Luton

The aircraft was operating a charter flight from Dublin to Luton, loaded with newspapers and equipment necessary for the conveyance of horses back to Dublin. The passengers were six grooms who were intended to accompany the horses on the return flight. During the uneventful flight from Dublin to the Luton area the pilot received a surface wind forecast for Luton of 300/06 knots. At midnight contact was established with Luton Approach. The pilot was given the Luton landing conditions as: 'QNH 1013.5, CAVOK, (ceiling and visibility OK) surface wind practically calm' and asked if he would accept radar positioning for a visual approach to runway 08, to which he agreed. The radar positioning was terminated at 00.04 hrs when the aircraft was cleared to Luton tower frequency with 'Six track miles to run' and the runway in sight. When the pilot contacted Luton Tower at 00.05 hrs, he was cleared to land on runway 08 and given the surface wind as 300 degrees 04 knots. He acknowledged this last transmission and there was no further communication with the aircraft. The evidence indicates that the approach path and speed were normal. The commander did not notice the Indicated Air Speed (IAS) immediately before touchdown but recalled that the initial approach was made at approximately 130 knots IAS reducing to the target threshold speed of 115 knots as the flaps extended. The aircraft touched down at an IAS of 105 knots. The commander was of the opinion that, despite a tendency to float, the aircraft touched down at the correct distance down the runway, and, as soon as it had done so, he called for reverse thrust immediately the aircraft was on the runway. On receiving the commander's order, the engineer selected reverse thrust on numbers 2 and 3 engines followed by numbers 1 and 4 whilst monitoring the engine instruments. The commander was familiar with this method of selecting reverse which was the technique normally used in the company. The flight engineer did not see the blue warning lights illuminate to indicate that the propellers were moving into reverse pitch, he therefore selected Nos 1 and 4 propellers to forward pitch, with throttles closed, in case the reason for the malfunction was an electrical overload due to operation of all four feathering/reversing pumps at low engine rpm. The commander had also noticed that the blue lights had not illuminated and, seeing that Nos 1 and 4 propellers were selected to forward pitch, called 'reverse all engines'. In response to his order the engineer made the required selection and all four throttle levers were seen to be in the reverse quadrant by the operating crew, although no blue lights were noted. The aircraft was not decelerating during this period and that no reverse thrust was achieved. The commander ordered the engineer to 'put them in the middle', thus to cancel the reverse thrust selections. There were two short periods of engine acceleration during the landing roll. The commander assisted by the first officer applied the toe brakes, assessed them to be ineffective and, as the aircraft was still not decelerating, applied the emergency pneumatic brakes by turning the operating handle to 'on'. The commander did not notice any deceleration and, consequently, did not follow the procedure of selecting them alternatively to 'hold' and to 'on'. All four main wheels locked, the tyres burst and further retardation from the brakes was lost. Sparks and smoke were seen emanating from the area of the undercarriage when the aircraft approached the end of the runway. When it became apparent that the aircraft would overrun the runway the commander called to have the 'switches' put to 'OFF'. The flight engineer selected the ignition switches off before the aircraft left the end of the runway and ploughed across the overrun area. It was still travelling fast enough to follow a trajectory off the top of the bank at the end of the runway leaving no wheel marks down the slope. The aircraft stopped in soft ground 90 metres from the end of the runway at the foot of the bank having demolished part of the aerodrome fence and some of the approach lights. All persons on board abandoned the aircraft without delay. As the flight engineer was leaving via the right hand side crew door, he noticed a small fire under the number 3 engine. He returned to the cockpit, pulled the firewall shut-off controls and discharged a fire extinguisher to all four engines.

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Luton to Wolverhampton to carry two members of the Dowty Group (owner of the aircraft) who wanted to fly to France. A first attempt to land was abandoned due to poor weather conditions and the crew climbed to 2,500 feet before initiating a second attempt to land that was also abandoned. During the third attempt, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the roof of a house and crashed in flames 600 yards short of runway 25 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed as well as the house and both crew members were killed plus one people in the house. Two other person on the ground were injured.

The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Luton Airport. Shortly after takeoff with an engine voluntarily shut down, the airplane went out of control and crashed in flames onto a factory near the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and both crew were killed while no one on the ground was injured.

Following an uneventful charter flight from Luxembourg, the crew completed a landing by night on a wet runway. After touchdown, the airplane encountered difficulties to decelerate and overran. It lost its undercarriage and came to rest few dozen yards further. All 69 occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair. At the time of the accident, the horizontal visibility was estimated to 1,800 meters with clouds at 300 feet. It is believed the aircraft suffered aquaplaning after landing while the flaps were retracted in the takeoff position and the brakes were applied intermittently.

Flight BY 105 was a non-scheduled international flight from Luton (England) to Ljubljana (Yugoslavia), for the transport of tourists. The aircraft took off from Luton at 2110 hours GMT on 31 August 1966, with a crew of 7 and 110 passengers. Before overflying the Yugoslav border, the crew contacted the Zagreb Area Control Centre. The radiocommunications were uninterrupted, and the crew received all necessary information and instructions. After overflying Klagenfurt, the crew contacted Ljubljana Aerodrome Control, and from that time on the radio communications were uninterrupted and continuous. The conversation between the crew spoken sometimes too fast and a trifle garbled, and the controller spoken without any difficulty to understand is contained in the transcript of the R/T tape recording. During the radiocommunications the controller supplied the crew with meteorological and other necessary landing information: "Wind is calm, visibility 5 kilometres, shallow fog aver the runway is forming now, clouds 218 strato-cumulus 1 800 metres. QNH 1011, QFE 968 millibars. Temperature 10 and dew point also 10 degrees. Runway will be 31. After Dolsko make left pattern holding, descend down to 4 500 by QNH, report inbound." The crew acknowledged receipt of the information with: "Roger. We have runway 31. Over Dolsko descend 4 500 in the holding pattern. The QNH 1 011." When the pilot asked the controller if the ILS was operating, the controller answered that he had radar contact at a position 20 NM southeast from the airport and advised the crew to make an ILS approach to runway 31, and to report after descending to 4 500 ft QNH. The crew acknowledged and reported they were at 4 500 ft and would call over Dolsko inbound for the outer marker and asked again if the ILS was operating and if it was serviceable. The controller answered affirmatively, adding that the ILS was working normally. He then gave the position "abeam Dol" and after that was acknowledged by the crew, he asked if they had contact with the runway. The crew confirmed that they had contact, and thereafter did not at any time indicate that they had lost contact, although it was implied by their request for a radar approach just before the accident occurred, and one minute later they reported having passed Dolsko continuing and descending towards runway 31. The controller acknowledged this information and requested the crew to "check final for runway 31", and gave the aircraft its position as 7 NM from touchdown on the centre line should be passing 3 300 ft and repeated "check final for runway 31'. The crew acknowledged this message and 1 1/2 minute later reported having passed the outer marker inbound. The controller issued clearance for landing and advised that he had set the approach and runway lights to maximum intensity. He then left the radar console and went to the light control console at the same time glancing towards the approach and the runway. He could not see the aircraft but the approach and runway lights were clearly visible. At that moment, the crew requested radar assistance. The controller returned to the radar console and started to supply them with radar information. After giving the crew two aircraft positions of 34 NM and 2 NM from touchdown, he observed that the aircraft signal was turning to the right and gave a correction of 3° left. Observing that the aircraft did not make any correction, the controller informed the crew that its position was 1 1/2 NM from the touchdown, and asked the pilot whether he was making a short right turn to the radio beacon Menges. The crew did not reply, and there was no further contact with them although the controller continued calling. Radar contact was lost at 0047 hours local time on 1 September 1966 (2347 hours GMT on 31 August 1966) and when fire and smoke was seen from the tower, the controller gave the alarm and took necessary emergency measures. The rescue services, after 15 minutes, found the crashed aircraft on fire, in a wood, 2.8 km southeast of the threshold of runway 31 and 0.7 km north of the runway extended centre line. A crew member and 18 passengers were evacuated to local hospital while 98 other occupants were killed. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

A tire burst on landing. For unknown reason, the captain decided to go around when the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed near the runway end. The airplane was destroyed and all seven occupants were injured.

Shortly after takeoff from Luton, the crew encountered an unknown technical problem and elected to return. The pilot in command realized this would not be possible so he reduced his altitude in an attempt to make an emergency landing. The twin engine aircraft belly landed in a pasture and skidded for several yards before coming to rest with the left engine sheared off. Both crew members were unhurt while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Crashed for unknown reasons while on approach to Luton Airport, killing all three occupants.
Crew:
Alasdair Workman MacRobert, pilot.
Passengers:
Edward Sander Baker,
Ronald Eric Laurence Beere.

On final approach to Glasgow-Renfrew Airport, one of the engine failed. The pilot lost control of the airplane that crashed in Johnstone, about 4 km short of runway. All four occupants were killed.
Crew:
Michael O'Bryen Shute Barrington, pilot.
Passengers:
John Milne Barbour,
John Houston,
Stanley Pearcy.