergency; the reply was "negative on the emergency, and may we have runway 33 left?" The controller approved the request, and the flight proceeded to Boston as cleared. At approximately the same time, the captain instructed the crew to "shut down everything you don't need." At 09:34:20, the controller asked, "Clipper 160, what do you show for a compass heading right now?" Clipper 160 answered, "Compass heading at this time is 205." The controller then asked, "will you accept a vector for a visual approach to a 5-mile final for runway 33 left, or do you want to be extended out further?" The crew replied, "Negative, we want to get it on the ground as soon as possible." At 09:35:46, the controller stated, "Clipper 160, advise anytime you have the airport in sight." Clipper 160 did not reply. At 09:37:04, the arrival controller made the following transmission: "Clipper 160, this is Boston approach control. If you read, squawk ident on any transponder. I see your transponder just became inoperative. Continue inbound now for runway 33 left, you're No. 1. There is a Lufthansa 747 on a 3-mile final for runway 27, the spacing is good. Remain on this frequency, Clipper 160." There was no reply from the flight. With flaps and spoilers had been extended for speed reduction, the airplane approached runway 33L. The yaw damper was rendered inoperative by the uncoordinated execution of emergency procedures earlier. This made the 707 extremely difficult to control at low speeds. Control was lost and the airplane struck the ground nose down about 262 feet from the right edge of the approach end of runway 33.Pan American World Airways Clipper Flight 160 was a scheduled cargo flight from New York-JFK to Frankfurt (FRA), Germany, with a scheduled stop at Prestwick (PIK), Scotland. At 08:25 the flight departed JFK. The aircraft was carrying 52912 lb (24000 kg) of cargo, 15,360 lb (6967 kg) of which were chemicals. After departure, Clipper 160 was vectored on course while climbing to FL330. At 08:44, Clipper 160's clearance was amended, and it was instructed to maintain FL310 as a final cruising altitude. Clipper 160 reported level at FL310 at 08:50. As the flight approached Sherbrooke VORTAC 100 miles east of Montreal, Canada, at about 09:04, it advised Pan American Operations (PANOP) in New York that smoke had accumulated in the "lower 41" electrical compartment, and that the flight was diverting to Boston. At 09:08, Clipper 160 advised Montreal Center that they were level at FL310 and wanted to return to JFK. Montreal Center cleared Clipper 160 for a right turn to a heading of 180 degrees. At 09:10, Clipper 160 advised PANOP that it was returning to New York and that the smoke seemed to be "getting a little thicker in here." At 09:11, the crew advised PANOP that they were now going to Boston and that "this smoke is getting too thick." They also requested that emergency equipment be available when they arrived at Boston. During this conversation, the comment was made that the "cockpit's full back there." During its return to Boston, the flight was given preferential air traffic control treatment, although it had not declared an emergency. After issuing appropriate descent clearances en route so that fuel could be burned off more rapidly at lower altitudes, at 09:26:30 Boston Center advised Boston Arrival Radar that the flight was at 2,000 feet. At 09:29, Clipper 160 asked Boston Center for the flight's distance from Boston, and added, "The DME's don't seem to be working." The Center answered, "You're passing abeam, Pease Air Force Base, right now, sir, and you're about 40 to 45 miles to the northwest of Boston." The first communication between Clipper 160 and the arrival radar controller was at 09:31:21. The flight was cleared "direct Boston, maintain 2,000." The controller asked if the flight was declaring an emergency; the reply was "negative on the emergency, and may we have runway 33 left?" The controller approved the request, and the flight proceeded to Boston as cleared. At approximately the same time, the captain instructed the crew to "shut down everything you don't need." At 09:34:20, the controller asked, "Clipper 160, what do you show for a compass heading right now?" Clipper 160 answered, "Compass heading at this time is 205." The controller then asked, "will you accept a vector for a visual approach to a 5-mile final for runway 33 left, or do you want to be extended out further?" The crew replied, "Negative, we want to get it on the ground as soon as possible." At 09:35:46, the controller stated, "Clipper 160, advise anytime you have the airport in sight." Clipper 160 did not reply. At 09:37:04, the arrival controller made the following transmission: "Clipper 160, this is Boston approach control. If you read, squawk ident on any transponder. I see your transponder just became inoperative. Continue inbound now for runway 33 left, you're No. 1. There is a Lufthansa 747 on a 3-mile final for runway 27, the spacing is good. Remain on this frequency, Clipper 160." There was no reply from the flight. With flaps and spoilers had been extended for speed reduction, the airplane approached runway 33L. The yaw damper was rendered inoperative by the uncoordinated execution of emergency procedures earlier. This made the 707 extremely difficult to control at low speeds. Control was lost and the airplane struck the ground nose down about 262 feet from the right edge of the approach end of runway 33. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

The flight from New York-JFK was uneventful and the crew started the descent to Miami-Intl Airport by night and good weather conditions. On approach, the captain instructed 'gear down' but all three green lights failed to illuminate properly. The second officer was instructed to enter the forward electronics bay but the problem could not be resolved. The crew informed ATC about the situation and was cleared to climb to 2,000 feet. The crew then discussed to try to find a solution but failed to realize that the airplane was continuing to descend. When a warning sounded in the cockpit indicating a +/- 250 feet deviation from the selected altitude, none of the crew members react to the warning sound and no action was taken. At 2341LT, the crew was instructed by ATC to turn heading 180 and a minute later, the first officer realized that something was wrong with the altitude. Seven seconds later, while turning in a left angle of 28°, the left engine struck the ground then the aircraft crashed in the Everglades National Park, about 20 miles short of runway threshold, and disintegrated on impact. 77 people were rescued while 99 others were killed, among them five crew members. More than a week later, two survivors died from their injuries.