New York-Idlewild

The Viscount was parked at gate to board passengers when it was struck by a Seaboard & Western Airlines' Lockheed L-1049D Super Constellation which was performing training flight LN800 at Idlewild Airport. The Constellation began its takeoff run on runway 31R of the New York International Airport at 1100. When an airspeed of 117 knots (V 2) was reached, the aircraft became airborne and climbed to an altitude of approximately 25 feet. At this altitude severe control difficulty was encountered, causing the aircraft to veer suddenly to the left and the left wing to lower 20 to 30 degrees. This wing struck the runway and from this point on directional control of the aircraft was lost. The aircraft skidded In a westerly direction into a temporary terminal area and came to rest after striking the Viscount. All five crew members from the Constellation were injured while the Viscount was empty. Both aircraft were totally destroyed by fire.

Seaboard & Western's Flight LN-800, a training flight, began its takeoff run on runway 31R of the New York International Airport at 1100. When an airspeed of 117 knots (V 2) was reached, the aircraft became airborne and climbed to an altitude of approximately 25 feet. At this altitude severe control difficulty was encountered, causing the aircraft to veer suddenly to the left and the left wing to lower 20 to 30 degrees. This wing struck the runway and from this point on directional control of the aircraft was lost. The aircraft skidded In a westerly direction into a temporary terminal area and came to rest after striking a parked Trans Canada Air Lines Vickers 724 Viscount. All five crew members were injured while the Viscount was empty.

Parked at Idlewild Airport, the aircraft was stolen by a technician who was able to takeoff. During initial climb, at an altitude of 150 feet, the airplane stalled and crashed near the runway. The aircraft was destroyed and the 'pilot' was killed.

N1245V departed Greater Pittsburgh Airport, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, at 1850, December 20, 1956, on an IFR flight plan via airways V-35, V-6, V-168, V-30, and V-1 to New York International Airport. Jamaica, New York. The crow consisted of Captain Roy E. Rollo and Copilot Lewis Thomas Williams. Mr. Alden Roach, President of Columbia-Geneva Steel Company, was the only passenger. At the time of takeoff from Pittsburgh, the gross weight of the aircraft was 19,421 pounds (maximum allowable gross load 19,500 pounds) and the weight was properly distributed. The purpose of the flight was to transport Mr. Roach to New York International Airport. The flight reported to Pittsburgh Air Route Traffic Center at 1905 when it was over New Alexandria, Pennsylvania, altitude 7,000 feet. A revised routing clearance to New York International Airport was issued to the flight at 1906 by ARTC to proceed via airways V-35, V-6, V-168, and Blue 18, and to climb to and maintain 9,000 feet. 2 Accordingly, N1245V reported leaving 7,000 and 8,000 feet at 1907 and 1909, respectively. At 1921 the Civil Aeronautics Administration Communications Station at Philipsburg, Pennsylvania, received a call from the flight giving its position as over the Coalport intersection at 1916, estimating Philipsburg at 1930. Philipsburg radio then requested N1245V to change over to the frequency of the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center and this message was acknowledged. This was the last radio contact with the flight. At 1928 Philipsburg radio received a telephone call, from a location 24 miles east of the Coalport intersection and approximately 12 miles south-southwest of the Philipsburg Airport, to the effect that an aircraft, later identified as N1245V, had crashed and was burning in a nearby mountainous wooded area. The Philipsburg 1928 weather sequence was: Ceiling measured 400 feet, overcast; visibility 2 miles; fog; temperature 40; dewpoint 40; wind calm; altimeter 30.04.

YV-C-AMA, on scheduled flight 253, took off from Idlewild Airport, NY, for Maiquetía, Venezuela, on 26 November with 7 crew and 18 passengers aboard. The flight plan gave an altitude of 17 000 ft, and the duration of the flight was estimated at 9 hours 48 minutes, with Barcelona and Curaçao as alternate airports. The pilot transmitted two position reports, the first, 75 miles northwest of Maiquetía, at 17 500 ft at 0751 hours, and the second, 14 minutes later, 35 miles northwest of Maiquetía at 7 000 ft. No further communication was received from YV-C-AMA after it had been cleared to change to tower frequency. Following the failure to report to the control tower, the aircraft was repeatedly called on all Maiquetía Control Centre frequencies at 0815 hours, with negative results. A state of emergency was declared at 0835 hours, and it was later established that the aircraft struck the western slope of peak El Avila located in the El Avila National Park at an altitude of 6 702 ft, killing all 25 occupants.

The four engine christened 'Rafael Urdaneta' departed New York-Idlewild Airport at 2306LT and proceeded to the south. One hour and twenty minutes later, while flying along the US coast, the crew contacted ground and received the permission to return to New York following the failure of the number two engine. The crew was unable to feather the propeller and the aircraft suffered severe vibrations. Ten minutes later, while the crew was trying to dump the fuel, a fire erupted. The aircraft went out of control, dove into the sea and crashed about 40 miles southeast of New York. The airplane disintegrated on impact and all 74 occupants were killed.

After an uneventful instrument flight involving no Air Route Traffic Control routing and control, Flight 451 reported at 1122 to the Idlewild Approach Control as being aver the Mitchell Radio Range Station at 7,000 feet. The flight was then cleared to enter the Scotland holding pattern (located approximately 13 nautical miles southwest of the airport) and was subsequently "laddered down" to the number one position to approach. Between 1147 and 1159 weather conditions deteriorated below the ceiling minimum of 400 feet for landing on runway 22, the runway then in use. The flight continued to hold. At 1159 reported weather conditions improved and I-LINE was cleared for an approach to runway 22 using the back course of the ILS (Instrument Landing System). At 1218 the flight reported it had discontinued this approach. It was then issued missed-approach instructions and returned to the Scotland holding pattern. Shortly thereafter weather conditions were again reported below minimums for runway 22. They were then reported as: Ceiling 300 feet, broken, 2,500 feet, overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles, light rain and fog; wind south-southeast 20 knots. While holding, the flight was asked by Approach Control if it would be able to make an approach to runway 4, the ILS runway, considering the tailwind component. The flight accepted runway 4 and was cleared at 1307 for an ILS approach. At 1313 the tower was advised by 451 that the approach had been missed. The flight was next offered, and it accepted, a GCA (Ground Controlled Approach). This approach was abandoned at 1324, a missed-approach procedure was followed, and the flight returned to Scotland. At 1327 the Italian Airlines Station Manager, in a message relayed by the tower, asked the flight its remaining fuel, and received the reply that there was three hours of holding fuel. The Station Manager then suggested that the flight hold for 1-1/2 hours and if unable to land to proceed to Washington, D. C. At 1329 the flight acknowledged this message. At 1349 the flight was again cleared for an ILS approach, the third approach to runway 4 and its fourth to the airport. At approximately 1400 the aircraft struck the left pier. The impact was accompanied by a violent explosion and followed by an intense fire. Tower personnel immediately sounded the crash alarm and initiated emergency procedures. At the time of the accident weather conditions were reported as: Ceiling 200 overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles, light rain and fog; wind south-southeast 16 knots. Italian Airlines' minimums for ILS approaches to runway 4 are ceiling 200 feet and visibility 1/2 mile. The aircraft was destroyed and all 10 crew members and 16 passengers were killed, six others were injured.

After a night takeoff from runway 32 at Shannon Airport, the four engine aircraft christened 'Triton' climbed to a maximum height of 260 feet and reached the speed of 155 knots when it went into a slight nose down attitude. It then started to descend until it crashed into the Shannon Estuary, about 8,170 feet from the departure end of runway 32. The crashed occurred approximately 35 seconds after liftoff. 28 occupants were killed while 28 others were rescued. The aircraft was destroyed.

The crew of Flight 627 consisted of Captain C. C. Foxworth Captain E. M. Engle, (first officer), Flight Engineer L. P. Devries, Flight Attendant A. J. Folli, and Flight Attendant A. L., Krause. On departure from the ramp, the gross weight of the aircraft was 95,838 pounds; allowable gross takeoff weight was 105,530 pounds. The load was distributed so that the center of gravity of the aircraft was within the approved limits. Flight 627 initially taxied out at 2345, bar 18, for takeoff from Runway 7R. This flight and a preceding flight returned to the ramp because fog drifted in and reduced visibility below the approved minimum of one-fourth mile while they were awaiting clearance for takeoff. 2 Neither flight was issued off clearance, although according to Captain Foxworth, they held at Runway 7R about 15 minutes. The captains of flights reported that when they arrived at Runway 7R the existing visibility was well over the required one-quarter mile, as they could ace beyond the far end of the 8,200-foot runway, and so advised the control tower. About 15 minutes after returning to the ramp, Captain Foxworth was advised by Eastern Operations that visibility had improved, and the flight again taxied out, following another Eastern aircraft, Flight 623W. While they were taxing, the tower suggested that takeoff be made on Runway 22L and advised that visibility to the south-southeast, from tower location, was three miles. Since both flights had taxied beyond this runway at the time this information was conveyed to them, they turned around and Captain Foxworth, now in the lead, took position for takeoff near the end of Runway 22L. The tower advised Flight 627 that the weather was now being reported as thin obscuration, one and one-half miles visibility, fog, and smoke. 4 Captain Foxworth opened the left side "clear-view" window for maximum visibility. The runway lights were turned to full intensity, and the landing lights of the aircraft were on. Captain Foxworth observed that visibility appeared to be at least one-fourth mile, and stare could be seen. He could see the runway border lights and down the runway centerline for some distance. He said that he was unable to see past the intersection. The engines were run up, cockpit checks completed, and airways clearance via Long Beach, Sully, and Woolf intersections was received. Takeoff clearance was issued at 0055, October 19. Captain Foxworth, flying from the left, made the takeoff using the runway border lights and centerline as visual reference guides. The first officer also maintained visual reference except when he briefly directed his attention to retraction of the landing gear. In the takeoff run the captain noticed that visibility was variable due to fog and seemed to get progressively worse, but later stated that he had "expected to come out on top almost any second" after becoming airborne; he did not go on instruments. Takeoff seemed normal. Shortly after calling for retraction of the gear. Captain Foxworth observed that air speed was approaching 110 knots. He said that he lost all ground references at about the intersection of Runways 19L, 25L, and 22L, at or shortly after becoming airborne. A few seconds later he heard the first officer shout a warning and they struck the ground while at takeoff power. A second or two after the first officer moved the landing gear handle to retract position and again directed his attention outside, he saw they were quite low, grabbed for the control wheel to pull the nose up, and simultaneously shouted a warning. He did not recall whether he got his hands on the wheel before impact. The aircraft struck the ground to the left of Runway 22L at Taxiway F. It bounced, and following the second impact skidded to a stop in an undeveloped part of the airport south of Taxiway G. An intense fire immediately developed in the left wing at No. 2 engine position. The pilots, flight engineer, and one passenger left through the crew door, located just to the rear of the cockpit on the right side; all other occupants exited in orderly fashion through the main cabin door at the left rear side of the aircraft.

At 0139 the pilot advised Bradley Approach Control that the aircraft was over Hartford at 0138 and that he would maintain 3,000 feet to the Bradley Field outer marker. The controller in the Bradley Field tower, who was handling all three radio positions, acknowledged the Hartford position report, gave the flight a time check (0139), and cleared it for an instrument approach with advice that No. 6 was the runway in use. Weather information was also given to the flight: "Wind indicating northeast calm," and Bradley Field 0128 weather conditions - ceiling indefinite 500 feet, obscurement, visibility one and one-half miles, light rain and fog, altimeter 30.01 inches. The pilot was then requested to report over the outer marker when inbound and was advised that the Bradley Field glide path was inoperative until further notice. The glide path had been decommissioned for some time owing to extension of Runway 6; this had been duly published in "Notices to Airmen." At approximately 0141, the pilot asked if the Bradley Field ILS localiser was also inoperative. He was told that the monitoring panel indicated normal operation of all components except the glide path. The pilot replied, "I believe my ILS is cut momentary and I will continue to make an ADF let-down." The flight reported over the outer marker at 0144. The controller acknowledged and asked the pilot if the flight was inbound. The pilot replied "Roger" and the aircraft was cleared to land. The controller advised that the high intensity lights were on intensity 5 (maximum brilliance) and requested the pilot to let the tower know when he wished the intensity lowered, The pilot again acknowledged with "Roger." This was the lest contact with the aircraft. At approximately 0149, the controller requested the pilot to give the aircraft's position. Receiving no response, he then transmitted the following advisory: "If you are experiencing transmitter difficulties and have missed your approach you are cleared to reverse course, climb to 2,500 feet to the outer marker for another approach 2 Several other efforts were made to contact the flight, but to no avail. Following the last contact with the tower, the aircraft was seen and heard flying low to the southwest of Bradley Field just before it struck the trees. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and both pilots were killed.
Crew:
Jefferson R. Elliott, pilot,
John Bielak, copilot.