New York-Idlewild

Eastern Air Lines Flight 512, a Douglas DD-7B, N815D, crashed during an attempted go-around following an instrument approach to runway 4R at New York International Airport, at 2145 e.s.t., on November 30, 1962 Of the 51 persons aboard, 21 passengers, 3 crew members and an additional crew member occupying the jump seat did not survive. Flight 512, regularly scheduled from Charlotte, North Carolina, non-stop to New York International Airport, entered a fog condition near the threshold of runway 4R. A go-around was initiated; however, the aircraft struck the ground in a slightly nose-high attitude and was virtually destroyed by impact and subsequent fire.

The Boeing 707 aircraft, named "Chateau de Sully", was on a non-scheduled (charter) international flight from Paris (ORY) to Atlanta (ATL) and Houston via New York (JFK). Ten crew and 122 passengers were on the flight when, after a considerable delay to await the arrival of passengers, it was cleared to take off from runway 08 at Orly Airport at 11:32 UTC. It aligned itself for takeoff and waited 6 seconds, which permitted the setting and checking of takeoff parameters on the four engines. Full thrust was applied, and the aircraft accelerated normally. From testimony and flight recorder data, the takeoff was reconstructed as follows. Between 20 to 40 seconds after the start of the roll, the rate of acceleration was steady at 1.80 m/s2. The aircraft rolled along the runway centre line without showing any tendency to veer to either side. V1, determined as 147 kt IAS, was attained after a ground roll of 1500 m. This was followed by VR, 158 kt IAS. Forty-eight seconds after the beginning of the takeoff run and approximately when passing the 1800 m mark, the aircraft reached the rotation speed (VR), and the pilot-in-command initiated the takeoff manoeuvre by pulling backwards on the control column. According to witnesses, the aircraft made an incomplete rotational movement about 2100 m from the threshold. It remained for 4 to 6 seconds with its nose slightly raised. Then the nose dropped when the brakes were applied. Thick smoke streamed from the wheels. The aircraft was 2600 m from its starting point and had reached a maximum speed of 179 kt IAS. It braked for the last 680 m of the runway with an average deceleration of 1.2 to 1.3 m/s After 250 m of braking the aircraft veered slightly to the left, and 50deg of flap were selected. Then after another 250 m the aircraft listed heavily to starboard. Its path then curved right, which suggests a possible attempt to ground loop. However, the aircraft's speed precluded the success of this manoeuvre, and it left the runway while still on the centre line. It rolled for a while on the grass extension of the runway but, because of the unevenness of the terrain and the high speed of the aircraft (160 kt), the port gear broke off 110 m from the end of the runway and was wrenched away. The aircraft pivoted left, and engines No. 1 and 2 scraped the ground. Fire broke out in the port wing at the level of the landing gear. About 300 m beyond the end of the runway the aircraft crossed the encircling road. The starboard gear collapsed, and No. 2 engine broke loose. It then struck the approach lights, which represented a considerable obstacle. It started to disintegrate when reaching the hollow at the end of the runway extension, which descends at a steep angle towards the Seine. The front part of the fuselage struck a house and garage. The nose of the aircraft broke away, and the rest of the fuselage came to a stop 100 m further on. The site of the accident was 550 m beyond the end of runway 08 on its extended centre line, at an elevation of 89 m. The airplane was completely destroyed by a post crash fire. Two stewardess who seated in the rear were slightly injured while all 130 other occupants were killed.
Crew members who were killed:
Roland-Paul Hoche, pilot,
Jacques-Marcel Pitoiset, copilot,
Raymond Gautrand, navigator,
Robert-Gaston Barres, mechanic,
Marie-Geneviève Barot, stewardess,
Robert Mancel, cabin chief,
François Gutrupi, steward,
Robert Lugon, steward.

Flight One was cleared for takeoff from Runway 31L on a regularly scheduled nonstop flight to Los Angeles, California, and became airborne at 1007 e.s.t. The takeoff and initial climb appeared to be normal and a gentle turn to the left was started about 8,000 feet down the runway near taxiway AA, at an altitude of about 100 feet. Straightening out from this turn the aircraft continued to climb for several seconds on a magnetic heading of 290 degrees, and started a second turn to the left, apparently in compliance with radar vector directions given by Departure Control. In the second turn the airplane continued to climb. After initiation of the second turn the angle of bank increased until the airplane rolled through 90 degrees of bank at a peak altitude of about 1,600 feet m.s.1. It then entered an inverted, nose-low attitude and plunged earthward in a nearly vertical dive. The airplane struck the shallow waters of Pumpkin Patch Channel of Jamaica Bay approximately three miles southwest of the Idlewild Control Tower at 1008:49 Floating debris and fuel ignited a few minutes later and burned fiercely. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and there were no survivors among the 95 occupants.

On November 15, 1961, at approximately 1710LT, 47 minutes after sunset, a ground collision occurred at Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, between a National Airlines DC-6B, N8228H, attempting a takeoff on runway 09 and a Northeast Airlines Viscount N6592C, during its landing roll on runway 04R. National Airlines Flight 429 originated at Boston. Its destination was Norfolk, Virginia, with five intermediate stops. Northeast Airlines Flight 120 originated at Washington, D. C. Its destination was Boston, Massachusetts, with an intermediate stop at LaGuardia Airport, New York. There were no serious injuries to either the crew or passengers of the DC-6; however, four passengers of the Viscount received minor cuts and abrasions while deplaning. There was major damage to both aircraft. As a result of this accident the Board recommended to the Federal Aviation Agency that consideration be given to requiring that all restrictive clearances or instructions issued by air traffic control be acknowledged by pilot repetition.

While taxiing at Idlewild Airport, preparing for a cargo flight to San Juan, one of the main gear collapsed. The aircraft sank on its belly and came to rest in flames. All three crew members were uninjured while the aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Following an uneventful transatlantic flight from New York, the crew started the approach to runway 20 at Brussels-Zaventem Airport. On short final, while at an altitude of 900 feet, the crew raised the landing gear, increased engine power and made a go around. The plane made three 360° turns to the left and climbed to 1,500 feet. During these turns the bank angle increased more and more until the aircraft was in a near vertical bank. The wings then leveled, followed by an abrupt pitch up. The 707 lost speed, started to spiral rapidly towards the ground nose down, crashed and caught fire. All 72 occupants were killed as well as one farmer working in the field. Among the passengers were 17 members of the US National Hockey Team who were flying to Prague to take part to the World Championship.

The four engine aircraft departed Idlewild Airport at 1157LT with a crew of six and climbed along the shore of Long Island on a training mission. 23 minutes later, the airplane christened 'Flagship Oklahoma' banked left, entered a dive and eventually crashed into the ocean five miles off shore. Few debris were found off Montauk Point and all six crew members have been killed.

The first approximate 6,200 feet of takeoff roll was observed by control tower personnel, visually, until the aircraft was lost to view by obscuring snow, approximately 3,800 feet from the control tower. They stated that at that time the aircraft had not taken off or rotated. Another tower controller observed the aircraft by airport surface-detection *** radar from the start of its roll to the eastern end of runway 7R, where it disappeared from view. A few seconds later he observed a bright orange flash on the sky northeast of the airport. He could not tell if the aircraft left the runway. Emergency procedures were started immediately by the controllers and an unsuccessful attempt was made to contact the flight on the departure radio frequency. Captain Poe was the only survivor of the four cockpit occupants. He stated as follows: The checklist was accomplished normally. The runway condition was good and everything apparently occurred in a routine manner through the 100-knot time check when the first officer called out "***" (Spanish for 100). Upon reaching approximately 130 knots (the V1 speed) the first officer called out V1 and VR rapid succession. The aircraft was then rotated quickly and somewhat excessively. Poe did not see the airspeed go over 130 knots and as rotation started he saw the airspeed start to drop back quite rapidly to about 110 knots. At this time the Aeronaves captain called or pointed to the airspeed indicator. Poe felt that the aircraft could not become airborne under these conditions and that the runway remaining was not long enough to put the nose back down to start the takeoff again from that speed. His only choice, so he stated, was to try to get the aircraft stopped on the runway. Poe unfastened his safety belt, stood to gauge progress down the runway, moved forward, shoved the throttles forward briefly, noted a normal and uniform response from the engine instruments (the EPR gauges were reading normally from 2.52 to 2.54), and then pulled the throttles full back. Captain Gonzales "immediately" pulled the reverse throttles back into reverse thrust and used wheel brakes. Poe extended the spoilers and then sat down on the jump seat without refastening his seat belt. He believes that the aircraft did not take off Whether it did or not wall be discussed later in this report. Poe's actions would have taken about three seconds, an shown by later test. The aircraft continued ahead the full length of the 10,000-foot runway, beyond it, through a blast fence, 3 catching on fire, through the airport boundary fence, and across Rockaway Boulevard where it struck an automobile injuring the driver and sole occupant. After going through the blast fence, many parts were shed before the aircraft came to rest in flames 830 feet beyond the end of the runway. Emergency vehicles from the airport and of the New York Fire Department were quickly started for the scene. Although impeded somewhat by weather conditions, they reached it within about six minutes and extinguished the fire. Evacuation and rescue of the occupants had already been effected in a total time of about five minutes, although most persons were out of the wreckage and away from the fire site in half this time. Many of the survivors were taken to hospital in privately owned vehicles. Destruction of the aircraft was extensive.

On December 16, 1960, at 1033 e.s.t., a collision between Trans World Airlines Model 1049A Constellation, N 6907C, and a United Air Lines DC-8, N 8013U, occurred near Miller Army Air Field, Staten Island, New York. Trans World Airlines Flight 266 originated at Dayton, Ohio. The destination was LaGuardia Airport, New York, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohio United Air Lines Flight 826 was a non-stop service originating at O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois, with its destination New York International Airport, New York. Both aircraft were operating under Instrument Flight Rules. Following the collision the Constellation fell on Miller Army Field, and the DC-8 continued in a northeasterly direction, crashing into Sterling place near Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, New York. Both aircraft were totally destroyed. All 128 occupants of both aircraft and 6 persons on the ground in Brooklyn were fatally injured. There was considerable damage to property in the area of the ground impact of the DC-8. TWA Flight 266 departed Port Columbus Airport at 0900, operating routinely under Air Traffic Control into the New York area The New York Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) subsequently advised that radar contact had been established and cleared the flight to the Linden. Intersection, Control of the flight was subsequently transferred to LaGuardia Approach Control. When the flight was about over the Linden Intersection, LaGuardia Approach Control began vectoring TWA 266 by radar to the final approach course for a landing on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Shortly thereafter TWA 266 was cleared to descend to 5,000 feet, and was twice advised of traffic in the vicinity on a northeasterly heading. Following the transmission of this information the radar targets appeared to merge on the LaGuardia Approach Control radar scope, and communications with TWA 266 were lost.United Air Lines Flight 826 operated routinely between Chicago and the New York area, contacting the New York ARTCC at 1012 Shortly thereafter the New York Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very high frequency omni directional radio range station (VOR) direct to the Robbinsville, New Jersey, VOR, and thence to the Preston Intersection via Victor Airway 123. At approximately 1021, UAL 826 contacted Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their company that the No. 2 receiver accessory unit was inoperative, which would indicate that one of the aircraft's two VHF radio navigational receivers was not functioning. A "fix" is established by the intersection of two radials from two separate radio range stations. With one unit inoperative the cross-bearings necessary can be taken by tuning the remaining receiver from one station to the other. This process consumes considerable time, however, and is not as accurate as the simultaneous display of information on two separate position deviation indicators While UAL 826 advised the company that one unit was inoperative, Air Traffic Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York ARTCC issued a clearance for a new routing which shortened the distance to Preston by approximately 11 miles. As a result, this reduced the amount of time available to the crew to retune the single radio receiver to either the Colt' s Neck, New Jersey, or Solberg, New Jersey, VOR in order to establish the cross-bearing with Victor 123, which would identify the Preston Intersection. In the event the crew would not attempt to retune the single VOR receiver, crossbearings on the Scotland Low Frequency Radiobeacon could be taken with the aircraft direction finding (ADF) equipment. This would be a means of identifying the Preston Intersection but, under the circumstances, would require rapid mental calculation in the interpretation of a display which could be easily misread. Several factors support the conclusion that this occurred. Instructions had been issued to UAL 826 for holding at the Preston Intersection the clearance limit, should holding be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewild Airport would be received from Idlewild Approach Control and the transfer of control of the flight from the New York Center to Idlewild Approach Control would normally take place as the aircraft was approaching Preston. UAL 826 was not receiving radar vectors, but was providing its own navigation. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advised that radar service was terminated and instructed the flight to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewild Approach Control, stating "United 826 approaching Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. At the time UAL 826 advised it was approaching Preston it had in fact gone on by this clearance limit several seconds before and was several miles past the point at which it should have turned into the holding pattern. This is confirmed by the data obtained from the flight recorder which had been installed in the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the communication tapes At a point approximately 11 miles past the Preston Intersection a collision occurred between TWA 266 and UAL 826. Weather at the altitude of the collision and at the time of the accident was such as to preclude flight by visual means.

Flight 2511 departed New York International (Idlewild) Airport at 2334LT on January 5 on an IFR clearance scheduled as a nonstop flight to Miami, Florida. The flight proceeded routinely in accordance with its flight plan until shortly after passing Wilmington, North Carolina. At 0231 Flight 2511 contacted the company radio station at Wilmington while over Carolina Beach at 18,000 feet, and transmitted a routine progress report. Shortly after the completion of this radio contact a dynamite explosion occurred in the passenger cabin. Following this explosion the aircraft entered a wide descending right turn and crashed 1-1/2 miles north-west of Bolivia at 0238 some 16 miles west of its intended flight path. All 29 passengers and the crew of five were killed. It is believed that Julian Frank was the author of this act of sabotage after he contracted a life-insurance for one million US$. But this assumption was not confirmed as he was himself seating in the aircraft when the explosion occurred.
No reference is made in this report concerning the placing of the dynamite aboard the aircraft or of the person or persons responsible for its detonation. The malicious destruction of an aircraft is a Federal crime. After the Board's determination that such was involved, the criminal aspects of this accident were referred to the Department of Justice through its Federal Bureau of Investigation